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ABSTRACT 
 
    US foreign policy during the Cold War has been analysed from a number of perspectives, 
generating large bodies of literature attempting to explain its origins, its development and its 
conclusion.  Within the discipline of International Relations these debates have tended to be 
led by scholars focusing on events at the system level. However, there are still many 
questions left only partially explained.  In large part this is because these accounts restrict 
themselves to a single level of analysis, either the international system, or the structure of the 
state and society.  The first level of analysis, focusing on the role of individuals, has largely 
been excluded from International Relations. It is often left to historians to incorporate the role 
of individual decision makers into their studies. The problem for international relations 
students, however, is that their arguments run the risk of determinism. They come close to 
advocating that the course of history is shaped by these external forces and there is little if no 
room for alternate courses to be steered. They have, intentionally or otherwise, removed 
human agency and choice from the equation. 
    This thesis argues that structural theories, and any approach that limits itself to one level of 
analysis, are inadequate to explain the development of US foreign policy. Instead, it is 
necessary to incorporate the first level of analysis in order to bring human agency back into 
International Relations and provide a more detailed explanation of US foreign policy. The 
present study proposes an analytical framework which incorporates presidential agency into a 
multi-level analysis of US foreign policy during the Cold War. Drawing on Foreign Policy 
Analysis, International Relations theory, presidential studies and the historiography of US 
foreign policy, this thesis constructs a multi-level case study comparison of the foreign 
policies of Presidents Truman and Reagan. It argues that the worldview of the president is 
central to agenda setting in US foreign policy making and that the management style of the 
president influences both decision-making and the implementation of US foreign policy. 
Evidence to support this is drawn from detailed empirical analysis of Truman’s foreign policy 
of containment in Korea and Reagan’s foreign policy of rollback in Nicaragua.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
    Is international politics shaped by social forces beyond the control of individuals, or do 
powerful individuals have a role to play in the making of history? This question lies at the 
heart of international politics, and social science more broadly. Unfortunately, the attention of 
most scholars in International Relations (IR) is directed towards the study of social and 
structural forces. These approaches prioritise the role of structure, arguing that it is the most 
important explanatory factor. This raises an important question: how fully can one explain 
history without addressing the role of individuals? That is, how complete a picture of 
international relations can one have without incorporating the actions of Roosevelt, Churchill, 
Stalin, Lenin, Hitler, Napoleon, Julius Caesar and Alexander the Great? Replace these figures 
with others and there is no guarantee history would have unfolded in the same manner. 
Historians are comfortable with acknowledging this, social scientists appear less so.  
    Of course, not all individuals possess the same power or have the same opportunities. The 
particular context facing each actor will influence the degree of opportunity or constraint they 
encounter. Times of crisis, domestically and internationally, provide opportunity. This is why 
the above list of names contains so many wartime and revolutionary leaders. But the context 
does not determine the action. Different individuals will not be motivated in the same way. 
They will perceive these opportunities and constraints differently. Churchill saw Hitler as a 
great threat when his colleagues did not. Individuals will rank priorities differently, as 
Roosevelt did by prioritising the war in Europe over the war in Asia when the US population 
were demanding revenge against Japan. Some will take risks, such as Hitler’s invasion of the 
Soviet Union in 1941. Others will not. Therefore, it is necessary to acknowledge that 
individual leaders possess agency in international relations. They have the ability to make 
decisions that will direct the resources of their state towards an end beyond their borders.  In 
order to understand and explain international relations it is essential to incorporate human 
agency into our research. This thesis offers an agency based approach to the study of 
international relations by analysing the role of one individual leader during a specific 
historical context: the president of the United States during the Cold War. 
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1.1.1 Research Questions 
 
     By the end of the Second World War in 1945, the dominant continental European powers 
of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries had been devastated by six years of conflict. The United 
Kingdom, whilst not the scene of any land battle, had suffered extensive bomb damage and 
exhausted almost all of its financial resources in the defeat of Germany. The European states 
would no longer be able to exert the same level of influence beyond their borders. This left a 
power vacuum in international politics, one which would quickly be filled by two emerging 
great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. Their relationship would define 
international politics for the next forty five years, a period which would become known as the 
Cold War. The erstwhile allies developed a mutual distrust of each other, which quickly 
escalated into an international rivalry that, with the development of nuclear weapons, 
threatened the existence of the human race. This was a seminal period in the historical 
development of US foreign policy. The US established itself as a global leader in the 
construction of international institutions, committed itself for the first time to membership of 
collective security arrangements, and deployed its vast economic resources on a global scale 
never before seen. The result was four and a half decades of military, political, economic and 
ideological confrontation with the Soviet Union, which erupted in several proxy wars and the 
creation of a nuclear arsenal capable of assuring the mutual destruction of the US, the Soviet 
Union and the rest of the world. 
    The Cold War has been analysed from a number of perspectives, generating large bodies of 
literature attempting to explain its origins, development and conclusion.  Within the 
discipline of IR, these debates have tended to be led by scholars focusing on events at the 
system level. Realist scholars have offered explanations emphasising the role of the anarchic 
system and presenting much of the Cold War as the inevitable outcome of the bi-polar 
distribution of power.
1
 Other scholars have emphasised the role of social and economic forces, 
arguing that the Cold War can be explained in terms of competing ideologies (democracy 
versus communism) and modes of economic organization (free market capitalism versus 
central planning). 
2
 These competing approaches have been applied to not only the 
development of the Cold War as a whole, but to the development of specific US foreign 
                                                          
1
 Mearsheimer, J. (2001) The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton) pp190-202, 225-232; Waltz, K. 
(1979) Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill) 
2
 Saull, R. (2001) Rethinking Theory and History in the Cold War: the State, Military Power and Social Revolution 
(London: Portland); Cox, R. (1987) Production, Power, and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History 
(New York: Columbia University Press) pp211-267 
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policies during the period, each emphasising the factors deemed most relevant by their 
theoretical assumptions. This debate has helped to explain many aspects of US foreign policy 
during the Cold War. However, there are still many questions left which have been, at best, 
only partially explained.  
    In large part, this is because these explanations restrict themselves to a single level of 
analysis, either the international system, or the structure of the state and society. The first 
level of analysis, focusing on the role of individuals, has largely been excluded from IR. It is 
often left to historians to incorporate the role of individual decision makers into their 
analyses.
3
 The problem for international relations students, however, is that their explanations 
run the risk of determinism. They come close to arguing that the course of history is shaped 
by these external forces and there is little if no room for alternate courses to be steered. They 
have, intentionally or otherwise, removed human agency and choice from the equation. 
    When we turn to specific US foreign policies during the Cold War we find that 
policymakers were often faced with various options as to the direction they could possibly 
take. In particular, the presidencies of Harry Truman at the outset of the Cold War and 
Ronald Reagan at its conclusion raise interesting questions which cannot be explained by 
structural theories alone. For example, why did the decision to send economic aid to Greece 
and Turkey evolve into the Truman Doctrine and the policy to contain the Soviet Union? 
Why did the US intervene in Korea in 1950? Why did the Reagan Doctrine try to incorporate 
a policy of rollback into the containment strategy? Why did the US increasingly intervene in 
                                                          
3
 Historians have produced a vast literature on the Cold War. This is often divided into three competing groups 
of scholars. The ‘orthodox’ historians argue the Soviet Union was to blame for the outbreak of the Cold War. 
They characterised US foreign policy as purely reactive to Soviet aggression in Eastern Europe. Examples of this 
type of work include: Feis, H. (1967) Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Waged and the Peace They 
Sought (Princeton: Princeton University Press); Feis, H. (1970) From Trust to Terror: The Onset of the Cold War, 
1945-1950 (London: Blond); and Schlesinger, A. Jr. (1967) ‘Origins of the Cold War’, Foreign Affairs, 46, pp22-
52. By the late 1960s, this view was challenged by ‘revisionist’ scholars who believed that the US was largely 
responsible for the outbreak of the Cold War. They argued that US foreign policy was driven by economic self-
interest and the need for US capital and businesses to gain access to new foreign markets. This led to a form of 
economic ‘imperialism’ which saw the US use its economic and military power to construct a post-war order 
that would protect American interests. The revisionists argue this culminated in the Vietnam War. Examples of 
revisionist works include: Williams, W.A. (1959) The Tragedy of American Diplomacy (New York: World 
Publishing Company); Horowitz, D. (1967) From Yalta to Vietnam: American Foreign Policy in the Cold War 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin); Kolko, G. and Kolko, J. (1972) The Limits of Power: the World and United States 
Foreign Policy (New York: Harper Row). The third group of scholars emerged in response to both the orthodox 
and revisionist accounts of the Cold War. Known as the ‘post-revisionists’, they argued that both sides were to 
blame for the Cold War, either through Soviet hostility, US expansion of power, or a combination of 
uncertainty and misperceptions on both sides. Examples of this type of work include: Paterson, T. (1973) 
Soviet-American Confrontations (Baltimore: Johns Hoskins University Press); Gaddis, J.L. (1997) We Now Know: 
Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Clarendon); Gaddis, J.L. (1972) The United States and the Origins of the 
Cold War, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press) ; Leffler, M. (1993) A Preponderance of Power: 
National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press). 
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Nicaragua from 1981? None of these policies were predetermined or inevitable. Choices 
existed. The president, as chief executive, would be responsible for making the final decision 
and have the constitutional authority to instruct the US bureaucracy to implement the policy. 
The role of the president is therefore crucial to any explanation of US foreign policy during 
the Cold War. How the president views the world, how they process and filter information, 
how they organise the executive, how they work with their staff, how they make decisions, 
how they interact with Congress, all depend on who is president, and these factors contribute 
to the construction of presidential agency and influence the direction of US foreign policy. 
The dominant structural approaches to IR are not able to incorporate individuals into their 
analyses. As a result, they cannot engage with these issues of agency, choice and decision-
making, and can only offer a partial explanation for US foreign policy during the Cold War. 
    This thesis argues that structural theories, and any approach that limits itself to one level of 
analysis, are inadequate to explain the development of US foreign policy. Instead, it is 
necessary to incorporate the first level of analysis in order to bring human agency back into 
International Relations and provide a more detailed explanation of US foreign policy. This 
thesis proposes an analytical framework which incorporates presidential agency into a multi-
level analysis of US foreign policy during the Cold War. It applies this framework to a case 
study comparison of the foreign policies of Presidents Truman and Reagan.  
    In order to locate the role of presidential agency in US foreign policy, it is necessary to 
identify how the president as an individual influences US foreign policy. This thesis argues 
that who is president matters, in particular, the US president influences US foreign policy 
through their worldview and management style. It therefore asks two case specific research 
questions. First, what role did Truman’s worldview and management style play in the 
formation of the Truman Doctrine and the decision to intervene in Korea? Second, what role 
did Reagan’s worldview and management style play in the formulation of the Reagan 
Doctrine and the decision to intervene in Nicaragua? It will be argued that the worldview of 
each president helped to shape the foreign policy agenda, particularly the ranking of security 
threats, and contributed to the formulation of the Truman and Reagan Doctrines. Also, the 
president’s management style, how they structured their executive and operated within this, 
influenced the decision-making process and implementation of policy, contributing to the 
evolution of US foreign policy in Korea under Truman and Nicaragua under Reagan. In 
doing so it offers an agency based approach to IR which stands in contrast to pre-existing 
structural theories.  
18 
 
 
 
    This approach draws on and contributes to the growing body of literature which rejects the 
primacy of structure in IR. This sub-discipline known as Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) 
attempts to “ground” IR in agent-specific theory, arguing “all that occurs between nations and 
across nations is grounded in human decision makers acting singly or in groups.”4 This thesis 
is an attempt to locate the role of presidential agency in US foreign policy during the Cold 
War administrations of Truman and Reagan. Drawing on Foreign Policy Analysis, 
International Relations theory, presidential studies and the historiography of US foreign 
policy during the Cold War, this thesis constructs a multi-level case study comparison of the 
foreign policies of Presidents Truman and Reagan. It argues that the worldview of the 
president is central to agenda setting in US foreign policy making and that the management 
style of the president influences both decision-making and the implementation of US foreign 
policy. Evidence to support this is drawn from detailed empirical analysis of Truman’s 
foreign policy of containment in South East Asia and Reagan’s foreign policy of rollback in 
Nicaragua.  
    The case studies support the argument by demonstrating the central role of Truman and 
Reagan’s worldview in formulating the Truman and Reagan Doctrines. Truman’s worldview 
contributed to the framing of Korea as a security threat, while Reagan’s worldview was one 
of the most important factors in the ranking of Nicaragua as a first order security threat. This 
stands in mark contrast to structural theorists of IR, who argued that such interventions in 
‘non-strategic’ areas were not first order foreign policy priorities for the United States.5 
Clearly, Presidents Truman and Reagan disagreed. Reagan believed he saw a security threat 
in Nicaragua, even if Congress (and structural theorists) disagreed. Reagan was prepared to 
invest the resources of the US foreign policy bureaucracy and take a personal risk in 
attempting to overthrow the Sandinista government of Nicaragua. As a result, structural 
theories cannot explain why these decisions were made.  The role of presidential agency must 
be incorporated to augment the structural approaches. 
    The case studies also support the argument that presidential management style is central to 
the foreign policy making process of the United States. Truman’s choice of a formal 
management style and reliance on a group of advisors with similar views of communism and 
the Soviet Union led to the decision to authorise US troops to cross into North Korea, which 
                                                          
4
 Hudson, V (2005) “Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations” 
in Foreign Policy Analysis 1:1 p1-2, italics in original 
5
 Kenneth Waltz was a particularly strong critic of US intervention in non-strategic areas. He believed the 
Vietnam War was a prominent example. See Waltz, K. (1967) ‘The Politics of Peace’ in International Studies 
Quarterly, 11/3, pp199-211 
19 
 
 
 
resulted in Chinese forces entering the conflict. Likewise, Reagan’s decision to cut several of 
his highest ranking foreign policy officials out of the decision-making process over 
Nicaragua policy led to the Iran-Contra scandal and the collapse of his Nicaragua policy. 
Presidential agency was central to both of these outcomes. 
    It must be stated that this thesis does not adopt a ‘great man of history’ approach. It does 
not argue that US foreign policy during the Cold War can be explained solely in terms of 
presidential agency. This would be an example of gross reductionism and would fail to take 
context into account. Instead, this thesis adopts an agency based explanation of US foreign 
policy, emphasising presidential agency, but also locating it within a multi-level analytical 
framework that engages with both state level and system level factors. The cases support the 
argument that explanations of US foreign policy cannot be located solely at the level of 
agency or structure. In doing so, it will contribute to the growing literature incorporating 
agency level factors into explanations of US foreign policy.
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1.2 Literature Review 
 
    This thesis adopts a multi-level framework by analysing the president’s interaction with the 
executive, the Congress and the international system. As a result, it engages with several 
bodies of literature: International Relations theory, Foreign Policy Analysis, Presidential 
Studies and the historiography of the Cold War. This thesis will attempt to combine all four 
bodies of literature to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the role of the president. 
The ambition is for the conceptual lenses provided by IR theory and Foreign Policy Analysis 
to be complemented by the detailed empirical historical research. As a result, the literature 
review below will focus on the conceptual literature developed by IR and FPA and the 
remaining literatures will be included into the following chapters. 
 
1.2.1 Agency-Structure Debate 
 
    In order to locate the role of presidential agency in US foreign policy it is first necessary to 
analyse the concept of agency. By necessity this leads us into the structure-agency debate, 
one of the key theoretical issues lying at the heart of social science. The issues raised by the 
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agency-structure debate have been central to many disciplines within the social sciences, with 
some scholars claiming it to be the most important theoretical issue we face.
7
 Although not as 
prominent a research agenda within the discipline of politics as it is in other branches of the 
social sciences, the debate has received some attention. Recently, several scholars have 
argued that questions raised by the agent-structure debate should be given more attention by 
political scientists and incorporated into their analyses.
8
 The debate revolves around the issue 
of whether agents are able to shape their own destiny, or whether there are structural forces 
beyond the control of agents which determine their fate. In this context, “Agency refers to the 
individual or group abilities (intentional or otherwise) to affect their environment. Structure 
usually refers to context; to the material conditions which define the range of actions 
available to actors.”9  
    The tendency within social science has been to adopt - implicitly or explicitly - 
explanations resting on either structure or agency-based assumptions. Those scholars who 
privilege the role of structure in explaining social outcomes, such as political change, are 
defined as ‘structuralists’. They argue that society is at the mercy of the complex interaction 
between various types of social, economic, political and ideational structures. Individuals 
have no autonomous power. Their destiny is determined by structure, not by their own choice 
of action. Most individuals are not aware these structures exist because they cannot perceive 
them. As a result, the only role which individuals play is as the ‘bearers’ of structures. This 
approach has been criticised by the ‘intentionalists’, who argue that events must be 
understood and explained as the result of human action, not social structures. Intentionalists 
base their theories and explanations on agency. If structure is incorporated, it must be 
understood as the outcome of human agency. For the intentionalists, structures do not exist 
separately from humans. It is the actions of human beings acting as individuals or as groups 
that explain social behaviour and outcomes.
10
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    With increasing attention having been focused on the agency-structure debate within social 
science, it is perhaps unsurprising that many scholars are beginning to reject approaches 
which favour either agency or structure and have instead tried to incorporate both into their 
theories. These scholars argue in favour of ‘dialectical’ approaches. As the name suggests, 
these scholars wish to investigate how structure and agency are related. They are concerned 
with the interaction between structure and agency, arguing that both affect each other. This 
has generated a further debate.
11
 
    In one corner are those who adopt ‘structuration’ theory. They argue that structure and 
agency are not separate entities. Instead, each is dependent on the other: they are two sides of 
the same coin. Giddens argues that structures may constrain human action, but, structures 
consist of resources as well as rules. This opens up the possibility of structures actually 
enabling agents to choose particular courses of action. Even more so, the actions taken by 
individuals may have the potential to change the structure.
12
 In the opposite corner are those 
who reject Giddens’ claim that agency and structure are the same thing. Hay and Jessop argue 
that agency and structure are distinct concepts.
13
 Structures exist which shape the landscape 
of human action. However, this structure is strategically selective. It privileges certain 
strategies at the expense of others. Hay argues that structures do not treat all agents equally, 
that some players are strategically advantaged.
14
 As a result, structures act to constrain and 
enable depending on the context. Hay and Jessop assume that individuals are aware of these 
structures and, as a result, are able to develop strategies and tactics which help them to reduce 
the constraints placed on them by structure. Through the process of trial and error individuals 
are able to influence and change structures. Hay refers to this as ‘strategic learning’: “agents 
are reflexive, capable of reformulating within limits their own identities and interests, and 
able to engage in strategic calculation about their current situation.”15 These calculations will 
produce outcomes, some of which will be intended, but some may be unintended. As a result, 
structural change may result from the unintended consequences of human agency.
16
 
    The purpose of this thesis is to offer an agency based explanation of US foreign policy 
within a multi-level framework. It therefore rejects structuralism and intentionalism 
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approaches in favour of a dialectical approach, drawing on the work of Hay and Jessop. It 
conceptualises the president as a political actor within the existing domestic and international 
structures of the time. As will be discussed in future chapters, the domestic political structure 
of the US grants the president an advantage in foreign policy over other US domestic political 
actors, whilst the international structure grants the US an advantage as one of the great 
powers. The US president is able to formulate strategies that allow him to overcome domestic 
and international constraints, for example Reagan’s search for external funding for the 
Contras to overthrow the Sandinista government in Nicaragua, but their actions may also 
generate unintended consequences, such as the Iran-Contra scandal which resulted from 
Reagan’s search for external funds. The thesis will investigate this relationship between 
presidential agency and structure throughout. 
 
1.2.2 Levels of Analysis in International Relations 
 
    Traditionally in IR, ‘level of analysis’ has been presented as a ‘problem’ that requires a 
‘solution’. This idea was given credence by the publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Man, the 
State and War where he argued that in order to explain the existence of war, analysts must 
focus on the international system.
17
 This argument was developed further by Waltz’s Theory 
of International Politics.
18
 Whether or not this constitutes ‘the’ theory of international politics 
as Waltz claims (his many critics would suggest otherwise), the importance of this 
publication for IR is that it created the division between IR theory and foreign policy. Waltz 
is quite explicit on this matter. His theory operates at one level of generality, foreign policy 
exists at another. Much of IR since the 1970s has been dominated by structural approaches. 
    Neorealism has established itself as the predominant structural IR theory. It claims its 
strength lies in the theory’s ability to explain political outcomes at the level of the 
international system across time and regardless of the particular states involved. This is 
because, neorealists argue, systemic forces are at play which shape state behaviour in certain 
directions. The key theoretical claim is that the international system is anarchic and all states, 
weak or powerful, past or present, must operate within this environment. For neorealist 
theoretical explanations, the internal characteristics of the states do not matter. The only 
individual property driving the theory is the material capabilities each state possesses, and 
this is incorporated into the system level by focusing on the distribution of material 
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capabilities across it. Due to the anarchic nature of the international system states must 
provide for their own security. Therefore they are concerned with the relative distribution of 
material capabilities, and the relative gains made by each state in this regard. The outcome of 
this process is the development of international balance of power politics, as states try to 
increase their power and other states try to stop this from happening. State behaviour is 
explained in terms of these system level forces.
19
 
     
1.2.3 The Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy Analysis 
 
    Although structural approaches have dominated orthodox IR for the past forty years, the 
study of the domestic sources of foreign policy has not been completely marginalised. 
Indeed, the discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) has established itself as a 
methodological and theoretically diverse academic discipline. This sub-field of International 
Relations scholarship challenges the assumptions of the rational actor model of the state in an 
attempt to explain state behaviour by looking at ‘internal’ sources. Of crucial importance to 
FPA is its analysis of decision-making, particularly at the level of government leaders and the 
upper-echelons of the foreign policy bureaucracy. Foreign policy analysts wish to locate the 
role of political agency in international relations.
20
 To do this, they argue that foreign policy 
must be broken down into its constituent parts and processes in an attempt to determine how 
choices are made and which actors have the most influence on the process. As Christopher 
Hill has argued, “FPA has the capacity to indicate the extent to which the nature of the 
decision-making process determines the outcomes of foreign policy, in terms of both the 
intrinsic quality of a decision and its effective implementation”. 21 
    Foreign policy analysts argue that the outcomes of the foreign policy process are much 
more complex than abstract theories allow. They try to engage with the reality that  
 
causation always includes both structures and agents, and that… the two kinds of 
phenomena help to constitute each other in a perpetual process of interaction. This means 
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by definition, that it is impossible to come to fixed conclusions about the limits to agents’ 
freedom of choice or their capacity for impact.
22
  
 
This is important for understanding the relationship between the domestic and international 
contexts. It is increasingly difficult to separate the international from the domestic. Instead of 
viewing each as a separate entity, scholars of foreign policy are increasingly viewing the 
choice not as one of international or domestic, but of accepting that each makes up “two ends 
of a continuum rather than being sharply demarcated.”23 Whereas most structural theorist 
refuse to study domestic variables in their quest for generality and parsimony, foreign policy 
analysts begin with the assumption that foreign policy is formulated in a domestic setting, 
and then it is operationalised in an international setting where the existing structure will 
contribute, in varying degrees, to its success or failure due to the constraints or freedoms that 
it presents. The underlying assumption fuelling much of contemporary foreign policy analysis 
is that individual agents (be they states or policy makers) are able to influence structure to a 
greater degree than most structural theorists are willing to accept. Hill is clear on this issue: 
“Since structures are consistently influenced by agents, they are always in flux and should not 
be regarded as fixed entities like an engineering jig, with precise, limited and determining 
qualities.”24  
    This may raise criticism that FPA is too reductionist and too individualistic, but again Hill 
is quick to respond to this charge, “Individuals are the original source of intentions, and they 
make a difference. But they never work in a vacuum, and the pattern of their institutional and 
political environment will have a big influence on how they see the world.” 25  Powerful 
individuals will have influence at the domestic level, and powerful states will have more 
influence at the international level. The questions needing to be addressed are: which agents 
make a difference, and under what circumstances? This discussion of FPA’s conception of 
the agent-structure debate leads us on to FPA’s methodological approach. 
    Far from seeking parsimony and generality, most analysts reject the possibility of a general 
theory of foreign policy being developed, that is, a general theory which “synthesises” the 
existing approaches to produce the FPA equivalent of Waltz’s theory. Instead, foreign policy 
analysts adopt a myriad of methodological approaches that strike a balance between theory 
and empirical research, “geographical and historical specifics are taken to be more important 
                                                          
22
 Ibid., p26 
23
 Ibid., p38 
24
 Ibid., p26 
25
 Ibid., p29 
25 
 
 
 
than abstractions like bipolarity and multipolarity.” 26  Hill argues strongly in favour of a 
pluralist approach, stressing that the complexity of the foreign policy making process, 
particular the amount and types of actors involved, necessitates a variety of methods ranging 
from middle-range and weak theories, to history and discourse analysis.
27
 Carlsnaes, however, 
does not rule out the possibility “a synthetic framework for analysing foreign policy is indeed 
possible, but that it has to be on a level of abstraction that does not substantively prejudge 
explanation in favour of any particular type or combination of empirical factors.”28 What we 
can summarise though is that FPA involves flexibility in many key debates, particularly 
questions regarding agent-structure, domestic-international and theory-empirical issues. 
 
1.3 Analytical Framework 
 
   1.3.1 The Domestic, the International and US Foreign Policy: A Multi-Level Approach 
 
     The framework developed by this thesis is located firmly within this scholarly tradition. It 
is agent-centred, focusing on a specific individual: the president of the United States. It is 
geographically specific, focusing on the US political system. It is multi-level, realising that 
US foreign policy does not exist in a vacuum and must be contextualised within the 
international system. Finally, it is contextual; focusing on two specific historical case studies 
from which the empirical evidence required to support the analysis of the president will be 
drawn from.  
    This thesis will focus on the president’s relationship with the executive, the congress, the 
international system, and the interaction between these different levels. The president’s role 
within the domestic US political system of separated powers and the impact this has on the 
president’s ability to conduct foreign policy will be analysed in chapter two. This multi-level 
framework of the domestic and international will form the structure of the case studies in 
chapters three through six, and form the basis for the comparison between the case studies 
conducted in the penultimate chapter. 
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1.3.2 Presidential Agency 
 
    Having discussed how agency and structure have been conceptualised at the theoretical 
level, it is now necessary to begin constructing the definition of presidential agency that will 
be applied in this thesis. To analyse the role of individual humans in international relations 
we must turn to the discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis. The attempt to ground international 
relations at the level of agent and actor centred theory provides us with a general 
conceptualisation of agency. The emphasis lies on the existence of choice and the potential 
for individuals to influence their future courses of action. Where choice exists, decisions must 
be made. As a result, foreign policy analysis must therefore contend itself with decision-
making. Outcomes in international relations must be grounded in individuals making 
decisions. Therefore, in foreign policy, agency “entails individual human beings taking 
decisions and implementing them on behalf of entities which possess varying degrees of 
coherence, organization and power – of which the most effective are generally states.”29 It is 
political agency this thesis contends with, the extent to which an individual invested with 
political power is able to turn these resources into policy outcomes when operating within a 
specific political context. This is foreign policy agency at the general level. 
     However, these decision makers are not abstract entities. The focus of this thesis is on one 
particular individual, the president of the United States, and a specific context, US foreign 
policy during the Cold War. Therefore we need to move our definition of foreign policy 
agency towards a construct of presidential agency in US foreign policy. The literature on this 
topic is large, covering a vast array of topics and perspectives. However, it can be grouped 
into two broad categories. The first are those who adopt the rational actor model. The 
president is conceived as a rational, self-interested actor, making choices strategically on the 
basis of cost benefit analysis. This is the hallmark of the positivist ‘scientific’ approach to the 
study of politics and maintains all the assumptions of its microeconomic origins: exogenous 
preferences, perfect information, and the ability of the president to calculate expected 
utility.
30
  The second are those who question the usefulness of this approach and/or reject it 
outright. The criticisms are various. Some challenge the assumptions of the model, arguing 
that it is too abstract, particularly the assumption of perfect information. Herbert Simon 
developed the idea of ‘satisficing’ to convey the idea that, in reality, decision-makers do not 
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necessarily choose the ‘best’ option in terms of that with the highest level of utility, but 
instead satisfy themselves by choosing an option that meets a lower standard of acceptability. 
The reason decision-makers will ‘satisfice’ is because they do not know the expected 
probabilities of each outcome and therefore cannot calculate outcomes with high level 
precision. This led to the development of the concept of bounded rationality and its 
application to decision-making.
31
 Others reject the rational actor model outright. Political 
psychologists argue that human behaviour does not conform to the rational actor model. This 
can be due to individual traits, such as learned habits, as well as group dynamics, such as 
group think.
32
 Political scientists have also challenged the rational actor model, arguing that it 
diminishes the role of organisational context and bureaucratic politics.
33
 
    We are therefore presented with an almost unlimited number of ways in which we could 
construct presidential agency. However, this thesis proposes a specific multi-level framework, 
looking at the president’s relationship with the international system, the executive and 
Congress. We therefore need a construction of presidential agency that can be operationalised 
within this framework. FPA again offers us the tools to do this. It grounds us in decision-
making, emphasising the importance of the policy-making process. Foreign policy analysts 
have conceived of the policy making process as taking place in a series of stages: agenda 
setting, decision-making and implementation.
34
 As a result, it is necessary to conceptualise 
presidential agency in relation to this process. How does the president influence agenda 
setting, decision-making and implementation? What individual differences does the president 
bring to the process? What concepts and approaches from the existing literature allow us to 
identify and analyse the role of the president in this process?  
     In order to locate the role of the president this thesis proposes a two stage analysis 
focusing on the worldview and management style of the president. This allows us to tie the 
president into the multi-level analytical framework. The president’s worldview links them to 
the international system and provides the filters through which they as individuals 
conceptualise US foreign policy. A president’s worldview contributes to how they establish 
foreign policy priorities and rank security threats. This directly influences agenda setting. 
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Analysing the president’s management style allows us to locate the president within the 
executive and establish their relationship with Congress. In turn we can then assess the 
impact Presidents Truman and Reagan had on the domestic sources of foreign policy and 
decision-making by investigating their relationship with other actors in the foreign policy 
process, namely executive bureaucrats and members of the legislature. By combining the two 
approaches we can trace the development of individual foreign policies. Specifically, how 
policies originate in relation to the president’s worldview, and how the president attempts to 
choose and implement these policies via their management style. 
    The thesis does not argue that presidential agency can be captured entirely by focusing on 
the president’s worldview and management style. No single concept or theory can explain 
everything. To try to claim so would result in reification. Instead, worldview and 
management style offers us the chance to examine a particular aspect of presidential agency 
in relation to existing models of policy making, the impact the president has on agenda 
setting, decision-making and implementation, and  allows us to apply this within the multi-
level framework developed by this thesis.
35
 
 
1.3.3 Worldview 
 
    The concept of worldview has been incorporated into the construct of presidential agency 
and the analytical framework of this thesis for several reasons. It allows the analysis to focus 
specifically on the individual president and to compare the impact of different presidents 
holding different worldviews on the development of US foreign policy. As will be discussed, 
it not only allows us to analyse how each president views the world, but also what aspects of 
a president’s worldview impact the president’s political behaviour. Worldview impacts 
information processing and decision-making, how the president constructs their identities of 
self and others, which, in turn, allows them to rank foreign policy priorities and security 
threats. In doing so, a clear link between presidential worldview and agenda-setting can be 
drawn, allowing worldview to be incorporated into the traditional policy making model of 
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agenda setting, decision-making and implementation. As will now be shown, the study of 
presidential worldviews is well established in the literature. 
    One of the earliest contributions to the literature on worldviews was David Barber, who 
offered the following definition: ‘A president’s world view consists of his primary, politically 
relevant beliefs, particularly his conceptions of social causality, human nature, and the central 
moral conflicts of the time. This is how he sees the world and his lasting opinions about what 
he sees.’36 From this initial definition, one can see that the concept of worldview is more than 
simply how a decision maker ‘views the world’. Perception of the external environment plays 
a significant role, but perception does not stand alone. It is intertwined with the concepts of 
beliefs and motivation. It is necessary, therefore, to try to unpack the relationship between 
these concepts. 
    Perception is the starting point. Although Jervis is often the point of departure for many 
works on perception, it is possible to trace the origins of perceptions to the earliest days of 
foreign policy analysis
37
. Sprout and Sprout, building on the work of Snyder et al, developed 
the idea of the ‘psychomilieu’ to highlight the relationship between the international 
environment and the decision-maker’s perception of it.38 As Hudson has explained, ‘The 
psycho-milieu is the international and operational environment or context as it is perceived 
and interpreted by...decisionmakers.’39 From this insight has grown a substantial literature on 
the role of perceptions in decision-making, spanning political psychology and international 
relations theory.
40
  
    A definition of perception will be drawn from the existing literature in order to contribute 
to the current analysis of the concept of worldview.  Voss and Dorsey define perception as 
‘an integrative process by which stimuli become interpreted by the individual, the process 
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taking place via the integration of the stimulus events with the prior knowledge and beliefs of 
the individual.’41 This definition is used because it explicitly links perceptions to the pre-
existing beliefs held by the individual. The decision-maker does not perceive the world from 
the position of an objective blank slate. The life experiences of the individual shape their 
perception of the world. The specific life experience the current analysis focuses on is the 
political motivation held by the individual. 
    Drawing on the work of Hermann et al, it is assumed that decision-makers are motivated in 
one of two ways.
42
 One group are driven by ideology and a purpose. They set goals and work 
to achieve them. The other group is contextually sensitive and look to respond to the situation 
they find themselves in. In terms of the typologies’ relationship to perceptions, Hermann et al 
find that the goal driven group tend to perceive the world through ‘a lens that is structured by 
their beliefs, attitudes, motives and passions.’43 As a result of this, decision makers who are 
goal driven tend to selectively perceive information from external sources. Over time this will 
reinforce the pre-conceptions of the individual, making it unlikely that they will change their 
pre-held attitudes and beliefs. Contextually sensitive leaders, on the other hand, tend not to 
view the world through a lens. In order to respond to the situation facing them, such decision 
makers try to keep information channels open in order to maximise their options.
44
 This 
demonstrates the link between worldview and agenda-setting. A leader driven by specific 
goals and purposes will pursue a narrow agenda that attempts to push the state’s foreign 
policy in the direction of the leader’s ‘vision’.45 George W. Bush, the Bush Doctrine and the 
conduct of the Iraq War provide evidence to support this typology of a president pursuing one, 
narrow foreign policy goal.
46
 Contextually responsive leaders will adopt a less focused 
agenda and will pursue a variety of goals due to the fact they lack a policy vision derived 
from their worldview. Bill Clinton’s foreign policy ‘incoherence’ is often held as a model of 
this typology.
47
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    Finally, presidential worldview plays a crucial role in the ranking of foreign policy 
priorities and security threats. This is the result of the image the president holds of others. 
How a president ‘frames’ others, for examples as allies, collaborators, rivals, or enemies, 
attributes to them an identity which in turn stimulates pre-held beliefs held by the president as 
to how the ‘others’ should be dealt with.48 If the president assigns a positive identity, the 
president will look for ways to cooperate with the foreign state. If the president assigns a 
negative identity, the foreign state will be ranked as a security threat.
49
 This demonstrates the 
way in which individual presidents make a difference in terms of helping to set the foreign 
policy agenda. 
    The terms ‘worldview’ can have more than one meaning to different scholars in various 
contexts.  To some philosophers, worldview is conceived as ‘Weltanschauung’, namely the 
beliefs held by individuals about how the world works. When these beliefs are shared by a 
group or society as a whole they are often referred to as ideology. This is where conceptual 
confusion between the terms worldview and ideology can arise. However, the current 
analysis is grounded in the study of foreign policy and individual decision-makers, not 
philosophy. In the context of this thesis the term worldview is applied to an individual 
decision-maker, the president of the United States, in order to determine how their pre-
existing beliefs affect how they perceive the world, process information, and make decisions.  
An ‘ideological’ worldview in this context refers to a president who holds a closed belief 
system. They will tend to view the world in dichotomous terms: good and bad, black and 
white. Information contrary to their worldview will be ignored whilst information that 
confirms their worldview will be used to reinforce their prior beliefs. As a result, their 
worldview will remain fixed. This contrasts with those who hold a ‘pragmatic’ worldview. 
They will be open to new sources of information and will be less likely to ignore or 
manipulate information in order to support their pre-existing beliefs. They will exhibit more 
flexibility, both in their beliefs and decision-making.
50
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1.3.4 Management Style  
 
    The second component of our construct of presidential agency is the president’s 
management style. Again, this has been chosen because it allows us to locate the role of the 
president within our analytical framework and the traditional policy making model outlined 
above. As head of the executive, the president plays an integral role in the decision-making 
and implementation stage of the US foreign policy making process.  Therefore, how the 
president structures his executive, how he interacts with his staff, how he operates within this 
system, how he receives, selects and processes information, in short how the president 
marshals their political resources, all contribute to decision-making and the implementation 
of policy. This is an important aspect of presidential agency because the choice of 
management style is the result of the individual preferences of the president. As will be 
shown in the case studies, the president’s choice of management style is largely the result of 
their previous experiences of management. Truman’s management style was a direct result of 
his time in the army and US Senate, whereas Reagan drew upon his direct experience of 
executive government from his time as Governor of California. Therefore who is president 
matters because they each have different management preferences as a result of their 
historical experiences. 
    In order to implement his foreign policy agenda, the president must work closely with a 
variety of foreign policy actors. In light of this, a growing body of literature has developed in 
foreign policy analysis examining the relationship between leaders and their advisors.
51
 This 
chapter will adopt the framework developed by George and Johnson.
52
 Facing the 
complexities of foreign policy making in the United States, the president relies on a team of 
advisers whose job is to provide information to allow him to make decisions, as well as help 
the president coordinate the multitude of actors involved in implementing policy. A crucial 
relationship exists between the president and their advisors, which is in large part determined 
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by the personal characteristics of the president. As George has argued, ‘the incumbent’s 
personality will shape the formal structure of the policymaking system that he creates around 
himself, and, even more, it will influence the ways in which he encourages and permits that 
formal structure to operate in practice.’53 George builds on the seminal typology of Johnson, 
who suggested that there are three ways of managing the modern presidency: the formalistic, 
collegial and competitive styles.
54
  
    The formal style attempts to bring order to the seeming chaos of foreign policy making. 
The president sits at the top of a hierarchical structure, advisers are given responsibility for 
specific issues, there is little overlap of roles, and options filter up to the president. The logic 
behind this style is that issues of lesser importance can be decided at lower levels, thus 
allowing the president to focus on making the final decision on the most important issues. 
The competitive management style is usually adopted by a president who wishes to 
encourage conflict amongst his advisers in order to maximise the amount of information that 
flows into his office, allowing him to hear a diversity of views. To do this he will structure 
the executive to create overlapping jurisdictions and organizational ambiguity. The collegial 
model stresses the importance of diverse opinions and competition in the policy making 
process. However, whereas the competitive model often leads to conflicts of interest based on 
jurisdictional parochialism, the collegial model attempts to encourage departmental heads to 
identify with the president’s perspective and build consensus. To do this the president will 
encourage close cooperation amongst his advisers.
55
  
    George develops Johnson’s framework by identifying three personal characteristics that 
influence the president’s management of the foreign policy process. The first trait George 
identifies is the president’s cognitive style, which focuses on how the president processes 
information. If the president is driven by an ideology and has a specific agenda he wishes to 
achieve then they will likely surround themselves with advisers who share the same goals. If 
the president prefers to respond to the context he find himself in then he is likely to want 
advisers who can provide him with a wide variety of expert information. The second is the 
belief the president has in his own capabilities as they relate to management and decision-
making, what issues he feels comfortable dealing with, and his overall level of engagement in 
the policy-making process. If the president has issues they are particularly interested in then 
he is likely to focus on these more. The third is the extent to which the president is tolerant of 
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conflict amongst their advisers. A president who can tolerate conflict may choose a more 
competitive style of management, whereas those presidents who do not enjoy conflict are 
more likely to create a formal or collegial system. George acknowledges that his management 
styles represent ideal types, and in reality presidents may adopt features of all three or stay 
closer to one type. However, this is an important insight for our construct of presidential 
agency because it demonstrates the extent to which the president’s choice of management 
style is directly linked to their individual preferences. Different presidents will adopt different 
management styles as a result of their personal preferences and experiences and this in turn 
will impact the foreign policy making process.
56
 
    Recent developments in presidential decision-making studies have tried to refine these 
typologies by including more variables and increasing their complexity.
57
Although useful 
within the purposes of attempting theoretical development, the increased complexity makes it 
difficult to incorporate them within the multi-level analysis developed by this thesis. Instead, 
the original work of Johnson and George will be incorporated into the multi-level framework 
of analysis. This will allow the role of the president to be located not just in relation to the 
executive, but to the Congress and the international system.  
 
1.4 Methodology 
 
1.4.1 Case Study Comparison 
 
    The case studies of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan have been selected for several 
reasons. The first is a result of the analytical framework developed in this project. The thesis 
adopts an agency based approach analysing the role of the president operating within the 
multi-level environment of US foreign policy making. As a result, in order to limit the effects 
of structural changes, it is necessary to try and keep the structural environment as constant as 
possible. Therefore the research will focus on two presidents drawn from the Cold War 
period when both presidents faced a bipolar international system. Second, in terms of the 
historical context, the case studies have been selected on the basis of their relationship to the 
development of the Cold War. The presidency of Harry Truman allows the thesis to analyse 
                                                          
56
 George, A. (1980) Presidential Decisionmaking in US Foreign Policy, p145-164 
57
 Hermann, M. And Preston T. (1994) ‘Presidents, Advisers and Foreign Policy’; Mitchell, D. (2005) ‘Centralizing 
Advisory Systems: Presidential Influence and the U.S. Foreign Policy Decision Making Process’ in Foreign Policy 
Analysis, 2, p181-206 
35 
 
 
 
the role of the president in the origins of the Cold War while the presidency of Ronald 
Reagan allows for a comparison of the role of the president in the final days of the Cold War. 
Thirdly, the cases have been selected because they allow a comparison of the role of the 
president in the formulation of two distinct foreign policy doctrines, containment during the 
Truman Administration and rollback during the Reagan Administration.  
    Finally, the case studies have been selected for methodological reasons. In order to 
construct the level of detail required to locate and analyse the role of the president in US 
foreign policymaking it is essential to have access to a wide selection of primary documents. 
Unfortunately for scholars, these foreign policy and national security documents are 
classified by the US government for at least thirty years, making it impossible for a research 
project based on the proposed analytical framework to adopt a contemporary focus. Therefore 
it has been necessary to adopt a historical perspective. No restrictions are in place for 
documents produced during the Truman Administration. As a result there is a wealth of 
material available for analysis. Unfortunately, many documents from the Reagan 
Administration are still classified, particularly the minutes of National Security Council (NSC) 
and National Security Planning Group (NSPG) meetings. However, as discussed in the 
following section, as a result of the Iran-Contra scandal, the subsequent government 
investigation, and the freedom of information requests from the National Security Archive, a 
wealth of documents on Nicaragua have been declassified and released for public viewing. 
The availability of these documents forms the justification for the choice of this thesis to 
analyse Nicaragua policy during the Reagan years. 
 
1.4.2 Research Methods 
 
    This study draws on a wealth of primary documents collected during extensive fieldwork 
at the National Archives in College Park, Maryland; the National Security Archive at George 
Washington University; the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library in Independence, Missouri; 
and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in Simi Valley, California. In order to locate and 
analyse the role of the president a vast array of sources were consulted. Of fundamental 
importance are the declassified documents from the highest levels of the US government. 
These include: minutes of the meetings of the National Security Council; minutes of meetings 
of the National Security Planning Group during the Reagan administration; minutes of 
meetings of the Cabinet; minutes of meetings held between the president and his highest level 
advisors and minutes of meetings between the president and members of Congress. These 
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sources are valuable because they provide a documentary record of the positions taken by the 
president and their advisors, the information the president consulted, the views the president 
held and expressed at these meetings, whether these views changed or not, the decisions that 
were made, how these decisions were implemented, and what, if any, changes the president 
made on the basis of this implementation.  
    Supplementing the official documentary record of the decision-making process are the 
briefing papers, memos and documents prepared by the mid- to lower-level bureaucrats and 
the role these played in providing the president with information upon which their decisions 
were based. These documents allow us to construct a detailed picture of each president’s 
worldview as they are the historical record of classified meetings where the president would 
be able to state his own views, rather than adapting them for public and political consumption. 
In terms of the second part of the analytical framework, these documents provide evidence to 
support the analysis of the president’s management style. They allow us to piece together 
how the president wanted his executive to run and, more importantly, they allow us to 
compare this with how the documentary record suggests it was actually run. 
    However, there are limitations to the official record. The National Archives and 
Presidential Libraries are only able to hold and display a small percentage of all the papers 
created during each administration. This does not hamper the present study too much because 
it focuses on the highest level of presidential decision-making and unsurprisingly these 
documents are kept as a priority.
58
 
    The declassification process also places limitations on the study. Most national security 
documents are classified for thirty years.
59
 This did not hamper the case study of Truman as 
all of the foreign policy documents from his administration have been declassified and are 
available for research in the National Archives and the Truman Library. Indeed, the 
limitations faced were a result of the limited time available to conduct fieldwork as a research 
student. Faced with such a large amount of documents and limited time to conduct research, I 
prioritised the highest level documents involving the president (National Security Council 
meetings, meetings with the Secretaries of State, etc.) and worked my way down through the 
bureaucracy when time permitted.  
    The Reagan Administration provides a different set of methodological challenges. The vast 
majority of national security documents at the Reagan Library are still classified. As a result 
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they are not available for scholarly research. However, over the past few years, documents 
from the earliest years of the Reagan Administration have finally been declassified. This 
study forms one of the first academic works to make use of these primary documents. 
    Although the vast majority of Reagan era national security documents are still classified, 
there is one area which does not suffer from the same level of restriction. Due to the Iran-
Contra scandal, a large amount of documents on Reagan’s Nicaragua policy were declassified 
in order to form the basis of the subsequent government investigations. These documents still 
would not have been released to the wider public without the efforts of the National Security 
Archive at George Washington University. Campaigning under the Freedom of Information 
Act, this non-government organisation requested these documents to be made available to the 
public. As a result, copies of these documents are now held by the National Security Archive 
and they provide the richest selection of high level national security primary sources 
currently available on the Reagan Administration’s foreign policy in Nicaragua. These 
documents include minutes of the National Security Council meetings and National Security 
Planning Group meetings where aid to the Contras and covert operations were discussed and 
authorised. These primary sources are of incredible importance to the present research and 
form the empirical basis of the Reagan case study in this thesis.  This also demonstrates the 
importance of not relying on one source of documents. If I had limited my search solely to 
the Reagan Library I would not have found the quantity and quality of foreign policy sources 
available at the National Security Archive. 
    Not all views are expressed at formal meetings, nor are all decisions made there.
60
 For 
example, Reagan’s decision to authorise the NSC staff to search for alternative sources of 
funding for the Contras in Nicaragua was not taken at a meeting of the NSC, therefore it is 
not documented in the official minutes. It is only thanks to the subsequent Congressional 
hearings on the Iran-Contra scandal, and the testimonies of key individuals such as National 
Security Advisors Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, that we have access to this 
information. As a result, we must be aware that the minutes of these meetings can never tell 
the whole story. The documentary record can only offer a snap shot of the decision-making 
process. These documents must be supplemented with other primary sources.
61
 
     Important in terms of providing context, filling in gaps in our knowledge, and offering 
first hand interpretations, the memoirs of the president and US foreign policy officials are an 
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invaluable source. They provide valuable information to support the documentary record. 
Again, we must be aware of the limitations of memoirs. As they are written after the event it 
is possible that the author may not remember events correctly. The human memory is not 
perfect. Also, these memoirs may be written with an agenda to promote a specific 
interpretation of the period, often one which tries to present the author’s role in a positive 
light and as a result glosses over the negatives. In order to counter this, it is important to 
consult a wide variety of memoirs.
62
 This thesis incorporates both the memoirs of the 
presidents themselves as well as a selection of memoirs from high and mid ranking foreign 
policy officials. 
    Presidential diaries are a useful primary source because they detail the president’s thoughts 
from the contemporary vantage point in a way which memoirs alone do not. These are useful 
for constructing the president’s view of policy, decision-making, his colleagues, his 
relationship with Congress and his interpretation of international events. Again, they may 
suffer from the same limitations as memoirs. Even so close to events, the president may be 
trying to protect his legacy.
63
 
    Newspapers provide another important primary source, especially for the Reagan case 
study. Classified documents are sometimes leaked to the media. Therefore, it is important to 
research contemporary media sources to discover if they have written articles based on leaked 
documents. These are important especially if they are able to attribute quotations to officials 
involved in decision-making.
64
 
    Due to the historical nature of the project, there is limited scope for conducting interviews 
with the relevant figures. Contemporary media again forms an important source, in this 
instance providing data in the form of direct quotations from the president and other foreign 
policy officials collected during interviews with journalists. This again helps to ground the 
thesis in primary sources, facilitating the construction of each president’s worldview and 
generating important insights into their decision-making. 
    This wide selection of sources has been employed in order to strengthen the validity, i.e. 
the correctness and precision of the results, of the research methodology undertaken. This is 
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in-line with the research strategy of triangulation which argues that several methods and 
sources of research must be adopted.
65
 
 
1.4.3 Outline of Chapters 
 
    To answer the questions posed in the introduction, chapter two argues that it is necessary to 
apply the conceptual tools of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) in order to analyse presidential 
agency. The chapter begins by briefly outlining the ontological and epistemological 
foundations of IR before reviewing the traditional structural approaches of International 
Relations theory. The chapter then reviews current approaches to FPA before arguing that it 
is necessary to draw on the literature of decision-making to assess the role of the president in 
US foreign policy. 
    Chapter three locates the role of the presidency as an institution and the president as an 
actor in the US domestic political context. The chapter begins with an overview of the 
president’s formal powers, and how these operate in the system of separate institutions 
sharing power as laid out by the constitution. The chapter proceeds to analyse the 
development of the institution of the presidency over time. The chapter argues that debates 
over what the founding fathers intended are less important for understanding US foreign 
policy than how the institution of the presidency was “operationalised” by successive 
presidents. The central thesis developed in this chapter is that the institutional battle for 
power in US foreign policy-making has swung from the Congress to the presidency as a 
direct result of the actions of individual presidents. 
    The chapter then focuses on how personal characteristics of the president impact on the 
functioning of the office. The chapter argues that the management style of the president in 
large part determines how decisions are made within the executive, and this in turn 
contributes to how effectively the president is able to direct foreign policy. A president who 
struggles to control his own White House may soon find himself faced with a crisis of his 
own making. Once a decision is made in the White House, the president then confronts the 
problem of implementation. In doing so he faces the harsh and complex reality of “his” 
bureaucracy. The chapter addresses the fact that it is not simply the case that the Chief 
Executive commands his Executive Departments and they obey his order. Each department 
                                                          
65
 Lewis, J. and Richie, J. (2004) ‘Generalizing from Qualitative Research’, in J. Richie and J. Lewis (eds), 
Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers (London: Sage Publications) 
p263-286 
40 
 
 
 
has their own interests, loyalties and operating procedures, which can both help and hinder 
presidential initiative. How the president attempts to deal with this dilemma is of crucial 
importance to effective foreign policy making. This also relates to the president’s 
management style and how he decides to structure the executive. This chapter argues that 
central to presidential control of foreign policy making is how he chooses to structure the 
relationship between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser.  
    Chapters four and five focus on the foreign policy of Harry Truman. They analyse the role 
played by Truman in formulating a policy of “containment” of the Soviet Union and how this 
was applied in the context of Korea. The chapters argue that Truman’s management style 
contributed directly to the growth of presidential power in foreign policy and laid the 
foundations for future centralisation in the White House. Chapter four analyses Truman and 
the birth of Containment. The decision to involve the US in a worldwide anti-communist 
foreign policy was not inevitable. This chapter argues that Truman’s worldview was 
fundamental to the decision-making process.  
    Chapter five analyses the development of Truman’s management style and its application 
to policy making during the Korean War. The first section details Truman’s management 
system and his attempts to organise his executive. It argues that Truman developed a formal 
management system based on his individual preferences which had developed during his time 
in the army and US Senate. It demonstrates how important personal relationships were to the 
functioning of Truman’s presidency by focusing on the president’s relationships with his 
Secretaries of State. The second section takes the form of a case study of the Korean War and 
focuses on the role played by Truman’s management style in the decisions to frame Korea as 
a security threat, intervene in the war, and cross the border into North Korea. The central 
argument presented is that both Truman’s choice of management structure and how he 
operated within this system are central to understanding the debacle of US intervention in the 
Korean War. Evidence to support the arguments made in these chapters is drawn from a 
wealth of declassified national security documents collected during extensive fieldwork at the 
National Archives in College Park, Maryland and the Harry Truman Presidential Library in 
Independence, Missouri. 
    Chapters six and seven focus on the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan. They analyse the 
role played by Reagan in formulating a policy of “rollback” of the Soviet Union and how this 
was applied in the context of Nicaragua. These chapters argue that although Reagan is well 
known for his detached style of leadership, which involved the development of a formal 
management style and the delegation of power to his subordinates in the executive, in the 
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areas of foreign policy that he deemed of utmost importance he was willing to involve 
himself in the formulation of policy and was prepared to exploit the powers of his office in 
attempting to achieve his desired goal. The chapters argue that Reagan’s proclivity for grand 
strategising at the expense of grasping the finer details of policy making, coupled with his 
hands-off formal management style, set his administration on the path towards the Iran-
Contra scandal.  
    Chapter six begins by placing the Reagan Administration in historical context. Late 1970s 
US. foreign policy was marked by arguments over the idea of American decline and Soviet 
resurgence. The election of Ronald Reagan offered a strong counter to ideas of American 
decline and brought forward resurgence in support of increased American assertiveness in 
international relations. Drawing on the analytical framework developed in chapter one, the 
Reagan case study analyses the individual characteristics of Ronald Reagan, particularly his 
view of American power and the Soviet Union, his vision for American foreign policy and 
how this shaped his attitude to executing the functions of the office of the presidency. 
Chapter seven uses the example of Reagan to highlight the potential for presidential agency 
in US foreign policy by analysing how Reagan was able to pursue his anti-Sandinista agenda 
by continuing to support the Contras even when a clear majority in Congress did not support 
him. This involved the president deliberately cutting his senior advisors out of the decision-
making process, leading to a breakdown of his management system and the Iran-Contra 
scandal. Evidence to support the arguments made in these chapters is drawn from a wealth of 
recently declassified national security documents collected during extensive fieldwork at the 
National Security Archive in Washington DC and the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library in 
Simi Valley, California. 
    Chapter eight will conduct a comparison of the foreign policies of presidents Truman and 
Reagan in order to establish the impact the president has on the formulation of US foreign 
policy. The chapter will proceed in three sections looking at the sources and constraints of 
presidential autonomy. The first section begins with the external environment each president 
confronts in the shape of the international system. This section will argue that the president’s 
worldview is crucial in determining the general orientation of US foreign policy during each 
administration. The second section focuses on the internal sources and constraints of the 
executive bureaucracy. Unsurprisingly, as Chief Executive, the president has greater control 
over events within this environment. However, more room for presidential manoeuvre results 
in opportunities for both success and failure. This section will argue that the management 
style adopted by the president becomes an important factor in all aspects of foreign policy, 
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including decision-making and implementation. The third and final section places the 
president within the context of the US system of separated powers. It will look at how the 
constitutional settlement, which forces the president and Congress to share foreign policy 
power, creates a system of formal constraints that each president must contend with. The 
argument presented here is that how the president works with Congress is central to the 
success of their foreign policy.  
    Throughout the chapter it will be noted that each of these sources and constraints do not 
exist in isolation. It will be shown how the relationship between all three, and the president’s 
awareness of and ability to work within this multi-level environment, determines the extent to 
which a president is able to maintain presidential autonomy and control over the direction of 
US foreign policy. The chapter will argue that the constraints facing the president are not 
fixed. They change as a result of both exogenous factors beyond the president’s control (the 
foreign policies of foreign states and elections to congress, for example) and directly as a 
result of presidential actions, such as choice of management style and decision-making. 
    Chapter nine will conclude the thesis by placing Truman and Reagan within the wider 
context of US foreign policy during the Cold War and assessing their legacies. It will then 
proceed with a final analysis of the wider conceptual issues raised by the study of presidential 
agency in US foreign policy. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the 
present study and possibilities for future research. 
 
1.5 Contribution 
 
    This thesis will make several contributions to the academic literature. This is the first time 
the presidencies of Truman and Reagan and the policies of Containment, Korea, Rollback 
and Nicaragua have been compared to such an extent within this multi-level approach. From 
the detailed empirical analysis this thesis will draw wider conclusions about the role of 
Truman in the origins of the Cold War, the role of Reagan in its conclusion and the role of the 
president in US foreign policy making. Secondly, this study is one of the first to incorporate 
the recently declassified National Security Council documents from the Reagan Library. This 
makes a new contribution to the historiography of the Reagan administration and presents 
evidence to support the argument made in this thesis that Reagan was more active in certain 
policy areas than previously acknowledged by existing scholars. Finally, by developing a 
multi-level framework rooted in Foreign Policy Analysis, and applying it to the role of the 
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president in US foreign policy, it makes a contribution to agency based perspectives in the 
study of International Relations, Foreign Policy Analysis and US foreign policy. 
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Chapter 2: International Relations, Foreign Policy and the 
Individual 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
    Before addressing the issue of presidential agency in US foreign policy, it is necessary to 
offer a review of the theoretical approaches to international relations. This chapter will 
address several questions: How have scholars of international relations approached the topic 
of foreign policy? Why have structural approaches dominated the discipline? What do these 
theories argue? What are their weaknesses? The central argument presented is that in order to 
understand international relations it is necessary to incorporate agency into explanations of 
foreign policy. This allows the analyst to engage in a multi-level analysis which brings 
together the domestic and international sources of foreign policy. This will help to generate a 
richer level of explanation than structural theories alone can produce, and will provide us 
with the tools to explain how, why and when change happens in international relations. The 
theoretical tools developed in this chapter will inform the forthcoming Truman and Reagan 
case studies, allowing us to address the role of presidential agency in US foreign policy. The 
chapter begins by introducing some of the meta-theoretical issues raised in attempting to 
explain foreign policy. It then proceeds to review the dominant structural theories of 
International Relations (IR), arguing that their lack of engagement with questions of agency 
renders them very limited in terms of how much international politics and foreign policy they 
can actually explain.  
    The chapter moves on to introduce the sub-discipline of Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA). 
By challenging the unitary actor assumptions of IR, FPA provides the means for 
incorporating agency into the study of IR. It does so by allowing us to focus on the source of 
agency in international politics, the interaction between human decision makers.  The chapter 
outlines some of the main approaches to foreign policy analysis and existing attempts to 
integrate the domestic and international levels of analysis. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of why IR scholars have been reluctant to incorporate individuals into their 
analyses and offers justifications as to why these reasons are not valid. 
 
 
45 
 
 
 
2.2 Explaining State Behaviour 
 
    We must begin with a theoretical overview of the topic of foreign policy and international 
politics. How has the realm of foreign policy and international politics been conceptualized 
by scholars? What methods have been deployed in their analyses? Walter Carlsnaes refers to 
this as the “twin problematique” which lies at the heart of foreign policy and international 
politics.
1
 First, we have to decide what we are studying (the level of analysis). Carlsnaes 
states that  
 
foreign policies consist of those actions which, expressed in the form of explicitly stated 
goals, commitments and/or directives, and pursued by governmental representatives 
acting on behalf of their sovereign communities, are directed toward objectives, 
conditions and actors – both governmental and non-governmental – which they want to 
affect and which lie beyond their territorial legitimacy.
2
 
  
Foreign policy analysis therefore proceeds from the assumption that states remain an 
important, if not the most important, source of agency in international politics. States are the 
main sources of power and change at the international level. It is their behaviour we need to 
explain. This approach has been challenged in recent years with scholars turning their 
attention beyond the state to address the impact of globalization and non-state actors such as 
International Non-Government Organizations and multinational corporations.
3
 However, the 
state remains an important actor in international relations for the following reasons. States, 
particularly large states, are able to collect and distribute material resources on a level that 
surpasses most, if not all, non-state actors. This is clear from the military arsenals possessed 
by the world’s leading states, most notably the nuclear powers. Inter-state war still has the 
potential to impact international politics more than any other event. One only has to compare 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and the response of the United States and their allies. Al-Qaeda 
were able to hijack four planes and use two of them to destroy the World Trade Centre. In 
response, the US launched a decade-long war on terror and spent billions of dollars invading 
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Afghanistan and Iraq. Beyond warfare, states are responsible for signing international 
agreements, forming international institutions, providing the funding and staff for many 
positions, and deciding whether or not to uphold their provisions. Therefore the study of 
decision-making within states remains crucial to the study of international relations.
4
 This 
thesis is concerned with the role of the president in US foreign policy so it will focus on state 
actors.   
    Secondly we must decide how we will try to explain state behaviour. This leads us into the 
meta-theoretical debates that surround the issues of ontology and epistemology. 
 
2.2.1 Ontology 
 
    Ontologically we must engage in the agent-structure debate. Can foreign policy be 
explained in terms of the actions of individuals, or is the international structure the most 
important source of state behaviour? Wendt reframes this debate in terms of ‘holism’ versus 
‘individualism’. He states that, “Holism implies a top-down conception of social life in 
contrast to individualism’s bottom-up view. Whereas the latter aggregates upward from 
ontologically primitive agents, the former works downward from irreducible social 
structures”.5 As discussed in the previous chapter, this thesis will not attempt to answer this 
perennial philosophical conundrum. Instead it will adopt a dialectical approach, offering an 
agency based explanation of US foreign policy but rooting this within a multi-level analysis 
which also incorporates the role of structure. 
 
2.2.2 Epistemology 
 
     Epistemologically we face the choice between an ‘objectivist’ or ‘interpretative’ approach. 
Wendt refers to practitioners of the former as those “who think science is an epistemically 
privileged discourse through which we can gain a progressively truer understanding of the 
world, whilst the latter refuse to acknowledge this privileged status”.6 In IR, “The choice is 
thus between an approach that models itself on the natural sciences, and one premised on the 
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independent existence of a social realm constituted by social rules and intersubjective 
meanings”.7     
    There are a wide variety of approaches to the study of foreign policy. What scholars need 
to determine is to what extent they are complimentary or competitive. This thesis is clear on 
this point: the world is neither holistic nor individualistic, rational nor interpretative. We must 
be aware that these are just specific approaches required to answer a specific research 
question. However, Fearon and Wendt identify a problem which may develop from this 
seemingly innocuous observation. They acknowledge that theories are merely analytical 
conveniences which help answer the question that interests the analyst.
8
 However, “there is 
nevertheless a danger that, through a process of forgetting what we are doing, what starts out 
as merely an analytical convenience can become something more than that, a tacit assumption 
about what the world is really like which limits our theoretical and/or political horizons”.9 To 
an extent this has happened in IR and the study of foreign policy. Like much of contemporary 
social science, many IR theorists are engaged in a quest for generality and parsimony. As 
such, scholars of IR and foreign policy tend to favour structural and rationalist approaches. I 
wish to explain the role of the individual in foreign policy. However, before I can address this 
topic, I must begin by reviewing the existing theoretical approaches to the study of foreign 
policy and identify their weaknesses. Due to the constraints of the project I do not claim this 
to be an exhaustive review. I merely wish to establish which approaches have to a large 
extent dominated the study of foreign policy. This section will be structured in light of the 
“level of analysis” question. I begin with structural theories before moving on to those which 
focus on factors within the state. 
 
2.3 The International System 
 
2.3.1 Neorealism 
 
    The publication of Kenneth Waltz’s Theory of International Politics in 1979 represented a 
turning point not only for realism, but the discipline of International Relations as a whole. 
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The book developed what Waltz defined as structural realism (soon to become widely known 
as neorealism). Waltz’s aim with this book was simple: to take the ‘classical’ realism of 
Morgenthau and replace it with a rigorous, deductive, systemic theory of international 
politics.
10
 In doing so, Waltz ushered in a new era of IR, one dominated by systemic and 
rationalist approaches.  
    Traditional realist thinkers, such as Morgenthau and Wolfers, had incorporated state 
characteristics and the role of statesmen into their analyses.
11
 Waltz rejected this approach, 
arguing that inter-state relationships are more important determinants of state behaviour 
rather than intra-state factors. Therefore any theory of international politics must be systemic 
and focus on events at the level of the international system. As Waltz argued:  
 
In order to turn a systems approach into a theory, one has to move from the usual vague 
identification of systemic forces and effects to their more precise specification, to say 
what units the system comprises, to indicate the comparative weights of systemic and 
sub-systemic causes, and to show how forces and effects change from one system to 
another. 
12
 
 
Waltz’s theory is rooted in the international system. His key assumptions are that the system 
is ordered by the principle of anarchy and populated by functionally undifferentiated units, i.e. 
states. Differences in states are measured solely in terms of material capabilities. Waltz is 
concerned with identifying and explaining how changes at the system level impact 
international political outcomes.
13
 
    From these assumptions Waltz derives what he believes are generalizable propositions 
about state behaviour. States exist in an anarchic international system therefore their primary 
goal is survival which they must provide for themselves. Increasing the level of material 
capabilities they possess will increase their chances of security. However, state security will 
decrease as a result of other states increasing their material capabilities. Therefore states will 
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be concerned with relative gains, leading to the development of balance-of-power politics and 
making long-term cooperation between states difficult.
14
  
    The importance of Waltz does not lie solely in the predictions of his theory, his view that 
states will be forced to forever compete for survival so long as the international system 
remains ordered by the principle of anarchy, but also in the methods he adopts as a result of 
his understanding of what constitutes “theory”. For Waltz, a scientific theory must be general, 
parsimonious and produce testable predictive hypotheses.
15
 With this understanding, Waltz 
sets himself the task of producing a general theory of international politics. This leads him to 
develop a systemic theory of international politics based on the rationalist foundation of 
microeconomics. From the outset, Waltz makes it very clear that his theory is not a theory of 
foreign policy: 
 
True, the theory does not tell us why state X made a certain move last Tuesday. To expect 
it to do so would be like expecting the theory of universal gravitation to explain the 
wayward path of a falling leaf. A theory at one level of generality cannot answer 
questions about matters at a different level of generality.
16
 
 
Using Waltz’s economic analogy to explain this further, his theory is an attempt to explain 
the market of international politics (the system), not the firms which compete within the 
market (states). 
17
 
     If this is the case, then why is a discussion of Waltz relevant? First of all, there are many 
theorists who deny this separation of foreign policy and international politics. James D. 
Fearon argues that there is an important sense in which neorealist and other systemic theories 
are indeed theories of foreign policy. Namely, “the things that structural realist theories seeks 
to explain – such as balancing, the probability of major power war, or a general disposition to 
competitive interstate relations – are either foreign policies or the direct (if sometimes 
unintended) result of foreign policies”.18 Therefore any theory that attempts to explain state 
behaviour must be at this fundamental level a theory of foreign policy. In trying to claim that 
there is complete separation between his purely structural theory and explanations of 
individual state behaviour, Waltz drastically oversimplifies the separation between domestic 
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and international politics. Secondly, several of his fellow realists believe this is an untenable 
position and that it is indeed possible to formulate a neorealist theory of foreign policy.
19
 
Mearsheimer not only produced a theory of state behaviour but he also tested it against real 
world historical examples in his Tragedy of Great Power Politics.
20
 The work of the neo-
classical realists (discussed later in this chapter) also challenges this assumption of Waltz. 
Thirdly, Waltz has made a major contribution in strengthening structural perspectives within 
IR. An understanding of Waltz is essential for anyone seeking to make a contribution to the 
field, particularly those who wish to look at foreign policy from the perspective of individual 
agency. 
    Outcomes at the level of the international system are explained in terms of individualist, 
unitary, rationalist states interacting in an anarchic environment, with the only differentiating 
factor being the distribution of capabilities across the system. This allows no room for 
agency. According to Waltz, the inclusion of any other state characteristic produces a 
reductionist theory and thus invalidates it as a theory of international politics.
21
 The top-down 
approach to international politics is the hallmark of neorealism, the theory which has 
dominated IR since the 1980s. Structure is the primary source of explanation for international 
political outcomes; domestic politics and human agency are secondary considerations. The 
assumption of the state as a ‘billiard ball’ remains central to neorealism.  
    One can accept this to some extent, but only if we agree to Waltz’s incredibly restrictive 
terms. What we have to be aware of is that, for Waltz, the fundamental aspect of any theory is 
that it must be parsimonious, it must be general, and it must be predictive. The problem is 
that this leaves us with a theory that has a lot to say about a few aspects of international 
politics (the balance of power, the comparative levels of stability of uni- bi- and multi-polar 
systems) whilst telling us little about anything else. Far from being the theory of international 
politics, we find that the theory explains very little of international politics. Therefore, in 
order to explain more of international politics it is essential to incorporate agency into our 
analysis. Only by including domestic factors and human agency will we be able to address a 
wider array of research questions. However, as we shall now discuss, structural approaches to 
theorising have influenced not just subsequent neorealists, but also many of their opponents. 
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2.3.2 Neoliberalism    
 
     Neoliberal institutionalism has developed as the main theoretical challenge to neorealism. 
It shares a similar systemic core, adopting a top down structural approach to theory 
construction. Neoliberals assume that the international system is anarchic and populated by 
states, which are assumed to be rational unitary actors. As a result, state behaviour can be 
explained in terms of self interest and value-maximizing.
22
 However, where neorealists argue 
that cooperation between states is difficult to achieve due to concerns over relative gains, 
neoliberals are more optimistic. This is because they reject the neorealist concept of relative 
gains. Instead, the neoliberals argue that the rational nature of states will lead them to pursue 
absolute gains. States realise that competition in an anarchic system will produce sub-optimal 
outcomes in various policy areas such as trade, the environment, cross border policing and, 
the most sub-optimal of all outcomes, inter-state war. If states are rational, neoliberals argue 
that they will attempt to avoid these outcomes by pursuing inter-state cooperation in the hope 
of generating mutual benefits in the shape of absolute gains. As such, states will try to 
increase their levels of interdependence to promote co-operation. This is one of the central 
arguments made by neoliberal institutionalists.
23
 
    The neoliberals are not idealists. The system is still anarchic, uncertainty remains, so states 
must be concerned with their security. However, they believe that increased interdependence 
and cooperation between states will reduce the threat of war. States are rational, self-
interested, value-maximisers. War is expensive, bloody and unpredictable. Therefore, the 
rational course of action will be to avoid war if possible. States will not act in the aggressive 
manner envisioned by the offensive neorealists like Mearsheimer. As Keohane and Nye have 
stated, “relative to cost, there is no guarantee that military means will be more effective than 
economic ones to achieve a given purpose”.24 Non-military strategies will take precedence. 
Military engagement will be reserved as a means of last resort, undertaken only if the 
interests at stake are deemed important enough to accept the inevitable costs. Where 
neorealists had emphasised the importance of material capabilities and the balance of power 
in determining outcomes at the level of the international system, neoliberal institutionalists 
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stress the role of sensitivity and vulnerability to interdependence in explaining state 
behaviour.
25
 
    In terms of this thesis and the role of agency in international politics, we are again 
confronted with a theory which emphasises the role of structure, assumes states to be unitary 
actors, and does not concern itself with the internal characteristics of the state, let alone the 
role of domestic politics. This is in marked contrast to previous liberal theories of 
international politics which argued that the internal characteristics of a state played a central 
role in explaining state behaviour. One notable example being the democratic peace theory, 
which argued democracies were less likely to go to war than non-democracies. Andrew 
Moravcsik has claimed that ‘neoliberal institutionalism’ is a misnomer as it is not so much a 
distinct theory but essentially a variant of neorealism due to its systemic approach and 
assumption of states as unitary rational actors.
26
 Therefore, similar to neorealism, we have a 
theory which fails to take into account agency in international politics. We have another 
picture of the system, but again we are left with much of international politics unexplained 
due to the restrictive nature of abstract systemic theorising. The dynamics of choice and 
change are not to be found in either neorealism or neoliberalism, and therefore both can only 
tell us so much about US foreign policy during the Cold War. 
 
2.3.3 Social Constructivism 
 
    The similarities between neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism are due to the fact that 
both are rationalist approaches to the study of politics. They share the same choice-theoretic 
assumptions borrowed from microeconomics. The first is that states are assumed to be 
atomistic, self-interested and rational, i.e. “capable of establishing the most effective and 
efficient way to realize their interests within the environmental constraints they encounter”.27 
Second, social interaction has no role to play in preference formation. State preferences are 
exogenous and pre-determined. Third, the international system is conceived as a strategic 
realm where states interact purely to maximise their interests. As Reus-Smit has stated, 
“Actors are not, therefore, inherently social; they are not products of their social environment, 
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merely atomistic rational beings that form social relations to maximize their interests”.28 The 
rationalist assumption that state preferences are pre-social and not shaped by interaction with 
other states or actors has been challenged by the emergence of social constructivism. 
    Social constructivism should not be conceived as a theory of international politics in the 
manner of neorealism or neoliberalism. Instead, social constructivism consists of a group of 
social theories who are concerned with understanding the relationship between agents and 
structures. This approach can be applied to all disciplines in the social sciences. However, in 
international politics, we can identify one belief that all constructivists share: the role of 
human consciousness in international life.
29
 In order to study this, constructivists share three 
ontological propositions about social interaction. The first is that the behaviour of social and 
political actors is conditioned by both ideational and material structures. Indeed as Wendt has 
argued “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structures of 
shared knowledge in which they are embedded”. 30   Therefore, ideational or normative 
structures are just as important as material structures and should be incorporated into any 
study of international politics. Second, constructivists argue that ideational and normative 
structures shape actors’ identities, interests and actions. Third, constructivists view agents and 
structures as mutually constitutive.
31
 As Wendt stated, “social structures exist, not in actors’ 
heads nor in material capabilities, but in practices. Social structures exist only in process”.32 
Constructivists reject the rationalist argument that preferences are exogenous. Instead, 
constructivists argue that preferences are endogenous to social interaction. Society is a 
constitutive realm, not a strategic game. 
    Social constructivists reject the positivist epistemology of the rationalists. They argue that 
the study of norms, ideas and non-material structures must be grounded in an interpretative, 
hermeneutic approach. This rules out the possibility of formulating a universal law or abstract 
general theory of international politics because “there is simply no such thing as a universal, 
trans-historical, disembedded, culturally-autonomous idea or identity”.33 However, there is 
one dissenting constructivist voice on this subject. Alexander Wendt has attempted to engage 
directly with Waltz by constructing what he calls a “social” theory of international politics. 
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This has proven controversial amongst social constructivists due to Wendt’s adoption of an 
epistemology he calls “scientific realism”. In line with his constructivist counterparts, Wendt 
has adopted an idealist and holistic ontology, but his use of a positivist epistemology puts him 
at odds with the majority of constructivists.
34
 
    Wendt is relevant to our current analysis for two reasons. The first is his prominence in the 
field. Wendt is regarded as the leading figure of social constructivism in international 
politics, even if his approach differs from many other constructivist scholars.
35
 The second, 
and more important reason, is that Wendt also adopts a systemic approach. His social theory 
is top down, focusing on the interaction of unitary states. His argument is similar to other 
constructivists in that states’ interests and actions are shaped by their identity. However, by 
focusing entirely on how structural contexts, systemic processes, and strategic practices 
produce and reproduce different types of state identity, Wendt stands opposed to his fellow 
constructivists.
36
  Reus-Smit (2005, p200) has criticised Wendt’s theory for being too narrow, 
arguing that  
 
From this perspective, it is impossible to explain how fundamental changes occur, either 
in the nature of international society or in the nature of state identity. By bracketing 
everything domestic, Wendt excludes by theoretical fiat most of the normative and 
ideational forces that might prompt such a change.
37
 
 
    Social constructivism will continue to challenge the dominance of rationalism in 
international politics, as well as contributing to the agent-structure debate. However, if 
rationalists continue to treat Wendt as the leading figure, this contribution will not be as 
significant. Rationalists have debated Wendt on epistemology and ontology.
38
 However, they 
are in agreement on the level of analysis: the system is what matters (even if they do not 
agree on what constitutes the system). Social constructivism offers promising avenues of 
research in US foreign policy by addressing the ideas of identity and how this impacts 
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constructions of the national interest.
39
 However, these scholars are not restricting themselves 
to one level of analysis. Therefore we must move beyond Wendt’s restrictive framework and 
proceed to investigate what benefits we can gain from incorporating the state level into our 
analysis. 
 
2.4 Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy 
 
    Systemic theories of IR have treated the state as a unitary actor. They have adopted a 
‘billiard ball’ metaphor, assuming that the internal characteristics of the state are not 
necessary for their theory construction and explanations. As discussed in the previous 
chapter’s review of the agent-structure debate, this presents us with a problem. Systemic 
theories push us towards accepting determinism. There is little consideration given to the fact 
that states are presented with choice in their foreign policies. It is possible that they could 
have acted differently at a specific time. The state as unitary actor assumes this possibility 
away. State behaviour is explained in terms of structural change, changes in material 
capabilities, changing levels of interdependence, or changing conceptions of identity, 
depending on whether you adopt a neorealist, neoliberal or Wendtian theoretical approach. 
The system explains outcomes.  
    However, systemic theories find it difficult to answer questions relating to specific foreign 
policy events. Why did the US quarantine Cuba during the missile crisis of 1963? Why did 
the US intervene in Korea in 1950? Why did the US support the Contras in the 1980s? To 
answer these questions it is necessary to challenge the assumptions made by structural 
theorists. States are not unitary actors. They are black boxes that cover a huge array of actors 
and institutions, each with varying resources, who interact in incredibly complex manners. 
Foreign policy is the outcome of this process. These are the domestic, state level sources of 
foreign policy. Of central importance to this thesis is the understanding that if the inputs 
change, it is likely the foreign policy outcome will change. The fact that change is possible 
demonstrates the importance of incorporating agency based explanations into IR. The sub-
field of IR that has tried explicitly to do this is foreign policy analysis. 
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2.4.1 Foreign Policy Analysis, Agency and Multi-Level Frameworks 
 
    Scholars of foreign policy analysis argue that what they study is the ‘ground’ of IR. By 
‘ground’ they mean “the conceptualization of the fundamental or foundational level at which 
phenomena in the field occur.”40 They reject the notion that the domestic sources of foreign 
policy can be brushed aside by the unitary actor assumption. Instead, they break open the 
billiard ball to identify the internal sources that make foreign policy. These scholars argue 
“All that occurs between nations and across nations is grounded in human decision makers 
acting singly or in groups.”41 Traditionally this approach has focused on individuals and 
groups with authority to commit resources, which are normally states.
42
 Therefore foreign 
policy analysis has attempted to explain and understand the complex interaction of 
government and state decision makers and the role they play in shaping foreign policy. 
Foreign policy analysts may try to explain a single decision or a sequence of decisions. In 
doing so they will concern themselves with the process, investigating such factors as problem 
recognition, framing, perception, goal prioritisation, option assessment and other relevant 
factors.
43
 
     Foreign policy analysis has adopted an approach to explanation that differs from 
traditional IR theory. Foreign policy is viewed as multifactorial, with many complex inputs 
drawn from various levels of analysis. Therefore foreign policy analysis has the potential to 
engage in multi-level assessment. Whether the input is an individual, a group, an institution, 
or the international system, if it impacts foreign policy making then it is of importance to the 
foreign policy analyst. In order to study these phenomena, foreign policy analysis draws on a 
multitude of existing disciplines from across the social sciences and attempts to integrate 
these into its explanations. Finally, foreign policy analysis is rooted in agent-oriented theory. 
Valerie Hudson argues that “States are not agents because states are abstractions and thus 
have no agency. Only human beings can be true agents, and it is their agency that is the 
source of all international politics and all change therein.” 44  These agents are not inter-
changeable. Change happens in international politics because individuals differ. Rather than 
study individuals in the abstract, foreign policy analysis adopts an actor-specific approach 
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and grounds individuals within the specific historical context they faced.
45
 This thesis adopts 
the foreign policy analysis approach by focusing on a specific individual, the president of the 
United States, placing him within the specific context of the Cold War, adopting a multi-level 
framework that analyses his interaction with his executive, the Congress and the international 
system, and draws on a multi-disciplinary literature including IR theory, foreign policy 
analysis and Cold War historiography. 
    The following sections will review some of the existing approaches to foreign policy 
analysis. It begins by looking at state level approaches, moves on to look at attempts to link 
domestic and international explanations, before concluding with a discussion of why IR has 
struggled to incorporate the role of individuals. In doing so I acknowledge the intellectual 
debt this thesis owes to the existing literature and highlight the theoretical contributions that 
will inform the case studies in the forthcoming chapters. 
 
2.4.2 Allison’s Conceptual Lenses 
 
    Graham Allison has contributed to the debate on agency in foreign policy by challenging 
the assumption held by IR theorists that states are unitary actors. He argues that this may be 
useful shorthand for the construction of systemic theories, however this assumption 
 
obscures as well as reveals. In particular, it obscures the persistently neglected fact of 
government: the “decision maker” of national policy is obviously not one calculating 
individual but is rather a conglomerate of large organisations and political actors. What 
this fact implies for analysts… is no simple matter. Its implications challenge the basic 
categories and assumptions with which we approach events.
46
 
 
Allison identifies one of the most important shortcomings of the systemic approach and the 
extent to which this assumption limits our ability to understand and explain events in 
international politics. 
    The focal point of Allison’s argument lies in his criticism of the rational actor model, 
which we have previously established as the analytical foundation of both neorealism and 
neoliberalism, the dominant structural approaches to international politics. Rationalists are 
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concerned with explaining government choice and state behaviour on the assumption that 
they are facing a specific strategic problem.
47
 Rationalists assume the state to be a unitary 
actor operating within an international system they view as a ‘strategic marketplace’. In 
accordance with basic microeconomic theory, states are assumed to have a list of preferences 
they wish to achieve, i.e. certain foreign policy outcomes they favour above others. States 
will have a variety of options at their disposal to help achieve these ends. Each option, if 
chosen, will produce a benefit but may incur a cost usually in the form of responses from 
other states. Engaging in basic cost-benefit analysis, the state will choose the option it 
believes will lead to the best possible outcome i.e. the maximum reward for the minimum 
cost. This process is a simple value-maximizing mechanism from getting from a strategic 
problem to a logical solution.
48
 
    Allison argues there are two significant weaknesses to the rational actor model that limit its 
usefulness. The first is his direct challenge of the unitary actor assumption. States are not 
billiard balls. State foreign policy is directed by governments, and these consist of many 
different layers in a highly differentiated decision-making process. The unitary actor 
assumption fails to account for this, which limits the explanatory power of the model. The 
second is that outcomes are not simply the result of rational choice calculation. In fact, “large 
acts are the consequences of innumerable and often conflicting smaller actions by individuals 
at various levels of bureaucratic organizations in the service of only partially compatible 
conceptions of national goals, organizational goals, and political objectives”. 49  These 
criticisms question how ‘rational’ the foreign policy making process is and therefore the 
extent to which the rational actor model can adequately explain foreign policy outcomes. In 
order to improve our understanding of foreign policy, and the explanatory powers of foreign 
policy analysis, Allison has proposed two alternative models. 
    The first is the Organizational Behaviour Model (OBM). It questions the usefulness of the 
rationality assumption by arguing that government behaviour can only be explained by 
considering the impact of the bureaucracy on government decision-making. In this model, 
outcomes are not simply the result of government choice. Instead they are the result of large 
government organizations functioning according to standard patterns of behaviour. Thus, 
“government behaviour relevant to any important problem reflects the independent output of 
several organizations, partially coordinated by government leaders. Government leaders can 
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substantially disturb, but not substantially control, the behaviour of these organizations”.50 
Therefore it is not simply the case that a government leader clicks their finger and the 
bureaucracy does exactly what they want. Indeed, standard operating procedures may even 
place limits on policy making options. If the situation requires a course of action that the 
bureaucracy is not capable of carrying out, or developing a new operating procedure within 
the time frame, then government leaders do not have that option to choose from. The OBM 
challenges the rational actor model by analysing the organizational routines and repertoires 
that produce government action and limit the government’s ability to act as rational value-
maximizers. 
    Allison’s Organizational Behaviour Model is important for our analysis not only because it 
challenges the structural rationalist models of IR, but because it introduces us to the role 
played by domestic structures in foreign policy. This is why this thesis proposes a multi-level 
framework. The domestic context and the particular domestic structures the president faces 
are crucial to explain foreign policy. Thus, the president’s relationship with the bureaucracy 
will form a crucial component of the forthcoming case studies. 
    The second model Allison proposes to challenge the rational actor model and further our 
understanding of foreign policy is the Governmental Politics Model (GPM). Whereas the 
OBM introduced the role of the domestic bureaucracies, the GPM incorporates the role of 
individual decision-makers who sit on top of these bureaucratic organisations. These 
individuals are not a monolithic group. Rather, “each is in his own right, a player in a central 
competitive game. The name of the game is bureaucratic politics: bargaining along 
regularized channels among players positioned hierarchically within the government”. 51 
Rather than rational value-maximizing or organisational outputs, foreign policy making has 
to be understood as a political process where outcomes are the result of “compromise, 
coalition, competition, and confusion among government officials who see different faces of 
an issue”.52 As a result, foreign policy outcomes may be intended or unintended, and they 
may satisfy all, some or none of the participants, based on the compromises and bargains 
which had to be struck to reach a decision.  
    Although the GPM offers a more detailed approach to the study of foreign policy, and 
emphasises the role of agency, it does raise some important criticisms. The first of these is 
that “ministries and other bureaucratic units pursue at best their own version of the national 
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interest and at worst their own parochial concerns”.53 Foreign policy is no longer viewed as 
the result of logical and rational planning but the unintended outcomes of various battles of 
political will. According to Hill, we find that policy as a result of foul-ups is just as likely to 
occur as rationally thought out and pre-designed policy. If the policy is the result of 
unintended outcomes and compromise then it is likely that it will not satisfy the preferences 
of any particular actor.
54
 
    The second, what Hill defines as the weakest aspect of the theory, is the question of 
whether the agents are acting irrationally or just sub-optimally. Are they acting as rational 
individuals but as an irrational collective? The key question is, “If policy-makers, instead of 
trying to construct an effective, united national position, prefer rather to pursue the interests 
of their own, ministry, department or office, why should this be so?”55 The motivation of 
agents is not clear, and it seems to make little sense to pursue the interests of your department 
if this risks the security of the state. 
    Hill’s third and final criticism of the GPM is its assumption of role socialisation, “the 
presumed ability of an organisational context to socialise its staff into a particular set of 
values attached to that unit, over and above apparently superordinate value-systems such as 
‘the national interest’”.56 The problem is how do we determine which “unit” the individual is 
socialised by? Is it the whole department or a small group within that department? Also, how 
do individuals know what their unit’s preferences are in order to maximize them? Hollis and 
Smith have argued that this conception of bureaucratic behaviour is too narrow.
57
 The 
behaviour of individual bureaucrats is not determined solely by their position in the hierarchy. 
Instead there is a relationship between the constraining effects of the position held and the 
potential for action that it creates. The office provides institutional powers and restraints, but 
individual capabilities determine how different individuals are able to interpret their 
bureaucratic roles. This will be discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters when 
detailing how different presidents have interpreted the role of the president in foreign policy 
in various ways. Of particular relevance to our current discussion is Hill’s observation that 
political actors, particularly heads of government, have a privileged role in the GPM. 
Through their power of personage, their relationship with foreign leaders and “the sheer 
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capacity for heroic transcendence of routine which all powerful leaders enjoy, a head of 
government can change the rules of the bureaucratic game and start the whole dance off again 
to different music”.58 Therefore, one must always be aware of the specific historical and 
institutional context to which the GPM is being applied. 
    The GPM model is important for our analysis because it introduces the role played by 
individuals in the policy making process. It offers an agency based approach to foreign policy 
which allows us to analyse the role of the president in relation to his closest advisors and the 
effect this has on policymaking. The forthcoming chapters will demonstrate how important 
the relationship between the president and his advisors is and why it is essential to 
incorporate this into explanations of US foreign policy. 
 
2.5 Linking the Domestic and the International 
 
2.5.1 Putnam’s Two Level Game 
 
    The analytical framework proposed by this thesis incorporates a multi-level approach, 
stressing the importance of the interplay between the individual, the state and the 
international system. The preceding approaches reviewed in this chapter have tended to 
restrict themselves to one level of analysis. However, previous attempts have been made to 
develop multi-level approaches. It is to these we now turn. 
    Addressing the relationship between international and domestic politics Putnam noted, “It 
is fruitless to debate whether domestic politics really determine international relations, or the 
reverse. The answer to that question is clearly ‘Both, sometimes.’ The more interesting 
questions are ‘When?’ and ‘How?’”.59  In response, Putnam developed a model which tries to 
integrate both levels in order to analyse the areas of entanglement between them. 
    Putnam restricts his model to studying international negotiations between state 
representatives. He develops the concept of the two-level game in order to illustrate this 
relationship: 
 
 At the national level, domestic groups pursue their interests by pressuring the 
government to adopt favourable policies, and politicians seek power by constructing 
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coalitions between those groups. At the international level, national governments seek to 
maximize their own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse 
consequences of foreign developments.
60
 
 
As a result of the leader having to play both levels simultaneously, it is possible for decisions 
to be rational at one level but not at the other. 
     At the heart of Putnam’s model lies the concept of the ‘win-set’. This is the combination 
of all possible agreements reached at the international level which will be approved by a 
majority of domestic constituents. If a large win-set exists, there is increased chance an 
international agreement will be struck. Many factors combine to determine the size of the 
win-set. Putnam identifies the following three as major determinants of success: domestic 
preferences and coalitions, domestic institutions, and the international negotiator’s strategies. 
These three factors set the scene of the game. They determine how much leverage a 
negotiator has on an issue. If they have domestic support, they will be in a strong bargaining 
position. However, the existence of the opponent and their domestic constituencies 
complicate the picture. If the negotiator does not take into account the domestic situation 
facing his opponent then it is unlikely they will strike an agreement at the international level, 
let alone have it ratified by constituents in the foreign country.
61
 
    The chief negotiator is assumed to be the only formal link between the domestic and the 
international, and is assumed to act as an honest broker on behalf of his constituents. 
However, Putnam acknowledges this is an oversimplification. In reality, there is the 
possibility the chief negotiator’s preferences may diverge from those of his constituents. If 
the negotiator’s incumbency is dependent on his domestic constituents then ““he is more 
likely to present an international agreement for ratification, the less of his own political 
capital he expects to have to invest to win approval, and the greater the likely political returns 
from a ratified agreement”.62  The chief negotiator therefore has what amounts to a veto 
power over possible agreements. An agreement may be acceptable to the domestic 
constituents, but if a negotiator is opposed to it then they are unlikely to present the 
agreement for ratification. We therefore have an example of when a leader can ‘make a 
difference’. 
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    Although Putnam’s analysis is restricted to international negotiations, its insights are still 
important for the multi-level framework developed in this thesis. It introduces the 
relationship between international politics and domestic constituents, and the games leaders 
must play in order to make foreign policy. This is the case with US foreign policy where the 
President is forced by the constitution to share foreign policy power with Congress. Therefore 
the relationship between the president and Congress will be central to our analysis. This will 
be shown in the case studies with the success of Truman in ‘selling’ the Truman Doctrine to 
Congress and in Reagan’s continued struggle to get Contra funding from Congress. One 
president was able to maximize their win-set, the other was less successful. 
 
2.5.2 Neo-Classical Realism 
 
    While Putnam has restricted his analysis to international treaty negotiations, a broader 
development has taken place in recent neorealist theorising. A group of scholars have 
attempted to “weaken” Waltz’s systematic theorising by incorporating domestic variables 
into their approach. However, these neoclassical realists make it quite clear that what they are 
developing is not a theory of international politics in the style of Waltz, but rather, they offer 
a theory of foreign policy. Fareed Zakaria, a leading neoclassical realist, is adamant on this 
point. He argues that theories of international politics are distinguished by that which they 
seek to explain. A theory of international politics seeks to explain international events 
between states by making assumptions about each state’s motivation. A theory of foreign 
policy is a completely different approach. It seeks to explain why state preferences change 
over time and why different states strive to achieve different goals in similar circumstances. 
Rather than making assumptions about states’ motives, a theory of foreign policy attempts to 
explain state motivation.
63
 But that is as far as the theory should go, according to Zakaria. 
Whether a state’s foreign policy succeeds or not is determined by the intentions and 
capabilities of other states with which it interacts with in the international system. Thus, if 
one wishes to “explain the outcomes of international interactions – colonization, the 
formation of alliances – one must consult a theory of international politics”.64  
    Although departing from Waltz’s international theory approach to offer a theory of foreign 
policy, Zakaria shares Waltz’s belief in the need for generality. He argues that a theory of 
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foreign policy must begin by analysing the impact of the international system on state 
behaviour. This is essential because every state operates within the anarchic international 
system; therefore the ability of a state to implement a successful foreign policy is in large part 
determined by its material capability in relation to its competitors. Beginning with an 
assessment of a country’s relative standing in the international system also allows a theory to 
generalize across different countries. However, generalizations can only ever offer a partial 
explanation. The neoclassical realists argue that we can sacrifice generality by narrowing the 
theory’s scope to a particular state and incorporating additional variables from lower levels of 
analysis.
65
 Thus a good explanation of a particular state’s foreign policy will include both 
systemic and domestic factors. Zakaria warns against relying solely on domestic factors to 
explain state behaviour and discusses an interesting example, that of German expansion from 
1933 to 1945: 
 
Clearly, Adolf Hitler and Nazi ideology are crucial to an understanding of German 
aggression, but that aggression did not arise in a vacuum. As critics of the Treaty of 
Versailles continually pointed out, Germany’s post-1919 position in the international 
system made some form of German revanchism almost inevitable. Only Hitler and 
Nazism can explain the particularly ghastly form this revanchism took.
66
 
 
    The neoclassical realists argue for the inclusion of domestic variables because they contend 
that the impact of material power on foreign policy is indirect and problematic. The first 
domestic variable they incorporate is the role of state leaders. Gideon Rose explains that 
systemic theories such as structural realism assume that the rational actor model produces a 
direct link between changes in material capabilities and state behaviour.
67
 Friedberg states 
that  “In most structural realist formulations... assessment [of relative power] through rational 
calculation plays the part of a reliable but invisible transmission belt connecting objective 
[material] change to adaptive behaviour”.68 The international system provides constraints and 
opportunities which state leaders are assumed to react to rationally. If the rationality 
assumption holds constant, then changes in state behaviour can be explained by changes in 
the international system. 
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    However, the neoclassical realists believe that the assumption of rationality and a 
“smoothly functioning mechanical transmission belt is inaccurate and misleading”.69 Material 
power is not converted directly into state action; instead it is filtered through the perception 
of state leaders. Foreign policy analysts must therefore attempt to engage with the contextual 
reality that state leaders find themselves in, that is, to try and understand how state leaders 
perceive their environment. As Rose has argued, “What this means in practice is that the 
transition of capabilities into national behaviour is often rough and capricious over the short 
and medium term”.70 
    The second domestic variable incorporated into neoclassical realist theory is the level of 
state power in relation to domestic society. The material capabilities of a state may increase, 
but it is not always possible for state leaders to turn national material capabilities into state 
power. Their ability to increase state power requires two developments. The first is the state’s 
ability to extract wealth; the second is the degree of centralization of decision-making power 
within the state. If these two conditions are not met then no state can be classed as strong. 
Thus “state-centred [neoclassical] realism predicts that nations try to expand their political 
interests abroad when central decision-makers perceive a relative increase in state power”.71 
    The nature of neoclassical realist theorising demands a very specific methodology. If one 
wishes to explain a particular case of foreign policy then in order to analyse the perceptions 
of state leaders, and to determine how much access to state resources they had, then this will 
require in-depth empirical research. This is the result of “their appreciation of the degree to 
which their central, parsimonious independent variable needs to be studied in conjunction 
with a variety of messy contextual factors in order to say much of interest about their subject 
matter”.72 In depth knowledge of the country to be studied is essential to complement the 
theoretical premises of neoclassical realism. Critics may question if this is a theory of foreign 
policy at all, but Rose argued that “its very looseness, in other words, makes it a useful 
framework for carrying out the kind of midrange theorizing that so often is the best social 
science can hope to achieve”.73 Critics of the neoclassical realists have also questioned if 
                                                          
69
 Rose, G. (1998) ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” World Politics 51.1, p158 
70
 Ibid., p158 
71
 Zakaria, F. (1998) From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press), p30 
72
 Rose, G. (1998) ‘Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy” World Politics 51.1, p166, emphasis in 
original 
73
 Ibid, p168 
66 
 
 
 
their approach can really be called realist at all, arguing that they have in fact abandoned the 
core assumptions that separate realism from competing paradigms.
74
  
    Although this thesis does not adopt an explicitly neo-classical realist framework, it is 
important to acknowledge the intellectual debt it owes to these scholars. They have taken 
steps towards integrating the domestic and the international and weakening the abstractions 
of their neorealist colleagues. They have argued for the inclusion of ‘messy contextual 
factors’ and the role of individual leaders, particularly their perceptions, to explain foreign 
policy. This thesis will build on this intellectual tradition by focusing on the role of the 
president in US foreign policy making within the multi-level framework. How Truman and 
Reagan perceived their contextual environment was crucial to the formulation of the Truman 
and Reagan Doctrines, and will be discussed in detail in the following chapters.  
    The preceding discussion has shown what attempts have been made to incorporate the role 
of domestic agency into theories of foreign policy. This provides us with a working 
assumption that individual leaders are an important source of influence in foreign policy, the 
questions we must now address are to what extent are individuals able to influence the 
foreign policy making process, and under what circumstances do they make a difference?    
 
2.6 The Individual 
 
2.6.1 Locating the Individual in International Relations 
 
    The role of the individual does not play a significant part in the research of the majority of 
IR scholars. This lack of attention is both puzzling and troubling. It is inconceivable that 
policy makers in the world’s capitals would attempt to formulate policy without a detailed 
understanding of their counterparts. Most scholars of international relations will acknowledge 
that individuals do make a difference, through their successes and failures, their sound 
judgements and their mistakes, and even the differences in their personal traits all have a role 
to play. However, scholars have demonstrated a curious lack of attempting to incorporate the 
individual into their theorisation.  
    There are three common justifications put forward by IR scholars to explain the lack of 
focus on individual policy makers. The first group of scholars argue that individuals have 
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only the smallest, if any, impact on international relations. Instead, they locate the sources of 
influence at other levels of analysis: the anarchic system, the distribution of material 
capabilities, domestic politics and institutional arrangements. All of these combine to weaken 
the influence of individuals.
 75
  The second group argue that individuals may be important, 
but they are too difficult to theorise about. Individuals vary to such an extent, in their 
perceptions, beliefs and capabilities that it is impossible to generalise about them at the 
international level. Any theory rooted at the level of the individual would lack parsimony.
76
 
The third group believe that individuals have great influence in shaping state objectives, but 
for the purposes of IR theory this is irrelevant as all states are functionally equivalent and all 
share the primary goal of security. Therefore there is no need to study the role of 
individuals.
77
 
    These claims can be rebutted. In his seminal work Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz  
tries to determine the sources of war between states. He argues that human nature is constant; 
therefore if individuals are the source of state behaviour then states should always be at war 
or always at peace. As this is not the case, Waltz believes the source of war must be located 
at the level of the system. However, Waltz has made a serious error with his analysis. Human 
nature is not constant, people are neither wholly good nor wholly bad all of the time. Thus, if 
the personal traits and behaviour of individuals differ, then it is possible that these differences 
could provide an explanation for variances observed in international relations.
78
 
    The second objection that theories focused on individuals cannot be parsimonious can also 
be challenged. Waltz claims that good, predictive theory requires abstraction whereas a 
“realistic” theory adds more variables to the model which decreases its use value. The debate 
can be restructured into one of parsimony versus accuracy. The true test of a model is how 
well it explains reality, and to what extent it can offer predictions. A parsimonious model 
would be preferable, but if the choice is between a less accurate parsimonious model, and a 
more accurate complex model, then there is an argument to be made in favour of the latter.
79
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    The third objection to rebut is that state intentions are irrelevant, as they must all pursue 
security. However, reducing explanations of international politics solely to the distribution of 
capabilities is empirically weak. Even the formation of alliances depends on more than just 
calculations of power.
80
 Distinctions are also drawn between “status quo” and “revisionist” 
states.
81
 Thus, state intentions determine to a large extent the pattern of international 
relations, and it is important to assess the impact that individual leaders have had in shaping 
these intentions.
82
 
     To illustrate this point, consider the example of Nazi Germany. Hitler alone pushed 
Germany from a revisionist state, seeking only the return of her pre-1919 territory and power, 
into an aggressive potential hegemon attempting world domination. He did so in opposition 
to the German public, the German elite and the army high command. Even more, the British 
and French were prepared to accede to almost all German demands in terms of recapturing 
her former territory as they did not want another continent wide war. Thus, it would have 
been possible for Germany to achieve her moderate revisionist demands, but the personal 
ambition of Hitler made war inevitable. With ever-greater concentration of political and 
military in the hands of Hitler, his decision-making shaped the direction of German policy. 
This would eventually result in Germany’s defeat with his decision to invade the USSR.83 
    It is thus possible to theorise at the level of the individual and to address the questions of 
what impact individuals have on international relations, what type of individuals have the 
greatest impact, and under which circumstances leaders have the most influence. Individuals 
set the ultimate and secondary intentions of a state, they shape the strategies the state will 
adopt, and in doing so they affect the behaviour of opposing states. Furthermore, it is possible 
to specify how individuals affect international relations. Leaders with grand visions, who are 
risk-tolerant, deluded, or a combination of all three, are likely to destabilise international 
relations and often initiate wars. Likewise, leaders who are more moderate and predictable 
are likely to form more enduring and peaceful alliances.
84
 
    Clearly individuals do not have an equal impact in all situations. It is essential to establish 
under what conditions they are able to make an impact. Perhaps the most obvious hypothesis 
is that the more power an individual has, the greater their influence. The ability of individual 
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leaders to dominate even strong institutions demonstrates the important role they can play in 
international relations. An individual is able to exert more influence when international, 
domestic and bureaucratic forces conflict or are ambiguous. Powerful figures are able to 
exploit weakness or confusion in order to set a policy-course based on their preferences. This 
is particularly true in times of great crisis or change. Individuals are able to act decisively and 
thus often assume greater importance.
85
 
    The preceding analysis is important for this thesis because it provides a conceptual 
justification for incorporating the role of individuals into the study of international politics. 
Rather than ignoring the study of individuals because it is ‘too messy’ for abstract theorising, 
the first level of analysis should be included because it plays such a crucial role in agenda 
setting and decision-making. It allows us to see that structures are not fixed and history is not 
predetermined by social forces. Only by incorporating the role of the president will we be 
able to explain why US foreign policy during the Truman and Reagan administrations took 
the shape it did, for example, why Truman crossed the 38
th
 Parallel and why Reagan pursued 
Contra funding in the face of congressional opposition. 
 
2.6.2 Individual Preferences 
 
    Attempting to theorise about agency and the individual raises a challenging question about 
the preferences of individuals. Rationalists and constructivists have clashed over the topic of 
preference formation. Rationalists assume that preferences are exogenous. All that matters is 
that rational actors have preferences, and these form the basis of value-maximizing decision-
making. Constructivists argue that in order to explain behaviour you must first explain 
preferences. As a result, preference formation must be endogenous to explanations of foreign 
policy. Attempts have been made to resolve this dispute. Jeffrey Legro has argued that 
rationalism and constructivism should be viewed as complementary, not competing 
approaches to theorising. He proposes a ‘two-step’ solution. First we explain preferences, and 
then we explain behaviour.
86
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    Fearon and Wendt raised what they see as potential problems with this approach.
87
 If 
assuming preferences are exogenous or endogenous is merely an analytical convenience to 
answer a specific research question then this poses little difficulty. However, Fearon and 
Wendt noted that 
 
“there is nevertheless a danger that, through a process of forgetting what we are doing, 
what starts out as merely an analytical convenience can become something more than 
that, a tacit assumption about what the world is really like which limits our theoretical 
and/or political horizons”.88 
 
    To avoid this difficulty, the thesis will not frame itself in terms of the rationalist-
constructivist debate over preferences. The role of presidential preferences will be central to 
the forthcoming case studies. Therefore it will analyse how presidential preferences are 
formed and how they shape policy. In particular, the case studies will show the important role 
played by the presidential worldview in setting the foreign policy agenda and ranking 
security threats. Reagan’s preference was to remove the Sandinistas from power therefore he 
was prepared to pursue his policy of funding the Contras, even in the face of congressional 
opposition. It will be shown where this preference came from (Reagan’s anti-communist 
worldview) and how this policy was operationalised (covert funding of the Contras). 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
 
    This chapter has highlighted the weaknesses of structural theories of International 
Relations. By restricting themselves to one level of analysis and assuming states to be unitary 
actors, structural theories leave much of international politics left unexplained. This is due to 
the fact that they are unable to realise that agency is the heart of change in politics. Whether 
adopting a rationalist perspective, as do the neorealists and neoliberals, or a constructivist 
approach, structural theories struggle to explain why change occurs, let alone predict it. If we 
wish to explain foreign policy and why states behave the way they do, it is essential to 
incorporate agency into our approaches. This chapter has offered a conceptualisation of 
agency based on the role played by state representatives in the form of human decision-
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makers. How these decision-makers interact is crucial to the formulation of foreign policy. 
Therefore we have to acknowledge their existence and address them in our research 
questions. This will be to our advantage in a number of ways.  
    First, the creep towards historical determinism present in structural theories, particularly 
those of a rationalist flavour, will be challenged directly. The international system presents 
structural conditions that a state must face. However, this does not determine their foreign 
policy response. States have options and the dynamic inter-play of decision-makers 
determines how a state will act. If any of these inputs are changed, then the output will 
change. This is what is known as ‘foreign policy substitutability’89. For example, if Al Gore 
had won the US presidential election in 2000 there is an argument to be made he would not 
have invaded Iraq in 2003. He would likely have included several moderate and liberal 
Democrats in his advisory team, rather than neo-conservatives. As a result he would have 
approached the Iraq situation from a different perspective. Changing these inputs would 
likely have changed the output.  
    Second, agency based approaches will move us away from abstract generalisation towards 
a more empirically detailed understanding of international politics. Attempting to explain 
international politics in terms of scientific laws is of little value once we acknowledge the 
role played by human agency. Atoms do not have choices to make. Decision-makers are 
faced with choices. Under similar circumstances they could conceivably make another 
choice, altering the outcome and changing the course of international politics. For example, 
in 2003 Saddam Hussein could have cooperated with UN weapons inspectors allowing them 
to conclude he did not possess Weapons of Mass Destruction, thus weakening the Bush 
Administration’s case for an invasion. Instead, Hussein appeared to believe the US was 
bluffing and refused to cooperate with the UN. Why did Hussein do this? IR theory is silent 
on the matter.  
    This is not to say that agency alone explains all of international politics. Instead, this leads 
to the third and final major advantage, the ability to engage with international and domestic 
levels of analysis. By adopting an agency based approach and focusing on the interaction of 
human decision-makers we can start making links between existing theoretical approaches. 
When we turn our attention to US foreign policy during the Cold War in the forthcoming 
chapters we will analyse the role played by external structures, internal structures and the 
interaction of the president with other participants in the policy making process, namely their 
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executive and Congress. In doing so we will offer an explanation of US foreign policy during 
the Cold War that is rooted in presidential agency but also engages with structural factors.  
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Chapter Three: The President, the Presidency and US 
Foreign Policy 
 
3.1 Introduction        
 
    This chapter will attempt to analyse the role of presidential agency in the formulation of 
US foreign policy. The president is but one of many sources, both domestic and international, 
which determine the final outcome of US policy. The president, Congress, the Courts, the 
bureaucracy, political parties, interest groups, NGOs, the media, foreign states, international 
institutions and many others all contribute to the foreign policy making process. This thesis is 
concerned with one particular aspect of US foreign policy, that of the role of the president. In 
order to determine the scope for presidential agency in US foreign policy it is necessary to 
look at several key factors.  
    The first is the constitutional origins of the president’s foreign policy role. This requires us 
to analyse the presidency as an institution and to locate its formal powers. One important 
relationship we will discern from this discussion is that of the president and Congress. The 
US constitution has created a government of separated institutions sharing power.
1
 This has 
important ramifications for understanding the US foreign policy making system. 
    The second factor is the development of the institution of the presidency over time. The 
constitution is a document open to interpretation and therefore debates over what the 
founding fathers intended are less important for understanding US foreign policy than how 
the institution of the presidency was “operationalised” by successive presidents. 2 Particularly 
important will be the historical precedents set by Washington and Lincoln, as these laid the 
foundation for the birth of the “modern presidency” during the administration of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt.
3
 
    Perhaps more than any other institution of government, the institution of the presidency is 
shaped by the personal characteristics of the office holder. This thesis focuses on the 
management style of the president, how the president chooses to structure and manage the 
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executive in order to facilitate decision-making.
4
  This is the third factor influencing US 
foreign policy. The management style of the president in large part determines how decisions 
are made within the executive, and this in turn contributes to how effectively the president is 
able to direct foreign policy. A president who struggles to control his own White House may 
soon find himself faced with a crisis of his own making (directly as in the case of Watergate, 
or “indirectly” as in the case of Iran-Contra, if one is willing to believe Reagan’s defence of 
plausible deniability). Once a decision is made in the White House, the president then faces 
the problem of implementation. In doing so he faces the harsh and complex reality of “his” 
bureaucracy. We will see that it is not simply the case that the Chief Executive commands his 
Executive Departments and they obey his order. Each department has their own interests, 
loyalties and operating procedures, which can both help and hinder presidential initiative. 
How the president attempts to deal with this dilemma is of crucial importance to effective 
foreign policy making. This also relates to the president’s management style and how he 
decides to structure the executive. One key relationship this chapter will look at is that of the 
Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser. How the president decides to utilise 
each of these generates important insights into the relationship between the White House and 
the Executive Departments. 
    Finally, the relationship between the president and Congress in the realm of foreign policy 
will be analysed. The most important insight to remember is that of Charles Jones, “The 
presidency is not the government. Ours is not a presidential system”.5 The president and 
Congress share the foreign policy making power. The president is Commander-in-Chief, but 
only Congress can declare war. The president is responsible for international treaty making, 
but these can only become law with the consent of the Senate. All presidential initiatives 
require funding, but it is Congress who controls the purse strings. Therefore how the 
president attempts to work with Congress on foreign policy issues is of crucial importance. 
    What we shall see in the subsequent discussion is that it is difficult to separate these factors 
in reality. Interactions take place between each factor and it is the combination of these which 
influences final policy outcomes. The constitution defines the formal separation of powers 
and attempts to regulate how the branches of government should interact, but in practice we 
find that the relationship changes over time, with power moving from one branch to the other. 
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In the realm of foreign policy this has more often than not been a one-way transfer from 
Congress to the president. This can be due to external factors and the deference of Congress, 
but often it is a direct result of presidential initiative. 
    It is important to make clear what this chapter does not argue. It does not claim that the 
president is in total control of foreign policy, and what he demands, the bureaucracy and 
Congress meekly accept. The president is part of a unique system of government whereby 
each institution is forced to share power with the other. The president may be the chief 
executive, but the bureaucracy is not his to command. However, within this system of 
competing sources of power it is possible to advance the argument that the presidency is in 
the strongest position to direct US foreign policy, both in theory and practice. This allows us 
to adopt an executive centred view of the policymaking process from which we can try to 
determine how much scope there is for presidential agency. 
 
3.2 Constitutional Origins 
 
    The constitution of the United States is a compromise. In attempting to forge a new nation, 
the Founding Fathers shared several ideas in common. Chief amongst them was their belief 
that the purpose of any state was to protect individual liberty. They feared that unchecked 
government power would lead to tyranny and thus the destruction of liberty. Above all, the 
Founding Fathers rejected the notion of absolute monarchy. Agreement may have been 
reached as to the ends of government, but the key debate in the Constitutional Convention of 
1787 was how this would be achieved. Eventually, a compromise was reached whereby a 
unique system of government was proposed. Each branch of government would be separated, 
with power shared among them, in the hope that each branch would be able to check and 
balance the other. This was due to the Founding Father’s belief that an unchecked legislature 
or executive could lead to tyranny.
6
 
3.2.1 The Question of Foreign Policy 
 
    The separation and sharing of foreign powers was also the result of a compromise. The 
convention had split into two camps over one major issue of foreign policy, the power of the 
executive. James Madison had argued strongly in favour of a system of separated powers. He 
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believed that an overly powerful and overly centralised government would pose a threat to 
the liberty of the citizens. Wary of what he believed was the selfish and self-interested nature 
of human beings; it was therefore essential that any system of government must be based 
upon strict rules that limited the potential for tyranny. As Madison wrote in Federalist Papers 
No, 51 “You must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place, 
oblige it to control itself.”7 
    Alexander Hamilton emerged as the leading voice for those who favoured a powerful 
executive. This developed from his belief in the need for a strong central government. 
Hamilton believed that a strong executive was absolutely essential for any system of 
government to function. He argued that executive leadership was required in order to promote 
good government. Writing in Federalist Paper No. 70, Hamilton argued, “A feeble executive 
implies a feeble execution of the government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a 
bad execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in theory, must be, in 
practice, a bad government.”8 
    The divergence of opinion between Madison and Hamilton sheds light on the final 
compromise laid out by the constitution. If a system of checks and balances was to be 
adopted, then a strong executive would be required to provide the initiative to make the 
system work. On paper it seemed as if Madison had triumphed, but Hamilton’s insistence on 
a strong executive laid the seeds for future executive initiative. 
    Article II of the constitution establishes the powers of the presidency. The president is 
granted plenary power to be chief executive in both foreign and domestic policy (“The 
Executive Power shall be vested in a President” and “he shall take Care that the Laws be 
faithfully executed”). The Constitution grants command of the armed forces to the president 
(“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United 
States”). Finally, Article II designates the president as chief negotiator and chief diplomat 
(“He shall have power, by and with the advice of the Senate, to make treaties...shall appoint 
Ambassadors...and he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers...”). 9  These 
constitutional delegations have generated competing interpretations of the president’s role in 
foreign policy. Wittkopf et al have argued, “Clearly, the specific grants of constitutional 
authority are limited. The president has important opportunities, but not unambiguous 
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authority to lead”.10 This is challenged by McCormick, who notes, “With such power at his 
disposal, the president seemingly possesses the constitutional mandate to dominate foreign 
affairs”.11  
    The Founding Fathers were concerned with placing too much power in the president’s 
hands. In order to check and balance the power of the president, Article I of the Constitution 
entrusts Congress with the general legislative power (“all legislative powers herein granted 
shall be vested in a Congress of the United States”), which empowers it to make laws and 
appropriate funds (“no money shall be drawn from the Treasury but in consequence of 
appropriations made by law”). 12 Wittkopf et al have suggested that, “Together, the general 
legislative power and the ‘power of the purse’ grant Congress nearly limitless authority to 
affect the flow and form of foreign relations”.13 The Constitution also designates specific 
foreign policy powers to Congress. Treaties must be ratified by the Senate. Congress alone 
has the right to declare war and provide for national defence (Congress is authorised to 
“provide for the common defence...; to declare War...; to raise and support Armies...; to 
provide and maintain a Navy). Congress is also entrusted with the authority to “regulate 
commerce with foreign nations” and to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” 
for carrying out its other responsibilities.
14
 
    As with any legal document, the Constitution relies on interpretation. Scholars have long 
concerned themselves with the question of what the Founding Fathers intended, that is to say, 
in what way they wanted the government to function.
15
 One of the major difficulties in 
attempting to address this question lies in the choice of language used by the framers. Article 
I clearly states that “All legislative powers herein granted shall be invested in a Congress of 
the United States”. 16  Thus, although Congress is given sole legislative power, the 
Constitution places restrictions on this power in that Congress can only legislate in relation to 
those areas listed in the constitution. Article II, however, is much more ambiguous. It states, 
“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”.17 This 
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statement fails to limit executive power in the manner of Article I. As a result, it is possible to 
argue that, “Carried to its extreme, this view gives the president unlimited powers”.18 
    In the field of foreign policy, debate over the relationship between the president and 
Congress appeared to centre on the war making power. Disagreement again arose between 
Hamilton and Madison. The former argued in favour of strong presidential leadership in 
matters of war, but Madison sought to temper this desire. In a letter to Thomas Jefferson, 
Madison wrote, “The constitution supposes, what the history of all governments 
demonstrates, that the executive is the branch most interested in war and most prone to it. It 
has accordingly with studied care vested the question of war in the legislature”.19 The result 
of this compromise was that Congress was given the sole power to declare war, but the 
President was made Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces who would be fighting the war.  
    The reality of the constitutional ideal has led to conflicting views between the executive 
and the legislature as to where each branch’s foreign policy making authority begins and the 
other’s ends. McCormick has noted, “What has emerged, in the words of Supreme Court 
Justice Robert Jackson, has been “a zone of twilight in which [the president] and Congress 
may have concurrent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain”.20 This uncertainty 
has produced a vast amount of literature centred on the debate over who should control 
American foreign policy. Scholars such as John Yoo, William Howell and Terry Moe argue 
in favour of a ‘President-first’ approach, whereas Louis Fisher and Louis Henkin reject this 
interpretation and argue for a strong congressional based foreign policy.
21
 The complexities 
of this literature are not of direct relevance to the current discussion. What is important, 
however, is that the constitution attempts to structure the presidency in relation to the 
Congress, but the ambiguity of the language involved has, as we shall now see, allowed 
individual presidents to shape the office to their particular preferences, and, in the field of 
foreign policy, presidents have been able to increase their power at the expense of the 
Congress. 
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3.3 The Constitution in Practice 
 
    In many ways, the ambiguity of Article II was a deliberate choice made by the Founders. 
Unable to fully resolve the issues raised by Madison and Hamilton in relation to the powers 
of the presidency, the Framers left the constitutional language vague because they knew that 
George Washington would be the first president. The framers were confident that 
Washington would interpret the constitution in a correct and responsible manner. 
 
3.3.1 George Washington 
 
    Washington came to office with one overriding principle. He wanted to avoid ideological 
divisions and to focus his energies on making the government function as smoothly as 
possible. He was also aware that, as the first president, his every act and decision would be 
analysed by the nation and possibly established as a precedent. Washington wrote, “many 
things which appear of little importance in themselves… may have great and durable 
consequences from their having been established as the commencement of a new general 
government”. 22 
    This was indeed the case, and many of the precedents set by Washington led to the growth 
of presidential power in foreign policy. In negotiations with foreign nations Washington 
established the precedent that not only would the executive represent the United States 
abroad, but that the president had sole power to recognize other states. In this case the event 
he was responding to was the question of recognising the new French Republic. By accepting 
the ambassador from the French Republic, Washington signalled to the world that the United 
States accepted the new republic, not the monarchy, as the legitimate rulers of France.   
Washington then established the precedent of withholding foreign policy information from 
the House of Representatives. In 1796 the House asked Washington for copies of diplomatic 
papers relating to the Jay Treaty with Britain but he rejected this request arguing that the 
House had no constitutional right to interfere in the treaty-making process. By unilaterally 
declaring neutrality between France and Britain in 1793 Washington established the 
precedent of executive initiation of foreign policy. Schlesinger has argued that these actions 
led to the creation of an “executive perspective” of the foreign policy making process and a 
“feeling that the executive branch, with superior information and direct responsibility, was 
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the source of judgements to which Congress, without abdicating its separate powers, should 
customarily defer”.23 
    Washington’s declaration of neutrality initiated another constitutional debate between 
Hamilton and Madison. The power to declare neutrality was the president’s constitutional 
right, according to Hamilton. He was of the firm belief that foreign policy was an executive 
privilege.
24
 Although the constitution granted Congress the right to declare war, Hamilton 
argued that the executive had the sole right to interpret treaties. The consequence of such an 
interpretation of the constitution was the possibility that if a military alliance was signed 
between the United States and a foreign country, whereby the US made military 
commitments to aid that foreign country if it found itself at war, it would be the president’s 
decision to determine if the US was required to honour its military commitments. Thus the 
president would not require a declaration of war from Congress should he decide that he had 
to send the US military into combat in order to uphold the treaty obligation.  
    Madison replied that such an interpretation of the constitution was grossly flawed. He 
argued that there was no basis for the assumption that foreign policy, particularly questions of 
war and treaty making, was an inherently executive function. The constitution had granted 
Congress the sole authority to declare war. Any attempt by the president to use military force 
against a foreign state on the basis of a treaty obligation, without the consent of the Congress, 
would be a violation of the constitution.
25
  
    Again, the purpose of the current analysis is not to delve too deeply into debates on the 
interpretation of the constitution. However, what must be reiterated is that it is this potential 
for constitutional ambiguity that presents individual presidents with the possibility of 
increasing the power of the executive, particularly in foreign policy. Although Washington 
was worried about setting bad precedents that other presidents could exploit for dubious 
purposes, he was well aware that the birth of the Republic provided the best opportunity to 
begin trying to define the relationship between the branches of government. Indeed the 
potential for presidential agency was greater in the early years of the Republic because the 
president was not constrained by prior precedents. Thus the importance of Washington’s 
actions in the field of foreign policy cannot be overstated. Declaring the right to recognise 
other states as being the sole preserve of the presidency provided the executive with a strong 
opportunity to take the lead in international relations. McCormick has offered an interesting 
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summary of this process: “When President Washington followed the Hamiltonian notion of 
inherent executive power by initiating foreign policy actions, he seemed to imply that the 
powers of the executive derived from the fact that the United States was a sovereign state and 
that the president was the representative of that sovereignty”. 26  Washington’s actions in 
withholding information from the House regarding the Jay Treaty also demonstrate that 
Washington held a strong understanding of the presidency’s place in the constitutional order. 
He attempted to maintain the separation of powers in relation to foreign policy. Eventually he 
was prepared to concede that constitutionally it was in fact Congress’s responsibility to 
address questions of neutrality. However, just as he was aware, Washington’s actions 
provided a precedent for future presidents to justify their foreign policy actions and, 
intentionally or not, began the gradual transfer of power from the Congress to the executive 
that would eventually result in FDR’s “modern” presidency and Nixon’s “imperial” 
presidency. 
 
3.3.2 Abraham Lincoln 
 
    Following from Washington, the next individual president to set a dramatic precedent for 
presidential power was Abraham Lincoln. In response to the secession of the Southern states 
Lincoln initiated sweeping and drastic actions. He ordered a blockade of the Southern ports, 
enlarged the army and navy, called the militia into service, arrested persons suspected of 
disloyalty and suspended the writ of habeas corpus. All of this was done without the 
authorisation of Congress and was thus unconstitutional. In terms of the reality he faced, 
however, the reasons for Lincoln taking these actions are understandable. The nation was 
faced with the greatest crisis since the War of Independence. In order to save the Union, 
Lincoln was forced to take these drastic, extra-constitutional measures. 
27
 
    Lincoln’s actions are important to the present analysis for two reasons. The first is the fact 
that his actions once again set a precedent. In times of national crisis the president may be 
required to encroach into areas of congressional responsibility in order to defend the nation. 
This is what presidents to this day continue to define as their most important constitutional 
role.
28
 The second reason is that Lincoln offered a unique constitutional justification for his 
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actions. He developed the Lockean idea of executive prerogative into a so called “war power” 
which he believed resided constitutionally with the president. Locke had argued that 
prerogative power allowed governments “to act according to discretion for the public good, 
without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it”.29 For Lincoln, the war 
power of the president was based in the Take Care and Commander-in-Chief clauses. The 
former requires that as Chief Executive of the United States it is the duty of the president to 
“take care that the laws be faithfully executed”. The latter clause grants the president 
authority to command the armed forces. Lincoln fused these ideas together in order to justify 
his actions during the Civil War: “When rebellion or invasion comes, the decision is to be 
made…and I think the man whom, for the time, the people have, under the constitution, made 
the commander-in-chief of their army and navy, is the man who holds the power and bears 
the responsibility of making it”. 30  Lincoln had developed a new and expansive view of 
presidential power. He was clearly stating that in times of national crisis the president, as 
commander-in-chief, had constitutional authority to take whatever steps he deemed necessary 
to protect national security. Furthermore, this proclamation was accepted by the Congress in 
a special session, convened by Lincoln on July 4 1861, twelve weeks after hostilities began. 
By August 6, Congress had retroactively ratified all of Lincoln’s military actions. The 
Supreme Court ruled in the Prize Cases of 1863 that Lincoln had the power to do this, even 
without a formal declaration of war from Congress.
31
 
    Although these precedents were set in the context of a civil war, the argument that the 
president, as commander-in-chief, has the right to initiate military action to defend the nation 
in times of crisis has important ratifications for the conduct of foreign policy. The majority of 
threats to national security will originate from foreign sources. Thus, future presidents would 
be able to draw on Lincoln’s example when drafting national security policy. They could now 
make the claim that Congress has the power to declare war, but in the case of sudden attack it 
is the president who exercises power as commander-in-chief. Schlesinger has argued that 
such an expansion of executive power is not justified on the basis of Lincoln’s conduct 
during the Civil War.
32
 He argues that the Prize Cases relates solely to domestic insurrection 
and that they confer no additional or special powers on the president in foreign policy. 
However, as we shall see, future presidents did not share Schlesinger’s interpretation. 
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3.3.3 Theodore Roosevelt 
 
    Washington and Lincoln served as president during the nascent years of the republic, in 
terms of the country’s size, development and standing in the international system. Foreign 
policy was not of primary importance for a nation focused on domestic expansion across the 
continent. This contentment with isolation was challenged during the presidency of Theodore 
Roosevelt. The United States by this point had settled the continent and developed into an 
industrial power. Roosevelt was intent on expanding both the power of the presidency and the 
standing of America as a world power.
33
 He reasserted the Monroe Doctrine by defining 
Central and South America as central to US national interests, as a zone of influence where 
he was willing to intervene in the internal affairs of neighbouring states if deemed necessary. 
He sent troops to the Dominican Republic and Cuba. He actively encouraged the 
Panamanians to declare independence from Colombia, strategically placing the USS 
Nashville in local waters to limit Colombian resistance. The aim of this endeavour was to 
allow the US to gain control of the Panama Canal.
34
 Further abroad, Roosevelt wished to 
demonstrate America’s strength both as a military and diplomatic power. As a diplomat, 
Roosevelt successfully negotiated a peace treaty between Russia and Japan, for which he won 
the Nobel Peace Prize.
35
 To demonstrate the growing military power of the United States, 
Roosevelt ordered the US Navy to sail around the world. Congress refused to fund such an 
endeavour, but Roosevelt dispatched the ships anyway, informing Congress that the Navy 
had enough money to make it halfway round the world, but if Congress wanted the sailors to 
return home the legislature would have to make more funds available.
36
 Cronin and Genovese 
have stated that Roosevelt “aggressively asserted presidential power both at home and 
abroad, and re-established presidential primacy”. 37  In doing so he offered a new and 
expansive view of the president’s position in the constitutional order. Lincoln had developed 
a prerogative theory of presidential power, whereby in times of emergency the president 
could justify usurping power to defend the nation. Roosevelt developed what became known 
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as the stewardship theory asserting that “it was not [a president’s] right but his duty to do 
anything that the needs of the nation demanded unless such action was forbidden by the 
Constitution or by the laws” and that “under this interpretation of executive power I did and 
caused many things not previously done by the president and the heads of the departments. I 
did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of executive power.”38 
 
3.3.4 Woodrow Wilson 
 
    The presidency of Woodrow Wilson further cemented two of the key relationships in our 
analysis, the growth of US influence as a world power, and the further centralisation of 
presidential power in the making of US foreign policy. Pika and Maltese have argued that “it 
was Wilson who linked inspirational rhetoric to a broad program of action in an effort to 
address domestic and foreign affairs in much the same way as a British prime minister”.39 
Wilson’s attempt to strengthen the role of the president was given a helping hand with the 
outbreak of the First World War. Understanding the magnitude of the conflict would require 
a mobilisation of resources unheard of in American military history, Wilson realised that his 
role as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces would not be enough to allow him to control 
all aspects of the war effort. He thus asked Congress to grant him authority to manage the 
wartime economy. Congress accepted his request and gave him power to “allocate food and 
fuel, to license trade with the enemy, to censor the mail, to regulate the foreign language 
press of the country, and to operate railroads, water transportation systems, and telegraph and 
telephone facilities”.40 The conduct of the war was now centralised through the president, 
with the full support of Congress. Upon the signing of the Armistice, Wilson placed himself 
at the centre of the peace treaty negotiations. Building on his famous Fourteen Points speech 
to Congress in January 1918, Wilson helped write the Versailles Treaty and developed the 
idea of the League of Nations. Although the Senate failed to ratify the Versailles Treaty and 
the US never took up membership of the League, the example of Wilson is very important for 
our analysis of presidential agency. In a positive sense, Cronin and Genovese have noted that 
he “further established the United States as a world power and the presidency as a pivotal 
centre or lever of American government” and that “his leadership during World War 
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1…elevated the office of the presidency to one of national and international leadership”.41  In 
a negative sense however, it was Wilson’s own personal refusal to compromise on the 
Versailles Treaty, combined with his personal hatred for Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, the 
main opponent of the treaty, which eventually led to Versailles’s eventual demise on the 
Senate floor.
42
 This was definitely not what Wilson intended, but it was a direct result of his 
actions. Thus, although the president as an individual may have failed to achieve the jewel in 
the crown of his foreign policy agenda, his actions in conducting the American efforts in the 
First World War led to a growth in the power of the presidency as an institution in the long 
term. 
 
3.3.5 Franklin D. Roosevelt 
 
    The presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt is widely regarded in the literature as a 
significant turning point in the development of the presidency as an institution. Greenstein 
has labelled FDR’s tenure as the birth of the “modern presidency”.43 The changes that took 
place during the presidency “added up to such thorough a transformation that a modifier such 
as “modern” is needed to characterize the post-1932 manifestations of the institution that had 
evolved from the far more circumscribed traditional presidency”.44 Others, however, have 
argued that the presidency of FDR did not constitute the birth of a modern presidency.  
Nichols argues that the American government merely became more active and that there was 
no underlying change in the constitutional order.
45
 Skowronek addresses the value of the 
“modern presidency” as conceptual construct, arguing that it hinders rather than helps our 
understanding of presidential history.
46
 However, from the perspective of the role of the 
president in the history of US foreign policy, we shall see that the presidency of FDR, 
particularly after the outbreak of the Second World War, does indeed signify a growth in 
presidential agency. 
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    FDR was able to initiate this transformation in response to two crises, the Great Depression 
and the Second World War. To address the problems generated by the economic collapse of 
the 1930s FDR created a social, economic and political revolution with the initiation of his 
New Deal which led to an expansion of the Federal government which intervened into more 
areas of American society than ever before. As Pika and Maltese have argued, “Roosevelt 
established the concept of the ‘positive state’ in America – a government that has the 
obligation to take the lead in providing for the welfare of all the people”.47 
    It is his response to the outbreak of the Second World War that this analysis shall focus on. 
Congress had declared American neutrality in response to the hostilities in Europe. However, 
with German victory after German victory on the continent, Roosevelt knew that it was only 
a matter of time before the US would have to intervene in some regard. Hitler’s invasion of 
France in May 1940 and the eventual evacuation of British troops at Dunkirk led British 
Prime Minister Winston Churchill to appeal directly to Roosevelt for assistance. He requested 
the US to send naval destroyers in order to help defend the English Channel. At first, 
Roosevelt appeared to decline the direct appeal when he explained to Churchill that, as a 
result of the Neutrality Acts, he could not send any military units without the explicit 
agreement of Congress. The Acts specified that no arms could be sent to any state unless paid 
for in cash. Even at this early stage Britain was struggling to keep up with her payments.
48
 
    Roosevelt viewed the victory of the Nazis in Europe as unacceptable and he began the 
complex procedure of trying to increase domestic support in favour of supporting the Allied 
war effort whilst trying to transfer American resources to the frontline. His first contribution 
was to declare as surplus large quantities of munitions which he sent to Britain. The question 
of naval destroyers, however, was a more complicated issue. To solve the dilemma, 
Roosevelt proposed a two-step solution. The first was to redefine the situation in Britain as a 
national security issue. If Britain were to fall, then Nazi control of the British Royal Navy and 
colonial islands in the Western Hemisphere would pose a threat to the US.
49
 The second was 
to declare that, as Commander-in-Chief, it was his duty to prepare for the defence of the 
nation. To do so, Roosevelt drafted an executive agreement to lend fifty “outdated” US naval 
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destroyers to the UK, in return for the ninety-nine year lease of several British territories in 
Newfoundland and the Caribbean to allow the construction of US military bases.
50
 
    The use of an executive order is important for our analysis. The Constitution states that 
presidents have the right to make treaties with foreign nations, but that they require the 
support of two-thirds of the Senate to ratify the treaty into law. Executive agreements weaken 
congressional involvement in foreign policy because they are concluded between the 
executive and a foreign nation and, once signed, have the same legal force as treaties but do 
not require the consent of the Senate. The use of an executive agreement in this instance by 
Roosevelt is significant because it was a military agreement, concluded during a period of 
war, and explicitly against the prevailing public and congressional opinion. Roosevelt 
justified his actions by arguing that this was a single, completed transaction and that in order 
to constitute a treaty, and thus involve the Senate, an international agreement had to involve a 
series of continuous transactions and long term commitments on behalf of the US 
government. The Destroyers-for-Bases agreement therefore did not meet the requirements of 
a treaty and could be concluded unilaterally by the president.
 51
  
    By November 1940, the newly re-elected Roosevelt received a communication from 
Churchill stating, “the moment approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for 
shipping and other supplies”.52 With the British running out of money, Roosevelt knew it 
would be impossible for them to hold off the Nazis. Declaring that “the best defence of Great 
Britain is the best defence of the United States”, Roosevelt initiated a novel approach to 
supplying the British.
53
 He decided he would simply lend the British the supplies they 
needed, using the analogy of a man lending his garden hose to a neighbour whose house was 
on fire. Roosevelt managed to overcome initial congressional opposition and by early March 
1941 Congress passed the Lend-Lease Act with an initial appropriation of $7 billion.
54
 
    Although Britain had managed to stave off a German invasion, it was clear that they would 
not be able to do so for much longer, and there was certainly no chance that they would be 
able to liberate Europe. Roosevelt knew that if the balance of power were to be restored on 
the continent then it would require significant US military involvement. The problem was 
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that the American public was split between those who favoured American intervention, and 
the isolationists, who remembered the horrors of the First World War and did not wish to see 
American soldiers involved in another European conflict. Roosevelt had addressed this on the 
campaign trail in November 1940, promising that he would not send American sons into any 
foreign war.
55
 By the summer of 1941 Roosevelt realised he would in all likelihood have to 
break this campaign promise. He began by declaring a neutrality zone in the north Atlantic 
between the United States and Iceland. The US navy was ordered to patrol the area and report 
German submarine movements to the British. Roosevelt then used an executive order to send 
troops to Greenland in April. This move faced little opposition as Greenland, part of the 
Western Hemisphere, was viewed as part of the American sphere of interest. By July, Hitler 
had invaded Russia, and forced Roosevelt into further action. He ordered US troops to move 
to Iceland, allowing the British forces stationed there to move to the Middle East. This action 
was more controversial as Roosevelt had placed American soldiers closer to Europe, and had 
done so via another executive agreement and without the authorisation of Congress. 
Schlesinger argues that Roosevelt pursued this course not because he believed the 
Commander-in-Chief clause granted him authority independent of Congress, but because the 
emergency was so great that he did not have time for full Congressional deliberation.
56
 He 
had to act, and although realising, much like Lincoln, that he might be overextending his 
constitutional powers, he justified his actions in terms of national security and hoped 
Congress would later agree with him. As Schlesinger has argued, “Roosevelt knew where he 
wanted to go and where he believed the nation had to go. But he did not want – and this is 
why he was one of the greatest presidents – to go there alone”.57  
    The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor and the German declaration of war on the United 
States solved Roosevelt’s dilemma. With a congressional declaration of war, “Roosevelt 
seized on the role of Commander in Chief with relish”.58 His first strategic decision was to 
concentrate on defeating Germany before Japan. This would prove to be a highly 
controversial decision with a significant proportion of the American public. From as late as 
1942 public opinion polls show that the American people were more concerned with seeking 
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revenge against the Japanese than fighting Germany.
59
 In order to make the public realise that 
Europe was more important Roosevelt knew he would have to get American troops involved 
in the fighting. The president directed his military commanders to be ready to engage the 
Germans somewhere in Europe by 1942. This greatly influenced the Allied strategy that 
resulted in the invasions of North Africa in November 1942, Italy in July 1943 and finally 
Normandy in June 1944.
60
 Roosevelt also took over economic control of the war effort, 
building on the legacy of Wilson, to further expand presidential involvement in the conflict. 
In addition, Roosevelt adhered to the Wilsonian precedent of presidential activism in 
diplomacy by taking the lead in creating the United Nations. Unfortunately, Roosevelt died 
on April 12 before the charter of the UN was drawn at the San Francisco conference.
61
 
    What we can see from the above analysis are several clear examples of presidential agency 
in foreign policy. Roosevelt had to navigate initial public and congressional isolationist 
opposition in order to first allow the US to help supply the allies at the outbreak of the war, 
and then skilfully managed to manoeuvre the US military into ever increasing involvement in 
the war. In doing so he expanded presidential power in foreign policy through the use of 
executive agreements. Although, as discussed above, Schlesinger argued that Roosevelt 
would have preferred to have involved Congress in more detail, what is important for our 
analysis is the fact that Roosevelt was able to decide to pursue his north Atlantic strategy 
through presidential directives as Commander-in-Chief. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor 
and Hitler’s inexplicable declaration of war on the US may have finally forced the public’s 
and Congress’s hand, but Roosevelt was still faced with the challenge of directing US forces 
against Germany instead of the more obvious (at least to the public) Japanese threat. 
    The death of FDR in April 1945 also allows us to pose an interesting hypothetical question. 
Would the US’s initial Cold War policy have been different if Roosevelt had been alive? 
From Roosevelt’s desire to ensure participation of the Soviet Union in the United Nations it 
is possible to argue that he was not as hostile, or indeed blatantly anti-Soviet, as many in his 
administration were. In fact, Roosevelt’s plans for post war policy clashed with many of his 
colleagues and Allies, particularly Vice-President Truman and Prime Minister Churchill. The 
consensus view was that Stalin would not be a reliable leader to deal with, and that he would 
eventually try to dominate Eastern Europe. Roosevelt disagreed. Truman held strong views 
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on what he viewed as unprovoked Soviet aggression in Poland, whereas Roosevelt was 
willing to concede that in light of recent history it was understandable that Stalin would feel 
threatened by a build up of pro-Western liberal capitalist democracies on his border. What we 
can clearly see is a classic tension between Roosevelt’s more realist interpretation of foreign 
policy, rooted in ideas of great powers and legitimate zones of influence, and Truman’s 
idealistic belief in the inherent goodness of liberal democracy versus the evil of autocracy.
62
 
Obviously it is impossible to say what direction American foreign policy would have taken 
had Roosevelt lived, but, all things being equal, a more moderate response might have been 
developed had the US been led by someone who was willing to cooperate more with Stalin. 
 
3.3.6 Harry Truman 
 
    The presidency of FDR and the beginning of the Cold War led to the creation of what is 
commonly accepted as the modern presidency. The crisis created by the early years of the 
Cold War led to further centralization of foreign policy power in the executive and an 
expansion of presidential power. The presidency of Harry Truman will be discussed in more 
detail in the following chapters but for our current analysis of the growth of presidential 
agency in foreign policy it is important to highlight two key precedents set by the first 
president of the Cold War era. 
    The first relates to the relationship between the president, Congress and the power to 
initiate military hostilities. The issue of war making was dramatically raised by North 
Korea’s invasion of South Korea in June 1950. Truman viewed the invasion as a clear 
attempt by the Communists in China, and in all probability the Soviet Union, to challenge the 
West’s post-war structure. Having begun to establish a multilateral framework of both 
military (NATO) and diplomatic (the UN) international institutions, Truman was not willing 
to let communist aggression challenge his global order. He viewed the invasion not just as a 
threat to South Korea or the United States, but also as the first real test of post-war collective 
security.
63
 
    Truman’s response was based on two factors. The first was the influence of his Secretary 
of State, Dean Acheson. As under-Secretary of State in February 1947 it was Acheson who 
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had advised Truman of the need to support Greece and Turkey on the basis of the domino 
theory, which held that if one state fell to communism it would only be a matter of time 
before its neighbours followed. He was able to foster a close relationship with the president 
and helped to shape the drafting of the Truman Doctrine.
64
 Not only did Acheson have strong 
views in relation to communism and the Soviet Union, he also, as a lawyer, held strong views 
concerning the extent of presidential power. He was a staunch advocate of Lincoln’s 
prerogative theory and argued that as Commander-in-Chief the president had all the authority 
he required to intervene in Korea, with or without a congressional declaration of war.
65
 
Truman accepted Acheson’s argument, but he was not confident that he could justify the 
intervention to Congress or the American public based solely on a perceived constitutional 
power. Thus, as he had framed the defence of Korea in terms of collective security and 
multilateralism, Truman decided to cite two UN resolutions (UNSC 82 and 83) as 
justification for his decision to send American troops to Korea. Louis Fisher has defined this 
as “the most significant precedent for executive action” in the history of US foreign policy.66 
Arthur Schlesinger goes further by arguing, “Truman dramatically and dangerously enlarged 
the power of future presidents to take the nation into war by insisting that the presidential 
prerogative alone sufficed to meet the requirements of the Constitution”. 67 
    Both Fisher and Schlesinger are highly critical of Truman’s actions, as they believe he 
overstepped the constitutional boundary that separate the president from Congress’s right to 
declare war. However, the constitutional arguments regarding what ought to have been done 
are not the focus of this analysis. Instead, Truman’s decision to send troops to Korea serves 
as both an example of presidential agency in foreign policy and of the expansion of 
presidential power which future presidents would be able to use as a precedent to justify their 
foreign policy decisions. This is what Johnson and Nixon did in relation to Vietnam. 
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3.3.7 Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon 
 
    The Vietnam War stands as perhaps the most extensive and controversial exercise of 
presidential war making power. Both Johnson and Nixon extended presidential prerogative in 
foreign and national security policy beyond any previous markers. Johnson came to the 
presidency with a hard-line executive constitutional outlook. He believed the president had 
complete authority to send troops abroad in the execution of US foreign policy goals, 
especially to defend against national security threats. He first exercised this authority in April 
1965 when he sent 22,000 troops to the Dominican Republic, without congressional 
authorisation, to crush what he feared was a communist revolution that would lead to the 
victory of another Castro.
68
 
    The situation in South East Asia was rather different. American policy in Vietnam had 
evolved through the Administrations of Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy, with varying 
degrees of congressional input and presidential initiative. It was Johnson though who 
authorised the bombing of North Vietnam and sent combat troops into South Vietnam. With 
the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, Congress had essentially given Johnson a blank 
cheque to wage war in Vietnam. However, Schlesinger notes “LBJ did not for a moment 
believe the resolution provided the legal basis for his action. He had this as president.”69 By 
August of 1965 Johnson had sent 50,000 additional military personnel to Vietnam, bringing 
the total to 125,000 men, with Johnson declaring that there would be no limit on the number 
of troops deployed. Vietnam was in every sense of the word a presidential war. It allowed 
Johnson to expand the definition of defensive war by claiming that a military conflict 
anywhere in the world could constitute a threat to American national security which would 
thus allow the president, as Commander-in-Chief, to deploy American combat forces in that 
part of the world to meet the threat, without Congressional approval. The president would 
also have exclusive power to determine what constituted a military threat to American 
national security. In doing so, Johnson attempted to centralise the war making power within 
the executive to a greater extent than any previous president. 
70
 
    Nixon assumed the presidency in January 1969, claiming to have a “secret plan” to win the 
Vietnam War. This turned out be a strategy of removing American ground forces while 
continuing to provide air and naval cover to the South Vietnamese and supplying them with 
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American hardware and munitions. The plan was to remove as many American personnel as 
possible in order to reduce casualties and let the South Vietnamese to continue bearing the 
brunt of the fighting. However, it soon became clear to Nixon that the North Vietnamese 
would not accept any compromise or partition of Vietnam. Their war aim was to unify the 
country under Ho Chi Minh’s leadership.71  This posed a major problem for Nixon. The 
American public were demanding an end to the war, but he refused to allow Ho Chi Minh 
victory in South Vietnam. This led to Nixon adopting a contradictory strategy. Whilst 
attempting to remove American forces from Vietnam, he escalated American involvement. 
    Of particular relevance to our analysis are his decisions to order the covert invasion of 
Cambodia and the bombing of Laos in 1970, and his decision to bomb Hanoi, the North 
Vietnamese capital, in December 1972. All of these actions took place without Congressional 
involvement. Nixon defended his actions using the argument that as Commander-in-Chief he 
had the right to take any measures he required in order to protect the lives of American 
military personnel. Thus he felt he was perfectly entitled to invade Cambodia and bomb Laos, 
both of which were neutral countries. The presidencies of Johnson and Nixon form the basis 
of Schlesinger’s ‘imperial presidency’ thesis. He argues that “Both Johnson and Nixon had 
indulged in presidential war making beyond the boldest dreams of their predecessors by 
claiming that inherent and exclusive presidential authority, unaccompanied by emergencies 
threatening the life of the nation, unaccompanied by the authorization of Congress or the 
blessing of an international organisation, permitted a President to order troops into battle at 
his unilateral pleasure”.72 This serves as the most extreme example of presidential agency in 
US foreign policy making. 
 
3.4 Accumulation of Presidential Power 
 
    The purpose of the above discussion has been twofold. The first was to analyse specific 
examples of presidential agency in foreign policy. The second was to demonstrate that the 
foreign policy actions of individual presidents have contributed to a long term trend that has 
pushed the presidency further and further to the centre of US foreign policy making. What 
has happened, in essence, is an accumulation of executive power. Each president may have 
been responding to individual cases that were very much context specific (Washington and 
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the Jay Treaty, Lincoln and the Civil War, Truman in Korea) but in doing so, each president 
established a precedent that future presidents were able to use both to justify their own 
actions and to further expand presidential agency in foreign policy (Johnson and Nixon, for 
example). 
    It is possible to argue that the preceding analysis has been weighted in favour of the so-
called “great” presidents and the more obviously controversial presidents of the Cold War era. 
This charge is not without merit. Just as it is possible to selectively pick the great presidents, 
it is easy to ignore the lesser holders of the office, such as Tyler, Grant and Harding, whose 
actions often weakened the office of the presidency. However, as Cronin and Genovese have 
argued, “if there were presidential underachievers along with those who stretched the 
boundaries of presidential power, clearly the institutional trend was in the direction of 
growing influence”.73 Therefore the above cases have been chosen and discussed in order to 
demonstrate the growth in presidential agency in US foreign policy. Each president made a 
substantial contribution to the expansion of executive power in foreign policy, particularly in 
the areas of national security and the use of military force. What has been witnessed over the 
past two centuries has been a gradual centralisation of war making within the executive. The 
constitution clearly allocates the power to declare war to Congress, but as a result of growing 
American power and influence in world affairs, individual presidents have been able to 
increase their control of national security by emphasising their role as Commander-in-Chief, 
responsible for the security of the American people. This has allowed them to take command 
of the huge national security bureaucracy that has developed since the Second World War 
and in doing so has greatly added to the institutional strength of the presidency in relation to 
Congress. The modern presidency is thus granted advantages in foreign policy making that 
Congress cannot match. This is not to say that it is simply the case that what the president 
commands instantly becomes official US foreign policy. It does however mean that the 
president is now well placed to take the lead in the formulation of foreign policy, which 
grants the president considerable scope for agency. 
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3.5 The Other Branches 
 
    To this point in the analysis we have adopted an executive centred perspective on the 
growth of presidential power in foreign policy. However, the picture will not be complete 
without a brief discussion of the roles played by the other branches of government in this 
accumulation of executive power. 
 
3.5.1 The Role of the Supreme Court 
 
    Historically, the Supreme Court has refrained from ruling on foreign policy issues. 
However, when it has taken a case, the Supreme Court has usually ruled in favour of the 
president. The most notable example, and possibly the most important Supreme Course ruling 
in the area of presidential authority and foreign policy, was the case of United States v. 
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation in 1936.
74
 The Court ruled that the president acts “as the 
sole organ of the federal government in the field of international relations”.75  Wittkopf et al 
note, “With few exceptions, the courts, in this and other cases, have repeatedly conferred on 
the president broad powers in foreign affairs.”76 
    One of the exceptions was the 1952 case of Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. et al v. 
Sawyer.
77
 The Supreme Court ruled that “presidential authority was greatest when explicitly 
authorised by Congress and circumscribed when explicitly prohibited by Congress. In the 
‘zones of twilight between them, authority is less certain and possibly shared with 
Congress.”78 The Supreme Court has acknowledged debate exists between the president and 
Congress on the subject of presidential leadership in foreign policy, and has ruled Congress 
may grant or deny such leadership on certain matters. How Congress has responded forms the 
basis of the following section. 
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3.5.2 Congressional Deference, Delegation and Opposition 
 
    Between 1945 and 1972 Congress appeared in general willing to support the president’s 
leadership in foreign policy. An era of bipartisanship developed where Congressmen and 
presidents tried to promote the view that ‘politics stopped at the water’s edge’. Senator J. 
William Fulbright, chair of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1959 to 1974, used 
an American football analogy to express his support of, and deference to, the president: “No 
football team can expect to win with every man his own quarterback... The Foreign Relations 
Committee is available to advise the President, but his is the primary responsibility.”79 Aaron 
Wildavsky analysed the success rate of presidential proposals to Congress between 1948 and 
1964. He found that the president had a 70% success rate in defence and foreign policy.
80
 
    Congress has not only deferred to the president on foreign policy. It has also delegated 
some of its constitutional powers to the president. On several occasions, Congress has 
authorised the president to use force as they see fit. In January 1955 Congress granted 
President Eisenhower the power to use armed forces “as he deems necessary” to defend 
Quemoy and Matsu from attack by Chinese communists.
81
 In August 1964 Congress passed 
the Gulf of Tonkin resolution which granted the president the right “to take all necessary 
steps, including the use of armed forces, to assist any member or protocol state of the 
Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty requesting assistance.” 82  This delegation of 
authority to initiate military force has resulted in Congress cementing the ‘imperial 
presidency’ by concentrating ever increasing foreign policy powers in the executive. 
    The events of the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal prompted Congress to 
reconsider its position in relation to the executive. Worried by what they believed were 
abuses of presidential power, Congress tried to become more active in foreign policy and 
exert its constitutional responsibility to balance and check the presidency.  They did so by 
targeting the use of executive agreements to bypass congressional oversight and the 
president’s claim to an inherent war power. 
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    By the early 1970s, Congress began to express concern over the breadth and depth of 
foreign commitments the president had entered into without Congress’s knowledge through 
the use of executive agreements. The Case Act of 1972 ordered the president to submit all 
international agreements to Congress within sixty days of their execution. However, the act 
was limited and ineffective. The president still had the power to decide which agreements 
would be treaties and which would be executive agreements. If the president decided an 
agreement was too sensitive for public disclosure then the Case Act only contained 
provisions to forward the relevant details to the relevant Senate and House committees. As 
Wittkopf et al have argued, “the statute may have complicated presidents’ lives, but it has not 
substantially restricted their freedom.”83 
    Turning their attention to the president’s use of military force, Congress passed the War 
Powers Act in 1974. Many legislators were concerned the president had abused his position 
as Commander-in-Chief during the Vietnam War. The Constitution grants Congress the right 
to declare war. However, it has done so only five times in history.
84
 In the same period, the 
US was involved in over one hundred foreign conflicts. These were often defined by the 
president as ‘police actions’, ‘limited conflicts’ or any other term which fell short of ‘war’. 
As a result of this semantic fluidity the president did not have to ask Congress for 
authorisation. The War powers Act was an attempt by Congress to place restrictions on the 
president’s ability to deploy military forces abroad. Under the legislation, presidents must 
report to Congress within forty eight hours the involvement of US troops in ‘hostilities’. If 
Congress fails to authorise the president’s decision then all US forces must be removed from 
the combat zone within ninety days. The act also instructs the president to consult Congress 
‘in every possible way’ in the run up to the use of force.85 
    The War Powers Act has been largely unsuccessful. Dumbrell has argued, “The war 
powers legislation has conspicuously failed in its objective of giving Congress a controlling 
voice in crisis situations.”86 Presidents have argued the act is unconstitutional. Richard Nixon 
stated it was an attempt “to take away by mere legislative act, authority which the President 
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has properly exercised for almost 200 years.”87 The vagueness of the language used in the act 
has been exploited by presidents. The act is unclear on who exactly the president should 
consult: the whole of Congress, the party leaders or the relevant foreign affairs committees? 
When asked if President Ford had consulted Congress about a rescue mission in Vietnam in 
1975, Senator Hugh Scott of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee replied, “We were 
informed. We were alerted. We were advised. We were notified... I don’t know whether that 
is consultation or not.”88 The ninety day time limit was also an issue, Senator Eagleton noted 
at the time of passage that the war powers provisions effectively allow the president an 
“open-ended blank check-book for ninety days of war making.” 89  Jacob K. Javits, the 
architect of the War Powers Act, argues that the resolution “did not, and does not, guarantee 
the end of presidential war, but it does provide Congress with the means by which it can stop 
presidential war if it has the will to act.”90  Congress has been reluctant to exert its will, 
however, especially if the president engages in short, victorious and politically popular 
conflicts such as Grenada, Panama and the First Gulf War. Congress is more likely to oppose 
domestically unpopular military interventions, such as Somalia during the Clinton 
administration. 
  
3.6 The President as an Individual  
 
    Our discussion up to this point has focused on the constitutional origins of the presidency 
as an institution and how the actions of individual presidents have over time expanded the 
foreign policy powers of the office in relation to the other branches of government. What is 
now required is an analysis of the president as an individual in an attempt to establish what, if 
any, personal power sources are available to the president. We do so in the attempt to 
establish that who occupies the office of president has an important impact on the formulation 
and direction of US foreign policy. Each president brings to the office a unique combination 
of ideology, worldview, management style and political skill and it is necessary to analyse 
these as important determinants of US foreign policy. 
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3.6.1 Informal Powers 
 
    One of the earliest attempts to draw attention to the president as an individual was Richard 
Neustadt’s Presidential Power.91 He was concerned with the idea of the president as an 
individual amongst many in a set of institutions. Neustadt was responsible for emphasising 
that the US system was one of separated institutions sharing power. As a result of this, 
Neustadt made the rather revolutionary claim that the president may have been granted 
significant formal powers by the constitution, but these formal powers were almost negated 
by the separation of powers and the system of checks and balances. Thus the president found 
himself with limited opportunity to exercise these powers in full, and that the office was 
reduced to that of a clerk. For Neustadt, the president cannot rely on his authority and mere 
commands to achieve results, instead the president must maximise his personal informal 
power. In doing so he will find that presidential power is in fact the power to persuade. To do 
so, a president must be able to demonstrate political skill in order to win the support of fellow 
policymakers in Washington and the American people. More importantly, it is not about 
demonstrating skill in one particular instance, but being able to create a reputation that will 
maximise his personal power resources in all future instances. The problem for Neustadt, 
though, is very clear: “Effective personal power is a risky thing – hard to consolidate, easy to 
dissipate, rarely assured.” 92  The overriding theme of his analysis therefore is one of 
presidential weakness.
93
 
    The rest of Neustadt’s book focuses on trying to demonstrate how a president can 
maximise his personal power resources. He highlights the complex relationship between 
decision-making, producing and assessing quality-information, and timing. A president must 
be aware of how his current choices affect his future power resources. In order to do this he 
must be equipped with the required information and have enough time to analyse the 
information in order to make the decision. The president must also possess confidence in 
himself to make such decisions and he must be able to organise his staff and the executive in 
such a way to maximise his personal power resources.
94
 This theme will be discussed in more 
detail in the next section, but for our purposes at the moment it is enough to acknowledge the 
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contribution made by Neustadt in allowing us to locate the influence of the president as an 
individual. 
 
3.6.2 Presidential Character 
 
    The second major contribution to the study of the president as an individual was made by 
David Barber in his work, The Presidential Character.
95
 The purpose of his analysis is to 
establish criteria that will help American citizens choose an effective president. In order to do 
so, Barber argues that “the first need is to see the man whole – not as some abstract 
embodiment of civic virtue, some scorecard of issue stands, or some reflection of a faction, 
but as a human being like the rest of us, a person trying to cope with a difficult 
environment.”96  By focusing on the president as a human, Barber is able to develop the 
thesis that the personality of the president influences his behaviour and that presidential 
personality is patterned and can thus be studied from a social scientific perspective. In order 
to do so, Barber focuses on three key concepts, style, worldview and character. Style is 
defined as “the President’s habitual way of performing his three political roles”, his 
worldview “consists of his primary, politically relevant beliefs” and character is “the way the 
President orients himself toward life – not for the moment, but enduringly.”97 As the title of 
his book suggests, character is the most important variable for Barber, but it does not 
necessarily determine worldview and style. 
    From these assumptions Barber develops two baselines which define Presidential “types”. 
The first is activity-passivity, how much energy the man puts into the job of being president. 
The second is how much personal satisfaction and enjoyment they get out of being president. 
This is the positive-negative effect. From these two baselines Barber is able to deduce a 
typology of character types.
98
 
     The first is active-positive. These presidents are goal orientated and are willing to exert a 
tremendous degree of effort in order to achieve their goals. They are willing to adapt to 
different situations and often exhibit personal growth. In doing so they derive great 
                                                          
95
 Barber, J. D. (1985) The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House (London: 
Prentice-Hall International, Inc.) 
96
 Ibid., p3-4 
97
 Ibid., p8-9 
98
 Ibid., p11 
101 
 
 
 
satisfaction from the application of rational thought to achieve desired ends. However, they 
may run into trouble as they fail to understand that not everyone shares the same goals.
99
 
    The second is active-negative. These presidents exert similar amounts of effort, but they 
feel relatively low emotional reward in return. This stems from feelings of low-self esteem 
and the activities they engage in often become compulsive. As a result, they often seek to 
exert power over others to overcome what they perceive to be their own shortcomings.
100
 
    The third is passive-positive. These presidents are other-directed who seek affection in 
order to compensate for low self-esteem. They hide this behind superficial optimism. They 
seek, and often get, encouragement from others, but are likely to face disappointment in their 
political career.
101
 
    The fourth is passive-negative. These presidents put little into their job and get even less 
enjoyment. They suffer from low self-esteem and compensate for this by viewing politics as 
their civic duty, as something they ought to do. They make poor political leaders as they lack 
experience and flexibility.
102
 
    The work of Neustadt and Barber has produced a significant volume of literature. The 
main criticisms of Neustadt are that he fails to discuss the ends to which presidential power 
should be put. Cronin and Genovese raise the issue of where ethical boundaries lie in relation 
to the personal power of the president.
103
 Sperlich raises two further criticisms of Neustadt. 
The first is that he overstates the significance of presidential bargaining and does not 
emphasise nonreciprocal sources of influence. The second is that Neustadt’s recommendation 
that presidents should try as much as possible to run their own White Houses by relying less 
on personal advisers would invariably overburden most presidents.
104
 
    Barber has been criticised for publishing a theoretically and methodologically 
underdeveloped thesis.
105
 He has also been accused of excessive reductionism by paying 
“insufficient attention to the full range of possible psychological and non-psychological 
determinants of behaviour” and attempting to explain too much with his theory.106 
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    However, what is important for our analysis is not to engage with the criticisms of 
Neustadt and Barber in any detail but to acknowledge the fact that they have laid the 
foundations for the study of individuals in political science. They allow us to separate the 
individual from the office and in doing so attempt to analyse what impact they are able to 
make on politics. Neustadt is quite clear that in the case of the president of the United States, 
his potential for influence is limited to that of a clerk by the system of separated powers. 
Barber, on the other hand, argues that who the president is can make a profound difference to 
national politics and that “the man himself weighs heavily among other historical factors.”107 
As there is only one president at a time it is not possible to prove this by comparison, but 
“only someone mesmerised by the lures of historical inevitability can suppose it would have 
made little or no difference to government policy had Alf Landon replaced FDR in 1936, had 
Dewey beaten Truman in 1948, or Adalai Stevenson reigned through the 1950s.” 108 
 
3.6.3 Presidential Leadership 
 
    The extent to which an individual can influence policymaking is often described in terms 
of leadership. The concept of leadership is complex in that it recognises differences exist 
between people in terms of their conception of interests and goals, and that in order to 
overcome these differences a leader must be able to exert influence in order to convince 
others to adopt his interests and goals, or to at least push others in a direction he requires in 
order for his goals to be attained. Greenstein has argued that in order for a president to exert 
successful leadership in a system of separated powers he must possess six qualities. First, he 
must be a skilled public communicator. Second, he must be able to organise his office in 
order to structure the activities of his aides effectively. We will discuss this in detail in the 
next section. Third, he must possess political skill in order to assert the powers of his office. 
Fourth, political skill must be harnessed to a vision of public policy that will provide both 
inspiration and a political strategy that will produce consistency in policy making. Fifth is his 
cognitive style, how the president attempts to process the mass of information he must 
contend with in his role as president. Sixth, is the president’s emotional intelligence. How the 
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president is able to cope with the intensity and pressures generated by the office will, 
according to Greenstein, determine how effective he will be as a leader.
109
 
    However, even if a president is able to maximise his own personal skill set of leadership 
qualities, this does not guarantee him control over the policy making process. Leadership 
does not exist in a vacuum. Like any other social activity it takes place within a historical 
context, and different contexts present individual presidents with varying degrees of freedom 
to exert their powers. Some presidents find themselves with many opportunities to lead whilst 
others are more restricted. However, the argument at the heart of this thesis is that although 
contextual factors may set the boundaries for political action, there is a strong potential for 
political agency. It is the combination of individual skill and contextual opportunities that 
determine whether a leader will be successful or not. It is the individual who decides whether 
he will take the opportunity or not. If the individual has the required skills, an opportunity to 
act, and the will to act, then they will have the maximum potential to achieve their goal. By 
acknowledging the fact that presidential agency is linked to context we avoid the charge of 
psychological reductionism but in stressing the potential of different individuals to exert 
leadership we also refute arguments in favour of historical and systemic determinism. 
 
3.7 The President and the Executive Branch 
 
    In the previous section we looked at the president as an individual in order to determine the 
extent of his personal and informal power. In doing so we identified that how a president 
chooses to organise the executive in large part determines to what extent he will be able to 
exert leadership. What we will see is that an important relationship exists between the 
president’s individual style and the effective operation of the institution of the executive. 
 
3.7.1 Presidential Management Style 
 
    Upon inauguration, the president will quickly discover that the formal powers granted to 
him by the constitution do not on their own lead to him exerting control over the executive 
bureaucracy. The foreign policy bureaucracy is so large and complex that the president and 
his closest aides are responsible not just for initiating policy, but must also attempt to bring 
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coherence throughout the executive branch in order to improve agenda setting, decision-
making and implementation. However, each president brings his own blend of experience and 
preferences and thus each will approach the structuring of the office in a different way. 
    The first decision a president must make is to what extent he wishes to be involved in the 
foreign policy making process. This is usually reflected in how he decides to structure the 
relationship between the Department of State and the White House. If the president wishes to 
take a less involved role in foreign policy then he is likely to appoint an experienced 
Secretary of State and charge him with directing foreign policy. However, if the president 
desires to involve himself in the business of foreign policy it is likely he will chose to 
centralise foreign policy within the White House. In the process he is likely to rely heavily on 
the National Security Council and grant his National Security Adviser wide authority in 
running US foreign policy, often at the expense of the State Department’s involvement. 
    Alexander George has identified a key relationship between the president’s personality and 
his management style: “the incumbent’s personality will shape the formal structure of the 
policymaking system that he creates around himself, and, even more, it will influence the 
ways in which he encourages and permits that formal structure to operate in practice.”110 
George has identified three personality variables which he believes directly influences the 
structure and operation of the executive. The first is the president’s cognitive style, “the way 
in which an executive such as the president defines his informational needs for purposes of 
making decisions.”111 The second is the belief the president has in his own capabilities as 
they relate to management and decision-making. The third is the extent to which he is tolerant 
of conflict amongst his advisers. These three personality variables combine to determine 
which method of information gathering and decision-making the president will prefer. The 
choice in essence is between a formal, hierarchical structure that focuses on teamwork and set 
routines, and a more debate orientated environment with less emphasis on hierarchy and more 
scope for idea generation. From this generalisation, George argues that there are three types 
of management style adopted by presidents.
112
 
    The first is the competitive model. This management style is usually adopted by a 
president who wishes to be heavily involved in the foreign policy process, has confidence in 
his abilities as a manager and decision-maker, and who wishes to encourage conflict amongst 
his advisers in order to maximise the amount of information that flows into his office. He 
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wishes to encourage a diversity of views. To do this he will structure the executive to create 
overlapping jurisdictions and organizational ambiguity. In doing so, every policy discussion 
will require the input of various advisers, who will often be unaware that their jurisdiction has 
been encroached by another, and so each must compete to win the president’s ear. The 
president will also engage himself at all levels of policymaking, often bypassing his aides in 
the White House to talk directly with lower placed administration officials and civil servants. 
In doing so the president hopes to increase his sources of information.
113
 This was the 
management style adopted by FDR, and is held in high regard by Neustadt.
114
 
    The second is the formal model. Whereas the competitive model stresses disorder and 
conflict, the formal model brings structure and an emphasis on hierarchy to the decision-
making process. The president attempts to reduce overlapping jurisdictions and 
organizational ambiguity by classifying each Department and Agency head as a functional 
expert on a specific aspect of foreign policy for which they are solely responsible for 
reporting to the president. What we find is that information passes up from the lower levels of 
bureaucracy to the agency head, who then presents this to the president. It is then the 
president’s task to make a decision based on the information received. He does not encourage 
his agency heads to interact and he will very rarely bypass his agency heads to discuss policy 
with lower officials. Often a president will employ a chief of staff to process information 
from the agency heads before it reaches the president. The formal model is usually adopted 
by a president who wishes to be less involved in the information gathering process, but who 
feels comfortable making the final decision. The formal model also tends to suit presidents 
who do not feel comfortable dealing with conflict amongst their advisers.
115
 Richard Nixon is 
the most extreme example of this. Although he chose to be actively involved in foreign 
policy, he found the whole process of decision-making incredibly stressful. He also had a 
deep-seated psychological need to avoid conflict. Therefore he chose to centralise foreign 
policy in the White House but gave Henry Kissinger, his National Security Adviser, a 
prominent position in the foreign policy structure. Indeed George has argued, “The foreign 
policy-making system that Kissinger, the special assistant for national security affairs, 
developed during the first year of Nixon’s administration is generally regarded as by far the 
most centralised and highly structured model yet employed by any president”.116 
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    The final type is the collegial model. Similar to the competitive model, the collegial model 
stresses the importance of diverse opinions and competition in the policy making process. 
However, whereas the competitive model often leads to conflicts of interest based on 
jurisdictional parochialism, the collegial model attempts to encourage departmental heads to 
identify with the president’s perspective. To do this the president will encourage close 
cooperation amongst the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser. Often special 
groups will be formed by the president to address a specific issue, with the group members 
being tasked to approach the problem not as representatives of a particular agency but as 
policy generalists who are open to the idea of cooperation and the sharing of ideas.  The most 
widely known and successful example of this arrangement was President Kennedy and the 
Executive Committee he formed during the Cuban Missile Crisis. 
117
 
    Each choice of management style generates both benefits and costs. The formal model 
brings structure to the office. It regulates the duties of the president’s advisers and it provides 
well-established channels of communication. This helps improve coherence and allows the 
president time to make decisions in a well-ordered fashion. The downside is that by clearly 
dividing tasks between well-regulated advisers can lead to a shortage of quality information 
reaching the president. By deliberately limiting the number of advisers he brings himself into 
contact with the president may deprive himself of valuable sources of information. He may 
not be aware of the bureaucratic conflict or cooperation that has led to the information he has 
been presented with. Therefore when making decisions he may not have access to all the 
information he requires. The competitive and collegial management styles reverse this 
problem. By encouraging debate and involving the president heavily in the search for 
information the competitive and collegial models have the potential to provide the president 
with much more information from a wider variety of sources. This, in theory, will improve 
the executive’s chances of making a quality decision. However, with the competitive model, 
the cost is to introduce parochial conflict and disorder into the executive. Instead of helping 
the president to see all sides of an issue, department heads will be tempted to use their 
bureaucratic muscle to present one-sided views that benefit their department at the expense of 
others. The collegial model attempts to overcome this by encouraging cooperation amongst 
the department heads whilst trying to get them to adopt a more general executive perspective. 
It is also clear that the competitive and collegial models place far greater demands on the 
president. For the competitive and collegial models to function effectively they require an 
                                                          
117
 Ibid., pp156-160 
107 
 
 
 
intelligent and highly active president who is willing to involve himself in the management of 
his executive. Finally, it must be noted that, like all social scientific models, these are 
abstractions from and simplifications of reality. In practice there will be a wide variety of 
management styles adopted by presidents and “To some extent, elements of two or even all 
three models may be present in different mixes, with different emphases, in the policymaking 
system of each president.”118 Presidents may also start off with one type of management style 
and progress to another. 
119
 
 
3.7.2 The President, the White House Staff and the Cabinet in Foreign Policy 
 
    In attempting to control and direct the executive bureaucracy the president relies on two 
sources, the White House staff and the heads of the Executive Departments. In the area of 
foreign policy this relationship focuses on the role of the White House centred National 
Security Council, The Department of State, the Department of Defence and the intelligence 
community.  
    Each department in the bureaucracy is a vast institution with its own collection of interests, 
goals, preferences and operating procedures, which often conflict with presidential 
preferences. The president attempts to exert his control over these institutions by appointing 
the head of each department and tasking them with two functions. The first is to execute the 
statutory requirements of the department. The second is to act as the president’s “man on the 
inside”, responsible for promoting White House policy and ensuring bureaucratic compliance 
with presidential demands. However, this system of management produces problems for both 
the president and the secretary. Cabinet heads find themselves in an unenviable position, 
caught between two competing sources of power. First, the president expects his secretary to 
be just that, to serve the president in his attempts to harness the energy of the bureaucratic 
department the secretary presides over. However, the secretary has a second function. He is 
the manager of a large bureaucratic staff. If he wants the staff to work for him then he must 
be sensitive to their needs. As he provides a direct link to the president, the staff expect him 
to act as their representative in the White House. This places the cabinet head in an almost 
impossible position. If they are seen as being too close to the president then they will lose the 
support of their department, if they align themselves too closely with their department then 
the president will view them as having “gone native” and thus become unreliable. It is 
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difficult for a secretary to resolve these tensions, which limits the president’s ability to rely 
on them for bureaucratic control.
120
 
    If the president does not feel that his departmental heads are contributing to successful 
management of the bureaucracy then he will likely decide to centralise policy making within 
the White House. In doing so he will give greater power to the White House staff and sub-
cabinet groups such as the National Security Council. The logic behind this choice is that 
White House staffers are not assigned in law the statutory functions that cabinet secretaries 
are. They should therefore have no divided loyalties and will be able to serve the president 
more effectively. Pika and Maltese have argued that the “Long term trend has been towards 
increasing reliance on a strong, sizable, centralised White House staff to protect the political 
interests of presidents, to act as their principal advisers, and to direct (as opposed to monitor 
and coordinate) the implementation of presidential priorities by the bureaucracy”.121 
    In foreign policy this cabinet/White House tension has played out in the relationship 
between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser. Traditionally, the 
Department of State has been the principal agent of the US government responsible for 
foreign policy. As such, the Secretary of State would occupy the highest position in the 
president’s foreign affairs framework. Indeed, many presidents would charge their Secretary 
of State with taking the lead in foreign policy making. However, since the end of the Second 
World War, the Department of State has lost its position of prominence due to the creation of 
the National Security Council. Founded by the National Security Act of 1947, the National 
Security Council is responsible for advising the president with respect to the integration of 
domestic, foreign and military policies relating to US national security. Although the 
Secretary of State is a member, the fact that the NSC is located within the Executive Office 
has led to the increase in importance of the National Security Adviser. Presidents who find it 
difficult working with what they often view as the anachronistic State Department will tend 
to downgrade its importance while relying ever more on the NSC to coordinate policy. The 
earlier NSCs were simply managers of the executive branch’s foreign policy operations. 
However, since Dean Rusk in the Kennedy Administration, NSAs have played an ever-
increasing role in the formulation of policy. As such they tend to establish a close relationship 
with the president, which in turn strengthens the position of the NSC in the foreign policy 
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making bureaucracy.
122
 The most notable example is Henry Kissinger. President Nixon 
viewed foreign policy as his most important task and was determined to exercise tight White 
House control in this area. He appointed Kissinger as his NSA, centralised decision-making 
within the White House and tripled the NSC staff. Kissinger assumed control of the running 
of the NSC with the president restricting his own role to that of final decision maker.
123
 This 
reflected Nixon’s own personal preference, as he greatly disliked face-to-face meetings and 
preferred to work alone in his office, making decisions on the basis of written reports. 
124
           
    However, increased White House centralization does not always lead to increased 
presidential control of foreign policy, or indeed to the creation of a successful policy. 
Increased centralization demands greater presidential input in the process. The presidency of 
Ronald Reagan and the Iran-Contra affair serve as an example of what can happen if a 
president delegates too much authority to his foreign policy aides within a White House 
centred system. This shall be discussed in greater detail in chapter seven. The NSC system 
has also increased tensions between the State Department and the White House. This is 
especially true when the president employs an activist NSA such as Henry Kissinger. The 
NSA is also confronted with two conflicting roles, having to choose between limiting himself 
to a management position or actively engaging in policy formulation.  
    Whatever the benefits and costs associated with the NSC, it is clear that its creation and 
expansion has contributed to the strengthening of presidential leadership in US foreign 
policymaking. 
 
3.8 The President and Congress 
 
    In the previous discussion we have detailed how the executive has managed to expand its 
power in relation to Congress in the area of foreign policy. However, although the president 
may find himself in a more dominant position in relation to Congress, the American system is 
still one of separated powers. Congress still remains an important actor in the policy-making 
process. This section will focus on how the president attempts to work with Congress and 
under what circumstances he can expect his influence to be strongest. 
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    There is a large body of literature centred on the issue of presidential-congressional 
relations. Broadly it can be split into three categories. Those, such as Edwards, who argue 
that the separation of powers severely limits the ability of the president to influence 
Congress; those, such as Jones, who adopt a midway position, arguing that although the US 
does not have a presidential system, there is a distinct role to be played by the president at 
certain times; and a final group who argue that the expansion of presidential power has led to 
the emergence of an “executive hegemony”.125 The purpose of this analysis is not to review 
this literature in substantial detail. Instead, working from this foundation, we wish to 
determine how the president attempts to “win over” Congress to successfully implement his 
foreign policy agenda. 
    The first major hurdle any president must face is what is now commonly known as the 
“expectations gap”. Most lay observers of American politics do not fully comprehend the 
complexities of the system of checks and balances. Combined with a selective interpretation 
of history that tends to emphasise the achievements of the great presidents, many citizens 
expect the president to take charge of government and initiate the wholesale changes his 
supporters demand. The problem is that Congress stands in the way. The president may 
propose legislation, but it is Congress who decides to enact it or not.
126
 
    The president must also face up to the fact that Congress is not a unified institution, even if 
his party is in the majority. Each Congressman and Senator represents a constituency whose 
own interests, needs and preferences will usually be very different from the president’s. With 
the threat of re-election constantly in their minds, Congressmen will often be forced to 
support the local parochial needs of their constituents rather than addressing the president’s 
national and foreign agenda. Although this can hamper the president’s attempts at 
Congressional leadership, in other cases it actually helps him. The parochial interests of 
Congressmen limit their ability to present a unified front. This provides the executive with an 
institutional advantage that has proved conducive to leadership in foreign policy. 
    The task facing the president then is attempting to persuade individual lawmakers in order 
to get them to vote in favour of the executive’s proposal. A large amount of a president’s time 
is therefore spent trying to build coalitions of Congressmen, often cutting across party lines, 
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in order to secure the required majority for a bill to pass. To do this, the president has several 
methods at his disposal. 
    The most direct way the president can influence individual lawmakers is to grant them 
favours. These can take many forms, but the general idea is for the president to use his power 
and influence to benefit the lawmaker or his constituency. In return this generates leverage 
for the president that he can use in the lead up to important votes. The greatest resource the 
president has in this respect is his power of patronage. He can greatly influence the selection 
of a wide range of high-ranking government positions. Granting the right job to the right 
person in the right constituency can quickly win the support of lawmakers. The president can 
also influence the location of government construction projects which will bring benefits to 
the local community. Likewise, the president can threaten to withhold these resources in 
order to ensure the compliance of lawmakers.
127
 
    The president also has less direct methods of influencing Congress. He can appeal to the 
public and pressure groups in order to mobilise their support against Congress. The president 
uses this tactic in the hope that constituents will put pressure on their Congressman and thus 
force them to support the president. However, such measures are not without risk. By going 
over the heads of Congressmen the president may incur longer-term hostility and more 
determined opposition.
128
 
    Pika and Maltese have argued that, in their dealings with Congress, presidents adopt one of 
three patterns of behaviour. The first and most predominant method is bargaining. This will 
involve granting or withholding favours, as discussed above, but presidents must be wary of 
indulging in this tactic too often as they only have a limited amount of resources to distribute 
and the demand for these favours from Congress exceeds the supply.
 129
 The second method 
employed by presidents is that of “arm-twisting”. Instead of the mutual cooperation of 
bargaining, arm-twisting involves “intense, even extraordinary, pressure and threats.”130 This 
tactic runs the risk of generating resentment and hostility, but “judicious demonstration that 
sustained opposition or desertion by normal supporters will exact costs strengthens a 
president’s bargaining position.”131 The most extreme method the president can deploy is 
direct confrontation. This may involve appealing to the public to pressure their Congressman, 
but can range to the president challenging Congressional authority or claiming presidential 
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prerogative. A president will usually only adopt this as a last ditch short-run tactic as it will 
likely generate sustained Congressional opposition if used too often.
132
 
    Having established what methods a president possesses in the legislative arena, we must 
now try to establish under what conditions he is likely to generate legislative support. In the 
realm of foreign policy it is quite clear that crises provide the president with the greatest 
opportunity to exert leadership. Under crisis conditions the president can usually expect to 
receive the support of the majority of Congress due to the fact that the president enjoys 
institutional advantages to respond to crises that are lacking in Congress. Although domestic 
crises are comparably rare, the realm of foreign policy is more likely to produce national 
security crises thus strengthening the president’s position in relation to Congress. 133 
Presidents elected with a clear electoral mandate are also better placed to win over Congress 
than those whose winning electoral margin is smaller. George W. Bush serves as an excellent 
example of both these factors. Inaugurated after the highly controversial election of 
November 2000, winning the electoral vote but losing the popular vote, the first eight months 
of his presidency produced a mixed relationship with Congress as he struggled to promote his 
bold conservative agenda. However, the terrorist attacks of September 11 produced a crisis 
that transformed his presidency. Enlisting the support of Congress he had the Patriot Act 
passed and sent US forces to war in both Afghanistan and Iraq.
134
 
    The nature of the opposition in Congress also largely impacts a president’s ability to 
legislate successfully. The greater the number of seats held by the opposition party and the 
greater the strength of their ideological opposition, the more difficult a president will find it 
trying to promote his agenda.
135
 However, a skilled president will be able to reduce the 
effectiveness of congressional opposition buy engaging in well-executed coalition building. 
President Johnson was particularly noted for his political skill in the legislative arena.
136
 
    The final question we must address is how often the president is successful in his 
relationship with Congress. To answer this question we must engage with the literature 
mentioned at the start of this section. George Edwards has argued strongly that presidential 
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leadership of Congress is typically at the margins, not the core, of policymaking.
137
 The 
resources available to the president are limited and he struggles to expand them when 
required. He is unable to drastically change the political landscape and instead must rely on 
his ability to exploit opportunities in the political environment when they present themselves. 
By himself the president will be unable to alter public policy. As a result, Edwards argues 
that the president must be viewed as a facilitator in the coalition building process rather than 
a dominant executive leader.
138
  
    Edwards is correct that the president operates in a system of separated powers. He has no 
constitutional authority to lead Congress anywhere they do not wish to go and cannot force 
them to legislate as he pleases. He is also correct to criticise those who place too much 
emphasis on the president as the sole source of political change in American politics. 
However, all serious commentators on the presidential-congressional relationship are aware 
that it is just that, a relationship. Neither can govern without the other. What the opponents of 
Edwards argue is that he underestimates the role the president plays not just as a facilitator in 
the coalition building process, but also as an initiator of policy, as the spark that starts the 
system moving. In a later analysis, Edwards and Barrett actually provide information to 
support this claim. They show that the president can almost always place significant 
legislation on the agenda of Congress, that the president generates about one-third of 
significant bills on the congressional agenda and that presidential initiatives are more likely 
to become law than congressional initiatives. Under united government, when the president’s 
party controls Congress, the rate of successful presidential initiatives is nearly twice that 
under divided government.
 139
 
    The methodology employed by Edwards has been criticised by Spitzer.
140
 He argues that 
Edwards’ studies are “are limited in their scope and applicability. The focus on the specific 
concept of presidential success as measured by roll-call votes precludes the multiplicity of 
decision points where the two branches interact up to the roll-call vote – in other words, most 
of the realm in which the two branches interact.”141 Spitzer argues that by classifying the 
president’s role as “marginal” Edwards manages to ignore two centuries of evolving 
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institutional arrangements and political development which Skowronek has described as “an 
evolutionary sequence culminating in the expanded powers and governing responsibilities of 
the ‘modern presidency.’”142 It can be argued that “marginal” and “leader” are poles on a 
continuum and the influence of the president will be found somewhere in between. However, 
it is clear that the president has gradually acquired powers and responsibilities over a long 
period of time that pushes his influence closer to that of a leader than a marginal figure, but 
due to the separation and sharing of powers he will never be able to fully dominate Congress 
in the manner expected by the less informed members of the public. 
    In the area of foreign policy we have seen how the powers of the presidency have 
increased in relation to the Congress. Presidents have tried to minimise the involvement of 
Congress in foreign policy, particularly in the area of national security and defence policy, 
but it is impossible for any president to avoid dealing with Congress. Clearly if any president 
is to be successful in his relationship with Congress he must be willing to engage 
constructively with the legislature in the hope of securing their cooperation. 
 
3.9 Conclusion 
 
    This chapter has focused on the role of the president in US foreign policy. It has 
demonstrated that, from seemingly humble constitutional origins, the presidency has 
developed into the most important institution in US foreign policy making. The constitution 
created a system of separated institutions sharing power but over the course of two centuries 
the executive has expanded its powers in relation to the Congress. As highlighted above, this 
was often the direct result of the specific actions of an individual president. It was argued that 
individual presidents often expanded the foreign policy powers of the office in order to 
achieve specific foreign policy objectives, but in doing so they set a precedent that over time 
produced a cumulative effect whereby more and more foreign policy power was centralised 
in the White House. The important point to note is that this chapter does not argue that the 
president is in sole command of US foreign policy. His powers are always defined in relation 
to the other branches of government as well as the bureaucracy, the American public and the 
international system. However, it has been demonstrated that of all the domestic sources of 
US foreign policy, the president finds himself in the most privileged position. Through the 
combination of factors discussed above it is clear that there is a large scope for presidential 
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agency in US foreign policy. This chapter also serves a second purpose. It provides the 
domestic framework within which to analyse the case studies to be discussed in the following 
chapters. Having looked at the presidency in the abstract in this chapter, we now turn our 
attention to analyse the roles Presidents Truman and Reagan played in the formulation of 
their administrations’ foreign policy. In doing so we will look at the key factors outlined in 
this chapter: the constitutional standing of the presidency at the time of their inaugurations, 
the development of their worldview, their informal sources of power, their management of 
the executive bureaucracy, and their relationship with Congress. 
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Chapter Four: Truman’s Worldview and the Origins of 
Containment in Greece and Turkey 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
    This chapter analyses the role of President Truman in the formulation of US foreign policy 
at the beginning of the Cold War. In particular, it argues that Truman’s worldview played a 
crucial role in the development of the containment policy, which would stand as the 
cornerstone of US foreign policy from Truman’s presidency until the collapse of the Soviet 
Union. The chapter proceeds in two sections. The first section focuses on Truman’s 
worldview. It traces the evolution of his worldview from childhood through the defining 
moments of his adult life and determines the impact this had on policy making during his 
presidency. It is argued that Truman entered the White House without a pre-determined view 
of international politics but his beliefs about the nature of man, society, war and peace 
allowed him to formulate a conceptual scheme for directing US foreign policy during his 
presidency.  The second section outlines the development of the Truman Doctrine and the 
birth of the containment policy in response to the Greek and Turkey crises. Why did the US 
decide to intervene in Greece and Turkey? Why did this intervention take the form of an open 
ended commitment to oppose authoritarianism? The chapter answers these questions by 
stressing the importance of Truman’s worldview to the development of the Doctrine which 
bears his name, and the wider containment policy which expanded from it. In doing so it 
makes the case for presidential agency as an important explanatory factor in the development 
of the Cold War. 
 
4.2 Historical Context  
 
    The United States emerged from the Second World War as a true global power for the first 
time in its history. By September 1945 the US had the largest economy and the most 
technically advanced military in the world. The Soviet Union had managed to defeat Nazi 
Germany on the Eastern Front and taken Berlin. In doing so, they had raised the largest 
conscription army in history. Six years of war in Europe had devastated the traditional great 
powers of the United Kingdom, France and Germany.  These states would not retain their 
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place as great powers in the international system. Instead, the multipolar system of the late 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries was replaced with a new bipolar system populated by the new 
great powers: the US and Soviet Union. However, they were not equal powers. The Soviet 
Union’s victory had been achieved at great cost. The German invasion of 1941 had inflicted 
severe damage to the Soviet people, their infrastructure and economy. The US homeland, 
separated from Europe and Asia by two oceans, had been spared the trauma of fighting a war 
on its own territory. As a result, it was domestically more stable and prosperous than the 
Soviet Union. The challenge the US faced was how it would deal with the post-war world 
and, in particular, the Soviet Union. The situation was complicated by the death of President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt. He was succeeded by his Vice President, Harry Truman, a man with 
little experience of foreign policy who was now charged with leading the United States into a 
new era of foreign policy.
1
   
 
4.3 Truman’s Worldview 
 
4.3.1 Origins 
 
    Truman entered office with a worldview that had developed over the course of his life. He 
did not have a rigid, well-defined view of international politics and could not be considered 
an ideologue, determined to push US foreign policy in a specific direction with well defined 
policy objectives.  He also had little in the way of foreign policy experience, his professional 
political career having been spent working on domestic issues.  It would be wrong, however, 
to describe Truman as a blank canvas in the area of foreign affairs. Over his lifetime he had 
developed several strongly held beliefs about the nature of man, society, war and peace, all of 
which would eventually help him to formulate a conceptual scheme for directing US foreign 
policy during his presidency.
2
 
    One important driving force shaping Truman’s worldview was his knowledge of history. 
As a child, Truman had been diagnosed with a rare eye disorder that forced him to wear very 
thick glasses. His mother refused to let her son participate in sports with other children, 
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fearful that the expensive glasses would break. As a result, Truman spent most of his 
childhood in the library. His favourite subject was history, and he particularly enjoyed 
reading the biographies of famous historical figures.  These history books became incredibly 
important to Truman, helping him to develop a frame of moral reference that would remain 
with him all his life.
3
 As he wrote in his memoirs, “reading history to me was far more than a 
romantic adventure. It was solid instruction and wise teaching which I somehow felt I wanted 
and needed.”4 Important for our study are two conclusions he drew from his studies. The first 
was his attempt to understand history. Truman subscribed to the “great man” theory of 
history, believing that historical events can be explained by the actions of powerful leaders. 
This insight is important because it strongly influenced his conception of leadership: 
 
“I learned from it [history] that a leader is a man who has the ability to get other people to 
do what they don’t want to do and like it. It takes a leader to put economic, military, and 
government forces to work so they will operate. I learned that in those periods of history 
when there was no leadership, society usually groped through dark ages of one degree or 
another. I saw that it takes men to make history, or there would be no history. History 
does not make the man.”5 
 
    Thus, when Truman assumed the presidency, he brought to the office a very specific 
understanding of what was expected of him as president. It was his duty to act as the foreign 
policy leader of the United States. In order to do so, Truman was aware that he would have to 
make difficult decisions in an increasingly complicated post-war foreign policy 
environment.
6
 However, he believed that his knowledge of history provided him with the 
tools to help make these tough choices.
7
 Truman believed, “There’s nothing new in human 
nature; only our names for things change.”8  As a result of this, Truman operated on the 
assumption that lessons can be drawn up from past events to help solve problems in the 
present: “Ancient History is one of the most interesting of all studies. By it you find out why 
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a lot of things happen today... You will also find out that people did the same things, made 
the same mistakes, and followed the same trends as we do today.”9  
    Throughout the course of his presidency, Truman would often attempt to draw parallels 
with historical events in order to provide him with guidance in selecting the appropriate 
course of action.
10
 The academic assessment of Truman’s use of history has tended to be 
rather negative. Most scholars agree that Truman had a rather weak and shallow 
understanding of history, and that he read historical biographies uncritically.
11
 There was 
similar concern during his administration. George Elsey, Truman’s Special Counsel and 
Administrative Assistant, recalled, “I don’t think his knowledge of European history was very 
deep; he had not paid too much attention to European history.”12 These assessments are 
largely accurate. However, for the purpose of the current analysis, what is important is that 
Truman formulated his worldview on the basis of his knowledge of history, and drew lessons 
from the past in order to guide him in the present. This will help us to explain the 
development of his foreign policy. 
    One lesson Truman had drawn from the most recent past was the origins of the Second 
World War. He believed that the combination of authoritarianism and American isolationism 
resulted in the outbreak of global conflict. In 1943 whilst still a Senator he made the 
following remarks on the Senate floor: 
 
A small group of wilful men kept us from assuming our world obligations in 1919-20, 
and the same thing can happen again. I am just as sure as I can be that this World War is 
the result of the 1919-20 isolationist attitude, and I am equally sure that another and a 
worse war will follow this one, unless the United Nations and their allies, and all the 
other sovereign nations, decide to work together for peace as they are working together 
for victory.
 13
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From the outset of his presidency, Truman made it clear that he wanted the US to play a 
larger role in international politics, particularly in attempts to “win the peace.”14 In order to 
do so, the relationship between the two remaining superpowers, the United States and the 
Soviet Union, would prove crucial. 
 
4.3.2 Truman’s View of the Soviet Union 
 
    Truman held complicated views of the Soviet Union.  He made it clear over the course of 
his administration that he did not give additional weight to the fact that the Soviet Union was 
a communist state. He characterized communism as merely a subset of authoritarianism, and 
did not think communism deserved special attention, or posed the largest threat to US 
security. For Truman, all dictatorships posed a threat to international peace and security. He 
believed the concentration of power in the hands of unaccountable leaders increased the 
chances of conflict. Truman would often write about and discuss views on this matter. In 
May 1945 he wrote in his diary, “I’ve no faith in any totalitarian state be it Russian, German, 
Spanish, Argentinean, Dago, or Japanese...They all start with a wrong premise – that lies are 
justified and that the old, disproven Jesuit formula – the ends justifies the means is right and 
necessary to maintain the power of government.”15  He made similar remarks publicly as late 
as 1947. Speaking informally to the Association of Radio News Analysts, Truman declared, 
“There isn’t any difference in totalitarian states…Nazi, Communist or Fascist, or Franco, or 
anything else-they are all alike…The police state is a police state; I don’t care what you call 
it.”16 These comments are important for our analysis because they demonstrate that Truman 
was not an ideologue. He was not an ardent anti-communist. Indeed, as John Lewis Gaddis 
has argued, “a surviving tsarist Russia would have posed as much of a threat, in the eyes of 
Truman..., as a communist one.” 17  It was this faith in the positive attributes of liberal 
democracy and his abhorrence of authoritarianism, combined with the lessons he drew from 
history, which helped shape his worldview and allowed him to start conceptualising a foreign 
policy for the US to pursue in the years following the Second World War. 
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    The main task facing Truman was to maintain world peace. To increase the chances of 
doing so, he knew that the US would have to establish a relationship with the Soviet Union. 
The difficulties facing Truman were in trying to decide what form this relationship should 
take, as well as trying to accurately interpret the underlying motivation of Soviet foreign 
policy. 
    The Soviet threat was conceptualised in two competing strands within the Truman 
Administration.  The first group of policymakers viewed the Soviet Union as a traditional 
great power who, like the United States, was concerned with maximising their power, 
influence and security within the existing international system. They were concerned not with 
the internal workings of the Soviet state, but with their external behaviour. As a result, the 
Soviet Union could be treated just like any other great power and foreign policy could be 
directed along traditional diplomatic lines, with the possibility of cooperation remaining an 
option.
18
 
    The second group did not accept the view of their colleagues. They rejected the view that 
the Soviet Union was just another great power looking to secure its position within the 
international system. Instead, the Soviet Union was a revolutionary state who wished to 
overthrow the capitalist world order and replace it with worldwide communism. In order to 
explain the Soviet Union’s foreign policy these analysts argued that US foreign policy must 
concern itself not just with calculations of power and interest, but must focus on ideology. A 
detailed understanding of the characteristics of the Soviet state was crucial to predict and 
counter Soviet foreign policy. These were the central ideas articulated by George Kennan in 
his infamous “Long Telegram”. Kennan argued that Soviet foreign policy could only be 
explained in part by the “traditional and instinctive Russian sense of insecurity”19 as the result 
of the Russian revolution of 1917 was to combine this insecurity with Marxist-Leninist 
ideology. Kennan believed “there can be no permanent peaceful coexistence”20 with a Soviet 
Union determined to pursue the ideals of worldwide communism.  His grim conclusion was 
that Soviet foreign policy presented the US with “undoubtedly [the] greatest task our 
diplomacy has ever faced and probably [the] greatest it will ever have to face.” 21 
Unfortunately, there were two major weaknesses with Kennan’s report. The first was that it 
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did not offer any specific policy recommendations. The Soviet Union was identified as a 
threat, the idea of containing at selected points was developed, but there was a lack of solid 
proposals upon which to build a coherent foreign policy. The second, and most crucial 
weakness, was Kennan failed to distinguish between economic and military containment
22
.  
    In particular, although Kennan had been the leading voice arguing that the Soviet Union 
presented a new and dangerous threat, he maintained that the Soviet Union did not present a 
military threat. There would be no open warfare in Europe
23
. Such an outcome would prove 
too damaging to both the US and the Soviet Union for such an option to be considered. 
Instead, he wanted the US to pursue a policy of economic and political containment. The US 
would be responsible for providing economic assistance to Western European allies that they 
would use in order to secure their domestic political stability and to ward off any chance of a 
communist takeover
24. However, others like Dean Acheson and the majority of Truman’s 
foreign policy advisors viewed the Soviet Union as a potential military threat. The lack of 
clarity on this point created the possibility for hardliners to misinterpret his analysis and use 
his work to justify the development of a more overtly confrontational strategy based on the 
idea of the Soviet Union as a military threat.
25
 
    Truman found it difficult to subscribe wholly to the view point of either group. Each side 
touched upon values that he felt important. He opposed authoritarianism, but he wanted peace, 
and he struggled to resolve these issues in the face of constant uncertainty regarding the 
motives of Soviet foreign policy. Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, he tried to find the 
middle ground between both views.  His overriding concern was to avoid another war and he 
was prepared to cooperate with the Soviet Union to achieve this.  He had learned the 
importance of Great Power cooperation as a result of his personal experience and reading of 
history. He had held this view since before assuming the presidency. As vice-president he had 
delivered a speech in 1944 stating, “if we had kept together after the First World War – if we 
had taken common measures for the safety and security of the world – the [Second World 
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War] need not have happened.”26 As a result, Truman was prepared to continue Roosevelt’s 
war time policy of cooperating with the Soviet Union. However, Truman did not fully accept 
the view of the Soviet Union as a great power who shared similar great power interests to the 
US. Instead, Truman viewed the Soviet Union as somewhere in between a revolutionary state 
and a satiated great power.  The Soviet Union was an authoritarian regime and would have to 
be treated firmly in order to secure their cooperation and to enforce agreements. Daniel 
Yergin has argued that at this stage Truman had conceptualised the Soviet Union as a “world 
bully” and that if the US was able to demonstrate enough resolve then “the Soviet Union 
could be made to accept a subsidiary role in the post-war world.”27 Truman knew that there 
would be many areas where the US and Soviet Union would disagree, but he was prepared to 
negotiate, even if it would be on US terms. In a meeting with Secretary of State Byrnes and 
US Ambassador to the Soviet Union W. Averell Harriman in April 1945 Truman said, he 
understood that “certain concessions in the give and take of negotiations would have to be 
made” and “we could not, of course, expect to get 100 percent of what we wanted but...on 
important matters...we should be able to get 85 percent.”28  
    Unfortunately, Truman’s initial hope for cooperation with the Soviet Union did not last. 
Over the course of the first three years of Truman’s presidency a series of international 
developments, including the Iranian crisis, the blockade of Berlin and increasing Soviet 
involvement in Eastern Europe, began to shake Truman’s faith in the possibility of 
cooperation with the Soviet Union. In a letter to Secretary of State Byrnes in January 1946 
Truman noted, “I’m tired of babying the Soviets.”29 Scholars have tried to determine at what 
point Truman moved from his original relatively optimistic view of the Soviet Union to the 
more pessimistic view that would eventually characterise US-Soviet Union relations during 
the course of his presidency and throughout the Cold War.
30
 However, for the purposes of the 
current analysis, it is not necessary to try and identify the exact moment where Truman 
developed a Cold War mindset. Instead, the important observation is that Truman did not 
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enter the Oval Office with a well defined view of the Soviet Union and that it was his ‘on the 
job’ experience of dealing with the Soviet Union that shaped his view of them. This supports 
Greenstein’s assertion that Truman was a reactionary rather than a visionary foreign policy 
president.
31
 This is not to say that Truman’s view of the Soviet Union fluctuated back and 
forth over his time in office. There had been an initial shift from optimism to pessimism, but 
once Truman was convinced cooperation with the Soviet Union was no longer possible due to 
their aggressive foreign policy ambitions, this view remained constant for the rest of his 
presidency and shaped the development the policy of containment. Indeed, this view of a 
hostile Soviet Union began to pervade all aspects of US foreign policy to the extent that 
Truman and his advisers began to interpret all hostile foreign policy actions as having their 
origin in the Kremlin. These ideas will be explored in greater depth later in this chapter, with 
analysis of the role of Truman in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine.  
 
4.4 The Truman Doctrine 
 
    This section will analyse the role of Truman in formulating the Truman Doctrine.  It begins 
with an overview of the situation facing US foreign policy makers in post-War Europe by 
focusing on the crisis prompted by events in Greece and Turkey. The reason for doing so is 
twofold. One, the birth of the Truman Doctrine represents a turning point in the history of US 
foreign policy, signalling a long term strategic commitment to Western Europe. Secondly, it 
allows us to examine the role played by President Truman in its formulation. It will be shown 
that the US decision to intervene was not inevitable, nor was the choice of policy. Instead, the 
birth of the Truman Doctrine allows us to investigate the importance of presidential 
worldview in US foreign policy. The key issue to stress is that Truman had choices to make, 
nothing was preordained. The US could have returned to isolationism, or restricted itself to 
simply funding Greece and Turkey. Why did Truman decide to enunciate a doctrine which 
committed the US to potentially long term intervention outside of the Western Hemisphere 
for the first time in its history? Did the Truman Doctrine have to be framed in such terms? 
Answering these questions will allow us to show that presidential decision-making is central 
to explaining the development of US foreign policy at the outset of the Cold War. 
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4.4.1 Greece and Turkey 
 
On February 21 1947 the British government sent two aide-memoires to the Department of 
State explaining that due to the financial burdens placed on the United Kingdom by the cost 
of the Second World War they would no longer be able to continue their assistance to Greece 
and Turkey in their struggle against domestic leftist uprisings.  The British would remove 
their forty thousand troops as soon as possible and would end military aid to both states. 
According to the British, if Greece and Turkey were not able to find support from other 
sources then it was likely that both countries would fall under control of communist forces 
loyal to the Soviet Union.
32
 
     The decision of the British to pull out of Greece and Turkey produced several results. First, 
it signalled to US policymakers that Britain was no longer the major power in Europe and the 
Middle East.  Dean Acheson stated bluntly, “The British are finished. They are through.”33 
Second, along with the majority of policymakers in Washington, Acheson interpreted the 
crisis in Greece and Turkey as a deliberate ploy by the Soviet Union to seize control of two 
strategically important European and Middle-Eastern countries
34
. The State Department had 
been monitoring the increasing political and economic instability in Greece for several 
months.
35
 As a result, Acheson knew that with the British gone only the United States could 
contain the Soviet Union in the Eastern Mediterranean.
36
 Marshall assured the British 
Ambassador that the matter was of utmost importance and would be brought to the attention 
of President Truman as soon as possible.
37
 
    On February 26 Secretary of State Marshall submitted a memorandum to President Truman 
that detailed the views of the Secretaries of State, War and Navy. All Department heads were 
in agreement that the potential collapse of Greece into Soviet hands represented a direct 
threat to US security and it was essential that the United States send aid to support the Greek 
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and Turkish government.
38
 Truman knew that a decision was required. Acheson had 
presented a strong case that the US had to intervene. The crisis in Greece had been 
conceptualised as a deliberate ploy by the Soviet Union. They were attempting to gain a 
communist foothold in the Eastern Mediterranean. As discussed previously, Truman viewed 
the Soviet Union as a world bully, and what he believed to be their actions in Greece 
confirmed his preconception. Truman agreed with Acheson, but at this stage he was torn 
between several positions. On the one hand the situation in Greece presented Truman with an 
opportunity to increase the US’s presence in the region. As demonstrated in the previous 
section, Truman held strong views that the US should use their power to promote peace and 
democracy. Truman believed he had learned from the experience of US isolationism in the 
1930s that if the US refused to intervene in Europe then the potential for conflict would 
increase and threaten US interests and security. However, at the same time, he was restrained 
by two forces. One was his experience of war, both as a soldier in the First World War and as 
President during the Second World War. He did not want to see the US involved in open 
conflict with the Soviet Union. Second, he knew that Congress would not fund US military 
involvement in Greece.
39
 
    However, Truman was adamant that the US must do something to stop the Soviet Union. 
He was tired of what he saw as the Soviet bullying of Eastern Europe and did not want to see 
their influence spread further south and west.
40
 Truman ordered a meeting of his highest 
ranking foreign policy team to take place the following day, and requested the attendance of 
the Congressional leaders. The president was fully aware that any decision to involve the US 
in the affairs of the Greece and Turkey would require the support of Congress and the US 
public. Congress controlled the purse strings and the fiscal conservatives dominating the 
institution would find it difficult to justify to their constituents sending millions of their tax 
dollars to Greece and Turkey – two autocracies whose existence seemed to have very little in 
the way of US national interest
41
. By inviting the Congressional leaders to attend the meeting 
Truman was laying the groundwork for future efforts to secure the support of Congress for 
his foreign policy.  In particular, Senator Vandenberg as chair of the Senate Foreign Relations 
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Committee would be a powerful ally in the legislature if he could be convinced to support 
Truman.
 42
 
    The meeting took place as scheduled on February 27. Truman asked Secretary of State 
Marshall to set out the geo-strategic implications of the Greek and Turkish crises for US 
policy in the region. Marshall explained, in rather dry terms, that the British pulling out of 
Greece and Turkey left these countries vulnerable to Soviet infiltration. He was clearly aware 
of the problem faced but was unable to convince the Congressional leaders of the severity of 
the situation. Indeed, a State Department official present at the meeting described the 
Congressional response as “adverse” with the Congressmen asking questions such as: “Isn’t 
this pulling British chestnuts out the fire?” and “How much is this going to cost?”43 
    Fearing that the Congressmen were not grasping the bigger picture Acheson asked 
Marshall for permission to speak:   
 
“We have arrived at a situation which has not been paralleled since ancient history. A 
situation in which the world is dominated by two great powers. Not since Athens and 
Sparta, not since Rome and Carthage have we had such a polarization of power. It is thus 
not a question of pulling British chestnuts out of the fire. It is a question of the security of 
the United States. It is a question of whether two-thirds of the world and three-fourths of 
the world’s territory is to be controlled by Communists.”44 
 
 Acheson went beyond a purely material conception of geostrategic security by drawing the 
Congressional leaders’ attentions to what he and Truman saw as the larger issues at stake45: 
“the two great powers were divided by an unbridgeable ideological chasm. For us, democracy 
and individual liberty were basic; for them dictatorship and absolute conformity. And it was 
clear that the Soviet Union was aggressive and expanding.”46  
    The documentary record of this meeting details the shock expressed by the Congressional 
leaders. Senator Vandenberg stated he was impressed and shaken by what he had heard.  He 
was prepared to support a programme of aid to support the governments in Greece and 
Turkey. However, he wanted specifics in terms of the design of the programme and the 
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estimated costs.
47
 Without these he would not be able to begin building support for the 
programme in Congress. Vandenberg also pointed out what Truman already knew, that the 
President would need to address the American people in order to set out the brevity of the 
situation in Greece, and the wider implications for US post-war foreign policy, in terms as 
stark as those which had been presented at the meeting.  Greece and Turkey had convinced 
Truman that the Soviet Union were indeed trying to bully the West. He told Vandenberg he 
would present the issue in its broadest sense.
48 49
 
    The meeting had proved a success in terms of eliciting support from the Congressional 
leaders. Within six days Vandenberg would write to his Congressional colleague John B. 
Bennett: 
 
“I am frank in saying that I do not know the answers to the latest Greek challenge because 
I do not know all the facts...But I sense enough of the facts to realise that the problem in 
Greece cannot be isolated by itself. On the contrary, it is probably symbolic of the world-
wide ideological clash between Eastern Communism and Western Democracy, and it may 
easily be the thing which requires us to make some very fateful and far reaching 
decisions.”50 
 
Truman now had his high ranking Congressional foreign policy ally. Vandenberg would 
work hard over the following weeks to secure the required support in Congress, reporting 
directly to the highest ranking officials in the State Department. 
51
 With the growing support 
in Congress, Truman turned his attention to addressing the American people. 
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4.4.2 The Truman Doctrine Speech 
 
    Truman did not personally draft the speech. This task was left to Dean Acheson in the 
State Department and Clark Clifford, Truman’s White House Counsel.52 However, Truman 
had made it clear at the previous meetings that he wanted US involvement in Greece in order 
to stop the advance of communism. He wanted to promote peace and prosperity in Europe 
and he believed that in order for this to be achieved the US had to play a role. Those drafting 
the speech were aware of what the situation required and what the President wanted.  On 
March 7 Truman ordered a meeting of his cabinet to discuss the crises in Greece and Turkey. 
The minutes of this meeting provide documentary evidence to support the argument that 
Truman played a crucial role in the development of the Greek policy and what would 
eventually become known as the Truman Doctrine. At the meeting Truman stated the 
decision to ask Congress for $250 million for Greece was “only the first step” and he knew it 
meant the US “going into European politics” and that it would require “the greatest selling 
job ever facing a president.”53 However, he concluded by saying, “The job is to get the facts 
to the country to get the support necessary. We can’t afford to revive the isolationists and 
wreck the United Nations.”54 This demonstrates that Truman was intent on securing the 
United States’ position as a leading member of the United Nations and he wanted the US 
involved in working to solve the problems faced by Europe. Therefore, although Truman 
knew his speech had to win over Congress, it was not just a cynical ploy to win votes for aid.  
By making this statement at a meeting of his cabinet, the President was clearly setting out his 
policy preferences, and his speech writers were well aware of this. Thus, when they presented 
the President with the draft of the speech, it included the important ideas the president wished 
to enunciate to the American people, namely, that the speech should not focus solely on the 
situation in Greece and Turkey. For Truman, it was essential to make the American people 
aware that there was a much more important issue at stake, namely the national security of 
the United States in the face of growing communist influence in Europe. If it had not, he 
would have had the speech redrafted until he was satisfied.
55
 Therefore, the idea that Truman 
was merely a passenger can be challenged. The President chose his staff, briefed them on 
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what he wanted and they produced a speech he was happy with. This highlights the 
importance of President Truman in the formulation of the Truman Doctrine. 
    Truman delivered his speech before a Joint Session of Congress on March 12, 1947. 
Beginning by explaining that the “gravity of the situation which confronts the world today 
necessitates my appearance before a joint session of the Congress”56 Truman framed the issue 
of Greece and Turkey as part of a broader threat to the national security of the United States 
and world peace.  The specifics were laid out by Truman requesting $400 million and civilian 
and military personnel to be sent to Greece and Turkey to help with reconstruction. However, 
the centrepiece of the speech was Truman’s declaration that “I believe that it must be the 
policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by 
armed minorities or outside pressures.”57 Truman’s speech divided the world into two groups: 
free peoples led by representative and open governments, and peoples subjugated by a 
minority group through fear and coercion.  The fall of Greece and Turkey would lead to a 
domino effect of the remaining free states falling under “totalitarian”58 dictatorship, with 
chaos and violence the inevitable result. Drawing on the lessons of history that were of such 
importance to the development of Truman’s worldview, he explained that the US had 
invested $341 billion dollars to win the Second World War and restore peace to Europe. Now 
the time had come for the US to spend one-tenth of that to secure their original investment. In 
doing so Truman explained that the US would be “giving effect to the principles of the 
Charter of the United Nations.”59 This speech is important not only because it set the broad 
contours of US foreign policy for the proceeding four decades, but also because it highlights 
the importance of Truman’s worldview in its formulation. The use of “totalitarian” 
demonstrates Truman’s belief that all dictatorships, communist or otherwise, are potential 
threats to world peace, and Truman’s faith in the United Nations highlights the idealistic 
streak that permeated his view of the world. These ideas were incorporated into the speech by 
Truman and directly link back to the argument presented in the first section outlining the 
development of Truman’s worldview and its importance in helping to shape post-war US 
foreign policy. 
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    Truman’s two pronged strategy proved successful.  On May 9 the Greek-Turkish aid bill 
was passed by 287-107 votes in the House of Representatives and by 67-23 votes in the 
Senate.
60
  President Truman signed the bill into law on May 22.
61
 The decision to target 
Vandenberg and use him as a figurehead for the administration’s legislative strategy to win 
the votes of Republican fiscal conservative Congressmen was important. Senator Vandenberg 
would later describe the passage of the aid bill as a triumph of “unpartisan” foreign 
policymaking. However, historians would point to the important role played by Truman and 
his speech to Congress.
62
 As Leffler has argued, “By seizing the initiative, utilizing 
ideological language, embarking on a crusade, and placing the prestige of the presidency and 
the country at risk over the issue of aid to Greece and Turkey, he [Truman] elicited support 
from a wary Congress.”63 
    It must be restated that Truman was not an idealist. As discussed in the previous section, he 
had long term goals that he wished to pursue: world peace, strengthening the United Nations, 
spreading democracy and promoting free market capitalism. However, he was aware of the 
strategic realities facing his attempts to push US foreign policy into a larger world role, and 
was reminded regularly in his meetings and by the briefing papers he read
64
. Greece and 
Turkey were conceptualised as a crucial barrier in stopping the spread of Communism into 
Europe. However, this was not purely an ideological battle of communism versus democracy, 
of free peoples versus totalitarianism. Instead, underlying the ideological dimension was an 
understanding of the strategic importance of Greece and Turkey: access to the Eastern 
Mediterranean and the oil supplies of the Middle East.
65
 Truman was well aware of the US’s 
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need to secure the balance of power in the region.
66
 Replying to Eleanor Roosevelt’s 
objections to the US “taking over Mr Churchill’s policies in the Near East, in the name of 
democracy” Truman wrote: 
 
I would argue that if the Greek-Turkish land bridge between the continents is one point at 
which our democratic forces can stop the advance of Communism that has flowed 
steadily through the Baltic countries, Poland Yugoslavia, Rumania, Bulgaria, to some 
extent Hungary, then this is the place to do it, regardless of whether or not the terrain is 
good.
 67
 
 
This demonstrates that Truman was working to shape US policy on the basis of both 
idealistic and geostrategic considerations. Truman was interpreting Soviet actions as 
confirmation of his pre-held beliefs about the nature of totalitarian regimes and using this to 
justify the development of US foreign policy in light of the Greek and Turkish crises. 
    President Truman wanted to increase the involvement of the United States in international 
politics in order to protect US security, stop communism advancing beyond Eastern Europe 
and spread democracy by supporting “free peoples”68. However, Truman was unable to see 
the long term consequences of his actions.  The first unintended consequence was the 
creation of a long term strategic commitment to contain the Soviet Union on a global scale. 
As Gaddis has argued, “By presenting aid to Greece and Turkey in terms of an ideological 
conflict between two ways of life, Washington officials encouraged a simplistic view of the 
Cold War which was, in time, to imprison American diplomacy in an ideological 
straightjacket almost as confining as that which restricted Soviet foreign policy.” 69  The 
second unintended consequence was to inadvertently push the United States away from 
foreign economic assistance. What began as a seemingly simple transfer of aid to Greece in 
order to prop up an allied regime was in fact the first step on the journey towards the 
development of a militarised form of containment, As Leffler has argued, ““The ideological 
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fervour... was important: by defining the enemy as inveterately hostile, it eliminated the 
prospect for compromise and accommodation; it also helped bring former isolationists into 
the interventionist camp, thereby creating the climate for yet additional measures.”70 These 
additional measures included increasing US commitments abroad, and, as a result of the 
President’s desire to protect the United Nations, involvement in the Korean War. This will 
form the heart of the case study in the following chapter. 
 
4.5 Conclusion 
  
    This chapter has focused on the development and application of Truman’s worldview to 
the formulation of US foreign policy during the early stages of the Cold War. It has argued 
that Truman’s worldview played a central role in the birth of the containment policy, one that 
is often undervalued by scholars. Truman initially hoped to cooperate with the Soviet Union, 
but with a distrust of authoritarian regimes, Truman began to perceive Soviet actions in 
Eastern Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean as hostile towards the United States and her 
interests in the region. Whatever optimism Truman may have held at the end of the Second 
World War, it soon gave way to the acceptance of the Cold War mindset which interpreted all 
foreign policy crises as somehow having their origins in the Kremlin’s plan for world 
domination. The ease with which the domino theory was accepted by Truman and his 
development of the Truman Doctrine in response to the crises in Greece and Turkey is 
evidence of this. Truman believed the events in Turkey and Greece were part of a larger 
communist project engineered by the Soviet Union and he directed US foreign policy 
accordingly. What began as economic aid to two European countries escalated to a military 
commitment to the whole of Western Europe and, as will be analysed in the following 
chapter, East Asia. President Truman’s worldview played a significant role in this outcome 
by filtering the incoming information the president received. As predicted by the worldview 
literature, this filtering of information had an impact on Truman’s decision-making. By 
adopting the Cold War mindset and interpreting all hostile foreign actions as the work of the 
Kremlin, Truman was unable to stand back and analyse possible alternative interpretations 
and outcomes. Events were no longer looked at in isolation. Truman believed Greek and 
Turkish politics were being manipulated by Moscow, (thus beginning the trend amongst US 
foreign policy makers of interpreting politics in foreign countries in light of the Cold War and 
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minimizing the role of domestic factors). The information filter provided by Truman’s 
worldview led the president to actively engage the US in opposing authoritarianism by 
enunciating the Truman Doctrine. The conditions in post-war Europe were important in 
increasing the likelihood of some form of US intervention. However, if a president with a 
worldview different to Truman’s had been in office there is an argument to be made that US 
intervention may not have happened so soon, or taken the shape of an open ended 
commitment to oppose authoritarianism and communism. If FDR had lived longer there may 
have been less hostility and more compromises. Instead, President Truman developed the 
containment policy and, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, played a crucial role in 
its expansion and militarisation. This demonstrates the important role played by presidential 
worldview in the formulation of US foreign policy. This chapter also provides evidence to 
support the central argument of this thesis. Only by incorporating agency into a multi-level 
framework is it possible to offer such a detailed explanation of US foreign policy at the outset 
of the Cold War. Structural theories alone would not be able to explain the development of 
the Truman Doctrine and containment policy. Analysing the role of presidential agency in 
relation to domestic and international structures allow us to do so. 
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Chapter Five: Truman’s Management Style and the 
Korean War 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
    This chapter analyses the development of Truman’s management style and its application 
to policy making during the Korean War. The first section details Truman’s management 
system and his attempts to organise his executive. It argues that Truman developed a formal 
management system based on his individual preferences which had developed during his time 
in the army and US Senate. It demonstrates how important personal relationships were to the 
functioning of Truman’s presidency by focusing on the president’s relationships with his 
Secretaries of State. The second section takes the form of a case study of the Korean War. It 
addresses several questions. Why did the US intervene in Korea? Why did they deploy 
ground troops? Why did the US decide to cross the 38
th
 parallel and invade North Korea? 
Why did the US advance north to the border with China and prompt Chinese intervention? 
The central argument presented is that both Truman’s choice of management structure and 
how he operated within this system are central to answering these questions and 
understanding the debacle of US intervention in the Korean War.  
 
5.2 Truman’s Management Style 
 
    As discussed in the previous chapter analysing the development and operationalising of 
Truman’s worldview, President Truman entered office with little experience of both 
executive politics and foreign policy. However, Truman had extensive experience of 
Congressional committee work from his time as Senator from Missouri. The following 
section will demonstrate how Truman applied this experience to the functioning of the White 
House. In particular it will focus on how Truman sought to overhaul what he viewed as his 
predecessor’s lack of formal organisation of the executive and his attempts to bring structure 
and hierarchy back to the functioning of the executive through the development of a formal 
management style. 
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5.2.1 Formalism 
 
   Adopting the typology developed by Johnson and discussed in the previous chapter, it is 
clear that Truman operated a formal management style. This approach to management had 
been established long before Truman entered the White House. From his time as an artillery 
officer on the Western Front during the First World War Truman learned the importance of 
hierarchy, routine, the assignment of specific tasks, clear lines of jurisdiction and, most 
importantly of all, loyalty. In the heat of battle it was essential to meet challenges directly and, 
as an officer, to make decisions that would achieve military objectives. These decisions 
risked the lives of his men. Truman relied on his men to follow his orders. If they did, he 
would give them his full support. As Johnson has stated, “This formula of reciprocal loyalty 
was to become a Truman trademark.”1 Truman carried his conception of loyalty into the 
White House, where it formed a cornerstone of his management style and, as will be 
discussed later, largely determined the extent to which the president was able to establish 
productive working relationships with his advisers. 
    The second most important influence on the development of Truman’s management style 
was his experience of working in the Senate for ten years between 1935 and 1945.  Instead of 
attempting to increase his public persona through speechmaking on the Senate floor, Truman 
preferred to work hard on less public assignments and developed a talent for committee work. 
In 1936 he volunteered to investigate the financial crisis facing America’s railroads. Truman 
believed the near bankruptcy of so many railroads was the result of corruption. As his 
investigation delved deeper into the industry Truman was soon faced with a wave of 
organised interests attempting to shut down his investigation. In the face of adversity Truman 
refused to back down, supported the work of his investigators, and was eventually able to 
prove that several railroads had engaged in criminal financial activities.
2
 
    Truman’s management style was cemented as a result of his experience leading the 
Truman Committee’s investigation into the inefficient use of government funds during the 
Second World War. Truman chose men he could trust to sit on the Committee with him. He 
selected investigators he believed to have the required abilities. Truman instructed his men to 
find the facts and present them to the Committee. As chairman, he demanded his fellow 
committee members agree unanimously on all decisions made, and all reports were to be 
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signed off by the full committee. This often required multiple drafts of reports until all 
committee members were in agreement.
3
 Truman tried to explain his desire for unanimity, 
stating “Reasonable men don’t differ much when they have the facts.”4 The combination of 
the correct choice of staff, the delegation of tasks and the hard headed desire of Truman as 
chairman to attain all the facts resulted in a hugely successful investigation. Uncovering a 
vast array of fraud, corruption and inefficiency, the Truman Committee forced institutional 
reorganisation by recommending the War Production Board replace the Office of Production 
Management.
5
 Over the course of the war it has been estimated that Truman and his 
committee saved the US government $15 billion
6
. 
    This discussion is important because it analyses the development of Truman’s management 
style. From the preceding section we can trace the evolution of several important traits of the 
management style adopted by Truman as president, most notably, the creation of a staffing 
system that was based on clear delegation of tasks and Truman’s insistence on loyalty. 
   Having not studied at university, Truman felt he lacked the intellectual capabilities and 
educational background of many of his colleagues. He commented on it regularly during his 
Senatorial career and time as president: “I wish I had a college education. I might have 
accomplished something better. I feel a terrible inadequacy of education.”7 These feelings of 
inadequacy were important in shaping the management style he adopted as president. Aware 
of his own limitations, Truman tried to overcome these by relying on the expertise of others. 
He would identify the area he lacked information on, appoint relevant experts and make 
decisions based on their advice. This was the heart of the Truman management style.  He told 
his Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace, after only a few weeks as president, that “he 
knew he didn’t have much in the way of brains but that he did have enough brains to get hold 
of people who were able and give them a chance to carry responsibility.”8 However, Truman 
made it clear that “I shall always be president and make the final decision in matters of major 
policy after they give me their facts and recommendations.”9 
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    There is disagreement in the literature over the extent to which Truman delegated and how 
well he kept track of those he delegated too. Larson argues that Truman was not particularly 
concerned about details, that he “preferred to let others handle particulars, leaving him free to 
concentrate on the broad issues.”10 However, Neustadt disagrees with this conclusion. He 
argues that Truman should not be thought of as ignorant of substantive details. Indeed, 
Neustadt points to the fact that Truman was “proud to take apart a budget.”11 The latter is 
supported by the testimony of staffers who worked with Truman during his presidency. John 
Hersey, a journalist, was granted privileged access to Truman and his administration for three 
months in 1950. During this time members of the administration commented on Truman’s 
attention to detail, particularly his ability to absorb information and recall it months later.
12
 
Therefore, the conclusion to be drawn is that although not academically gifted, Truman 
worked hard to keep himself informed on the development of policies as best he could. 
 
5.2.2 Truman in the White House 
 
    Truman had witnessed Roosevelt’s competitive style of management and did not want to 
replicate it in his administration.
13
 Instead, Truman tried to bring order to the process by 
setting out clear lines of authority and jurisdiction for his staff members. He did this in two 
ways. The first was through institutional reorganisation. With the passing of the National 
Security Acts of 1947 Truman established the National Security Council. Instead of the free-
wheeling and ad hoc system advocated by Roosevelt, with different advisers responsible for 
different tasks at different times, Truman brought into place a staff machinery within the 
White House directed solely at producing policy advice on the subject of national security. 
14
 
The second was to address the bureaucratic politics battles that were the legacy of 
Roosevelt’s system. As Greenstein has argued, Roosevelt “put a premium on wile, making 
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the influence of his advisers a function of their bureaucratic skills rather than the merits of 
their recommendations.”15To counter this, Truman sought to increase the control of each 
cabinet member over their respective department by delegating presidential authority to 
them.
16
 In order for this system to work efficiently, Truman would have to establish solid 
working relationships with his department secretaries. To do this, Truman enforced regularity 
in his schedule. He was briefed daily by his secretary of the National Security Council and 
held weekly meetings with the Secretaries of State and Defence, the NSC and his cabinet.
17
 
    A letter from President Truman to his Vice-President, Alben W. Barkley, written in July 
1950 provided direct instructions from the President as to how he wished his foreign policy 
system to operate. In the letter the president states that he wants the National Security 
Council to become the central decision-making body on all matters relating to national 
security. Truman wrote, “It is my desire that all such policies should be recommended to me 
through the Council in order that I may readily have the collective benefit of the collective 
views of the officials of the Government primarily concerned with the national security.”18 
The president explained that this could only be achieved if regular meetings were held “at 
which the responsible officials may freely discuss specific recommendations on which there 
has previously been coordinated staff work.”19 Concerned that previous meetings had been 
too large and stifled discussion, Truman ordered that only the statutory members of the NSC 
could attend and that “Participation by other officials will only be with my specific 
approval.”20 Truman concludes his letter by saying, “To be effective these meetings should 
be preceded by carefully coordinated staff work by the best qualified individuals who can be 
made available for the task.”21 
    This letter is important because it provides documented primary evidence from the 
President himself detailing how he wishes national security policy to be conducted. Truman 
uses the very phrases that were established as the key tenets of his system in the previous 
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analysis. Truman places great emphasis on the need for coordinated and careful staff work, 
tasks will be assigned based on the functional expertise of the staff member, clear lines of 
authority are drawn by only allowing the statutory members, the Department heads, to 
participate in the NSC meetings, and a strict hierarchy is enforced with President Truman 
sitting on top making decisions based on the information flowing up from below. This 
document demonstrates that Truman played a central role in organising decision-making 
structures within the White House and wider Executive. The formal style was how he wanted 
foreign policy to be run. It was a carefully designed system, drawing on Truman’s previous 
experience, that he worked hard to implement and maintain during his tenure as President. 
     How Truman wanted his executive to be run and how it actually was run are obviously 
two different things. Therefore, in order to move beyond the president’s wishes to a more 
balanced assessment, it is necessary draw on the opinions of those officials who worked in 
Truman’s executive and who are able to provide important primary evidence into the 
workings of the Truman White House and Executive. One important source are those 
members of staff who had worked for Truman’s predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt, and are 
able to offer a comparison of each president’s management style. Secretary of War Henry 
Stimson noted, “it was a wonderful relief to preceding conferences with our former Chief to 
see the promptness and snappiness with which Truman took up each matter and decided it” 
and that “There were no long drawn out ‘soliloquies’ from the President, and the whole 
conference was thoroughly businesslike so that we actually covered two or three more 
matters than we had expected to discuss.”22 It can be argued that Truman’s proclivity for 
quick decision-making stemmed from his personal feelings of intellectual inadequacy in the 
face of those he thought of as better educated. As Larson has argued, “He knew that 
Roosevelt’s former advisers could not look at him without making unflattering comparisons 
to their great leader. Making decision quickly was a means of providing to Washington 
officials that he was in charge and in command of events.”23 However, Truman does seem to 
have been successful in removing the confusion of the Roosevelt system and developing clear 
lines of jurisdiction and authority. As Assistant to the President John Steelman noted to a 
contemporary, “I’ve almost never come across a case in which the President gave me 
something to do which, or even part of which, he had given to someone else.”24 To his 
contemporaries, therefore, Truman was successful in overhauling the competitive system of 
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Roosevelt. However, as will be discussed in the case study, the formal system has its 
strengths, but it does not guarantee effective policymaking. The role of Truman within the 
system would prove crucial to its success or failure. 
 
5.3 Personal Relationships 
 
    For a formal management system to operate smoothly it is essential that staff members are 
fully aware of their place in the system, what tasks they are expected to complete, what 
jurisdictions they are responsible for operating within, and their relationship with the 
president. Therefore, the president must be satisfied that the staff working under him are 
qualified for the position they hold and be confident that the required information will flow 
up to him through the predetermined channels.  The president must be able to establish 
working relationships with his staff in order to ensure quality decision-making. The correct 
type of person must be employed and the president must make it clear to them how he wants 
them to work and what is expected of them in their role.  
    This was especially the case with President Truman. As discussed previously, Truman’s 
preferred operating style was for strict formalism, with clearly established lines of authority 
and jurisdiction. The president would sit at the top of the formal system and make decisions 
on the basis of information flowing up to his office from the lower echelons. As a result, the 
Secretary of State was designated as the president’s highest ranking foreign policy official.  
Truman expected the State Department to act as the institution primarily responsible for 
drafting US foreign policy, and the Secretary of State would be the president’s chief foreign 
policy advisor.
25
 Therefore, the relationship between President Truman and his Secretary of 
State would be crucial in the formulation of US foreign policy during the Truman 
administration. This section will look at each of Truman’s three Secretaries of State in order 
to establish that personal relationships were an important determinant in the ability of 
Truman to work successfully with each secretary. 
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5.3.1 Byrnes 
 
    James Byrnes’s tenure as Secretary of State demonstrates the importance of personal 
relationships in determining the success of working with President Truman. As Director of 
the Office of Economic Stabilisation and head of the Office of War Mobilization, Byrnes had 
been one of the most influential administration figures during Roosevelt’s presidency.  
Appointed Secretary of State by Truman on July 4, 1945, Byrnes was expected to become 
one of Truman’s closest advisors, having previously mentored Truman during his time in the 
Senate. 
26
 On the surface, all the ingredients were present for a successful working 
relationship with the President. However, over the course of Byrnes’ eighteen months in 
office several fatal problems emerged.  
    As discussed previously, Truman valued loyalty and placed great emphasis on the need for 
his subordinates to brief him fully on policy development. Truman had granted the State 
Department institutional primacy in the formulation of US foreign policy and expected 
Byrnes to report regularly, and in detail, to the President.  Time and again the Secretary 
appeared, in Truman’s eyes, incapable of fulfilling this duty. The most notable example 
happened as early as December 1945, when Byrnes took part in the Interim Meeting of 
Foreign Ministers at the Moscow Conference. Truman was unhappy with Byrnes’ 
performance for several reasons. In terms of the substance of agreements reached between the 
foreign ministers, Truman felt Byrnes had accepted too many concessions in relation to 
international atomic cooperation and Soviet influence in Iran. However, more importantly for 
the president, Truman believed that Byrnes had failed to keep him informed of daily 
developments and was outraged that his Secretary of State released the communiqué of the 
conference to the public before sending it to the President.
27
 For Truman, this was a clear 
dereliction of the Secretary of State’s role. On Byrnes’ return to Washington, Truman sent 
him a letter explaining why he was upset:  
I have been considering some of our difficulties. As you know I would like to pursue a 
policy of delegating authority to the members of the cabinet in their various fields and 
then back them up in the results. But in doing that and in carrying out that policy I do not 
intend to turn over the complete authority of the President nor to forgo the President’s 
prerogative to make the final decision. Therefore it is absolutely necessary that the 
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President should be kept fully informed on what is taking place. This is vitally necessary 
when negotiations are taking place in a foreign capital, or even in another city than 
Washington. This procedure is necessary in domestic affairs and it is vital in foreign 
affairs.
28
 
This letter is important because it details in the president’s own words the standards he 
expects of his Secretary of State. Truman stresses the importance of procedure because it is 
essential for the successful operation of his formal style of management. Truman also makes 
it clear that Byrnes does not have complete authority to make US foreign policy on his own. 
This remains the president’s prerogative. Truman concludes by saying he has “the utmost 
confidence in you and in your ability but there should be a complete understanding between 
us on procedure. Hence this memorandum.”29 Truman still believed Byrnes was the right man 
for the job, but he wanted him to try harder to fit into the President’s system. Unfortunately 
for Truman during the course of 1946 this failed to happen. Byrnes’ continued to operate in 
his independent style, relied on a few close advisors, and neglected his managerial role as 
Secretary of State by failing to organise the State Department.
30
 Unable to resolve the 
differences in their operating styles, Truman asked Byrnes to resign on January 21, 1947. 
 
5.3.2 Marshall 
 
    Truman was able to establish a more productive working relationship with Byrnes’ 
successor, George Marshall, and his final Secretary of State, Dean Acheson. The success was 
based on three factors. First of all, each was able to establish a personal relationship with 
President Truman, although each was based on different qualities. Secondly, each secretary 
was able to adapt to and effectively operate within the formal and hierarchical management 
style of Truman. Finally, each secretary knew what the president expected of them in their 
role in a way that Byrnes did not. Truman thus felt confident to grant each man increasing 
prominence as bureaucratic players within the US foreign policy institutional arrangements. 
    Truman appointed George Marshall as Secretary of State on January 21, 1947. Marshall 
entered office with impressive credentials. He was the first general promoted to five-star rank 
and served as Chief-of-Staff of the United States Army during the Second World War and 
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was instrumental in planning the successful allied invasion of Europe in 1944. Alonzo 
Hamby has said of the general, “Marshall generated more reverence than anyone in American 
life,” and this was reflected in the popular media, with Marshall being voted TIME 
magazine’s “Man of the Year” in 1943 and 194731. As discussed previously, Truman often 
felt deference to those he considered his betters, and perhaps unsurprisingly as an ex army 
officer himself, he held Marshall in particularly high esteem. When asked which American 
had made the greatest contribution of the previous thirty years Truman had no hesitation in 
naming George Marshall.
32
 It was from this foundation of respect that Truman and Marshall 
were able to form the basis of their working relationship. 
    Marshall brought specific talents to the office. His entire working life had been spent in the 
army, thus he found it easy to work within Truman’s formal system, with its emphasis on 
hierarchy and strict demarcation of roles. Marshall knew he was the Secretary of State and 
did not think he had a free hand in foreign policy, as Byrnes had seemed to believe at times.
33
 
Thus he would follow the president’s instructions and only work with the power that Truman 
delegated. The combination of presidential confidence and domestic popularity created the 
basis for strong and successful Secretary of State.  
    However, having previously been Army Chief of Staff, Marshall knew that he could not 
accomplish his job without a well organised bureaucracy operating below him. His 
predecessor did not share this view and had neglected his role as manager of the State 
Department. 
34
 Marshall was a commander, “interested in duty, order and sound 
administration,” and he instigated an overhaul of the State Department by clearing up lines of 
authority within the bureaucracy.
 35
 He also adopted a formal and hierarchical management 
style similar to Truman’s. The secretary surrounded himself with qualified assistants, 
assigned them clear tasks and gave them his full support in disputes with others in the wider 
bureaucracy. The changes wrought by Truman’s appointment of Marshall pushed the State 
Department to the forefront of US foreign policymaking.  
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    The closeness of Truman and Marshall’s relationship is demonstrated by the existence of 
the Marshall Plan. When pressed by colleagues to put his own name to the policy, Truman 
refused and was determined to acknowledge the importance of the role played by his 
Secretary of State.
36
 Unfortunately for Truman, Marshall suffered from ill health and was 
forced to retire in January 1949 after only two years in office. 
  
5.3.3 Acheson 
 
    Truman appointed Dean Acheson as Marshall’s successor. Acheson had vast experience of 
the State Department. He had served as Assistant Secretary of State from 1941 to 1945. 
During this time he was integral to the design and implementation of large parts of US 
wartime economic policy towards Europe, and served as the highest ranking State 
Department official at the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944, before being promoted by 
Truman to Under Secretary of State in 1945. With Byrnes and then Marshall often out of the 
country for long periods of time, Acheson often found himself serving as acting secretary, 
responsible for managing the State Department and working closely with President Truman, 
the cabinet and Congress on matters of policy.
37
 The combination of talent, experience and 
his relationship with Truman secured his promotion to Secretary of State in January 1949. 
    Much like Marshall, Acheson was able to work within Truman’s formal style. He also 
understood what the president expected of him as Secretary of State. He had learned by 
observing Byrnes’ mistakes. Acheson knew that the president respected loyalty and expected 
to be kept fully briefed on a regular basis. To keep Truman happy, Acheson set up regular 
scheduled meetings and submitted brief outlines of policy developments he was working on 
with the State Department. In a manner that neither Byrnes or Marshall had been able to do, 
Acheson also tried to develop policy aligned with Truman’s domestic programme, displaying 
an awareness of presidential electoral politics that Truman welcomed.
38
 Truman understood 
from his previous dealings with Acheson that his new Secretary of State would not try to 
usurp presidential authority, or make crucial decisions without informing the president.   
Likewise Acheson knew that the president would not try to be the Secretary of State, or set up 
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competing foreign policy advisers as FDR had done. In particular, the creation of the 
National Security Council staff had potential to evolve into a foreign policy rival, should the 
president choose to empower it. However, Acheson recognised that the State Department 
would remain the premier foreign policy institution under Truman, and as Secretary of State 
Acheson would remain the president’s closest and most important foreign policy adviser. 
There was little chance that Truman would bypass Acheson and keep him out of the loop on 
foreign policy.
39
 This mutual understanding of the role played by each man helped to 
facilitate effective foreign policy decision-making during the latter years of the Truman 
Administration. 
    Acheson was also able to do something Byrnes and Marshall had struggled with, forming a 
relationship that was more than just professional. Truman and Acheson formed a friendship 
that created a strong foundation for their working partnership. The somewhat unlikely 
friendship between a working class Midwesterner and an upper class East Coast Ivy leaguer 
was based on several factors. Truman respected Acheson’s intelligence, competence and 
experience. He also liked that Acheson was not a yes man and was comfortable speaking his 
mind to the president.
40
 Truman also particularly admired the respect Acheson showed 
towards the institution of the presidency. Acheson would, on occasion, gently rebuke 
members of the administration who did not display the correct etiquette towards the president 
– most notably when he reminded Byrnes not to address the President as “Harry”.41 For his 
part, Acheson respected the president for his directness.
42
 
    The combination of professional respect and mutual friendship gave President Truman the 
confidence to empower Acheson as Secretary of State even more than he had Marshall. 
Truman was happy to delegate tasks to Acheson, safe in the knowledge that his secretary 
would keep him briefed on both the development and implementation of policies that Truman 
had signed off on. There was also little risk of Acheson not carrying out the president’s 
orders as instructed. This point shall be discussed in greater detail in the Korea case study in 
the following chapter, but for our present analysis it helps us to establish the importance of 
inter-personal relationships in the development of effective foreign policy decision-making. 
As Robert Donovan has written, “The appointment of Dean Acheson as Secretary of State 
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was the most important appointment Truman ever made... with respect to the direction of US 
foreign policy”43 during his administration.  If a president feels confidence in his subordinates 
and vice versa then this helps remove impediments to effective information flows and 
decreases the potential for conflict between the two. 
    It has been shown that Truman implemented a formal management style based on 
hierarchy, demarcation of jurisdiction, the appointment of advisers based on functional 
expertise and the delegation of presidential authority. Truman preferred to sit at the top of the 
hierarchy and wait for information to flow upwards through the bureaucracy. He believed that 
he would be able to make decisions based on the options presented to him by his expert 
advisors. Truman placed weight not only on the expertise of his advisors, but also on their 
personal character, particularly their loyalty. Thus, personal relationships were a crucial 
element in determining the success of Truman’s ability to work with his staff.  The second 
section of this chapter will now look at the role played by Truman’s management system in 
the development of policy towards Korea. 
 
5.4 Korea Case Study 
 
    On the 25
th
 of June 1950 North Korean communist forces invaded South Korea. In 
response, President Truman authorised the US military, on the basis of a United Nations 
Security Council resolution, to lead a UN force to halt the invasion and restore the Korean 
border. After overcoming initial setbacks that threatened to force the US off the Korean 
peninsula, a string of military victories allowed the US to restore the Korean border at the 
38
th
 parallel in late September. This was followed by a decision ordering US forces to cross 
into North Korea in an attempt to reunify the country. As US forces pushed north and 
approached the border with China in November 1950 the military success was brought to an 
end when Chinese forces entered the conflict in support of North Korea and pushed the US 
forces back to the border. 
    US military intervention in Korea in June 1950 stands as one of the most important foreign 
policy decisions of Truman’s presidency.  Truman’s authorisation of military force without a 
congressional declaration of war constitutes a major development in the imperial presidency 
and stands as a valuable example of deficient presidential decision-making. This section of 
the chapter will analyse the role played by Truman and his management style in three crucial 
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decisions. The first section outlines Truman’s role in the decision to frame Korea as a 
security threat. The second section analyses Truman’s decision to authorise the US military to 
intervene in the Korean War to halt the North Korean invasion. The third section focuses on 
Truman’s decision to cross the 38th parallel. The central argument presented is both Truman’s 
choice of management structure and how he operated within this system are central to the 
debacle of US intervention in the Korean War.  
 
5.5 Framing Korea as a Security Concern 
 
    Korea was not initially a high ranking security concern for the Truman Administration in 
the first five years after the end of the Second World War.
44
 Truman and his advisers viewed 
Europe as the highest risk due to the increasing fears of the Soviet Union encroaching further 
west. As discussed previously, the growing concern with perceived Soviet ambitions in 
Western Europe combined with the decline of the traditional powers in the region had 
challenged Truman and his advisers to reconsider the role of the US in the new bi-polar 
international system.  The result was a commitment by the US to retain their presence in 
Europe. There would be no return to isolationism. The major policies enacted before 1950 
were focused on Europe:  the declaration of the Truman Doctrine after the crises in Greece 
and Turkey, the Marshall Plan designed to foster European economic recovery, and the 
creation of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation to offer collective security arrangements for 
US allies in the region. This was the birth of containment and it was implemented initially 
with the goal of keeping the Soviet Union out of Western Europe in order to protect US 
interests. 
     For Truman and his Administration, much like FDR before him during the Second World 
War, Asia was a secondary consideration. This is not to say that Asia was unimportant. 
Having fought a war in the region and the mass deployment of US troops still stationed 
across the Pacific meant that Asia would remain high on the foreign policy agenda of 
President Truman. The point was merely that US policy towards Europe took precedence. 
However, even within this area, Korea was not the highest ranking security or economic 
concern. Japan was viewed as the most important economic centre in the region due to its 
skilled workforce and latent economic potential (in this sense Japan was very much the 
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Germany of the Far East). Therefore protecting Japan’s economic development was the key 
security concern, followed by the traditional US strategic areas of the Philippines.
45
 
    However, Korea presented a set of challenges that could prove problematic in both the 
short and long term. The country had been liberated from Imperial Japan by a joint military 
effort between the Soviet Union advancing from the north and the United States gaining 
victory in the south. As in Germany, neither side was prepared to allow the unification of the 
country under the other’s system, and so Korea was divided at the 38th parallel into two 
separate political entities. 
46
 The remaining presence of US troops stationed in the southern 
Republic of Korea and Soviet troops in the northern Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 
produced another area of the world where the growing US-Soviet Union rivalry could 
develop.  However, as Gaddis has argued, “American and Russian forces remained there 
more to restrain each other than from any strong conviction, in either Washington or Moscow, 
that the territory itself was significant.”47 The division of Korea was not viewed with the 
same concern as the division of Germany. It did not have the strategic, economic or political 
importance as its European counterpart. Indeed, the major debate on Korea in the US in the 
first years after the end of the Second World War surrounded the demobilisation of the US 
army and the removal of US forces from Korea. The Soviet Union did not bother with an 
extensive debate and removed their troops from North Korea in 1948.
48
 The question to 
address is why did Korea become a security concern? 
    The debate over the demobilisation of the post-war US armed forces highlights a wider 
issue, the differing conceptualisations of containment held by different administration 
officials.  There was agreement on what was to be contained, but officials differed over 
where it was to be contained, and what methods were to be used.  In the case of Korea, the 
fact that US troops were stationed in a country sharing a border with a communist neighbour 
generated a consensus that containment would be applied there. However, there was 
disagreement over how much containment there should be and what form it take. The 
competing factions were State Department officials and senior members of the US military 
establishment.  Both supported the US sending economic and military aid to shore up the 
South Korean regime. However, the military wanted the removal of US troops from Korea, 
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whereas the State Department wished for the troops to remain. As Barton J. Bernstein has 
argued, “The concept of containment meant different things to different groups within the 
administration, depending on the perceived value (economic, military, and political) of an 
area and the cost and type of assistance in applying containment there.”49 The military did not 
want to fight in Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that although Korea was important as a 
political symbol of US resolve in supporting her allies, the geostrategic location did not 
favour US victory in a military conflict, and as a result recommended that resources be 
directed to nations of primary strategic importance in Western Europe and Japan. Only once 
this objective had been secured should resources be directed to Korea.
50
 The State 
Department, however, stressed the importance of South Korea as a political ally and 
emphasised the need for US troops to help stabilise the government in the face of post-war 
social unrest, economic decline and communist agitation from the North.
51
 
    The decision was left to President Truman. He tried to find a compromise among the 
competing factions. Not only did he have to concern himself with international political, 
geostrategic and economic factors, but he also had domestic political factors to address. The 
long term deployment of troops in South Korea would drain budgetary resources at a time 
when they were needed elsewhere. The President signed NSC 8/2 in March 1949, authorizing 
the return of US troops by the end of June. Truman agreed with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The 
US could not risk getting involved in a conflict on the Korean peninsula that could escalate 
into a wider war with the Soviet Union.
52
 The US would continue to send economic aid to 
South Korea and Truman hoped that the country would become “a beacon to the people of 
northern Asia in resisting the control of the communist forces which have over-run them.”53 
    Truman had decided Korea was important enough for aid, but not important enough to 
commit US troops into combat. Unfortunately, there were several factors pushing Korea back 
up the security agenda. The decade long civil Chinese civil war ended in October 1949 when 
Mao’s Communists drove Chaing Kai-shek’s Nationalists from the mainland and proclaimed 
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the People’s Republic of China. The communist victory sent shockwaves through US 
domestic politics, and provided the Republican Party with ammunition to attack President 
Truman and what they saw as his Administration’s preoccupation with Europe at the expense 
of Asia.
54
 The continued questioning of “who lost China?” strengthened Truman’s critics, 
most notably Joseph McCarthy in early 1950, and forced Truman and his Administration to 
publicly explain and justify their policy choices in East Asia.
55
 The most famous incident 
came in January 1950 when Secretary of State Dean Acheson delivered an address to the 
National Press Club. Discussing the Administration’s application of the containment policy in 
East Asia, Acheson explained that there was an American “defensive perimeter” in the 
Pacific that included Japan, the Ryukyus islands and the Philippines where America was 
prepared to use military force to protect US interests in the event of foreign aggression. 
Although Taiwan and Korea were excluded from this perimeter, Acheson confirmed US 
economic aid to these countries. Six months later North Korea invaded. Academics have 
debated for years whether Acheson’s public refusal to pledge military support to South Korea 
was read by the North as a “green light” to invade, on the basis that the US were not prepared 
to defend South Korea.
56
 However, the speech is important to the present analysis because it 
demonstrates the growing importance of Korea in US officials’ debate over how and where 
containment should be applied. External events were pushing Korea back up the security 
agenda. 
    Finally, President Truman played an important, if unintentional, role in laying the 
groundwork for possible US military intervention in Korea. Although he did not want troops 
stationed in South Korea, and signed NSC 8/2 authorising their removal, his prior 
commitment to the United Nations and the agreement of collective security placed US 
Korean policy in a bind. If the North did invade South Korea serious questions would be 
asked of the President’s resolve and would test his commitment to an institution that, as 
discussed previously, was central to his plans for promoting world peace. It could be argued 
that all of the above was a growing pile of firewood that was awaiting a spark to ignite it. 
 
 
 
                                                          
54
 Donovan, R.J.(1982) Tumultuous Years: The Presidency of Harry S. Truman 1949-1953 (London: W. W. 
Norton & Company), p27 
55
 Gaddis, J.L. (2006) The Cold War (London: Allen Lane), p36-37 
56
 Matray, J I. (2002) “Dean Acheson’s Press Club Speech Re-examined” in The Journal of Conflict Studies, 22:1, 
pp28-55 
152 
 
 
 
5.6 Deciding to Intervene in Korea – Truman’s Role 
 
    The spark was provided on June 25 1950 when North Korean forces invaded South Korea. 
The size of the North Korean force crossing the 38
th
 parallel worried American officials on 
the peninsula to such an extent that they reported the information with great urgency to their 
bosses in Washington. Upon hearing the news, Secretary of State Dean Acheson telephoned 
President Truman, who was home in Independence, Missouri, to inform him of the situation. 
Truman’s initial instinct was to stay in Missouri to wait for further updates. At this point the 
magnitude of the North Korean invasion was not fully clear, and Truman did not wish to 
alarm the US public by cancelling his trip to return to Washington. However, by the 
afternoon, Truman had decided the situation was too urgent to ignore and he decided to fly 
back to Washington. Upon his arrival Truman scheduled a meeting with his highest ranking 
national security and foreign policy advisers to take place that evening.
57
 
    Although the initial discussion focused on what appeared to be the most pressing issue 
facing the president, whether the US should supply additional arms and equipment to help the 
South Koreans push back the invasion, attention quickly turned to placing Korea within the 
wider Cold War context. Two themes were enunciated that would quickly form the heart of 
US policy towards Korea, and would be repeated again and again at future meetings of 
Truman and his foreign policy team.  
    The first was the assumption that the North Korean invasion was being directed by the 
Soviet Union. The invasion was viewed as part of the communist grand plan for subversion 
of the free world. As a result, Truman was determined to ‘draw the line somewhere’ and 
wanted to discuss the military options the US had available if he decided US military 
intervention in Korea was required.
58
 At this stage both Truman and his advisers were unsure 
of the Soviet Union’s intentions in Korea. They were convinced the Soviet Union had 
orchestrated the invasion, but they were unsure of whether the Soviet Union would send 
troops to support the North Koreans, ask the Chinese communists to enter the fighting, or 
whether they would use Korea as a distraction to open a second front elsewhere. Truman 
focused the discussion on Soviet military strength in the Far East. The fear was that if the US 
decided to intervene militarily to help South Korea, US forces could end up in combat with 
Soviet troops which could lead to a wider conflict. The severity of the situation can be shown 
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by Truman asking if the US could “knock out [Soviet] bases in the Far East?” General 
Vandenberg replied “it might take some time,” but “it could be done if we used A-bombs.”59 
The atomic bomb was never used, but the fact it was discussed as an option demonstrates 
how serious the situation was becoming. 
    The second theme was Truman’s belief that the North Korean invasion of South Korea 
proved a threat to the United Nations and his hopes for world peace. Korea would stand as 
the first true test of the US’s commitment to the notion of collective security upon which the 
UN depended. The UN had issued Security Council Resolution 82 on June 25. This 
resolution determined that the invasion constituted a breach of the peace, demanded that 
North Korea removed its forces north of the 38
th
 parallel, and called upon “all Member States 
to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution.”60 At the 
meeting Truman announced clearly to his administration “we are working entirely for the 
United Nations.”61 No one in the administration challenged the president on this point as they 
appeared to be in agreement with Truman. The meeting concluded with Truman ordering 
General MacArthur to send supplies to the South Koreans and a task force to assess the need 
for further US assistance. The president also ordered the State and Defence departments to 
survey “the next probable place in which Soviet action might take place.” 62  Truman 
“emphasized the importance” of this last point.63 North Korea had invaded South Korea but 
Truman and his administration found it impossible to isolate this incident from the wider 
Cold War and remained focused on Soviet intentions. This again provides evidence to 
support the argument that presidential worldview is crucial to the foreign policy decision-
making process. By June 1950 Truman had firmly adopted the Cold War mindset. Therefore, 
the North’s invasion of the South was not viewed by Truman as a civil war, but instead as a 
bold move by the Kremlin to spread communist influence in South East Asia. Combined with 
Truman’s anti-authoritarianism and support for the United Nations, this narrowed Truman’s 
focus to options in support of US intervention to protect South Korea. As will be shown in 
the next section analysing the decision to cross the 38
th
 parallel, this situation was 
compounded by Truman’s management system, which had resulted in the president 
surrounding himself with advisors who shared a similar view of the situation. 
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5.6.1 Initial Involvement: Air and Naval Forces 
 
    Over the next five days South Korean forces struggled to hold back North Korean 
advances. At the next meeting of his national security advisers on June 26 President Truman 
ordered the US air force and navy to provide military support to the South Koreans, 
authorising them to attack any North Korean forces south of the 38
th
 parallel. Truman 
explained that “no action should be taken north of the 38th parallel...not yet.”64 Truman was 
clearly worried that any US military action north of the border could run the risk of escalating 
the situation with China, the Soviet Union or both. However, the fact he did not rule out the 
possibility of sending US forces into North Korea suggests Truman had not completely given 
up on the possibility of reuniting Korea through military conquest. The president also ordered 
the navy’s Seventh Fleet to move to the Strait of Formosa in order to prevent a communist 
attack on the nationalists holed up on the island of Formosa, as well as increased aid to the 
Philippines and Indochina.
65
 The administration continued to focus on what they believed to 
be the wider Soviet threat.  The president also again reiterated that he was authorising US air 
and naval power to be used in Korea “for the United Nations.”66 
    The two themes of Soviet complicity and the United Nations’ doctrine of collective 
security continued to shape the dialogue and agendas of meetings both within the 
administration and between the administration and Congress. The first meeting of the 
president with Congressional leaders since the outbreak of hostilities provides an illuminating 
example.  Truman informed the congressmen he “couldn’t let this go by default.”67 The 
spectre of communism hung over the meeting as the president explained to the Congressmen, 
“The communist invasion of South Korea could not be let pass unnoticed...This act was very 
obviously inspired by the Soviet Union. If we let Korea down the Soviets will keep right on 
going and swallow up one piece of Asia after another. We had to make a stand some time or 
let all of Asia go by the board. If we were to let Asia go, the Near East would collapse and 
[there is] no telling what would happen in Europe.”68 Truman had ordered the deployment of 
troops and he was adamant that it was equally important a line should be drawn at Indo-China, 
                                                          
64
 Memorandum of Conversation, by the Ambassador at Large (Jessup), Blair House Meeting with President, 26 
June 1950, FRUS 1950, I, p179 
65
 Ibid., pp178-180 
66
 Ibid., p183 
67
 Acheson, D. (1950) Notes on Meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House, June 27, Acheson Papers, 
Box 67, Harry S Truman Presidential Library, p1 
68
 Elsey, G. (1950) Notes on Meeting in the Cabinet Room at the White House, June 27, Elsey Papers, Box 71, 
Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, p4 
155 
 
 
 
the Philippines and Formosa. This is a clear enunciation of the domino principle and shows 
the extent to which Truman subscribed to the idea. The invasion of North Korea into South 
Korea was interpreted purely in Cold War terms. There was no room for debate or dissent. 
No one challenged the assumptions underlying this prognosis. This was interpreted as a threat 
to world peace, led by the Soviet Union, and it was the responsibility of the United States to 
use military force to restore the peace. According to Truman, there was no alternative.   
     No congressman challenged the president on the issue of Soviet involvement. The 
congressional leaders were broadly supportive of the president’s decisions so far. Senator 
Wiley said it was “sufficient for him to know we were in there with force and that the 
President considered this force adequate.”69 Instead, most of the discussion focused on the 
issue of the United Nations. Senator Connelly declared “this was a clear cut case for the UN. 
This was an opportunity to test its methods.”70 Truman agreed and stated he was going to, 
“make absolutely certain that everything we did in Korea would be in support of, and in 
conformity with, the decision by the Security Council of the United Nations.” 71   The 
remainder of the meeting revolved around clarifying the role of the US in relation to the UN 
and which other countries were prepared to offer support for the UN in Korea. However, 
when Senator Wiley asked for clarification on policy in Formosa, the Philippines and 
Indochina, President Truman was quick to explain that the UN was not involved and that all 
actions undertaken in these areas were for purposes of US foreign policy only.
72
 This is 
important to note because it demonstrates that support of the UN was restricted to Korea only. 
Truman was not a utopian. He did wish to develop and strengthen the UN, but he was aware 
that this could only take place within the complex environment of post-war US foreign policy 
and at this stage the UN was a means towards an end in Korea. 
    President Truman reiterated these themes after the meeting in a private conversation with 
his assistant, George Elsey. In one of his most famous quotes, Truman stated, “Korea is the 
Greece of the Far East. If we are tough enough now, if we stand up them like we did in 
Greece three years ago, they won’t take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they’ll move 
into Iran and they’ll take over the whole Middle East. There’s no telling what they’ll do if we 
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don’t put up a fight now.” 73  According to Elsey, “The president appeared sincerely 
determined to go very much further than the initial orders that he had approved for General 
MacArthur the evening before.”74 Truman viewed Korea as part of what he believed to be the 
wider Soviet conspiracy for global supremacy. He was therefore prepared to use Korea as an 
opportunity to ‘draw the line’, to teach the Soviet Union an important lesson concerning US 
resolve in protecting its post Second World War national interests. However, at this stage 
Truman did not know how far the US would have to intervene in Korea in order to achieve 
this objective. 
 
5.6.2 Ground Troops 
 
    Even with US air and naval support, the South Koreans found it increasingly difficult to 
hold back the North Koreans. The sense of deepening crisis is evident from the minutes of the 
NSC meeting held on June 29. President Truman ordered a complete reassessment of “all 
policy papers affecting the entire perimeter of the USSR.”75 The fear of Soviet involvement 
framed and intensified the discussion of policy options available. Truman was determined to 
meet the challenge: “we should not back out of Korea unless a military situation elsewhere 
demanded such action.”76 The seeming inability of the current choice of US naval and air 
forces to meet the commitment made by Truman to the United Nations prompted Secretary of 
State Acheson to inform the president “what has been done may make it imperative to accept 
all out war.”77 This would require the involvement of US ground forces in large scale military 
combat for the first time since the end of the Second World War and possible attacks on 
North Korean air bases. The president was not prepared to authorise such actions at that 
moment and asked for intelligence reports on Soviet actions in Korea, Yugoslavia, Bulgaria 
and Iran.
78
 Truman still feared that Korea might be a ruse to distract the US from potential 
Soviet advances in more important regions. 
    However, the situation in South Korea worsened overnight. General MacArthur sent a 
telegram to the State Department and Joint Chiefs-of-Staff explaining he had conducted a 
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review of the South Korean military position. In his opinion the South Korean army was 
incapable of halting the North Korean invasion. The only option left to prevent further North 
Korean advances was the deployment of US ground troops. He requested a regimental 
combat team be deployed and recommended two divisions be sent from Japan. At 5am 
Secretary of the Army Frank Pace called President Truman to inform him of MacArthur’s 
request. With surprisingly little discussion Truman authorised the deployment of the combat 
regiment but said he would have to consult with his advisers before he could order the 
additional two divisions.
79
 
     The consultation took place a few hours later at a meeting of the NSC and Truman 
authorised the deployment of the two divisions. Aware of the magnitude of the decision, the 
president wanted to make clear in public pronouncements that although US ground forces 
would be committed to Korea, there would be no war with the Soviet Union. In private, 
Truman declared he was prepared to defend Korea if the Soviet Union invaded, but did not 
want to make it public. The sole objective of current, public, policy was to push North Korea 
back across the 38
th
 parallel and restore the border. However, Truman “wanted to be sure that 
we were not so deeply committed in Korea that we could not take care of other situations 
which might develop.” 80  The president authorised the air force to attack North Korean 
munitions supplies across the 38
th
 parallel. Truman stated “such operations should be 
designed only to destroy munitions supplies” and he “wanted it clearly understood that our 
operations in Korea were designed to keep peace in Korea and restore the border.”81 This 
point is important because it demonstrates two key issues. The first is that US policy in Korea 
at this time was firmly rooted within the broader doctrine of containment. Truman and his 
administration were primarily focused on pushing the North Koreans back across the 38
th
 
parallel and restoring the border. At this stage there was no serious long term plan to reunite 
Korea on the battlefield. In the face of the North Korean onslaught this did not appear to be a 
realistic ambition. The second is the inability of Truman and his advisers to place themselves 
in the position of other states’ decision makers. Truman believed it was obvious that the 
decision to deploy ground forces and any US air or naval attack north of the 38
th
 parallel was 
purely in support of the overall plan to restore the border. However, there is no guarantee that 
neighbouring states, particularly China, would perceive the operations in the same light. 
Truman did not comprehend that these actions could be interpreted by China as hostile and it 
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could be argued this constituted the first step on the road to Chinese intervention in 
November. This final point is particularly troubling in light of two telegrams the US had 
received from the USSR and China.  Acheson interpreted the notes to indicate that the Soviet 
Union would not intervene in Korea, but they might request the Chinese to intervene on their 
behalf.
82
 This information does not seem to have given Truman and his advisers particular 
cause for concern, and they carried on with the decision to deploy US ground forces in Korea. 
    Later on the same day Truman held a meeting with his cabinet and congressional leaders to 
update them on the developing situation in Korea. The president was less than forthcoming 
with information regarding the deployment of US troops. He explained that he had not 
committed any troops to “actual combat” but had merely sent “base troops to Pusan to keep 
communication and supply lines open.”83 In light of MacArthur’s report that US troops would 
be required to hold the line in Korea it was inevitable that US forces would soon be in ‘actual 
combat’ against the North Korean army.   Senator Wherry appeared to understand this and 
told the president he should advise the congress before sending troops to Korea.  Truman 
explained this had been an emergency and there was no time for lots of talk: “I just had to act 
as Commander-in-Chief and I did. I told MacArthur to go to the relief of the Koreans and to 
carry out the instructions of the United Nations Security Council.”84 This demonstrates the 
extent to which Truman subscribed to the concept of presidential prerogative in times of 
national security crisis. Truman had defined the conflict in Korea as a legitimate emergency 
and it was in the interests of US national security to engage ground troops in military conflict. 
As a result he believed he was under no obligation to ask Congress for permission to take this 
action. He had all the authority he required as Commander-in-Chief of the US armed forces.  
Senator Wherry maintained “I do understand the action, but I do feel Congress ought to be 
consulted before any large scale actions are taken again.”85 Truman replied, “If any large 
scale actions were to take place, he would tell the Congress about it.”86 The president did not 
say he would inform Congress before the decision was made let alone ask for their 
permission. 
    Truman’s decision to authorise the use of the military in Korea without prior discussions 
with Congress remained a contentious point during the early days of the conflict. At a 
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meeting with his foreign policy team and Senator Lucas on July 3 the topic of whether the 
President should make a full report to a Joint Session of Congress was discussed. Senator 
Lucas expressed support for President Truman saying “had very properly done what he had to 
do without consulting Congress” and “questioned the desirability” of addressing Congress. 
He went on to add, “most of the members of Congress were sick of the attitude taken by 
Senators Taft and Wherry.”87 However, Taft and Wherry were not present to make their case 
against presidential use of military force abroad without congressional consent.  All the 
participants were broadly in agreement both with the president’s conceptualisation of the 
crisis (a Soviet backed ploy in line with the domino theory) and with the methods he had 
chosen to deal with it (the militarisation of the containment policy).  This suggests that in 
little over a week since the beginning of the crisis, the focus of administration discussion on 
the topic of Korea had narrowed and dissenting voices were already finding it difficult to be 
heard at the highest levels of US foreign policy decision-making.  This highlights the 
important role played by the president and the impact his management style has on US 
foreign policy decision-making. By establishing clear lines of jurisdiction and hierarchy the 
president ended up working closely with specific individuals responsible for certain policy 
areas. Therefore he would be receiving information from the same people on the same topics. 
In the case of the early days of the Korean conflict at no point did he ask directly for the input 
of those who disagreed with him and his advisors, such as Senators Taft and Wherry. 
Information was being filtered by both Truman’s worldview and his management system 
resulting in US foreign policy being increasingly militarised. 
    Senator Lucas warned “that to go up to Congress might sound as if the President were 
asking for a declaration of war.”88 Truman replied, “this was exactly the point.” He said that 
he “had not been acting as President but as Commander-in-Chief of our forces in the Far 
East.”89 This statement appears rather confusing, the president is Commander-in-Chief and it 
is difficult to see how the two can be separated in the manner Truman claimed to be doing, 
but it does seem like an attempt to offer a constitutional justification for his decision. This 
can be seen in Truman’s closing comment on the matter: “it was necessary to be very careful” 
that he “would not appear to be trying to get around Congress and using extra-Constitutional 
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powers.”90 Truman was aware of how his actions might be interpreted, and he wanted to 
make sure that he could claim to be acting within the remit of his office. 
 
5.6.3 The Crisis Deepens 
 
    The crisis in Korea deepened over the summer. Even with the support of US ground forces, 
the North Koreans continued to advance south, defeating the US and South Korean forces in 
key areas on the Korean peninsula. Acheson’s summary of the cabinet meeting of July 12 
provides valuable insight into Truman and his administrations attempts to explain and 
interpret the development of the Korean situation. They focus almost entirely on the role of 
the Soviet Union.  Acheson explains that the State Department and Defence Department are 
in agreement on three general points. The first is that “the Soviet Union has the military 
capability at the present time of taking, or inspiring through satellites, military action ranging 
from local aggression on one or more points along the periphery of the Soviet world to all out 
general war.”91 The second is that, while agreeing there is no consensus on the probability of 
Soviet action, “it is completely agreed that there is not sufficient evidence to justify a firm 
opinion that the Soviet Union will not take any one or all of the actions which lie within its 
military capabilities.”92 The final point is “that the present situation is one of extreme danger 
and tension which, either by Soviet design or by the momentum of events arising from the 
Korean situation in which actual warfare is in progress, could present the United States with 
new outbreaks of aggression possibly up to and including general hostilities.”93 In the face of 
increasing setbacks on the military front, the underlying suspicion of the Soviet Union is 
brought even more to the fore and magnified fears of Soviet intervention across the globe. 
Unsurprisingly, based on the previous discussion of how the US ranked security threats in the 
post-Second World War environment, Truman and his administration were concerned with 
the impact of Korea on Western Europe. Acheson notes, “It is becoming apparent to the 
world that we do not have the capabilities to face the threat, and the feeling in Europe is 
changing from one of elation that the United States has come into the Korean crisis to 
petrified fright.”94 Acheson recommended to Truman the only way to improve the situation in 
Korea was to order more forces to the conflict and to ask Congress for more money. Truman 
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agreed to do so.
95
 This document is important because it reveals the extent to which policy in 
Korea was dominated by concerns over the Soviet Union and the fear they would invade 
Western Europe. The fact that Truman and his closest foreign policy advisor shared this view 
demonstrates the extent to which US decision makers had adopted the Cold War mindset and 
the central role this played in the increased militarisation of containment in Korea. 
    By the end of August, the situation in Korea had begun to improve slightly. Although 
North Korean forces had driven deep into South Korean territory, the US and South Korean 
forces were holding a perimeter outside Pusan, a city on the south-east coast. If the North 
Koreans had captured Pusan then the US would have been forced to abandon Korea. 
However, by maintaining the perimeter around the city, the US was able to land more troops 
and supplies, strengthening their position and giving policymakers hope that the US would be 
able to counter the North Koreans.  
    Still central to discussions in Washington was the role of the Soviet Union in Korea and 
Western Europe. At a meeting of the National Security Council on August 25 the topic of 
possible Soviet action in the light of the Korean situation was discussed. The focus, as usual, 
was Western Europe, particularly the JCS’s fear that the Soviet Union were planning to 
support an East German invasion of West Germany. The president agreed there was a risk 
Europe would fall to communism, but “there was no use in re-arming Western European 
countries if they will not fight.”96 Truman thought that “one of our greatest problems is 
creating this will to fight.”97 This suggests that Truman believed the US already had the will 
to fight and Korea stood as an example of his and the US’s intention to stand up to what they 
perceived as Soviet backed communist aggression in the Far East. The Cold War mindset was 
hardening in the Truman administration and foreign policy was being dominated by 
continued analyses of Soviet intentions and military capabilities. The result was to further 
increase the militarisation of the containment policy that now orientated US foreign policy, 
highlighting the central role of presidential worldview and management style in the 
development of Korean policy. 
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5.7 Deciding to Cross the Parallel  
 
    Although the US and UN forces were holding their position around Pusan they were still in 
a difficult position. To defeat North Korea they would have to break out of their perimeter. 
However, it was difficult to see how this could be achieved. The city was surrounded and the 
US forces had their backs to the sea. General Douglas MacArthur proposed a solution. He 
devised a plan to launch an amphibious assault on Inchon, a port on the north-west coast of 
South Korea, two hundred miles behind enemy lines, and only eighteen miles from Seoul. If 
he was successful he would be able to cut off the North Korean forces advancing on Pusan, 
and give US forces in the city a chance to break out.
98
 
    At dawn on September 15 MacArthur launched his counter-offensive. The landing of the 
US Tenth Corps took North Korean forces by surprise, and through a combination of skill, 
force and good fortune the US was able to secure the beachhead and drive on to Seoul. Some 
military historians have described MacArthur’s landing as one of the most daring in all of 
history.
99
 It gave the Eighth Army in Pusan an opportunity to break through the heavy North 
Korean resistance. The North Koreans were now encircled and began to take heavy losses. 
An estimate of twenty-five thousand soldiers managed to retreat across the 38
th
 parallel, but 
the Eighth Army and Tenth Corps linked up at Osan on September 26, took control of Seoul, 
and marched towards the border.
100
 
    At this point the “Soviet” threat had been contained. The status quo had been returned by 
securing the 38
th
 parallel leaving the communists in control of North Korea. Truman could 
have called a halt to the military’s advance. This did not happen. Truman decided to let 
MacArthur lead his troops across the 38
th
 parallel and pursue the North Korean army in the 
hope of defeating them on the battlefield and reuniting Korea under the government in Seoul. 
The policy of containment had morphed into the pursuit of rollback. Truman would attempt 
to overthrow a communist government through the use of direct US military force.
101
 
    The initial advance was successful as MacArthur drove the communists north. A question 
remained as to how far north MacArthur’s forces could advance. The major concern was the 
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border with China. Truman made it absolutely clear to MacArthur that he did not want to 
provoke the Chinese, that there should be no US military activity across or too close to the 
border. 
102
 However, the warnings were not heeded and MacArthur advanced too close to the 
Chinese border. On November 30 the Chinese army invaded. Over 200,000 Chinese soldiers 
entered the conflict. The US could not defeat them using conventional weapons. The US 
forces were routed and forced back to the border. MacArthur was able to hold the line, but 
any chance of all out victory and reuniting Korea was lost as the war descended into a 
stalemate along the 38
th
 parallel. The question this section will address is how this was 
allowed to happen. In order to answer this it will be necessary to focus on President Truman’s 
worldview, his management style and the quality of decision-making between the president 
and his advisers. 
 
5.7.1 Truman’s Management Style: Loyalty and Group Harmony 
 
    As discussed previously, Truman operated a formal management style. His administration 
was organised in a strict hierarchy of principals and subordinates, with each of his principals 
granted jurisdiction over specific policy areas based on their functional expertise. Each 
adviser was supposed to know their place in the system and which areas of policy they were 
responsible for.  The result was a presidential management style that encouraged delegation 
of tasks to his advisers and placed large emphasis on coordinated and careful staff work. 
Information would flow up from the bureaucracy and each cabinet and agency head would be 
responsible for briefing the president on their relevant policy areas. This would allow Truman 
to make decisions based on the information he received from below. However, Truman’s 
decision to cross the 38
th
 parallel, which resulted in the Chinese invasion of November 28, 
highlights several flaws in both Truman and his system. 
    In previous sections it was noted that Truman placed a great emphasis on loyalty. It was 
the glue he hoped would hold his system together. He expected his subordinates to be loyal to 
him as president, loyal to their colleagues across the executive and loyal to the policies of the 
administration. In return the president would use his personal and political power to support 
his staff in any run ins with Congress, the media, interest groups and the general public.
103
 
Trust and loyalty are important if any collective enterprise is to succeed, but if loyalty is 
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emphasised at the expense of other important factors, this can have negative consequences for 
effective decision-making. In the case of Truman and Korea, this can be seen in two areas. 
    The first is the negative impact resulting from the ideological conformity prevalent within 
the small group of close advisers who served the president during the Korean crisis.  Truman 
relied on the same advisers throughout: his Secretaries of State, Defence, Army, Navy, Air 
Force and the Joint Chiefs-of-Staff.  Glen Paige conducted interviews with the members of 
the group and published a study of their first six meetings. His key finding was the existence 
of high levels of “intra-group solidarity”.  Paige noted, “One of the most striking aspects [of 
these meetings] is the high degree of satisfaction and moral rightness shared by the decision 
makers.”104 According to one of the participants Paige interviewed these meetings exhibited 
“the finest spirit of harmony I have ever known.” 105At the outset of US involvement in the 
Korean War in June Paige concluded, on the basis of these interviews, that the initial 
decisions to deploy US forces to Korea were made with “minimal conflict.”106 This feeling of 
group solidarity continued to pervade Truman and his small group of advisers throughout the 
months they worked together on Korea policy. In large respect this feeling of solidarity was 
the result of the shared worldview held by Truman and his advisers. As discussed previously 
in this chapter, Truman and his advisers, particularly Dean Acheson, the president’s closest 
and most valued foreign policy adviser, held similar worldviews. Communism, and what they 
saw as the Soviet Union’s aggressive foreign policy, posed the greatest threat to US national 
security and world peace more broadly. All the members of Truman’s close-knit group of 
advisers agreed it was the responsibility of the US to contain Soviet expansion in order to 
protect the free world and the legitimacy of the United Nations. As the documentary analysis 
of the National Security Council meetings in the previous section has shown, Truman 
interpreted the North Korean invasion of South Korea as a Soviet ploy designed and 
implemented to expand communist power beyond the borders of the USSR. This was a view 
shared by his advisers.  On this basis it is clear to see why the decision to intervene in South 
Korea was made with ‘minimal conflict.’ Whether this decision to intervene was good or bad 
has unsurprisingly provoked serious debate in the literature.
107
 However, Truman’s decision 
to allow MacArthur’s forces to cross the 38th parallel has raised mostly criticism.  
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    One of the major flaws in Truman’s decision-making process in the lead up to the crossing 
of the 38
th
 parallel was the group harmony that existed between the president and his 
subordinates produced unsubstantiated optimism. David McLellan interviewed Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson in the late 1960s and he noted there was “something strangely 
unreal...about those meetings.”108 This assertion was based on his interpretation of Acheson’s 
testimony during the interview which demonstrated the extent of cohesion within the 
administration and the degree of loyalty Truman had been able to cultivate. This was 
particularly the case between the civilian and military advisers. Where one might expect the 
civilians to hold more ‘dove’ like opinions in contrast with the ‘hawkish’ views of the 
military, McLellan concluded “General Bradley and other members of the JCS shared 
completely Acheson’s view of grand strategy... Bradley and the Joint Chiefs were so in 
accord with Truman and Acheson that they earned from Senator Taft the epithet of ‘political’ 
generals.”109 As noted in previous sections, the President and Acheson held each other in high 
regard.  These feelings of mutual respect between the president and his subordinates, 
combined with their shared worldview, generated a sense of optimism within the 
administration.  
    Evidence to support this conclusion can be drawn from documentary analysis of two 
National Security Meetings held in early October.  At the first, held on October 2, barely two 
weeks after MacArthur’s assault on Inchon, the discussion focused on the drafting of NSC 68 
and “United States Objectives and Programs for National Security”, the document which 
would eventually serve as the blueprint for US foreign policy during the Cold War, and laid 
the foundations for the expansion of the national security and military apparatus required to 
operationalise the militarisation of the containment policy. However, of central importance to 
the present analysis of Truman’s decision-making in the run up to the Chinese invasion of 
November 30, is the president’s assertion “that this program would be a terrific job, 
particularly after the Korean emergency.”110 This suggests that as early as October Truman 
was feeling confident the conflict would be over quickly on the back of MacArthur’s success 
and he was already planning for long term military build up to counter the Soviet Union, 
without the distraction of Korea. At the second meeting of the NSC, held on October 13, 
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Truman was presented with a recommendation to cancel NSC 80, a proposed “Peace 
Offensive Concerning Korea...since the stalemate in Korea which it envisaged was no longer 
a possibility.”111 President Truman agreed and ordered the project to be cancelled.112 This 
demonstrates the level of confidence Truman and his administration felt that success would 
soon be theirs in Korea. No dissenting voices were heard during these discussions. 
    As Richard Tanner Johnson as argued, “There is much of Truman’s style to be found 
intertwined among what has come to be known as the ‘Korean Decisions.’ His emphasis on 
solidarity, his determination to do right, and his preference for harmony left their imprint on 
the group and its discussions. Unfortunately, in this instance, Truman’s style was out of step 
with the requirements of the situation.” 113  This was because the excessive optimism 
generated by the close working relationship and sense of intra-group solidarity that had 
developed between Truman and his foreign policy team produced a negative impact on 
effective information processing and decision-making within the Truman administration.  
 
5.7.2 Ignoring Intelligence Warnings 
 
    The clearest example of this defect was Truman’s decision to ignore the warnings of 
Chinese military intervention if US and UN forces advanced too close to Korea’s border with 
China. In late September the Chinese government issued several warnings. On September 30 
the Chinese Foreign Minister, Chou En-lai, gave a speech before a committee of the People’s 
Political Consultative Conference and stated that China “could not supinely tolerate the 
crossing of the parallel,” and “could not stand aside.”114 The second direct warning came on 
October 3 when the Indian Ambassador to China informed the State Department that Chou 
En-lai had told him “if United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel China would send in 
troops to help the North Koreans.”115 These warnings were dismissed as bluffs, with Truman 
believing the Indian Ambassador to be playing “the game of the Chinese Communists” as he 
had allegedly done in the past.
116
 As Neustadt wrote, “With the military opportunity before 
them and with diplomatic dangers out of sight, the men he [Truman] leaned on for advice saw 
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little risk of any sort.” 117  Truman did not take the warnings onboard and did not halt 
MacArthur’s advance north. The Chinese responded by deploying a limited number of troops 
to tactically engage US and UN forces in the hope of making US leaders realise they were not 
bluffing. Once again Truman ignored these warnings, even as the limited number of Chinese 
forces inflicted casualties on US forces in late October and early November.  MacArthur 
continued to follow Truman’s order and continued his advance north, pushing ever closer to 
the Chinese border. Their earlier warnings unheeded, the Chinese launched their mass 
invasion of over 200,000 troops on November 28 and all hopes of a US victory were 
extinguished. 
    How was it possible that Truman could be presented with several warnings of a possible 
Chinese intervention and, if not ignoring them completely, continued to allow MacArthur to 
advance US forces ever closer to China? Several factors were at play. As noted above, 
Truman did not trust the source of the verbal warnings. However, possibly defective 
intelligence does not explain why he did not take the initial Chinese tactical engagements 
seriously.  Indeed subsequent analysis by scholars suggests that there was enough evidence to 
take the Chinese threats seriously. As de Weerd has concluded, “It was not the absence of 
intelligence which led us into trouble but our unwillingness to draw unpleasant conclusions 
from it.”118 The question of why this was allowed to happen, and Truman’s role in shaping 
the outcome, must be addressed. 
    Irvin Janis argues that the defective decision-making stemming from the refusal to 
acknowledge the Chinese warnings was a result of what he terms ‘groupthink.’119 This is a 
social psychological phenomenon exhibited by small groups of decision makers. “Groupthink 
refers to a deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgement that results 
from in-group pressures,” particularly  the desire of small groups to maintain high levels of 
cohesiveness and pursue concurrence-seeking tendencies at the expense of critical 
thinking.
120
 The result of this diminished capacity for critical thinking is often “over 
optimism, lack of vigilance, and sloganistic thinking about the weakness and immorality of 
out groups.”121 Applying this framework to Truman’s decision to ignore the intelligence 
warning of an imminent Chinese invasion of North Korea, Janis highlights the impact of 
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these group norms. Although Truman and his advisers were presented with the same 
intelligence, none of them disagreed with the conclusions drawn or attempted to question 
initial assumptions. There was no correction of belief or interpretation. Indeed, as Joseph De 
Rivera has suggested, the members of the group adopted the opposite strategy and reinforced 
each other’s assessments “in a manner that increased risk taking.” 122 Not one presidential 
adviser approached the president to voice concerns because they all were “collaborating in an 
optimistic view of the situation.”123 The end result was the decision to continue pushing US 
forces north towards the Chinese border. Janis concludes this incident “highlights one of the 
central themes of the present analysis – the tendency for cohesive groups to foster a shared 
illusion of invulnerability, which inclines them to minimize risks.”124 
    However, Janis’ approach is only of partial use to the current analysis of presidential 
management style. The phenomenon of groupthink may be found in all small groups where 
concurrence-seeking behaviour exists. It is not restricted to US foreign policy decision 
makers.
125
 This thesis wants to demonstrate the way in which the president’s choice of 
management style can create the potential for flawed decision-making, of which groupthink 
is only one negative outcome. Therefore it is necessary to expand the analysis to focus 
specifically on President Truman’s choice of a formal management system and the extent to 
which this created the conditions for defective decision-making which led to US forces 
invading North Korea. 
 
5.7.3 Reliance on too few Advisors with Similar Views   
 
    A major weakness of Truman’s management style was a reliance on too few advisors. Due 
to the nature of the formal style Truman adopted he maintained strict lines of demarcation 
within his administration. Individual advisors were responsible for specific jurisdictions of 
policy areas, and they alone were responsible for presenting information to Truman. This was 
Truman’s choice, believing such a system would allow him to make the best possible choice 
and avoid what he saw as the bureaucratic confusion of the Roosevelt years. The downside of 
this system is clear in that it limits the number of voices the president hears on a daily basis. 
This situation was compounded by the outbreak of the Korean War. The conflict led to 
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Truman increasing his use of the NSC and developing it into a central foreign policy 
institution. As discussed previously, Truman had issued orders in July that all foreign policy 
options were to be presented to him through the National Security Council. Truman was even 
more explicit in relation to Korea policy:  
 
The President instructed the members of the National Security Council ...that all 
proposals for presidential action in the current Korea crisis must be forwarded to him 
through the machinery of the National Security Council. The president said he did not 
want any unilateral proposals for his action sent to him directly.
126
  
 
The president was not prepared to discuss formal options outside of the NSC machinery. This 
further centralised US foreign policy within the White House because the only people able to 
attend NSC meetings were the statutory members. Anyone else who wished to attend 
required an invitation from the President himself. Thus, if Truman did not ask anyone else to 
attend, he would be surrounded by the same people at each meeting, all of whom would be 
offering similar interpretations and recommendations to those he had already held, which 
confirmed his pre-existing beliefs. This contributed directly to the feeling of intra-group 
solidarity that proved so deficient for critical analysis of incoming intelligence and objective 
assessment of available options, which led to the decision to cross the 38
th
 parallel and pursue 
the destruction of the North Korean army despite the warnings from China. Dean Acheson 
offers evidence in his autobiography to support this conclusion: ““As I look back, the critical 
period stands out as the three weeks from October 26 to November 17. Then all the dangers 
from dispersal of our own forces and intervention by the Chinese were manifest. We were all 
deeply apprehensive. We were frank with one another, but not quite frank enough.”127 
    This reliance on too few advisors sharing too similar views did not have to happen. Within 
the State Department there were dissenting views held by senior officials with well 
established reputations within the Truman administration, George Kennan and Paul Nitze. 
Kennan had been a leading voice in Truman Administration during the early years of the 
Cold War, contributing directly the formulation of the containment policy. As discussed 
previously, his ‘Long Telegram’ and article in Foreign Affairs had made a large impact on 
Truman and the foreign policy establishment in Washington by providing the economic and 
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political rationale for containment.  Kennan rejected the assumption held by Truman and his 
staff that the communists in China were a Soviet puppet and did not believe they would stay 
out of the war if the US crossed the 38
th
 parallel. His boss, and newly appointed head of the 
Policy Planning Staff, agreed with Kennan’s assessment. They repeatedly made their case to 
Secretary of State Dean Acheson at meetings in the State Department, however, as Kennan 
has written, they were “relegated to the sidelines: attending the respective meetings in... the 
Secretary’s office, but not those that took place at the White House level.”128 With no access 
to the president Kennan resigned from the State Department in August saying he felt like “a 
floating kidney...one step removed from the real decisions.”129 
    Johnson and Janis suggest Dean Acheson, as Secretary of State, was to blame for not 
bringing dissenting views such as Kennan’s to the president.130 Acheson’s relationship with 
President Truman certainly proved crucial in the defective decision-making between 
September and November. As discussed in the previous section, Truman and Acheson were 
able to work together on the basis of mutual respect and friendship. However, once again, the 
Korean crisis demonstrates the potential flaws of such close working relationships within 
President Truman’s choice of a formal management style. Within the president’s 
management system Dean Acheson was given the task of Truman’s principal foreign policy 
adviser. Acheson acted as the primary source of foreign policy information reaching the 
president’s desk from the State Department. His role was to directly link the State 
Department to Truman. However, Johnson and Janis both suggest he failed in this task. By 
deciding not to present the views of Kennan and Nitze to President Truman, Johnson argues 
“Acheson the ‘funnel’ of information, had become the ‘filter’.” 131  Janis offers an even 
stronger rebuke suggesting “Secretary Acheson had adopted the role of a self appointed 
mind-guard, making sure that Kennan and those who shared his critical views of the risks of 
provoking Communist China were always kept at a safe distance from the men who had the 
power to shape United States policy in the Korean War.”132 Again, Acheson himself seems to 
offer evidence to support this, ““in the three weeks and three days from November 10 until 
December 4, when disaster was full upon us...two secretaries met five times with the 
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president, and I consulted with him on five other occasions. I have an unhappy conviction 
that none of us, myself prominently included, served him as he was entitled to be served.”133  
    This suggests that, on reflection after the events, Acheson realised that the president’s 
advisors had not performed their roles in the manner expected of them. This is an important 
point for two reasons. The first is that it shows Acheson also agrees there were weaknesses in 
Truman’s management system that had an impact on decision-making during the course of 
the Korean War. Had these defects been realised earlier it is possible the intelligence 
warnings would have been heeded and the US may not have advanced so far north, or may 
not have even crossed the 38
th
 parallel at all. The options may have been evaluated differently 
if the president had heard more dissenting voices. The second point is that it demonstrates 
both the role of presidential agency and its limitations. The president was responsible for 
developing his management system and choosing his key advisors. However, the other actors 
also had a role to play. Acheson acknowledges he did not serve the president as well as he 
could have in terms of providing information and generating options. This suggests that even 
if the president had included other advisors there is no guarantee they would have performed 
as expected. There are limits to the president’s ability to get the best out of his advisors. 
    The documentary record demonstrates that the highest ranking members of the Truman 
administration held grave concerns over the course of events in Korea as early as July.  In a 
letter dated July 12, Secretary of State Dean Acheson wrote to Paul Nitze, the Director of the 
State Department’s Policy Planning Staff to outline his views on both the short and long run 
situation in Korea as he saw it.  In the immediate future Acheson believed the US would need 
to put in “the force necessary to reoccupy the 38th [parallel]”, and that most administration 
officials shared this view, “so long as the Chinese and Soviets do not officially come in.”134 
Acheson recommends that to avoid the risk of Chinese and Soviet intervention the US should 
limit their military activities to the Korean peninsula and should not attack Chinese territory. 
However, if the Chinese or the Soviet Union did intervene then the US should be prepared to 
fight “unless and until the war becomes general.” 135  This conclusion is rather troubling 
because it is difficult to envisage open conflict between US and Soviet ground forces not 
escalating into a general war and all the risk this would entail in the nuclear age. However, of 
concern to the current analysis is Acheson’s view that the Soviet Union and Chinese would 
not intervene so long as the US’s goal was solely to restore the border at the 38th parallel. 
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This was the underlying assumption driving the early development of policy in the first 
months of the Korean conflict. 
    The tone of the letter changes when Acheson ponders the long term future of the US in 
Korea: “If we succeed in reoccupying the country, the question of garrisoning it and 
supporting it arises. This is expensive, requires troops needed elsewhere and presents a hard 
program to continue domestically. But I do not see how to avoid it.” 136  The Secretary 
continues “It seems abstruse to ask the country to sacrifice men and money to retake Korea to 
support the UN, and then let it slip away by default. I do not know how long this situation 
would continue, particularly in the light of changing conditions, but I cannot see the end of it. 
In other words, as the Virginians say, we have bought a colt.”137 This demonstrates that as 
early as July 12 Acheson held serious concerns about the long term future of US policy in 
Korea. The content of Acheson’s letter raises the question of how often these concerns were 
discussed with the president and whether or not sufficient time was devoted to the topic of 
long term planning. Even without Chinese intervention the US was being drawn into a 
quagmire and it is difficult to establish if the president and his administration were aware of 
the consequences of their decisions. Acheson’s letter reveals his personal view of the 
situation, but it also highlights potential weaknesses in Truman’s management style and his 
relationship with his closest advisers. There was no member of his team pushing hard for a 
serious reconsideration of Korea policy, and Acheson, the president’s closest foreign policy 
adviser, did not appear to be voicing his concerns to Truman. 
    However, it must be stressed that Truman allowed this situation to develop. For a man 
almost obsessed with making the correct decision it highlights a great personal flaw that he 
did not actively seek out alternatives. He sat and waited for options to present themselves to 
him through his formal channels. Roosevelt’s system may have had its problems, but a real 
strength was his ability to find dissenting views and alternative policy options before bringing 
them back to his advisors and forcing them to rethink or justify their initial choices. By doing 
so this ensured that a broader array of options was discussed with longer periods of critical 
analysis. Truman was unable to do this and his choice of formal system only reinforced the 
problem.  Therefore the blame does not lie solely with Acheson. President Truman must 
shoulder the responsibility for not asking either for Kennan or Nitze personally, and for 
failing to order Acheson to seek out alternative views from within the State Department. If 
Truman had done so, more caution may have been exercised in the lead up to the crossing of 
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the 38
th
 parallel and it may have been possible to avoid the Chinese intervention. This 
demonstrates not only the importance of a president’s choice of management system but also 
how they choose to use the system and the impact this has on US foreign policy. Truman 
could have operated a formal system and kept his information channels open by asking other 
members of the bureaucracy for advice. Instead, he chose not to. He continued to listen to the 
same voices, the result of which was his decision to cross the 38
th
 parallel and bring the 
Chinese into the Korean War, ending any hope of a US victory. 
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
    This chapter focused on the development of Truman’s management style and its 
application to policy making during the Korean War. It argued that Truman developed a 
formal management system based on his individual preferences which had developed during 
his time in the army and US Senate. It demonstrated how important personal relationships 
were to the functioning of Truman’s presidency by focusing on the president’s relationships 
with his Secretaries of State.  By constructing a case study of US policy towards Korea, it 
was possible to draw evidence to support the argument that both Truman’s choice of 
management structure and how he operated within this system are central to understanding 
the debacle of US intervention in the Korean War.  The negative outcomes were in part the 
result of Truman’s management system and the choices he made. Framing Korea as a 
security concern, intervening in the war, crossing the 38
th
 parallel and advancing towards the 
Yalu River, these were all the president’s choices. How these decisions were made are crucial 
to understanding the development of the Korean War, and provide evidence to demonstrate 
the role of presidential agency.  Truman chose to run a formal system, chose his advisors,  
chose to centralise Korean War decision-making within the NSC, and chose not to invite 
additional advisors into the NSC.  This demonstrates the central role of the president in 
making the US foreign policy-making system run. The situation was compounded by 
Truman’s worldview and the fact his advisors shared similar assumptions with regard to the 
role of the Soviet Union in the Korean War. The result was that Truman heard a narrow range 
of views, did not evaluate the alternatives, and pushed the US further towards the 
militarisation of containment.  The important point to note is that making the case for 
presidential agency does not equate with the president making the correct choices all the time, 
dominating the policy making process and achieving the outcomes they want. This would be 
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an oversimplification and exaggeration. Instead, Truman and Korea highlight that the 
negative and unintended consequences of presidential agency, in this case the result of the 
compounding factors of presidential worldview and management style, are just as important. 
Finally, this chapter has provided empirical evidence to support the argument that it is 
necessary to incorporate presidential agency into a multi-level framework in order to explain 
the development of US foreign policy. 
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Chapter Six: Reagan’s Worldview and Management Style 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
    This chapter will focus on the foreign policy of Ronald Reagan. It begins by placing the 
Reagan Administration in historical context. Late 1970s US foreign policy was marked by 
arguments over the idea of American decline and Soviet resurgence. The election of Ronald 
Reagan offered a strong counter to ideas of American decline and brought forward 
resurgence in support of increased American assertiveness in international relations. The 
chapter then moves on to look at the development of Ronald Reagan’s worldview, 
particularly his view of American power and the Soviet Union, his vision for American 
foreign policy and how this shaped his attitude to executing the functions of the office of the 
presidency. It addresses several questions. Why was Reagan so strongly anti-communist? 
What impact did this have on his foreign policy?  This chapter argues that Reagan’s 
worldview was formulated as a result of his direct experience of working with American 
communists in Hollywood in the 1940s and his dislike of the policy of containment. As a 
result, Reagan entered the White House with a desire to increase the military capabilities of 
the United States in order to counter what he viewed as the advances made by the Soviet 
Union in the developing world, leading directly to the development of the policy of rollback. 
This provides evidence to support the argument that presidential worldview is central to 
setting the US foreign policy agenda. 
    The second part of the analysis focuses on Reagan’s management of the executive branch 
and bureaucracy. It will be shown that, as with all presidents, the operation of the executive is 
a direct consequence of the management preferences of the president. While Reagan was 
keen to involve himself in formulating the long-term strategic goals of his administration, he 
was less willing to actively participate in the details and day-to-day complexity of foreign 
policy making. It will be shown that Reagan adopted a formal management system, but 
complicated matters by delegating a large amount of authority to his subordinates when it 
came to the actual implementation of policy.  The chapter will argue that Reagan’s 
management weaknesses directly contributed to the bureaucratic confusion that existed 
during his administration. In particular, it will focus on Reagan’s inability to manage the 
relationship between his National Security Council staff and the State Department, the 
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relationship between the National Security Advisor and the Secretary of State, and the 
divisions between the hardliners and moderates within his administration. In doing so it will 
show how important the president’s management style is to the functioning of the foreign 
policy making process. 
 
6.2 The Historical Context of the Reagan Administration and Reagan’s 
Worldview  
 
    US foreign policy faced several difficulties in the late 1970s. The legacy of the Vietnam 
War had produced a strong sentiment amongst the American population flatly opposed to 
deploying US troops in large numbers anywhere in the world unless there was a threat of the 
highest order to US national security. This domestic restriction on US military intervention 
left policymakers questioning the limits of American power. There was a widely held 
perception that the United States was in decline and was faced with the growing threat of a 
resurgent Soviet Union. The Iran hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had 
served to many as examples of American weakness. This was coupled with domestic 
economic stagnation as a result of the oil crises. The foreign policy of Jimmy Carter hinted at 
the lessening of containment, acceptance of the Soviet Union and attempted to incorporate 
new ideas of multilateralism and the promotion of human rights as US goals
1
. 
    The election of Ronald Reagan in 1980 offered a striking alternative to this feeling of 
malaise. Reagan rejected any notion of American decline and promised to restore America to 
its rightful place as the most powerful (and greatest) nation on Earth. Reagan believed 
American foreign policy should be based on the strongest view of American exceptionalism. 
He argued that Jimmy Carter had given in to liberal defeatism and it was now his job to lead 
a conservative revolution that would replace the pessimism of Carter with faith in the 
unlimited potential of American greatness. At his acceptance speech at the Republican 
National Convention, Reagan stated, “They say that the United States has had its day in the 
sun; that our nation has passed its zenith… that the future will be one of sacrifice and few 
opportunities… My fellow citizens I utterly reject that view”.2  
    For Reagan, there was a simple prescription to be followed in order to restore the US to her 
former glories: “the ‘simple answers’ were: free enterprise, deregulation, the ending of self-
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doubt, rearming in the face of Soviet aggression, and rejuvenation of the national democratic 
(and messianic) purpose.”3  The focal point of US foreign policy was the Soviet Union. 
Reagan viewed US-Soviet Union relations in simple good versus evil terms. At a television 
conference in January 1981, Reagan proclaimed that the Soviet leaders “have openly and 
publicly declared that the only morality they recognise is what will further their cause, 
meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order 
to attain that.”4 As will be shown later in the chapter, this dichotomy influenced almost every 
level of US foreign policy during his administration.  
    Reagan had been a staunch anti-communist since his time spent working as the leader of 
the Screen Actor’s Guild in the Hollywood movie industry in the late 1940s where he came 
into direct contact with communist activists
5
. Writing in his memoirs, Reagan described his 
experience dealing with left-leaning Conference of Studio Unions and the movie industry 
strike of 1946:  
 
These were eye opening years for me… Now I knew from firsthand experience how 
Communists used lies, deceit, violence, or any other tactic that suited them to advance the 
cause of Soviet expansionism. I knew from the experience of hand-to-hand combat [with 
the union leaders] that America faced no more insidious or evil threat than that of 
communism.
6
 
 
Reagan’s view of communists and the Soviet Union was cultivated further over the next 
twenty years during his employment with General Electric. He was hired as a company 
spokesman and spent most of the 1960s giving speeches to conservative and business groups 
attacking communism and refusing to acknowledge the right of the Soviet Union to exist.
7
  
    Upon entering office, Reagan based his Soviet policy on several assumptions about the 
nature of the bipolar structure of the international system. The first was that the Soviet leaders 
were adherents of Marxist-Leninist ideology and thus the foreign policy of the Soviet Union 
would inevitably seek the destruction of the liberal democratic capitalist countries and the 
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creation of a one-world communist state governed from Moscow. At a television conference 
in January 1981, Reagan stated,  
 
I know of no leader of the Soviet Union since the revolution, and including the present 
leadership, that has not more than once repeated in the various Communist congresses 
they hold their determination that their goal must be the promotion of world revolution 
and a one-world Socialist or Communist state, whichever word you want to use.
8
 
 
If the Soviet Union was planning world domination, then the United States had no choice but 
to do all it could to halt this advance. This produced the second assumption, that the US and 
the USSR were engaged in a zero-sum conflict. Gains for the Soviet Union were by definition 
losses for the United States. Defeat in Vietnam and Soviet advances into Afghanistan and 
other developing countries posed a security threat to the United States in the eyes of Reagan 
and his administration. 
    Here we can clearly see the link between Reagan’s worldview and the origins of his Soviet 
policy. His dealings with communist workers in the film industry during the 1940s had 
provided him with an ideological lens through which he interpreted Soviet foreign policy 
over the previous forty years. It should be noted that Reagan was obviously not the only 
American policy maker who held staunch anti-communist views. However, what is important 
to note is that Reagan’s views of the nature of the Soviet Union and its foreign policy were 
based in large part on his dealing with American workers over four decades previously. 
Rather than attempting to grapple with the complex realities of Soviet power, geo-strategic 
interests and communist ideology, Reagan often fell back on over simplified assumptions. Of 
course, as discussed in chapter one, it is inevitable that policymakers will develop 
simplifications of reality in order to cope with the complexities of foreign policy decision-
making. However, these are often based on experiences of dealing with similar situations or 
learning from others who have such experience.
9
 Where Truman suffered from a famously 
weak understanding of history and often deployed poor choices of historical analogies
10
, 
Reagan relied too often on inappropriate personal experiences and projected these 
simplifications onto reality and his decision-making suffered as a consequence.  
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    This in large part stemmed from the fact that Reagan had had almost no contact with 
anyone from the Soviet Union. He had never travelled to the country, had never met any of 
its people, and had only met one Soviet leader when Richard Nixon invited Reagan, then 
Governor of California, to meet Leonid Brezhnev. It was not until the third year of his 
presidency that Reagan allowed George Shultz to arrange a meeting with the Soviet 
ambassador, Anatoly Dobrynin. Although the meeting was deemed a success, Reagan was 
unable to distance himself from the image of the Soviet Union that was cultivated forty years 
earlier. James Mann recounts an interesting example of this: “A couple of years later, when 
Dobrynin was leaving his job as ambassador to return to Moscow, Reagan expressed 
astonishment that such a polished, urbane diplomat could represent the evil empire. ‘Is he 
really a communist?’ Reagan asked.”11 Although this may have been a joke, it highlights the 
difficulty Reagan had in differentiating between the stereotyped view of communists and The 
Soviet people he had developed and the reality of dealing with the Soviet Union as an actor in 
the international arena. We will also see later how this narrow view of communists affected 
his ability to comprehend the problems posed by the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. By defining 
them as communists hell bent on aggression and regional domination, Reagan was unable to 
deviate from his policy of total support of the Contra forces, who were engaged in armed 
rebellion against the Sandinistas. Indeed, Reagan’s over simplified worldview limited his 
ability to comprehend the difficulties involved in supporting an organisation as controversial 
as the Contras. Trying to paint the Contras as “Freedom fighters” 12 13  and “the moral 
equivalent of the Founding Fathers and the brave men and women of the French 
Resistance”14 was just one of the outcomes of a worldview which divided the world into good 
and bad and offered little room for compromise. 
    However, even at this early stage, and with something so apparently simple as Reagan’s 
worldview of international relations and the nature of the US – Soviet relationship, it is 
possible to identify a contradiction that would play a part in the policy incoherence of the 
later years, particularly in the president’s Nicaragua policy. Reagan had been elected on the 
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back of a severe criticism of Jimmy Carter, particularly his accusation that on Carter’s watch 
America had grown weak while the Soviet Union had increased in strength. During his 
acceptance speech at the Republican National Convention, Reagan asked the delegates, “Can 
you look at our reduced standing in the world today and say, ‘Let’s have four more years of 
this”? 15  Such words were intended to signal that Carter had failed to halt the growing 
advances of the Soviet Union. However, this assertion of the Soviet Union’s unquenchable 
desire for world conquest, and the very real possibility that it may happen if America failed to 
act, is somewhat contradicted by his Notre Dame commencement address a year later where 
he stated, “The West won't contain communism, it will transcend communism. It won't 
bother to dismiss or denounce it, it will dismiss it as some bizarre chapter in human history 
whose last pages are even now being written.” 16  Reagan seemed to have difficulty in 
determining whether the Soviet Union was in ascendance or whether it was doomed to 
collapse. This lack of coherence in Reagan’s worldview would eventually lead to competing 
and conflicting policies in the administration’s policy towards Nicaragua. By failing to 
clearly articulate a coherent image of “the enemy”, it made it possible for different factions 
within the bureaucracy to interpret Reagan’s strategy in different ways and would thus end up 
competing with each other, often breaking down into heated conflict fuelled by the 
ideological divisions between the factions.
17
 
    Having established Reagan’s worldview it is now necessary to analyse how this influenced 
the formulation of foreign policy during his administration. In terms of direct US-Soviet 
Union relations Reagan had very specific goals he wished to achieve. As noted above, 
Reagan believed that the balance of power had tipped in favour of the Soviet Union. Indeed 
Reagan thought that the Soviet Union had exploited the period of détente in order to achieve 
dominance over the United States. Speaking to reporters in August 1981, Reagan claimed 
that “the Soviet Union has been engaged in the greatest military build-up in the history of 
man, and it cannot be described as necessary for their defence. It is plainly a build-up that is 
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offensive in nature.”18  He feared that the Soviet Union would soon be in a position of 
dominance “where they can some day issue to the free world an ultimatum of ‘surrender or 
die’”.19 In order to counter what he saw as threatening Soviet behaviour, Reagan ordered an 
increase in defence spending in order to bolster the conventional military strength of the 
United States. Increased military spending was the top foreign policy priority during the first 
year of the Reagan administration. By August 1981 Reagan was claiming that his strategy 
was having the desired affect: “They [the Soviet Union] are squealing like they’re sitting on a 
sharp nail simply because we now are showing the will that we’re not going to let them get to 
the point of dominance.”20 
 
6.3 The Reagan Doctrine 
 
    The purpose of this analysis is not to chart the steps of Reagan’s Soviet policy nor to 
evaluate the role played by Reagan in “winning” the Cold War. There is a vast literature on 
this topic and it pushes well beyond the scope of this thesis.
21
Instead, this analysis focuses on 
a specific aspect of Reagan’s foreign policy and, in the following chapter, its application in 
one particular country. Complementing Reagan’s policy of increased direct confrontation 
with the Soviet Union was what is now commonly referred to as the Reagan Doctrine.  
 
6.3.1 The Origins of the Reagan Doctrine: Rollback in the Developing World 
 
    The Reagan Doctrine stemmed from one of the deepest held beliefs of Reagan, and was a 
direct consequence of his worldview. While working as a corporate spokesman for General 
Electric in the 1960s, Reagan began to think about the US’s conduct of foreign affairs and 
formulated what he believed was a better US Cold War policy. He argued that due to the 
inherent nature of the Soviet Union to forever strive for expansion and domination, the policy 
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of containment formulated during the Truman administration was not now and had never 
been a viable strategy. The only option that was available to the United States was to try and 
roll back the communists. Speaking in an magazine interview in 1961, Reagan argued, 
“Containment won’t save freedom on the home front any more than it can stop Russian 
aggression on the world front…we must roll back the network of encroaching control.”22 As 
mentioned earlier, the issue was about more than mere geo-strategic interests of the United 
States. Reagan questioned the very morality of a policy which accepted the Soviet Union as a 
legitimate international actor and sought accommodation with it. Reagan believed it was not 
acceptable to “say to a billion enslaved human beings behind the Iron Curtain – “Give up 
your hopes of freedom because we’ve decided to get along with your slave masters.”23  
    Once elected to president, Reagan began formulating a policy of rollback, which he hoped 
would replace containment as the cornerstone of US national security strategy. However, 
Reagan was well aware that he was not the first policymaker to call for an attempt to rollback 
the Soviet Union. As Secretary of State under Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles had attempted 
to push US Soviet policy in a more aggressive direction.
24
 The bipolar nature of the 
international system and the parity of military power between both states, however, meant 
that there was very little scope for direct superpower confrontation. Dulles and Eisenhower 
had learned this painfully when the US was left helpless in the face of Soviet intervention in 
Hungary during the 1956 revolution.
25
 Reagan was well aware that with the threat of nuclear 
war an ever present, there was no way he would be able to challenge the Soviet Union 
militarily, let alone roll the Soviet Union back from Eastern Europe. 
    With this understanding of the balance of power, Reagan knew that US foreign policy and 
any policy of roll back would have to be tempered to the strategic realities facing the United 
States. As previously discussed, Reagan had been elected on the back of a campaign that had 
attacked Jimmy Carter for allowing the Soviet Union to expand its influence abroad. 
Particularly, Reagan was worried about the increased involvement of the Soviet Union in 
developing countries, such as Angola, Cambodia and Nicaragua. Reagan accused the Soviet 
Union of exploiting the US policy of détente in order to support revolutionary movements in 
third world countries who were trying, and often succeeding, in overthrowing the existing 
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governments. With Reagan viewing international relations as a zero-sum game, these gains 
for the Soviet Union resulted in damaging losses for the United States. It was under these 
conditions that Reagan wished to formulate a policy of rollback. He wanted to see these 
revolutions overturned and believed the US was in a position to help. As we shall see in the 
following sections, the specific policy developed was one that promised aid to anti-
communist rebel forces who were trying to overthrow the newly installed communist 
government.  
 
6.3.2 The Role of Reagan in Formulating the Doctrine: Freedom Fighters 
 
    At this point it will be useful to contextualise the above discussion. This chapter is not 
arguing that Reagan was the sole architect of US foreign policy in his administration. It will 
be shown that the Reagan Doctrine, and the specific policies that were enacted, took shape as 
a result of a complex process of bureaucratic decision-making at the highest levels of the 
executive, where the president was one of several important players, along with the inevitable 
involvement of Congress. However, what the preceding discussion has focused on is the 
extent to which Ronald Reagan’s earliest experiences with communists shaped his very 
particular worldview of international politics, especially his perception of the nature of the 
Soviet Union. As a result, Reagan came to office with a specific idea of how he wished US 
foreign policy to be conducted. He wanted the US to rearm in the face of Soviet aggression in 
order to be able to stand up to Soviet foreign policy, with the long-term goal of reducing the 
Soviet Union’s’ ability to influence world events in their favour. He wanted to achieve this by 
increasing US involvement in the Third World by giving aid to anti-communist rebels who 
were fighting against recently established revolutionary communist governments.  The actual 
shape these policies took was obviously the result of the complex process of US foreign 
policy making. However, it was Reagan who came to office and set the agenda that these 
policies emanated from.  
    Previously we analysed the speeches and public remarks of the president in order to 
ascertain his worldview. As an actor, Reagan was fully aware of the important roles that 
speechmaking, public relations and appearance play in the functioning of the presidency.
26
 
During his first Inaugural Address Reagan articulated his worldview and announced the 
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direction he wished to take US foreign policy: “as we renew ourselves here in our own land, 
we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world. We will again be the 
exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom.”27 
Reagan was using his speech to connect the ideas of domestic renewal, increased military 
power and the belief in American exceptionalism. He also began to develop his ideas for 
supporting allies abroad, which would eventually evolve into the Reagan Doctrine: “To those 
neighbours and allies who share our freedom, we will strengthen our historic ties and assure 
them of our support and firm commitment. We will match loyalty with loyalty.”28 Reagan 
also issued a stark warning to “the enemies of freedom” that “peace is the highest aspiration 
of the American people. We will not negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for 
it, now or ever.”29 As we shall see, such an attitude of refusing to negotiate for peace would 
lead to the prolonged difficulties Reagan and his administration would have in dealing with 
the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. However, what is important for the current analysis is that here 
we have a clear example of Reagan actively setting the agenda for US foreign policy during 
the course of his administration. He is stating that America is prepared to promote peace and 
freedom abroad in order to protect US national security and that the US “will maintain 
sufficient strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we do so we have the best chance of 
never having to use that strength.”30 
    Reagan’s inaugural address represented the broad brushstrokes that the president was using 
to fashion a distinct foreign policy. It was not until his speech to the British Parliament in 
1982 that the development of the Reagan Doctrine began to take place. He called for a 
“crusade for freedom” and declared the United States would strive to aid democratic 
movements around the world in order to “foster the infrastructure of democracy…which 
allows a people to choose their own way to develop their own culture, to reconcile their own 
differences through peaceful means.” Reagan claimed that if this strategy was adopted “the 
march of freedom and democracy... will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of 
history.”31 Here we see a clear progression in Reagan’s conceptualisation of US foreign 
policy. A year previously at his inaugural address he announced that the US would continue 
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to support their allies in freedom. Now, Reagan was announcing that the US was prepared to 
support those who were willing to fight against the “enemies of freedom” in the newly 
declared crusade for democracy. At this stage it was not clear whether this support would be 
restricted to governments only. By the time he delivered his State of the Union address in 
1985, Reagan had made clear that his crusade included support for counter revolutionary 
groups. He declared, “support for freedom fighters is self-defence”. To justify this 
controversial claim he quoted the argument of Harry Truman, arguing, “our security and the 
world's hopes for peace and human progress ‘lie not in measures of defence or in the control 
of weapons, but in the growth and expansion of freedom and self-government.’”32 This is the 
clearest articulation of the Reagan Doctrine. It illustrates the extent to which Reagan’s 
worldview had been formulated into a set of ideas that Reagan was now declaring to be the 
foundation for a significant part of US foreign policy. It attempted to tap into the most 
important ideas of US identity and political culture, freedom and democracy, whilst 
confronting what Reagan believed to be the strategic realities of the international system. In 
doing so, Reagan set an agenda for what he wanted to achieve as president. This is important 
for the central argument of this thesis because it demonstrates the role of presidential agency. 
US foreign policy was framed in terms of anti-communism and it was Reagan who continued 
to push for the development of rollback.  What we shall now proceed to analyse is how 
Reagan tried to operationalise his doctrine as head of the executive. 
 
6.4 Reagan’s Management System 
 
6.4.1 Cabinet Government and Formalism 
 
    Reagan came to office with well-defined ideas of how he wished foreign policy to be 
conducted. As Richard Neustadt has written, “Reagan brought his ‘purposes’ in with him, his 
commitments, whereas others acquired theirs while working at the job, experiencing the 
impact of events on initial intentions.”33 As Governor of California Reagan had operated a 
formalist cabinet style of government and he wished to continue this style of operating during 
his time as president. He believed that he was best served by the heads of departments acting 
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as his principal advisers. Reagan expected his cabinet heads to carry out the dual role of 
being the managers of their departments responsible for the day-to-day operation of their staff 
and the executors of his policies. He wanted them to be dedicated to his strategy and loyal to 
him as president.
34
 Drawing on the typology developed by Johnson, Reagan entered the 
White House wanting to run a formal management style. His chief advisors would be 
appointed on the basis of their role as head of an executive department or agency. This would 
establish the clear lines of jurisdiction necessary to run the formalist system. 
    In the field of foreign policy, it initially appeared that Reagan would be placing the 
Secretary of State at the head of the foreign policy making apparatus. Reagan publicly 
declared that the Secretary of State would be his “primary adviser [and] the chief formulator 
and spokesman for foreign policy for this administration.”35 This seemed to be confirmed 
when Reagan downgraded the role of the National Security Adviser. Instead of reporting 
directly to the president, Reagan instructed that his National Security Adviser would report 
through the White House counsellor, a position created by Reagan for the purpose of 
overseeing domestic and foreign policy. This was a deliberate choice made by Reagan after 
witnessing the turmoil of the Carter Administration’s foreign policy. During the 1980 
election campaign Reagan had spoken out against what he saw as the debilitating effect that 
inevitably results when confusion exists as to the defined roles of the Secretary of State and 
the National Security Adviser. He claimed that the Carter administration was “unable to 
speak with one voice in foreign policy” due to the chaos of the Cyrus Vance and Zbigniew 
Brzezinski relationship.
36
 By placing the Secretary of State at the centre of foreign-policy 
making and relegating the National Security Adviser to the co-ordination of policy, Reagan 
hoped his administration would be able to speak with one voice in the pursuit of his chosen 
objectives. 
    However, by the time Reagan took office and began to structure the policymaking 
apparatus of his administration, several problems had been created that challenged his alleged 
desire for cabinet government and a formal management system. First was his decision to 
appoint his famous “troika” to the White House staff. James Baker was appointed chief-of-
staff, Michael Deaver was made deputy chief-of-staff and Edwin Meese was given the role of 
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the newly created White House Counsellor. To use Peter Rodman’s phrase, Ronald Reagan 
expected these men to act as his “palace guard”. 37  Their duty was to defend Reagan’s 
prerogative and to look out for both his personal and presidential interests in the decision-
making process. However, by strengthening the power of the White House staff, this sowed 
the seeds for future antagonisms with the cabinet heads. One large problem was created due 
to the fact that the troika had control over access to the president. Alexander Haig, Reagan’s 
first Secretary of State, complained that the White House staff limited his access to the 
president: “During the transition from the election to the inauguration, I saw the president 
alone once!… That’s all. That began to worry me very, very much, early on.”38 The president 
was publicly declaring that he was in favour of cabinet government but in reality there would 
be a strong White House presence in almost every aspect of policymaking. It is inevitable that 
the president’s White House staff will have a role to play, however, as discussed in chapter 
three, it is the president who decides how large this role will be and what their relationship 
with the cabinet heads will be. By granting such authority to his three closest White House 
advisers, it was clear that Reagan would not be relying solely on his cabinet heads, 
particularly in foreign policy. 
    The second obstacle to cabinet government and a formal management system in foreign 
policy was revealed when Reagan began to organise the National Security Council. As noted 
above, the role of the National Security Adviser was downgraded, but the institution of the 
NSC was to play a crucial, and ever increasing, role within the Reagan administration. The 
structure of the NSC was laid down in the second National Security Decision Directive 
(NSDD). The NSDDs were documents signed by the president in order to “promulgate 
presidential decisions implementing national policy and objectives in all areas involving 
national security.”39 These documents were Reagan’s equivalent to the NSC Intelligence 
Directives during the Truman administration (NSC-68 for example) and “constituted the 
fundamental, authoritative statements of US national security during the Reagan 
administration.”40 NSDD 2 explained how the NSC was to be organised, and what roles 
would be played by its statutory members. 
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    According to NSDD 2, the “National Security Council (NSC) shall be the principal forum 
for consideration of national security policy issues requiring presidential decision.”41 The 
Secretary of State is designated as the president’s “principal foreign policy advisor. As such, 
he is responsible for the formulation of foreign policy and for the execution of approved 
policy.” 42  He is also granted responsibility for “the overall direction, coordination, and 
supervision of the interdepartmental activities incident to foreign policy formulation.”43 The 
Secretary of Defence and Director of the Central Intelligence Agency were designated as the 
principal advisers for defence and intelligence policy, respectively. As discussed earlier, the 
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (the formal title of the national 
security adviser) was placed lower down the foreign policy hierarchy. He was expected to 
work “in consultation with the regular members of the NSC” and be “responsible for 
developing, coordinating and implementing national security policy.”44 What this document 
clearly shows is that Reagan wanted an explicit hierarchy within his administration. The 
Secretary of State would have pride of place in the actual formulation of policy, whereas the 
National Security Adviser would operate in a managerial position whose role was to 
coordinate the work of the higher ranked policy makers.  
    However, the role of the Secretary of State was further complicated by the organisational 
structure of the NSC developed by NSDD 2. Reagan wanted to combine his cabinet style of 
policy making with the development of interagency groups “to assist the NSC at large and its 
individual members in fulfilling their responsibilities.” 45  Three interagency groups were 
created with responsibility for foreign policy, defence policy and intelligence. The 
expectation was that foreign policy making was more complex than the State Department 
could handle on its own and therefore would required inter-departmental cooperation in order 
to function smoothly. The interagency groups were designed to solve any interdepartmental 
issues that arose, or, “if such matters required higher-level consideration, report them to the 
Secretary of State for decision or referral to the NSC.”46 This challenged the formal system of 
foreign policy making by blurring the lines of jurisdiction between the State Department and 
the NSC staff. 
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    What can be seen, therefore, is that even before the Reagan administration turned itself to 
the substantive problems of foreign policy making, the procedural system that had been put in 
place by Reagan contained the potential for complication and deviation from his stated 
preferred method of operating. Reagan claimed that he wanted to run foreign policy with the 
Secretary of State as his closest advisor. Up to a point this was possible, especially with a 
weakened National Security Adviser. However, by placing such priority on the NSC from the 
very start, it is possible to argue that the Secretary of State could at best hope to be a first 
among equals in the Reagan foreign policy team. By creating an inter-agency structure that 
was to be run through the NSC it is difficult to see how any Secretary of State under 
President Reagan would feel completely secure in their position as his chief foreign policy 
adviser. Combined with the “unofficial” power of the troika, the potential for increased White 
House involvement in foreign policy seems to have been present from the beginning of the 
administration.     
 
6.4.2 Coordination Problems 
 
     In Reagan’s first year, foreign policy making suffered from one major bureaucratic 
weakness, a lack of coordination. This in large part stemmed from Reagan’s decisions to 
downgrade the role of the National Security Adviser and implement an interagency approach 
to foreign policy making. As discussed in chapter three, the actual influence exerted by a 
National Security Adviser in large part stems from his personal relationship with the 
president. The NSC was created to help the coordination of foreign and national security 
policy. As the head of the NSC staff, the National Security Adviser has a vital role to play in 
coordinating the departments and agencies involved in formulating foreign policy. In order to 
do this the National Security Adviser requires both access to and the support of the president. 
In the case of Richard Allen, Reagan’s first National Security Adviser, he had neither. The 
president had publicly stated that he was downgrading the role of the National Security 
Adviser and they would be forced to report to the president through the White House 
Councillor, Edwin Meese. Without the support of the president, Allen was in no position to 
exert any influence over the departments and agencies involved in foreign policy. Indeed, 
Lou Cannon has claimed that Allen’s main task as NSA seemed to be trying to “shove 
decision documents and position papers” down the “funnel-like management system that 
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Meese had created to spare Reagan from decision-making”.47 Not only was Allen unable to 
do his job, but Meese was able to interfere in the process and make it almost impossible for 
Allen to execute his tasks properly. This is just one example of the extent to which Reagan’s 
decision to grant such a degree of power to his troika had a detrimental effect on 
policymaking. However, by placing the NSC in such a central position, Reagan left open the 
possibility of increasing the role of the NSA, if he chose to do so.  With the difficulties 
experienced during Allen’s time in office it seemed inevitable that such a change would be 
made. 
    In fact, Reagan made two important changes. The first was to replace Allen with William 
Clark, an associate of Reagan’s since his time as Governor of California. The second was to 
promote the NSA, allowing him to report directly to Reagan without having to go through the 
White House Counsellor. Edmund Morris, Reagan’s official biographer, has stated that Clark 
had an unusually close relationship with Reagan, both personally and professionally. He 
claims that Clark was granted almost unlimited access to the president. Whereas Allen 
struggled to get papers to the president to read, Clark was able to walk into Reagan’s office 
without making an appointment.
48
 The sudden change in relationship between the president 
and his NSA may have been prompted by a bureaucratic inefficiency that required adjustment, 
but in large part it was also due to the close personal relationship that existed between the two 
men. Robert McFarlane, Clark’s deputy NSA, observed that Clark “was closer to the 
president than anyone” in the government.49 Morris has written that Clark was “the only man 
who ever got within a furlong of intimacy” with the president.50 Clark himself seemed aware 
of the unique position he found himself in, claiming that when Reagan “came into the room, 
as governor or president, he didn’t need to say anything, I could tell what he wanted.”51 Clark 
was able to exploit his influence in two ways. First, he increased the size of the staff working 
in the NSC to its largest since Kissinger’s time in office. This provided Clark with the 
institutional muscle he required to carry out his duty as co-ordinator of policy. Second, Clark 
was able to use his access to the president to reconfigure the role of the NSA. Instead of 
acting as a mere ‘honest broker’ between the competing bureaucratic voices involved in 
foreign policy making, Clark began to involve himself in the formulation of foreign policy, 
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presenting his ideas as an equal to the cabinet and agency heads, in much the same fashion as 
his predecessors in the Nixon and Kennedy administrations. Thus, “by the summer of 1983, 
Clark was widely regarded as having become the most influential foreign policy figure in the 
White House.”52 
    This left Alexander Haig, Reagan’s Secretary of State, in an unhappy position. He had 
been promised the lead role in foreign policy and a cabinet style of government. Instead, he 
found himself facing a rival in the White House who had both access to and a close personal 
relationship with the president. Foreign policy was increasingly being centralised in the 
White House, placing the Secretary of State at a distinct institutional disadvantage. Haig’s 
troubles were not just bureaucratic, but personal and ideological. He did not share the same 
worldview as Reagan. Whereas Reagan viewed the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” who the 
US must engage in a moralistic crusade for freedom, Haig viewed the world as a traditional 
realist. The Cold War was a geostrategic conflict where US foreign policy must be geared 
towards shaping the balance of power in favour of US national interest.
53
 There was also a 
widely held view within the administration that Haig was power-hungry and determined to 
dominate the foreign policy-making process. Having clashed with the president on Central 
American policy, public pronouncements on Soviet policy and the conflict in Lebanon, 
Reagan felt that he could no longer work with Haig as Secretary of State. On July 5, 1982, 
Reagan asked Haig to resign and replaced him with George Shultz.
54
 
    The appointment of Shultz produced a better working relationship with Reagan. First and 
foremost Shultz was loyal to the president and told him explicitly how he viewed the role of 
Secretary of State: “I consider myself to be part of the White House and your team. I’m 
working for you, Mr President. I’ll make use of the talent at the State Department to get our 
job done.”55 Shultz came to the job with the view that his primary job as Secretary of State 
was to serve the president.  
 
A cabinet department is organized around the secretary and the programs of the 
department. The secretary is the boss. The White House is organized around the president, 
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and from what I have seen of the White House in different administrations, it is an 
egocentric kind of operation that varies tremendously from one president to another, as 
each puts on it his own personal stamp. Everyone in the White House is staff to the 
president.
56
 
 
If Shultz’s memoirs are to be believed then he came to the office without Haig’s desire for 
pre-eminence. He realised he was part of a team and he wished to work within that team as 
best he could to serve Reagan and his agenda. However, very quickly Reagan established a 
strong working relationship with Shultz. In August of 1983 he arranged to hold regular 
private meetings with Shultz to discuss foreign policy issues, without the input of the NSA.
57
 
As Shultz recounts:  
 
My private meetings with the president were crucial, I knew. But I also knew that there 
was no effective presidential policy without a supportive staff. I had to help the president 
make the NSC process work. Making the process work was the only way to explore the 
issues fully and to examine the alternatives carefully.
58
 
 
Having attempted to clear up the bureaucratic difficulties his administration had experienced 
by replacing Allen with Clark, Reagan was now sowing the seeds for further problems in 
future. Clark had managed to place himself at the forefront of the president’s foreign policy 
team, but now the president was beginning to grant favour to Shultz, even to the extent of 
cutting Clark out of policy discussions. This clearly demonstrates the direct influence a 
president can have on the procedural aspects of foreign policy. Reagan seemed to be either 
confused about how he wanted his administration to be run, or he was unaware of the 
negative impact he was having on operational procedures. He had begun with the promise of 
a Secretary of State led cabinet based foreign policy, only to move away from this ideal by 
slowly centralising foreign policy within the White House based NSC. He finally seemed to 
accept the need for an increased role for the NSA and allowed Clark to step up and exert a 
strong policy-formulating role, only to appoint Shultz and appear to move more responsibility 
to the Secretary of State. What Reagan had failed to do was offer (as far as is it possible) a 
strict demarcation between the roles he expected his NSA and Secretary of State to play. 
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From this confused origin it is little wonder that serious divides opened up in the second term 
over both procedural and substantive aspects of foreign policy. 
    The purpose of this discussion is not to chart the rise and fall of individual policymakers in 
the Reagan administration. This will be done to an extent in the case study below. Instead, 
our goal here is to analyse the role played by President Reagan in the functioning of the 
executive, and the impact this had on the procedural aspect of foreign policy making during 
his time in office. What is clear to see is that Reagan did not fully understand the link 
between the White House staff and the wider foreign policy bureaucracy, nor did he seem to 
fully appreciate the personal power he wielded as president and how the closeness of his 
relationship with policymakers influenced their ability to wield bureaucratic power. Reagan’s 
management style will be analysed in greater detail in the next section, but some final 
remarks on Reagan’s structuring of his foreign policy making apparatus are required. 
Although he professed to have a clear vision of how he wanted foreign policy to be run, it is 
obvious from his actions during his first term that he did not. The underlying issues between 
the State Department and the NSC were not resolved, and this proved to have negative 
consequences for effective foreign policy making and the administration’s ability to pursue 
Reagan’s chosen goals, let alone his desire that his team speak with ‘one voice’. 
 
6.5 Reagan’s Management Style 
 
    Having analysed how Reagan attempted to structure his executive it is now important to 
look at how the president himself operated within that structure. In order to do so it is 
necessary to look at, Reagan as manger. What will become clear is that while there may be 
nearly universal agreement amongst both scholars and members of his administration on what 
methods Reagan used, there is a significant division as to whether his management style 
produced a positive or negative effect on US foreign policy making.  
 
6.5.1 Decision-making and Delegation 
 
    Reagan was a very complicated individual who offered many contradictions. His advisers 
have spoken of their ability to work with him day-to-day in a professional capacity due to his 
warm and friendly nature.  However, they found it difficult to form any sort of close personal 
relationship with him. It was often impossible to know what the president was thinking until 
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he told them.
59
 He had an inner-self confidence that was cultivated during his years as an 
actor, and his skills as a negotiator were honed while working as a union representative in 
Hollywood. He was able to bargain effectively in the most heated of meetings with Soviet 
leaders, but he became very uncomfortable when faced with disagreements amongst his 
advisers.
60
 
    As a result, Reagan brought to the Oval Office a very distinct style of management. He 
viewed himself as responsible for setting the political agenda of his administration. It was his 
role as president to establish the broad strategic framework that he wanted his presidency to 
pursue, and he was to use the power of his office to explain this choice of direction to both 
the electorate and his staff. He would then delegate authority to his staff to work out the finer 
details of how these objectives would be achieved. His staff would be responsible for 
formulating the specific policy options they believed would achieve Reagan’s chosen goal. 
They would then present these options to Reagan and it would be his prerogative as 
Commander-in-Chief to make the final decision. In his very first NSC meeting Reagan 
explicitly stated how he wished foreign policy making to be conducted during his 
administration: “I will use the NSC structure to obtain your guidance, but I will make the 
decisions. Once made, I expect the Departments to implement them.”61 Reagan also wished it 
to be known publicly how he viewed himself as president. In an interview with Forbes 
magazine he explained how his system of decision-making operated:  
 
In the Cabinet meetings…I use a system in which I want to hear what everybody wants to 
say honestly. I want the decisions made on what is right or wrong, what is good or bad for 
the people of this country. I encourage all the input that I can get... And when I've heard 
all that I need to make a decision, I don't take a vote. I make the decision. Then I expect 
every one of them, whether their views have carried the day or not, to go forward together 
in carrying out the policy.
62
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   Most observers noted that Reagan appeared comfortable making decisions and that when 
his mind was made up he stayed true to his convictions. George Shultz has written that 
Reagan “is comfortable with himself. He is decisive, he steps up to things, and when he 
decides, he stays with it. And sometimes you wish he wouldn’t, but anyway, he does. He is 
very decisive, and he’s very strong.”63 All presidents need to make the final decision, but not 
all of them have been comfortable doing so. Reagan’s ability to make decisions, and feel at 
ease while doing so, has to be regarded as a positive aspect of his administration. However, 
like so many of the other contradictions in evidence during his presidency, his ease at making 
decisions papered over several serious problems. 
    The first of these stemmed from his delegation of authority to his subordinates. Reagan 
adopted an infamous ‘hands-off’ approach to the running of his administration. Once he had 
settled on a policy, it was up to the rest of the executive to implement his decision and then 
evaluate the policy as and when required. Reagan might have genuinely believed this was the 
most effective way to ensure high quality policy making, but it is clear that it also stemmed 
from some personal weaknesses in Reagan. He had to delegate so much authority because he 
had little understanding of the complex details involved in policy making. Evidence of such 
lack of knowledge is well known, but perhaps the most famous example was his inability to 
comprehend the logic of nuclear deterrence and why this meant the Soviet Union would not 
agree to Reagan’s development of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI).64 Reagan was also 
very reluctant to involve himself in the search for policy alternatives. Thus, when he was 
presented with a decision to make, he rarely questioned how these options had been 
developed or what the underlying bureaucratic consensus was in relation to these options. 
Neustadt has suggested Reagan “seems to have combined less intellectual curiosity, less 
interest in detail, than any president at least since Calvin Coolidge, with more initial and 
sustained commitments, more convictions independent of events or evidence, than any 
president since Wilson championed the League.”65 The sheer extent of Reagan’s delegation is 
also worthy of note. Neustadt draws an important comparison with Franklin Roosevelt, who 
was well known for delegating authority to subordinates: “FDR’s delegations were time 
limited and shifting; what Roosevelt gave he took back on notice” whereas “Reagan, it 
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seems, could delegate blindly year after year. The one man evidently knew what he was 
delegating and conducted himself accordingly; the other may have had little or no idea.”66 
The combination of a strongly held worldview, lack of knowledge and delegation of authority 
clearly has the potential for ineffective policy-making. 
    A second problem resulted from the combination of Reagan’s foreign policy making 
system and his management style. As discussed previously, Reagan initiated a system of 
foreign policy making whereby authority was centralised in a White House based NSC 
system. However, he had not clearly defined the roles he wished his Secretary of State and 
National Security Adviser to play in his administration. By delegating power to both of these 
individuals and asking them to formulate the specifics of policy based on his decisions it was 
almost inevitable that severe disagreements would arise between the two foreign policy 
advisers over how best to implement the president’s orders. Bureaucratic disagreements will 
obviously take place in any form of government. However, the impact of these disputes can 
be reduced by strong leadership from the chief executive. As we have discussed, Reagan was 
unwilling to involve himself in the day-to-day running of foreign policy so he was unlikely to 
resolve these disputes. The problem was confounded by a particularly debilitating trait of 
Reagan’s. He became very uncomfortable when faced with disagreement and conflict 
amongst his chief advisers. As Neustadt has argued, “Reagan hated conflict amongst his 
‘fellas’. He had no wish to watch them squirm, and he was modestly aware that his lack of 
detail often left him without the wherewithal for resolution.”67 Indeed, so aware was Reagan 
of this weakness in his character and management style that he developed a tactic to help him 
avoid these problems.  Whether in public speeches or in private meetings Reagan would tell 
stories and use anecdotes in the hope of deflecting attention away from his shortcomings. 
James Mann recounts: “As [Brent] Stowcroft and countless other visitors had discovered, 
Reagan’s almost compulsive habit of telling stories served the purposes of avoiding 
confrontation, overcoming bureaucratic disputes, and steering clear of the finer points of 
policy, in which Reagan often was not well versed.”68 This however, could only ever serve as 
a delaying tactic. The underlying issues would not go away. At best this could only buy time 
for the disputing parties to eventually resolve the issues themselves.  
    In his memoirs, George Shultz recounts one particularly telling incident. He had 
complained bitterly to Reagan about NSDD 276, which had established the NSA as chairman 
                                                          
66
 Ibid., p273 
67
 Ibid., p273  
68
 Mann, J. (2009) The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (London: Viking), p85-
86  
197 
 
 
 
of the inter-agency process. Shultz felt aggrieved that a member of the White House staff had 
been placed in a position of authority above the statutory NSC members, including cabinet 
heads like himself. Shultz had raised a legitimate procedural question but even before he 
received a formal reply from Reagan he “could see that President Reagan was not interested 
in what he regarded as a bureaucratic struggle.”69 The president eventually responded to 
Shultz’s concerns in a letter:  
 
None of the arrangements put in place by NSDD 276 will be at the cost of your authority 
or that of any other members of my cabinet. It is important to note that the committees 
chaired by the National Security Adviser and his deputy are not freestanding groups, but 
instead feeder systems for the NSC and NSPG which I chair.
70
  
 
Reagan felt this response would clarify the situation. Unfortunately, Shultz did not 
understand fully what the president was ordering, “I wasn’t sure what the president’s message 
to me meant. I decided that he was encouraging my instinct simply to ignore the directive.”71 
This is a clear example of Reagan’s failure to set forth a clearly defined policy making 
structure and his inability to settle disputes between his advisers. It is also important to note 
that to this point the analysis has focused purely on the procedural aspects of foreign policy 
making under Reagan. As will be discussed in the Nicaragua case study below, these 
underlying procedural issues would have a debilitating impact on the substance of Reagan’s 
foreign policy. The main problem to arise was that, without clear presidential intervention to 
provide guidance, the various bureaucratic players were forced to interpret Reagan’s 
instructions and carry out the policies that they thought Reagan wanted. If there was a general 
consensus as to what Reagan wanted then the system could function well, such as in the case 
of Reagan’s first term economic and military policies. However, if there was disagreement 
then disasters, such as Iran-Contra, became increasingly likely. As John Dumbrell has argued, 
“At worst, what Richard Perle called Reagan’s extreme ‘intellectual delegation of authority’ 
invited either bureaucratic chaos, or the pushing of policy far into the regions of 
unaccountability.”72 What will be highlighted in detail in the case study is the extent to which 
presidential involvement influences the foreign policy making process. It is possible for a 
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president to delegate authority and produce a coherent and successful foreign policy. But this 
depends on the president delegating the right amount of authority to the appropriate aides. If 
the reverse happens then it is essential for a president to either take back the authority he has 
delegated or be prepared to intervene at the correct moment to bring clarity and decisiveness 
back to the process. It is the president alone who can bring coherence to an administration in 
conflict with itself. As we shall see in the next section, Reagan struggled to achieve this 
consistently over the course of his administration. 
 
6.5.2 Divisions: Hardliners and Moderates 
 
    Having set out his vision for both the policies he wanted to achieve (rollback) and the 
structure of government he wanted to operate (allegedly a formalist cabinet system) Reagan 
knew it was imperative that he appointed the right people to help him achieve his goals. More 
so than any previous president, Reagan used his power of appointment to staff his 
administration with individuals who were both loyal to him, his office and his policy 
programme. Peter Rodman was a Reagan appointee in the State Department and has written 
about his involvement in Reagan’s appointment process:  
 
A staff of one hundred in the White House screened candidates for philosophy as well as 
competence and integrity. The Reagan team is widely regarded as having had more 
success than most preceding administrations in shaping the leadership of the bureaucracy 
by these means.
73
 
 
Reagan wanted to surround himself with figures of a suitably conservative political outlook. 
In particular, he expected his foreign policy team to share his worldview that the international 
system is characterised by a zero-sum logic, and that the Soviet Union is the primary global 
rival of the United States. However, as discussed previously, Reagan was not a realist. He did 
not view the world solely in terms of power relations. Reagan expected his subordinates to 
share his ideological and moralistic view of international politics. The United States was 
inherently a source of good in the world whilst the Soviet Union was viewed as an ‘evil 
empire’ which was the chief instigator of violence and disorder. 
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    As a result of this, Reagan relied heavily on conservative veterans of the Nixon and Ford 
administrations, as well as members of the increasingly influential neoconservative 
movement.
74
 He filled his foreign policy cabinet posts and the highest levels of his White 
House staff with fellow ideologues. National Security Advisers Richard Allen and William 
Clark, Secretary of Defence Casper Weinberger, Director of Central Intelligence William 
Casey, United Nations Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick and White House Counsellor Edwin 
Meese all shared Reagan’s view of international politics, US foreign policy and the threat 
posed by the Soviet Union. As discussed previously, Alexander Haig viewed the Soviet 
Union as the biggest threat to the United States, but this was based on a traditional realist 
world view, not an political ideological terms. Mark Lagon has argued that, “Members of 
Reagan’s inner circle consciously saw each other as allies labouring to keep the 
administration faithful to what they saw as its ideological agenda.” 75  It was from the 
combined efforts of Reagan and these aides that the Reagan Doctrine was formulated. 
    However, although there was agreement amongst Reagan’s policymaking team regarding 
the fact that the Soviet Union was the primary rival of the United States and that it posed a 
security threat, there were significant differences in the administration regarding the severity 
of the threat posed and the methods that were required to meet the threat. Over the course of 
Reagan’s term in office a deep ideological divide opened up within his administration, 
splitting his foreign policy team into two rival camps.  
    The group detailed above became known as the hardliners. They believed that the Soviet 
Union had exploited the era of détente in order to aggressively expand their influence in the 
developing world. The hardliners believed that this posed a serious threat to the national 
security interests of the United States and it was imperative that US foreign policy be directed 
to aggressively respond to Soviet provocations. As James Scott has argued: “Driven by a 
conservative ideological interpretation of international developments and opportunities, this 
faction viewed any retreat from this purpose or the use of diplomacy in conjunction with the 
Reagan Doctrine as a sell-out to communism.”76 For the hardliners, diplomacy in this context 
was useless and had to be rejected in favour of direct intervention in the target Third World 
countries. 
    The second group became known as the moderates. Included in its ranks were Secretary of 
State Shultz, Chief-of-Staff James Baker and Deputy Chief-of-Staff Michael Deaver, as well 
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as other State Department officials such as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American 
Affairs Thomas Enders. These officials agreed that the spread of communism in the Third 
World posed a threat to the US, but they believed that Reagan Doctrine intervention was only 
part of a broader strategy that included diplomacy in the hope of settling regional conflicts 
peacefully.
77
 Indeed, Shultz became famous for his belief that the US should develop a duel-
track strategy: “We needed strength and diplomacy in our policy: strength to show the 
communists that we would not tolerate their advance into our hemisphere and diplomacy to 
try pry the way open for solutions short of war.”78 This split in the administration would have 
serious repercussions for the formulation and implementation of policy in Nicaragua, as will 
be discussed in the following chapter. 
 
6.6 Conclusion 
 
    Reagan demonstrates the extent to which the worldview and management style of the 
president impact on the functioning of foreign policy making in the United States, both 
positively and negatively, producing intended and unintended consequences.  The life 
experience of Ronald Reagan had shaped a president who viewed the Soviet Union as the 
greatest evil in the modern world. Reagan saw the Soviet Union both as a geo-strategic rival 
and the ideological and moral enemy of the United States. As a result, Reagan believed it was 
the duty of the United States to stand up to the Soviet Union and to work towards the end of 
communism and the Evil Empire. To do this, Reagan rejected the policy of containment that 
had formed the conceptual basis of US foreign policy since the end of the Second World 
War. Reagan wanted to take the United States in a more aggressive direction that would 
begin to challenge the existence of the Soviet Union by trying to “rollback” the gains that the 
USSR had made in the previous decade. Reagan believed that if he was successful in this 
policy then it would only be a matter of time before the Soviet Union would crumble from 
within and democracy and capitalism would replace the tyranny of central planning and 
authoritarianism. This was of course Reagan’s longest of long-term goals, an objective that 
even his most loyal of supporters would acknowledge was an ambition tempered by the 
realities of international politics. But it is important to realise that this was the worldview and 
goal that motivated Reagan, which provides us with the conceptual lens through which to 
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view the Nicaragua case study in the following chapter. However, Reagan’s weaknesses as a 
manger directly contributed to the bureaucratic chaos that would become the hall mark of his 
foreign policy. In particular, Reagan was never able to resolve the tensions between the State 
Department and the National Security Council. This institutional conflict was personified by 
the rivalries that existed between the Secretaries of State and National Security Advisors 
across all eight years of the Reagan Administration.  Reagan’s inability to address these 
bureaucratic problems was a result of the limitations of his management style and had a 
negative impact on both the procedural and substantive dimensions of US foreign policy.  
This will be demonstrated in the following chapter’s case study of Reagan’s Nicaragua 
policy. 
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Chapter Seven: Reagan and Nicaragua 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
    Reagan’s Nicaragua policy has received an intense amount of scholarly interest as a result 
of the Iran-Contra affair.
1
 The scandal resulted in a presidential commission, a congressional 
committee investigation and prosecutions as a result of independent counsel Lawrence 
Walsh.
2
 It produced the largest constitutional crisis since the Watergate scandal, with legal 
scholar Louis Fisher going so far to describe Iran-Contra as “a stunning collapse of 
democratic government.” 3  Debate over the extent of presidential power in foreign 
policymaking and the failure of Congress to actively check the executive once again 
resurrected the idea of an “imperial” presidency: “Whatever else may be said about Ronald 
Reagan, he quickly showed that the reports of the death of the Presidency were greatly 
exaggerated.”4 
    However, the Iran-Contra scandal is but one aspect of Reagan’s Nicaragua policy and only 
forms part of the justification for the selection of this particular policy as a case study. This 
thesis is analysing the role of the president in US foreign policy. Having looked at the role of 
Truman in the formulation of the US strategy of containment and the application of this 
strategy in Korea, we will now analyse Reagan’s role in the application of the strategy of 
“rollback” in Nicaragua. Why did Reagan pursue the Contra policy with such rigour, even in 
the face of Congressional opposition? Where did the policy to search for alternative sources 
of funding originate? What role did Reagan’s worldview and management style play in the 
development of the policy? Why did the president take such risks in terms of securing 
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external funding? The chapter argues that although Reagan was known for his detached style 
of management, which involved the delegation of power to his subordinates in the executive, 
in the areas of foreign policy that he deemed of utmost importance he was willing to involve 
himself in the formulation of policy and was prepared to exploit the powers of his office in 
attempting to achieve his desired goal. Nicaragua was one such area. Reagan viewed 
Nicaragua through the narrow filters of his anti-communism and as a result rated it as one of 
the most serious foreign and security policies facing his administration. He believed the 
Soviet Union and Cuba were using Nicaragua as a proxy for communist intervention in 
Central America. As a result, he worked hard to keep Nicaragua at the top of his foreign 
policy agenda. This demonstrates the important role of presidential worldview in setting the 
US foreign policy agenda. However, when assessing the impact of presidential agency, it is 
important to recognise that unintended consequences can be just as important as intended 
outcomes. In the case of Reagan and Nicaragua, it will be shown that Reagan’s proclivity for 
grand strategising and the search for simple solutions at the expense of grasping the finer 
details of policy making, coupled with his hands-off management style, set his administration 
on the path towards the Iran-Contra scandal. 
    The choice of Nicaragua also allows us to analyse in detail the relationship between the 
president and congress in US foreign policy making. Reagan never had the consistent support 
of a majority of Congressmen on the issue of Nicaragua. Indeed, the policy remained one of 
the most controversial issues of his entire administration. Conservative Republicans agreed 
with Reagan on the threat posed by the Sandinista government and voted in favour of Contra 
funding. Liberal Democrats did not share Reagan’s view and consistently voted against 
Contra aid.  This left a minority of moderate Republican and conservative Democrats who 
Reagan had to try and win over in the run up to any vote on Contra funding and Nicaragua 
policy. This chapter will show how the president actively involved himself in the legislative 
battle to try and convince these legislators to vote in favour of his Contra policy.  This proved 
to be a complex and painfully slow process that did achieve some success, but was never as 
successful as the president wished. Indeed, the process became more difficult with the 
Administration’s attempts to forge a policy with or without the consent of Congress. The 
launching of covert operations in Nicaragua, the ever increasing role of the CIA and the lack 
of administration cooperation with the relevant Congressional oversight committees 
eventually culminated in the Iran-Contra scandal and the collapse of Reagan’s Nicaragua 
policy. 
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7.2 Framing Nicaragua as a Security Concern 
 
Although Reagan’s first term agenda was dominated by his attempts to pass his economic and 
military programmes, it was impossible for his administration to ignore the ongoing situation 
in Nicaragua. The left-wing Sandinistas had overthrown the US backed right-wing Somoza 
regime the previous year. As staunch anti-communists, the mere possibility of the Sandinistas 
setting up a Marxist state structure in a country so close to the US was unacceptable. The fear 
of ‘another Castro’ was prevalent throughout the administration. In January 1980, the State 
Department circulated a briefing paper that began to formulate the administration’s view of 
the situation in Central America, particularly their negative assessment of the role Cuba was 
playing in helping to spread socialism through the supply of economic and military aid.
5
 
    The importance of Nicaragua and Central America to the Reagan administration can be 
seen from the very first meeting of the National Security Council on February 6, 1981. The 
security concerns raised by events in the Caribbean Basin were deemed of enough 
importance to merit being placed at the top of the agenda, above even fears over increased 
Soviet intervention in Poland. Secretary Haig dominated the discussion as he attempted to 
establish Cuba as the source of major disruption in Central America. In his opening remarks 
he explained that: “This region is our third border. There is no question that it is in turmoil… 
Cuba exploits internal difficulties in these states by exporting arms and subversion.”6 The 
main focus of the discussion was on the role played by Cuba and Nicaragua in exporting arms 
to revolutionary groups in El Salvador. The right-wing government of El Salvador was a key 
regional ally for the US and its survival was deemed of great importance to Reagan. Indeed, 
the president spoke openly of his desire to establish firmer relations with US allies in the 
region:  
 
My own feeling – and one which I have talked about at length – is that we are way 
behind, perhaps decades, in establishing good relationships with the two Americas. We 
must change the attitude of our diplomatic corps so that we don’t bring down 
governments in the name of human rights. None of them are as guilty of human rights 
violations as are Cuba and the USSR. We don’t throw out our friends just because they 
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can’t pass the ‘saliva test’ on human rights. I want to see that stopped. We need people 
who recognise that philosophy.
7
 
 
Reagan was signalling clearly his intent to overhaul President Carter’s human rights based 
approach to foreign policy. This was a bold statement and outlined how Reagan viewed the 
world and how he wanted his foreign policy conducted. In terms of the narrower focus of the 
debate on Nicaragua and Central America, it was clear that the president wanted his 
administration to begin preparing to increase US involvement in the region.  
    At this stage the discussion remained focused on Cuba. Haig continued to outline what he 
saw as the threat posed by Cuban subversion and their continued supply of rebels throughout 
the region. He claimed to have evidence that over 600 tonnes of military material had been 
passed from Cuba to El Salvador via Nicaragua. The Sandinistas were involved in what Haig 
saw as the exporting of revolution. However, due to the large quantity of weapons being 
distributed, the working assumption was that Cuba was not acting alone and was in fact a 
proxy for the Soviet Union. This explains the Reagan administration’s evaluation of the threat 
posed by Cuba and Nicaragua. The fear amongst Reagan and his officials was the potential of 
the Soviet Union gaining a foothold on the mainland of Central American. Haig wanted to cut 
off economic aid to Nicaragua to demonstrate that “we will not tolerate violations as did the 
past Administration.” 8  Secretary of Defence Weinberger suggested that more could be 
achieved by using “covert aid… to disrupt Cuban activities.”9 He also pointed out that he was 
“not sure that most Americans understand the situation there” and argued “we need to explain 
to people that this is a dangerous situation for the US, and that we may have to move 
strongly.”10 Reagan, however, was keen to focus on the situation currently faced. He asked, 
“How can we intercept these weapons? How can we help?”11 The president’s desire for US 
involvement stemmed from his belief that “We can’t afford a defeat.”12 For Reagan, the idea 
of increased Soviet involvement in the region was unacceptable. 
    The minutes of the first NSC meeting are a remarkable document. They show the origin of 
many of the features that would eventually characterise perhaps the most controversial policy 
of the Reagan administration.  The debate centred on the spread of communism in the region 
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and the specific role played by Cuba. We see how the policy originates as an attempt to stop 
the Cubans and Nicaraguans sending weapons to Salvadorian guerrillas. The role of the 
president is also demonstrated as Reagan makes it clear that communist threats to regional 
US allies will not be tolerated and that his authority to respond to these threats will not be 
restricted by human rights considerations.  This is a clear break from the Carter 
administration and signals Reagan’s intention to take US foreign policy in a more aggressive 
and conservative direction. Weinberger expresses the fear that there is little public 
understanding of the threat posed by the Sandinistas. This is a rather pertinent observation 
given the fact that over the course of his administration Reagan was never able to convince a 
majority of Americans to support his policy. Finally, the option of covert involvement was 
discussed. The eventual decision to implement a covert policy of aid to Nicaraguan rebels 
would set off a chain of events that resulted in the Iran-Contra scandal. 
 
7.3 Deciding to Intervene 
 
    In the following months Reagan found it difficult to formulate options for a coherent 
policy. At NSC meetings Haig continued to champion aggressive action against Cuba. He 
discussed the possibility of quarantine and increased military options.
13
 The rest of the 
administration was less keen on such hostile action. Robert McFarlane, an assistant to Haig, 
suggested that less attention should be paid to Cuba, and offered a duel-track solution based 
on isolating Nicaragua and initiating an economic development program for all the countries 
in the region.
14
 This was based on the assumption that Nicaraguan and Cuban policies could 
not be implemented without the understanding of the problems facing the region as a whole. 
The Secretary of Defence was also wary of increased direct US military involvement. In his 
memoirs, Haig writes that Weinberger “genuinely feared the creation of another 
unmanageable tropical war into which American troops and American money would be 
poured with no result different from Vietnam.”15 As Robert Kagan has argued, “The Reagan 
administration’s failure to settle on a policy, however, was understandable... All the choices 
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were politically and, in the views of some, even strategically unattractive.”16 The Reagan 
administration was confronted with the reality of formulating foreign policy in the post-
Vietnam environment. There would be no public support for military involvement in 
Nicaragua, especially if the majority of the public did not share Reagan’s perception of the 
level of threat posed by the Sandinistas. 
 
7.3.1 Going Covert 
 
    The first important decisions made by Reagan in relation to Nicaragua and Central 
America were taken over the next two months. On March 9, Reagan signed a presidential 
finding authorising covert aid to “provide all forms of training, equipment and related 
assistance to cooperating governments throughout Central America in order to counter 
foreign sponsored subversion and terrorism.”17 The primary goal of this order was to begin 
helping the El Salvador government interdict weapons being sent from Cuba via Nicaragua. 
Reagan also allowed a diplomatic mission, led by Assistant Secretary of State Thomas 
Enders, to be sent to Managua to meet with Sandinista leaders. The proposed deal was for the 
Sandinistas to end their support of guerrillas in neighbouring countries and in return the 
United States guaranteed not to threaten or use force against the Nicaraguan regime.
18
 
However, the Sandinistas rejected the deal. Even if they had accepted, it is unlikely the 
agreement would have been finalised as the hardliners were unhappy with the terms. They 
found it unacceptable that Enders was proposing to accept the legitimacy of the Sandinista 
revolution in return for a cessation of arms trafficking. The hardliners demanded the removal 
of the communist and Soviet threat. With the failure of the diplomatic mission, Reagan 
ordered the suspension of aid to Nicaragua on April 1. 
    Over the summer, Reagan continued to receive briefings on what administration officials 
perceived to be the growing crisis in Nicaragua. Writing in his diary in October, Reagan 
explains that a meeting with the NSC “has left me with the most profound decision I’ve ever 
had to make. Central America is really the world’s next hotspot. Nicaragua is an armed camp 
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supplied by Cuba and threatening a communist takeover of all of Central America.”19 This 
diary entry shows how seriously Reagan believed the threat in Nicaragua to be. For Reagan, 
the US had to act to counter this threat.  Therefore Nicaragua had to remain a high ranking 
priority on Reagan’s foreign policy agenda. A month later at the November 16 meeting of the 
NSC, the Restricted Interagency Group responsible for Central American policy presented 
Reagan with a set of options it had developed in relation to the growing problems in 
Nicaragua.
20
 Secretary of State Haig continued to argue in favour of stronger direct action 
against Cuba, who he still thought of as the “source” of instability in the region.21 However, 
the rest of the NSC members were reluctant to endorse such a measure, fearing that it could 
provoke the Soviet Union into escalating the situation, and also wary that there would be little 
or no public support for such an aggressive act. Indeed, Enders recollects that during 
discussions Reagan made it clear that he was “profoundly adverse to violence”.22 This meant 
it was unlikely that the president would sign off on any of Haig’s more controversial policies. 
    An alternative to direct US involvement was required. If the fear was that Cuba and 
Nicaragua were smuggling arms to revolutionaries in El Salvador then a method was needed 
to put a halt to this. At the February 6 NSC meeting the president had asked how the US 
could help stop the supply of guns. The Director of the CIA, William Casey, offered a covert 
solution. The Sandinistas were currently facing a domestic uprising, ‘la contrarrevolucion”, 
led by the ‘Fuerza Democratica Nicaraguense’, or Nicaraguan Democratic Force (FDN). 
Casey suggested that with the aid of the US, these rebel groups would be able to stem the 
flow of weapons from Nicaragua to El Salvador. The rebels could also be supplemented by a 
team of CIA operatives who would lead and direct paramilitary operations against the 
Sandinista regime.
23
 The president and his advisers agreed on this option. Without access to 
the minutes of this meeting, which are still classified, it is difficult to determine the strength 
of the agreement reached. Several members of the administration have since claimed that 
opinion was divided. Haig has claimed that the covert policy was chosen “by default” and 
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was a result of the failure of the “policy-making apparatus”.24 Rodman argues that the policy 
was the result of a “bureaucratic compromise” between Haig, who wanted stronger action 
directed at Cuba, and Caspar Weinberger, who did not want to see the US military becoming 
entangled in another jungle conflict.
25
 Reagan, on the other hand, seems to have been in 
favour of the decision. Writing in his diary on November 17, he notes, “We have decided on 
a plan of covert actions, etc to block the Cuban aid to Nicaragua and El Salvador. There is no 
question but that all of Central America is targeted for a Communist takeover.”26 Again this 
diary entry provides evidence to support the argument that Nicaragua was one of the top 
ranking items on Reagan’s foreign policy agenda. The president rated the issue as a severe 
security threat and as a result he wanted the US to take action. The president may have been 
unwilling to intervene directly, and he was certainly aware that public opinion would not 
support such a policy. As a result, the decision to intervene covertly became the obvious 
choice for Reagan. 
    On November 17, President Reagan signed NSDD 17, which stated US policy is “to assist 
in defeating the insurgency in El Salvador, and to oppose actions by Cuba, Nicaragua or 
others to introduce into Central America heavy weapons, troops from outside the region, 
trained subversives, or arms and military supplies for insurgents.”27 As part of this strategy, 
Reagan authorised $20 million of aid to be sent to the anti-Sandinista rebel groups.
28
 On 
December 1, Central American policy was discussed at another meeting of the NSC. The 
result of this meeting was a far more controversial decision. Reagan signed a presidential 
directive, which ordered the CIA to “support and conduct…paramilitary operations against… 
Nicaragua.”29 The finding authorised the CIA to send five hundred operatives to Nicaragua.  
    A few days later, in line with the rules regarding presidential authorisation of covert 
activities, William Casey had to brief the House and Senate intelligence committees. Fearful 
of another Vietnam situation, Democrats on the House Committee asked him about the level 
of American involvement, possible escalation, and what right the US had to overthrow the 
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government of a foreign country. “Nobody was talking about overthrowing anybody,” 
explained Casey, “This was a small, contained attempt to interdict weapons and to put just 
enough pressure on the Sandinistas to keep them from delivering their revolution wholly to 
communism.”30  However, while stating that the purpose of US involvement was not to 
overthrow the Sandinista government, he failed to make it clear that the CIA would be 
responsible for interdicting the weapons, leaving the Committee members to assume that the 
Contras would be performing this task.
31
 This was the beginning of a series of inadequate 
Congressional briefings that Casey would take part in, and which formed part of a larger 
administration strategy of limiting Congressional knowledge of the executive’s conduct of 
policy in Nicaragua. 
    The events discussed above are worthy of note for several reasons. They demonstrate the 
extent to which the administration was working in response to the agenda set by President 
Reagan. The events of the Sandinista revolution and their consolidation of power were 
viewed solely in terms of the East-West superpower conflict, both by Reagan and the 
majority of his most senior advisers. This highlights the role of presidential worldview, as 
Reagan made his decisions on the basis of this perception of the Nicaraguan situation. For 
Reagan, the Sandinistas were communist proxies controlled by the Soviet Union. The fact 
that the revolution was taking place on the North American mainland intensified what was 
seen as communist aggression in America’s traditional sphere of hegemonic interest. Reagan 
made it clear that this had to be stopped. The decision to involve the CIA covertly may have 
been the result of a compromise, but this was a compromise of methods, not objectives. 
According to Thomas Enders the decision to go covert was intended as “the low-ball option” 
32
, but the use of the CIA allowed the policy to be centralised in the White House whilst 
affording Congress the least amount of involvement possible.  
    Having been elected as a staunch anti-communist and committed cold warrior, the decision 
to back the anti-Sandinista forces and send the CIA to intervene in Nicaragua had placed both 
Reagan and his administration on a course of action that would be difficult to deviate from. 
First, by committing to the Contras, Reagan believed any attempt to lessen US support would 
appear to Sandinistas and Moscow as a sign of weakness. As Reagan viewed the world in 
East-West and zero-sum gains, he could not back down from supporting the Contras as this 
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would result in a loss for the US and a gain for the Soviet Union. As a result, it was almost 
inevitable that the US would have to involve itself in Nicaragua to an ever-greater degree. 
This will be shown in the development of the CIA’s mission from merely interdicting 
weapons, to increased paramilitary operations directed at pressurising the Sandinista 
government towards political reform, to alleged attempts at direct overthrow of the 
Nicaraguan government. Second, this had a direct consequence for the possibility of a 
diplomatic solution. As Reagan became more concerned with political reform and his 
“crusade for freedom”, the increasing involvement of the CIA made it difficult for the 
diplomats to pursue a peaceful negotiated settlement. 
 
7.3.2 The Conflict Intensifies 
 
    In 1982 there were several important developments. The influx of US supplies and CIA 
involvement in Nicaragua began to have an effect on the size and efficiency of the anti-
Sandinista forces. As Kornbluh has written, “Whereas actions by small isolated bands of 
Somocista guardsmen had been previously limited to sporadic, ineffectual incidents along the 
border region, with the influx of US personnel, equipment, and money the frequency and 
destructiveness of the contra attacks escalated rapidly.”33 As a result, news of the US’s covert 
involvement in Nicaragua began to appear in the media.
34
 The most visible Contra attack 
occurred in March, when anti-Sandinista forces trained by the CIA in the use of explosives 
demolished two bridges in northern Nicaragua.
35
 What had initially began as a policy of 
interdicting arms destined for El Salvador, was now developing into a broader strategy 
focused on applying covert military pressure to the Sandinista government.  This change was 
in part a result of a covert operation initiated with a broad and ill-defined mandate as 
expressed in the presidential finding of December 1, but was also in part due to the 
developments taking place in the ideological orientation of Reagan. At his February 24 
speech to the Organisation of American States Reagan drew a contrast between the light of 
democracy and the darkness of totalitarianism in Central America: 
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“The positive opportunity is illustrated by the two-thirds of the nations in the area which 
have democratic governments. The dark future is foreshadowed by the poverty and 
repression of Castro's Cuba, the tightening grip of the totalitarian left in Grenada and 
Nicaragua, and the expansion of Soviet-backed, Cuban-managed support for violent 
revolution in Central America.”36 
 
Reagan went on to outline that US security assistance to Central America was not an end in 
itself, but the means towards the greater goal of democracy and freedom. By publicly 
attacking the Sandinistas and explaining that the US sought the spread of democracy in 
Central America, Reagan was laying the foundation for the Reagan Doctrine at a rhetoric 
level and serving notice to Nicaragua that the US policy of interdicting arms was only the 
beginning of a strategy that would eventually demand the reform of the Sandinista regime. 
Kagan has argued, “The Reagan Doctrine began as an act of political salesmanship. It 
wrapped a conservative Republican president’s aggressive anti-communist strategy in a 
broader cloak that appealed to moderate Democrats while it confounded liberals.”37  The 
president may have been trying to sell his Nicaragua policy, but the combination of 
increasingly violent and public “covert” acts combined with an ideological call for 
democracy promotion began to raise serious concerns within the moderate elements of his 
administration and began to attract the attention of Congress. 
    The moderates, led by Thomas Enders, were troubled by what they saw as a disparity 
between means and ends. If Reagan sought the overthrow of the Sandinistas and the 
establishment of democracy in Nicaragua, then support of the Contras would not achieve this. 
The contras were becoming larger and more effective, but they lacked the capabilities and 
domestic support necessary to have any real hope of achieving a revolution, let alone a 
democratic revolution, as Reagan controversially claimed. If Reagan wanted to use the 
Contras as a tool to achieve democracy in Nicaragua then this decision “was to embark on a 
policy with no foreseeable end and no prospect of success.”38 Enders, along with others in the 
State Department, knew that paramilitary operations alone would not achieve the president’s 
desired result. Indeed, the diplomats believed that it was wrong to view the Contras as an end 
                                                          
36
 Reagan, R. (1982) “Remarks to the Permanent Council of the Organization of American States on the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative” February 24, The Public Papers of President Ronald W. Reagan, The Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library, http://www.reagan.utexas.edu/archives/speeches/1982/22482a.htm accessed 
23/07/2010 
37
 Kagan, R. (1996) A Twilight Struggle: American Power and Nicaragua 1977-1990 (New York: The Free Press), 
p212 
38
 Ibid., p214 
213 
 
 
 
in themselves. Enders desired to reopen negotiations with the Sandinistas in the hope of 
avoiding an unnecessary escalation in a region of such strategic importance for the US. The 
Contras had a role to play, but this was as part of a larger diplomatic initiative. Enders 
suggested that he should pursue negotiations with the Sandinistas where the Contras should 
be used as a bargaining chip. If the Sandinistas were prepared to meet US demands in relation 
to arms trafficking, democracy and economic freedom, then the US would be willing to stop 
supporting the Contras in return. However, this proved a fruitless endeavour. The hardliners 
were unwilling to negotiate along these lines, and were not prepared to stop US support of the 
Contras.
39
 Reagan agreed, and the Contras continued to be the focal point of US policy in 
Nicaragua. 
 
7.3.4 Congress Responds 
 
    With the covert policy becoming ever more public, it was unsurprising that members of 
Congress began to investigate the policy and raise objections in relation to both the stated 
ends and the controversial means that had been adopted by the Reagan administration. When 
news of the US’s involvement in the Contra attacks first broke in March 1982 there was 
surprisingly little in the way of conflict between the branches of government over the 
president’s classification of the Sandinistas as Marxist-Leninists actively engaged in the 
export of terrorism and revolution throughout the region. On March 2, the chairman of the 
Senate Intelligence Committee, Barry Goldwater, announced publicly that there was “no 
doubt that there is active involvement by Sandinista government officials in support of the 
Salvadoran guerrilla movement.”40 
      The major disagreement at this stage centred on the administration’s support for the 
Contras. Like the moderates in the State Department, voices of concern were raised by 
members of the intelligence committees in both houses of Congress in relation to the belief 
that covert funding of the Contras would achieve the administration’s goals of stopping arms 
flowing from Nicaragua to El Salvador. Committee members also pointed out the difficulty 
the administration would have controlling the Contras, and raised concerns that the situation 
in Nicaragua could escalate and the possibility of war between Nicaragua and Honduras, 
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where the Contras had bases.
41
 Opposition was also strengthened due to the fact that only the 
intelligence committees had been briefed on operations in Nicaragua, the rest of the Congress 
did not have access to this information. Therefore, without knowing the full details of the 
policy, the majority of Congress was forced to rely on press reports for information. As a 
result, they were presented with images of CIA operatives appearing to do more than just 
interdicting arms. Reports were received of the Contras attacking roads, bridges and fuel 
tanks, engaging in assassination of government, health and education officials as well as 
economic targets in both industry and agriculture.
42
 Members of Congress therefore found it 
difficult to accept the Reagan administration’s argument that the aim of US policy in 
Nicaragua was to stop arms trafficking. The increasing violence of the Contras suggested that 
their aims were differing from those of Reagan. Many members of Congress became wary 
that the US was supporting an armed movement whose true aim was to overthrow the 
Sandinista regime. For these Congressmen, such a policy was unacceptable. Senators Dodd 
and Tsongas called the Nicaragua policy “as confused as it is dangerous.”43 
    This prompted several Congressional initiatives to place restrictions on Reagan’s policy in 
Nicaragua. Congressman Michael Barnes made the first attempt. He introduced a bill in the 
House Foreign Affairs subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs which, if it had passed, 
would have halted all covert actions throughout the whole of Central America.
44
 The second 
attempt was made in the summer by Edward Boland and the House Intelligence Committee. 
In a classified annexe to the intelligence authorization bill, the Committee declared that none 
of the funds appropriated could be used “for the purpose of overthrowing the government of 
Nicaragua or provoking an exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.”45 The annexe to the 
bill would have remained classified if it were not for two related events. Over the winter, the 
Contras increased their activities due to increased numbers and funding, and, as a result of 
increased media attention in the region, these incidents were publicised in the US media.
46
 
This prompted Representative Tom Harkin to offer an amendment to the defence 
appropriations bill which would prohibit US funds and support for all paramilitary and covert 
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activities in or against Nicaragua. This attempt at sweeping restriction prompted the House 
Intelligence Committee chairman, Edward Boland, to offer his own previously classified 
amendment which prohibited the use of funds for the overthrow of the Nicaraguan 
government and stipulated that Contra aid could only be used for the purpose of arms 
interdiction.
47
 The Boland Amendment passed by a vote of 411 to 0 and the president signed 
the bill on 21 December 1982. 
     
7.3.5 Reagan Re-asserts 
 
    Congress had attempted to place restrictions on Reagan’s Nicaragua policy. However, the 
president was unwilling to compromise on what he viewed as one of the most important 
foreign policy issues facing his administration. Even before Congress had passed the defence 
appropriations bill, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 59, titled “Cuba and 
Central America”, whereby the current policy of providing cover support to Nicaraguan 
paramilitary fighters was reaffirmed.
48
 Therefore, the Boland amendment might have been an 
attempt by Congress to signal to the president their concerns over the direction he was taking 
US policy, but Reagan was adamant that he would continue as planned. By late February 
1983, Reagan and his National Security Planning Group were already working on a new draft 
presidential finding in relation to Nicaraguan policy. The plan was for the CIA to “work 
with… organisations and individuals to build popular support… that will be nationalistic, 
anti-Cuban and anti-Somoza” and “support and protect the opposition… by developing and 
training action teams that will… engage in paramilitary operations.” 49  Reagan clearly 
intended to continue supporting the Contras even if Congressional opposition was rising. He 
was also willing to expand his program and involve himself personally in the process. 
    Reagan and the hardliners were working on the assumption that domestic opposition to the 
Contra policy was due to the fact that the general population were uninformed of the situation 
in Nicaragua, that they did not know enough details to form a more balanced opinion. The 
only reports they read were in newspapers, and much like their Congressmen, they were not 
happy to see the US involve itself in what appeared to be another jungle conflict with no 
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discernible end goal. Reagan ordered that the administration must engage in an extensive 
public diplomacy initiative, even going so far as to appoint an “overall coordinator who will 
be responsible for the development and implementation of a public diplomacy strategy” in 
order to “deepen the understanding and support for our policies in Central America” whilst 
focusing “not only in the developments in Central America but also on the impact that these 
activities have in Latin America as well as elsewhere overseas and in the United States.”50 
Reagan hoped that by increasing public awareness of the situation in Nicaragua, particularly 
the administration’s assessment of the threat posed by the Sandinistas, he would be able to 
convince enough members of the public to support his agenda and in turn he could use this to 
his advantage when dealing with Congress.
51
 
    While the foundations of a concerted bureaucratic public diplomacy campaign were being 
laid, Reagan decided to place himself at the forefront. On April 27 he delivered an address to 
a joint session of Congress on the topic of Central America. The usual themes were repeated, 
Nicaragua was a communist state and it was responsible for the spread of revolutionary 
movements throughout Central America. However, Reagan now wanted to make it 
abundantly clear just how close this threat was to the borders of the United States and the 
extent to which the American public underestimated the extent of the problem: “El Salvador 
is nearer to Texas than Texas is to Massachusetts. Nicaragua is just as close to Miami, San 
Antonio, San Diego, and Tucson as those cities are to Washington, where we're gathered 
tonight.”52 Reagan then proceeded to outline what he viewed as the major strategic threat 
facing US security in the region: 
But nearness on the map doesn't even begin to tell the strategic importance of Central 
America, bordering as it does on the Caribbean -- our lifeline to the outside world. Two-
thirds of all our foreign trade and petroleum pass through the Panama Canal and the 
Caribbean. In a European crisis at least half of our supplies for NATO would go through 
these areas by sea. It's well to remember that in early 1942, a handful of Hitler's 
submarines sank more tonnage there than in all of the Atlantic Ocean. And they did this 
without a single naval base anywhere in the area. And today, the situation is different. 
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Cuba is host to a Soviet combat brigade, a submarine base capable of servicing Soviet 
submarines, and military air bases visited regularly by Soviet military aircraft.
53
 
    Reagan was trying to paint a vivid picture of Soviet incursion closer to the United States 
than anything the Nazis had accomplished during the Second World War. Reagan was 
attempting to turn the debate on Nicaragua into a domestic issue rather than an abstract 
foreign policy that had little impact on the day-to-day lives of the average citizen. 
  This strategy proved successful in some respects, but produced unintended consequences 
that hampered the administration. First, Reagan was able to put members of Congress on the 
defensive. By posing the situation as a Soviet backed communist threat to the well being of 
the United States, Reagan was able to challenge the patriotism and anti-communist 
credentials of Congressmen who questioned either the ends or the means of US policy in 
Nicaragua. These critics were “compelled to demonstrate that they were just a resolute about 
standing up to communism in Central America, just as convinced of the threat, and just as 
opposed to the establishment of communist regimes in the hemisphere as were Reagan 
administration supporters.”54 Reagan was able to combine both the power of his office and 
his vast personal popularity to push forward his agenda at the level of both rhetoric and 
policymaking. It would be over a year before Congress could again bring forward a serious 
attempt to check Reagan’s support for the Contras. 
    However, this came at a cost for the administration. By setting forth on such a hostile 
course, Reagan turned Nicaragua into one of the most partisan issues to be fought during his 
time in office. Although Reagan had the support of conservative Republicans and Democrats, 
younger liberals in the Democratic Party were reluctant to repeat the mistakes of Vietnam and 
were not prepared to let Reagan and the CIA carry out a covert war against Nicaragua.
55
 
These liberals would continually oppose Reagan at every opportunity, thus forcing Reagan to 
attempt to win over the remaining swing voters who he needed for a majority. 
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7.3 Reagan’s Management System Failures 
 
7.3.1 Divisions 
 
    The overly ideological tone of Reagan’s new advance also began to increase the division 
within the administration between the moderates and hardliners. Even before the president’s 
speech, George Shultz, who had replaced Alexander Haig in July 1982 as Secretary of State, 
recalls that the intensity of Nicaraguan policy was increasing. As early as December, Bill 
Casey had written to Shultz arguing the case for the hardliners: 
 
Our support in Congress is fading. We’re in danger of losing on what is by far the most 
important foreign policy problem confronting the nation [central America]. You shouldn’t 
be travelling around Europe. You should be going around the United States sounding the 
alarm and generating support for tough policies on the most important problem on our 
agenda. Force is the only language the Communists understand.
56
 
 
  Shultz claims he was “taken aback by his vehemence and by the emotion in his attack on me. 
Casey seemed suddenly obsessed with the issue.”57 The division between the hardliners and 
the moderates focused more on means than on ends. To a large extent, Shultz agreed with the 
hardliner’s assessment of the situation in Nicaragua, he believed that the Soviet Union were 
trying to gain a foothold on the American mainland in order to “tie us down and preoccupy us 
right on our southern border in the hopes that we would not attend adequately to Soviet 
challenges in the farther reaches of the world.”58 But as Kagan has argued, “Implicit in 
Shultz’s assessment, however, was a conviction that the Reagan administration should not do 
the Soviet Union’s work by preoccupying itself with Central America and engaging in 
endless, divisive battles with the Democrats in Congress.”59 The Secretary of State did not 
view support of the Contras as sufficient to achieve the desired result in Nicaragua. He 
argued in favour of a duel-track policy of strength and diplomacy, whereby the Contras 
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would act as military pressure driving the Sandinistas to the negotiating table.
60
 The 
hardliners refused to accept this logic. They did not believe that it was possible to negotiate 
with communists. Casey, Kirkpatrick and Clark all believed that communists only entered 
into negotiations in order to buy time, or to force the US into accommodation.
61
 As Casey 
had said in December, force was the only way the US would be able to deal with the 
communists, and that meant supporting the Contras. 
    The division within the administration went beyond ideology; it also developed into a 
bureaucratic dispute. The hardliners were concentrated within the White House and NSC; the 
moderates were led by Shultz in the State Department. As discussed earlier, the Reagan 
foreign policy bureaucracy was centred in the NSC but the president developed a strong 
working relationship with Shultz. The tensions in this bureaucratic set up soon became 
apparent in relation to Nicaragua policy. Assistant Secretary of State Thomas Enders had 
begun working on an initiative to involve Mexico and other countries in the region in a 
negotiated settlement. His proposal had the support of Shultz, but such a policy was 
unacceptable to William Clark and he worked hard to kill it. This sparked off a bitter dispute 
between the Secretary of State and the National Security Adviser. Shultz “accused Clark of a 
power-grab and Clark accused Shultz of bypassing an orderly inter-agency process by end 
runs into the Oval Office, denying the president the benefit of dissenting views.”62 To some 
degree, both officials were correct in their accusations. Clark had been working with the 
support of Casey and Weinberger to centralise Nicaragua policy-making within the NSC, and 
Shultz had been exploiting his access to the president to discuss Nicaragua policy without 
other senior staff present.
63
 
    However, the president had made it clear over the previous two years that he considered 
the Nicaraguan situation to be one of his most important foreign policy issues, and he viewed 
support of the Contras as essential to US security. Even with a strong relationship with Shultz 
it was almost inevitable that he would side with the hardliners. Reagan decided to focus more 
aggressively on Nicaragua, and demanded an increase in US involvement. This took two 
forms. First, even though Congress had attempted to restrict the president’s involvement in 
Nicaragua, Reagan began working towards increased American support for the Contras. In a 
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memo to CIA Director Bill Casey, William Clark explains that the president approved an 
“increased funding level for the Nicaraguan Covert Action Program” but that “the President 
has deferred approval of your [Casey’s] request to increase further the Nicaraguan resistance 
forces until we have available a detailed projection of the long term goals/objectives and 
costs for these forces.”64 The president had also authorised increased Department of Defence 
support for the CIA’s covert activities.65 What this demonstrates is that Reagan was not 
rushing blindly to support the Contras. Instead, he was aware that his Nicaragua policy was 
becoming an increasingly visible and politicised policy and while he was prepared to fund 
existing Contra forces, he was not prepared at this stage to actively engage in their expansion. 
A larger force would be less covert and would result in increased opposition in Congress. 
 
7.3.2 Big Pine 
 
 
    Reagan’s second decision was to undo most of his previous careful planning. During May 
Reagan held a meeting on the subject of Nicaragua with Bill Casey and Henry Kissinger 
where they had discussed blockading Nicaragua in order to demonstrate to both the 
Sandinistas and the Soviet Union that the US were taking events in the region very 
seriously.
66
 Reagan again revisited this topic in a meeting with Senator Denton in July where 
they discussed the idea of the US working with regional allies in order to quarantine 
Nicaragua and halt the trafficking of arms from Nicaragua.
67
 Reagan was clearly beginning to 
think about expanding his Nicaragua policy to include both covert and overt elements. The 
president wished to confront both the Soviet Union and the Sandinistas, whilst at the same 
time impressing his authority as Commander-in-Chief on opponents in Congress. 
    At the end of July, Reagan signed National Security Decision Directive 100, authorising 
“Big Pine II”, a six month long set of military exercises off both the Atlantic and Pacific 
coasts of Nicaragua. The directive included some of the strongest language yet, not just in 
relation to the threat posed by the Sandinistas, but to the extent the US was willing to support 
her allies: 
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The democratic states of Central America must be assisted to the maximum degree 
possible in defending themselves against externally supported subversion or hostile 
neighbours. US military activities in the region must be significantly increased to 
demonstrate our willingness to defend our allies and to deter further Cuban and Soviet 
bloc intervention.
68
  
 
Over three thousand American troops would conduct war games with the Honduran army on 
Honduran territory. The activities may have demonstrated to the intended foreign and 
congressional audience Reagan’s intention, but this show of force came at a serious political 
cost, both within his administration and with Congress. 
    The decision to launch Big Pine was taken without the input of the Secretary of State. 
Shultz has written that upon hearing the news about the decision to launch the exercise he 
was left feeling “totally blindsided, and I did not know the extent to which President Reagan 
had been involved. I knew that I had no chance to give him my views.”69 This demonstrates 
the extent to which Reagan’s foreign policy system lacked cohesion and was at the mercy of 
factional splits. A decision had been taken to send the US military to Honduras as a show of 
force to the Sandinistas and the Soviet Union, but the matter had not been discussed with the 
Secretary of State, the man Reagan had personally pledged would be his leading official in 
foreign policy making. This example also shows the extent to which the president was able to 
bypass normal bureaucratic procedures. He had planned the exercise with Clark, Casey and 
Kirkpatrick and not one of his advisers had suggested that they should involve Shultz. To 
some degree the behaviour of his advisers is understandable if they felt that Shultz would 
disagree with their idea and argue his case to the president. But it highlights two important 
breakdowns in the foreign policy making process. First, Bill Clark as National Security 
Adviser was tasked with making sure the president had access to all views in relation to 
policy options. By deliberately keeping Schultz out of the process he was pursuing an overtly 
ideological agenda in order to shape policy, which went against the purview of the role of the 
NSA. Second, and more crucial, was the fact that Reagan had not asked why Shultz was 
absent. The president should have actively sought the engagement of his Secretary of State 
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and should have been aware that he was restricting himself to working with a group of 
advisers who only represented the more aggressively anti-Sandinista element of his 
administration. What is more, by cutting Shultz out of the process, Reagan was signalling to 
Clark, whether intentionally or not, that he agreed that his National Security Adviser should 
take a greater role in leading US policy in Nicaragua, thus strengthening the hand of the NSC 
in their bureaucratic tussle with the State Department. 
    If Reagan had spoken to Shultz, however, it is possible that not only would he have voiced 
his concerns over the foreign policy implications of sending the military to Honduras, but 
also he would have been able to brief the president on the domestic political ramifications of 
such a decision. Congress was planning to schedule a critical vote on Contra funding for the 
end of July and Shultz would have been able to tell the president that war games off the coast 
of Nicaragua would heighten the sense of alarm felt by the general public which in turn 
would result in increased Congressional opposition to the president’s Contra policy. This 
inevitably happened. On July 28 the House voted 228 to 195 to suspend all aid to the Contras. 
However, the administration knew the Republican controlled Senate would not agree fully to 
this. To influence the Senate, an NSC meeting was held on September 16 in order to produce 
a new Nicaragua intelligence finding.
70
 This was duly submitted to the Congressional 
intelligence committees and stated that US policy was now: 
 
“to induce the Sandinistas and Cubans and their allies to cease their support for insurgents 
in the region; to hamper Cuban/Nicaraguan arms trafficking; to divert Nicaragua’s 
resources and energies from support to Central American guerrilla movements; and to 
bring the Sandinistas in to meaningful negotiations and constructive, verifiable agreement 
with their neighbours on peace in the region.”71   
 
 The document was a clear intent to signal that the purpose of the covert operations was 
limited to halting Nicaraguan subversion in the region. However, the final paragraphs of the 
finding are telling. They state that US support of paramilitaries will stop once the arms 
trafficking and subversion ceases, and when “the government of Nicaragua is demonstrating 
a commitment to provide amnesty and non-discriminatory participation in the Nicaraguan 
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political process by all Nicaraguans.” 72  This is one of the first officially documented 
statements that Reagan’s policy was not only directed at the outward conduct of the 
Sandinista regime but that he was also aiming for internal democratic reform, and the Contras 
were to be used as a tool in achieving this end. This change in policy seems to have been 
missed by the House committee and in the reconciliation process with the Republican Senate 
the outright ban on Contra funding was eventually capped at $24 million. One major 
limitation was that the bill prohibited the use of CIA contingency funds, which meant that 
Reagan would have to apply to Congress to authorise future funds. 
    This was the first successful attempt by Congress to place restrictions on the executive. 
However, the law was based on the assertion that the purpose of the Contras was to drive the 
Sandinistas to the negotiating table. As was discussed above, both Reagan and the hardliners 
did not believe it was possible to negotiate with communists and that any attempts at 
diplomacy would only lead to accommodation or strategic time wasting on behalf of the 
Sandinistas. Indeed, Reagan publicly announced in November that he had no faith in the 
Sandinistas as negotiating partners stating: “I haven’t believed anything they’ve been saying 
since they got in charge.”73 This was Reagan signalling to Congress that he intended to 
continue funding the Contras, but it also publicly undercut the position of George Shultz and 
any future attempts he would try to make at pursuing a negotiated diplomatic solution. 
 
7.3.3 Reagan’s Weakness 
 
    At this point it is necessary to isolate and analyse the role of President Reagan in the policy 
making process during this period. Reagan was clearly involved in setting the agenda at both 
the rhetorical and policy levels. Reagan had articulated publicly, within his administration 
and even in his own personal diary that he viewed the Sandinista government as one of the 
most serious security threats facing the United States. He was adamant that first and foremost 
the trafficking of arms from Nicaragua to other countries in the region had to be stopped. 
Both his administration and Congress were clear that this was at least one of his intentions. 
One of the major problems facing Reagan was that his administration was split between those 
who favoured a tougher, direct paramilitary response and those who wished to place more 
emphasis on the possibility for diplomacy and a negotiated settlement. By choosing to 
                                                          
72
 Ibid. 
73
in  Scott, J. M. (1996) Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy (London: Duke 
University Press),  p167  
224 
 
 
 
covertly support the Contras and publicly stating that he had little faith in the Sandinistas as 
bargaining partners, it seems clear that Reagan was closer to the hardliners on this issue than 
he was to the moderates. The major criticism of Reagan at this juncture is that he failed to 
explain this clearly to his staff. This was due to the fact that having outlined his policy goal 
and having chosen covert paramilitary operations as the means he wished to employ to 
achieve this goal, he once again assumed a hands-off approach to policy making and did not 
immerse himself in the finer details of what exactly this policy would entail. By standing 
back, Reagan left what can be described as a power vacuum, where the bureaucratic factions 
within his administration began a turf fight over how best to implement his policy.  
    The example of the decision to launch Big Pine without the involvement of the Secretary 
of State demonstrates that at this stage the National Security Adviser and the hardline 
elements within the National Security Council had stepped into the vacuum and were 
beginning to dominate Central American policy making. Although it is difficult to determine 
whether this was the end result that Reagan desired, it is clear that this situation was a direct 
result of Reagan’s management style. The hardliners had listened to Reagan explain how 
serious he rated the situation in Nicaragua, and they were attempting to implement what they 
believed was his chosen policy. Clark, Casey and Kirkpatrick were happy to cut Shultz out of 
the process because they feared that he would bring his moderate views to the president’s 
attention and would perhaps weaken Reagan’s stance on the effectiveness of negotiations.  
    By delegating authority to the NSC, though, Reagan put himself and his administration at a 
distinct political disadvantage. The decision to launch Big Pine was clearly made without 
enough consideration being taken of the domestic political situation, and to authorise 
controversial military manoeuvres so close to a crucial Congressional vote on what was 
allegedly one of the president’s top foreign policy issues was a mistake of the highest order. 
There is also the issue of how much Reagan was deliberately delegating as part of a 
conscious strategy as opposed to merely stepping back and allowing others to run the policy 
on his behalf. If it had been a deliberate decision then Reagan should have explained to his 
staff in detail why he was relying on the NSC and their staff to have such an expanded role in 
Nicaraguan policy, why he was happy to allow Clark to step to the forefront of the decision-
making process, and crucially, explained to Shultz why he was not involving him in some 
aspects of Nicaragua policy. Instead, it appears that Reagan was either unaware of what he 
was doing or not able to anticipate the bureaucratic and congressional fallout from his actions. 
    Reagan’s lack of involvement is also highlighted in the bureaucratic struggle to replace 
William Clark, who had been forced to resign as a result of the Big Pine fiasco. Once again 
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ideological divisions in the administration came to light as the moderates led by Shultz and 
Michael Deaver wanted James Baker to become the new National Security Adviser. The 
hardliners, led by Casey and Weinberger, wanted Jeane Kirkpatrick. As neither of the 
factions was prepared to back down and Reagan was unable, or unwilling, to settle the 
dispute a compromise was eventually reached and Robert McFarlane, Clark’s deputy, was 
elevated to National Security Adviser.  As we shall see in the forthcoming discussion of Iran-
Contra, this compromise would play a crucial role in the difficulties the administration found 
itself in as a result of Reagan’s inability to exert a tight control over his NSC staff.  
 
7.3.5 Mining the Harbours 
 
    Congress may have placed restrictions on the president’s attempts to fund the Contras, but 
Reagan intensified his efforts in two ways. The belief amongst the hardliners was that the 
contras were “the only significant pressure being applied against the regime in Managua.”74 
He allowed the CIA to increase the size of the Contra force to eighteen thousand and did so 
without informing the congressional oversight committees.
75
 The CIA was also given 
authorisation to conduct its own attacks. Peter Kornbluh has estimated that the CIA 
conducted twenty-two assaults on various Nicaraguan targets.
76
 Having previously denied 
authorisation to increase the size and strength of the Contras, the decision to finally do this 
and allow the CIA a more direct and aggressive role in Nicaragua demonstrates the extent to 
which the hardliners in the NSC had begun to take ever greater control of Nicaraguan policy. 
    Whilst Reagan was expanding the role of the CIA and the size of the Contra force, he also 
began articulating a new goal for these groups and a possible change in the direction of US 
policy towards Nicaragua. Until this point the president had publicly declared that the 
purpose of US intervention in Nicaragua was to put a stop to arms trafficking and to halt the 
spread of revolutionary communism in the Western Hemisphere. This was a policy directed 
purely at the external behaviour of the Sandinistas. However, as discussed previously, the 
intelligence finding of September 1983 stated that the US was also seeking to improve the 
levels of participation in Nicaraguan politics. This hinted that Reagan was pursuing more 
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than just arms interdiction. However, this aspect of US policy had remained relatively secret, 
although questions had been raised by the congressional committees when originally briefed 
by Bill Casey, in relation to both the alleged ends of US policy and the means employed to 
achieve them. By March of 1984, Reagan appeared to be finally admitting that his policy in 
Nicaragua was not just restricted to trying to modify the external behaviour of the Sandinistas. 
Speaking to reporters, Reagan publicly announced, “We’ve made it plain to Nicaragua – 
made it very plain that this [the war] will stop when they keep their promise and restore a 
democratic rule and have elections.”77 Now the president was not willing to merely focus on 
external subversion, he wanted to see actual democratic reform in Nicaragua, and the Contras 
would be his method of choice to try and achieve this aim. Unsurprisingly, this newly 
articulated policy raised many important questions in relation to the capability of the Contras 
to force change in Nicaragua, whether the Contras could realistically claim to be fighting for 
democracy, and from liberal Democrats who strongly rejected the idea that the US should 
engage in the overthrow of foreign governments. 
    The most controversial incident took place in the first months of 1984. Reagan authorised 
the mining of Nicaraguan harbours. Not only was the decision controversial, but the 
procedure used to decide upon this course of action was also troubling. The original idea to 
plant mines off the coast of Nicaragua originated in the Restricted Inter-Agency Group (RIG) 
responsible for Central America. This group consisted of lower level officials including 
Langhorne Motley, the assistant Secretary of State for Latin America and Oliver North, a 
Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel serving on the NSC staff. This group “explored the idea, 
won the agreement of the RIG, obtained Reagan’s approval, organized the operation, and 
then in their own fashion briefed the congressional oversight committees.”78 In a memo to 
Robert McFarlane, Oliver North and Constantine Menges explain how the operation was 
carried out: “Our intention is to severely disrupt the flow of shipping essential to Nicaraguan 
trade during the peak export period…to impair the already critical fuel capacity in 
Nicaragua…thus hampering their ability to support… guerrillas in El Salvador.” They go on 
to state: “once a ship has been sunk no insurers will cover ships calling in Nicaraguan ports” 
thus forcing the Sandinistas to rely on Cuban and Soviet supplies. In accordance with prior 
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arrangements, the Contras were to take responsibility for the operation.
79
 This document 
demonstrates the fact that the CIA were not solely responsible for the operation and that the 
NSC staff were heavily involved in the policy’s formulation and implementation. 
    There were several problems with the plan. The bureaucratic process involved highlights 
many of the flaws of Reagan’s management system. The first is that, once again, only a few 
members of the administration were involved. These officials were also hardliners, with 
military backgrounds, who had total faith in the effectiveness of covert operations. However, 
by utilising only a small group with an almost homogenous view of the situation, there was a 
lack of detailed review of the plan. Possible shortcomings and negatives were not properly 
assessed. It had not been subjected to detailed criticism, for example, by the military 
experienced Joint Chiefs of Staff. The NSC staff was supposed to analyse the potential costs 
involved in choosing a particular policy, but Oliver North, the NSC staff member involved in 
this policy, was not a “disinterested party” but in fact a “zealous advocate.”80 Thus, when the 
proposal was presented to Reagan, he was not privy to all the information he required to 
make a decision. Not only does this highlight the problem of Reagan’s foreign policy making 
structure, it also demonstrates the problem of Reagan’s personal management style. When 
presented with the proposal he did not ask for a detailed review, he did not probe the CIA 
estimates and he did not think to ask the Joint-Chiefs for their expert military opinion. Much 
like Kennedy and the Bay of Pigs, Reagan had authorised an incursion into Central America 
on the basis of weak intelligence and poor planning. 
    The second major problem was that the plan had been conceived and executed without 
briefing Congress, as was required by law. This might not have been a problem for Reagan if 
the operation had remained covert, but news of the CIA’s involvement broke at the beginning 
of April.
81
 The Congress’s reaction was not surprising. On April 9, Barry Goldwater, the 
Senate Intelligence Committee chairman, and previously a supporter of Reagan’s Nicaragua 
policy, wrote an angry letter to CIA Director Casey stating: 
 
“It gets down to one, little, simple phrase: I am pissed off!… The President has 
asked us to back his foreign policy. Bill, how can we back his foreign policy when 
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we don’t know what the hell he is doing?… But mine the harbours of Nicaragua? 
This is an act violating international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I 
don’t see how we are going to explain it.”82 
 
For majorities in both the House and the Senate, there was no acceptable way to explain the 
president’s decision. Resolutions were quickly passed condemning the operation. On May 25 
the House voted to ban all funds for use in military or covert activities against Nicaragua and 
the Senate accepted the ban. This became known as the Second Boland Amendment (Boland 
II) and was attached to a Continuing Appropriations Resolution in October, which the 
president signed into law. According to Boland, this law “ended US support for the war in 
Nicaragua”.83 However, the ban on funding was attached to a continuing resolution that 
would have to be voted on again in a year’s time. As the issue of Contra funding was so 
important to President Reagan, it was inevitable that he would continue his attempts to win 
increased funding for the Contras and would once again force a vote on the issue in the 
coming year. The ban had certainly not ended support for the war in Nicaragua. Instead, it 
had merely delayed possible congressional support for the Contras. Reagan and the executive 
would continue with the funds they had, and as shall be shown, engaged in controversial 
activities in order to find alternative sources of funding. 
 
7.3.6 The Search for Alternative Sources of Funding 
 
    The search for alternative sources of Contra funding began as early as January 1984. 
President Reagan had learned from the experience of the first Boland amendment that there 
was every chance he would be unable to secure a reliable source of US funds for the Contras. 
If there was going to be a heated and prolonged struggle between Congress and the President 
every time the subject of Contra funding was discussed then Reagan realised there would be 
every chance that funding to the Contras could be cut-off for periods of time. As the US was 
the major source of funding for the Contras and provided it with the experienced military and 
CIA personnel required to conduct successful operations it was essential for Reagan to seek 
out additional sources who would be able to contribute to the Contra efforts in order to secure 
an adequate level of funds should Congress try to restrict the president’s use of US funds. 
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    The topic was first discussed at a meeting of the National Security Planning Group on 
January 6, 1984. A decision was taken to begin “immediate efforts to obtain additional 
funding of $10-15 million from foreign or domestic sources to make up for the fact that the 
current $24 million appropriation [for the contras] will sustain operations only through June 
1984.''
84
 Responsibility for this operation was given to National Security Adviser Robert 
McFarlane along with the assistance of NSC staff members Oliver North and Constantine 
Menges. McFarlane has testified that Reagan gave him the instruction to keep the Contras 
alive “body and soul”.85 The intention being that it was now the responsibility of the NSC 
staff to maintain the Contras as an effective fighting force, even in the face of Congressional 
restrictions.  
    This instruction is important for two reasons. The first is that it demonstrates the extent to 
which the NSC and its staff had become central to the operation of US foreign policy. Instead 
of acting as an impartial co-ordinator of information to help the president make decisions, the 
National Security Adviser and his staff were to begin active involvement in the operational 
side of foreign policy implementation. What once would have been left to diplomatic, 
intelligence or military personnel was now to be conducted by the NSC. Second, Reagan’s 
order to keep the Contras alive and to involve the NSC in the search for donors highlights the 
extent to which he did not accept congressional limits on his conduct as Chief Executive. He 
had determined that the Sandinistas posed a severe security threat to the United States, had 
decided that the Contras were the only available option to maintain the required amount of 
pressure on the Sandinistas, and, as president, was not prepared to sacrifice the Contras on the 
demands of a thin majority in Congress. 
    The first attempt to find external funding for the Contras was conducted in March 1984. 
Bill Casey had suggested to McFarlane that he should approach Israel and begin negotiations 
over the possibility of them supplying weapons and funding to the Contras. In April, 
McFarlane dispatched an NSC staff member, Howard Teicher, to ask the Israeli government 
if they would be willing to provide supplies to the Contra operation. The Israeli’s declined. 
From the outset, McFarlane decided to keep his programme a secret. He was worried that it 
would be “annoying and upsetting to the Congress” and “embarrassing to Israel,” although he 
was convinced the approach was “perfectly legal.”86 This assertion, however, is somewhat 
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contradicted by McFarlane’s behaviour in relation to other members of the administration. 
Shultz was informed about the approach to Israel from the US embassy in Israel. When he 
confronted McFarlane, he was told that Teicher had gone to Israel “on his own hook.”87 This 
indicates that McFarlane was not merely keeping the policy a secret from Congress, but that 
he was actively involved in trying to keep both his role and details of the policy as quiet as 
possible within the administration. 
    After the Israeli setback, McFarlane continued to look for other countries who would be 
willing to provide material support to the Contras. In May he met with Prince Bandar, the 
Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United States. Over the course of their meeting McFarlane 
explained to the Ambassador that Nicaragua was one of Reagan’s most serious foreign policy 
concerns and he was especially worried how the situation would deteriorate if the Congress 
cut off funding. According to McFarlane, ``it became pretty obvious to the Ambassador that 
his country, to gain a considerable amount of favour and, frankly, they thought it was the 
right thing to do, they would provide the support when the Congress cut it off.''
88
 The 
Ambassador contacted McFarlane a few days later and confirmed that the Saudi Arabian 
government would be willing to contribute $1 million a month, which would be deposited in 
a bank account opened by Oliver North, who was now running the ground operation in 
Nicaragua. McFarlane then reported this news to President Reagan and Vice-President Bush. 
He also informed Shultz and Weinberger that funding for the Contras had been arranged until 
the end of the year, but he did not tell them the source of the funding and they did not ask 
him.
89
 When the Saudis made their first payment in early June, McFarlane told the president 
that “no one else knows about this” and the president responded, “Good, let’s just make sure 
it stays that way.”90 
    Third country funding of the Contras was discussed at the June 25 meeting of the National 
Security Planning Group, which was attended by the majority of Reagan’s senior foreign 
policy advisers. The minutes of this meeting are an important document as they are one of 
only two sets of post-1981NSC/NSPG minutes on the topic of Nicaragua that have been 
declassified. As a result they give us a valuable insight into the thinking and planning of 
Reagan and his closest advisers. The topic of third country funding proved to be a matter of 
some controversy. CIA Director Bill Casey stated, “The legal position is that the CIA is 
authorised to cooperate and seek support from third countries” claiming that “If we notify the 
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oversight committees, we can help the FDN [Contras] get the money they need from third 
countries.”91 However, Shultz claimed that he had spoken to James Baker, a lawyer and 
Reagan’s Chief-of-Staff, who told him “if we go out and try to get money from third 
countries it is an impeachable offence.”92 A technical discussion then took place between 
Casey, Shultz and Weinberger over the specifics of Baker’s judgement and the actual policy 
being pursued. Casey claimed that Baker had said everything would be legal so long as the 
oversight committees were informed, Shultz retorted that “the US government may raise and 
spend funds only through an appropriation of the Congress”93, while Weinberger tried to 
argue that it would not in fact be the US government who was spending the money as “it is 
merely helping the anti-Sandinistas obtain the money from other sources.”94 The discussion 
of Contra funding was brought to a conclusion by Shultz who suggested, “we need to get an 
opinion from the Attorney General on whether we can help the Contras obtain money from 
third countries. It would be the prudent thing to do.”95 
    It is rather striking that it was Shultz, the most prominent moderate in the administration, 
who should voice the idea that it would be best to consult with the president’s lawyer, the 
Attorney General, to determine the legality of pursuing third country donations to the 
Contras. Unfortunately for Shultz, and most of the advisers present at the meeting, neither 
Reagan nor McFarlane mentioned the fact that they had already secured funding from Saudi 
Arabia. The question of whether such funding was legal or not is an interesting topic, and has 
been pursued at depth in the literature,
96
 but it is not the one being addressed here. Instead, 
the minutes of the June 25 meeting demonstrate the extent to which Reagan was involved in 
the breakdown of his foreign policy making process. Not for the first time, Reagan had 
formulated and executed a highly controversial policy without consulting all of his senior 
advisers. In the first instance, ordering the Big Pine military operation, he did not consult 
with Secretary of State Shultz, but had at least discussed the issue with Secretary of Defence 
Weinberger. The decision to pursue third country donors was reached in a much more 
restricted manner. The task was given to Robert McFarlane and the NSC staff, with the 
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support of Bill Casey. The standard operating procedures of Reagan’s administration, the 
inter-agency process, was completely bypassed. All of Reagan’s key foreign policy and legal 
advisers had been cut out of the process. None of them were given the chance to review the 
options and advise the president. When the topic of third country donors was finally 
discussed at a formal meeting of the NSPG, Reagan decided not to inform his staff that he 
was already pursuing the policy under discussion. For whatever reason, possibly believing the 
need for secrecy was great, Reagan consciously chose this course of action. Having been 
elected on a promise to implement cabinet government, by the end of his first term Reagan 
had centralised foreign policy making within the White House, had cut most of his advisers 
out of a controversial aspect of Nicaragua policy, and had authorised the NSC staff to expand 
into the operational side of intelligence gathering and covert activities. Reagan had put in 
motion the sequence of events that would eventually lead to the Iran-Contra affair, the largest 
political scandal in the United States since Watergate and the end of the Nixon 
administration. 
  
7.3.7 Diplomacy 
    
    The minutes of the June 25 NSPG meeting are also important because they highlight the 
divide between the hardliners and the moderates on the issue of diplomacy and the stance the 
US should take in relation to Nicaragua. Multilateral negotiations had been taking place since 
1983 within what became known as the Contadora group. Colombia, Mexico, Panama and 
Venezuela were attempting to deal simultaneously with the conflicts in El Salvador, 
Nicaragua and Guatemala, as well as addressing wider issues such as economic and political 
development. The motivation behind the initiative was that a regional settlement was 
required, in large part because the US was not attempting to engage in serious diplomatic 
negotiations to help solve the crises and was instead relying on military and covert 
intervention.
97
 Initially, President Campins of Venezuela told the US that they “don’t want 
[Reagan] to back Contadora but also not to put any obstacles in the way. Because we know 
the problem was a Latin America problem and must be solved by ourselves.”98 However, as 
the meeting of June 25 makes clear, the Contadora process was viewed at least as part of US 
strategy in the region. 
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    Shultz informed the NSPG that his State Department were involved in “bilateral 
conversations” with the Nicaraguans which had not yet been formalised but were scheduled 
to become a regular occurrence to run in addition to the Contadora negotiations. However, 
this strategy was vehemently opposed by Weinberger. He did not want to “dignify” the 
Sandinistas with offering them bilateral meetings in Washington and argued that US policy 
should be to help “the Contadora countries, who are our friends, obtain a comprehensive and 
viable Contadora treaty.”99 Reagan, however, was even more candid in his assessment of the 
diplomatic situation: “If we are just talking about negotiations with Nicaragua, that is so far-
fetched to imagine that a communist government like that would make any reasonable deal 
with us, but if it is to get Congress to support the anti-Sandinistas, then that can be 
helpful.”100 Reagan had absolutely no faith in the idea that a bilateral negotiated settlement 
with the Sandinistas was possible. This demonstrates the important role played by Reagan’s 
worldview. He continued to view the Nicaraguan situation as a Soviet engineered communist 
ploy, and, as predicted by the worldview literature, did not accept information that 
contradicted the image he held. As a result he did not pursue bilateral negotiations in any 
serious manner and continued to support the Contras as his policy preference. However, the 
president believed that the informal bilateral talks with the Nicaraguans should continue 
because they had “already begun and the press is eager to paint us as having failed again” but 
these would only be an adjunct to the Contadora process, which Reagan hoped would be able 
to achieve a negotiated solution that would be acceptable to him.
101
 However, Reagan was 
also clear that the only way this would happen would be with the continued use and support 
of the Contras: “The Contra funding… is what will keep the pressure on Nicaragua, and the 
only way we are going to get a good Contadora treaty is if we keep the pressure on.”102 Peter 
Rodman has referred to this as Reagan’s “Delphic pronouncement.”103  This was a clear 
statement that the priority for the US was the continuation of the Contra programme and that 
there would be no serious direct negotiations with the Sandinistas. The purpose of the 
negotiations was purely to appease the liberal members of Congress and hope that they would 
be encouraged by the appearance of diplomacy to vote in favour of increased Contra funding. 
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This is a clear example of Reagan setting the direction of US foreign policy. It also 
demonstrates the extent to which the president was refusing to give in to the Congressional 
restrictions on his Nicaragua policy. The Contras would remain the central focus of his policy 
and he would continue to press Congress to fund them. The evidence above demonstrates a 
clear role for presidential agency in US foreign policy. It was Reagan who insisted on 
prioritising Nicaragua and it was Reagan who overruled the moderates in order to continue 
US support for the Contras as the primary policy option. 
 
7.4 Temporary Presidential Success with Congress 
 
    It is ironic, therefore, that just as Reagan had authorised the search for alternate sources of 
funding, in the years 1985 and 1986 the president was actually successful in his attempts to 
win funding from Congress, first by securing limited “humanitarian” aid for the Contras in 
1985, followed by victory in a 1986 vote which resulted in $100 million dollars of military 
and humanitarian aid being sent to the Contras. The president was able to achieve this on the 
back of three events, his sweeping victory in the 1984 presidential election, the enunciation of 
the Reagan Doctrine, which switched the terms of debate from the external behaviour of the 
Sandinistas to the internal characteristics of the Nicaraguan state, and the aggressive 
legislative strategy which placed the president at the front of a very public battle with 
Congress over the direction of Nicaraguan policy. 
    Reagan’s position in relation to Congress was strengthened on the back of his electoral 
landslide, which saw him winning 49 states and over 58% of the popular vote. This made him 
the first second term president since Nixon and the most popular since Eisenhower. Not 
surprisingly, Reagan viewed this as an electoral mandate and was determined to use this to 
his advantage in pursuing his Nicaragua policy. According to Robert McFarlane, Reagan 
explained that he did not want to “break faith with the Contras” and ordered his National 
Security Adviser to “to do everything possible to reverse the course of the Congress and get 
the funding renewed.”104 McFarlane agreed with Reagan, up to a point. He believed that the 
Contras would be useful only if they were supported by Congress and funded accordingly as 
“without this support the contras were a hopelessly weak reed on which to rest American 
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policy.”105 The president was adamant, however, that the Contras would continue to be the 
focal point of his strategy, with or without the backing of Congress. 
    With the president making it clear that he wished to continue his struggle with Congress 
over Contra funding, the administration began trying to shift the terms of the Nicaraguan 
debate. Until this point the President had continually emphasised the security threat that the 
communist Sandinista regime posed to the United States due to what Reagan viewed as a 
concerted attempt to spread communist revolution throughout Central America, and the 
overriding fear that this would allow the Soviet Union a foothold on the continent of North 
America. As discussed previously, such an outcome was unacceptable for Reagan. However, 
it had proven almost impossible to win over a majority of Congress and the wider population 
to accept such an assessment. Reagan, therefore, decided that he would have to change tactics 
in order to win over the liberal members of Congress. Instead of focusing on the external 
behaviour of the Sandinistas, Reagan began to question the legitimacy of the Sandinista 
regime.  
    The most notable example of this shift came during Reagan’s State of the Union address 
on February 6, where he explained that US security depended on “the expansion of freedom 
and self-government.” In particular, Reagan called upon Congress to support the “democratic 
forces [in Nicaragua] whose struggle is tied to our own security.”106 This was a deliberate 
attempt by Reagan to tap into the legacy of democracy promotion in US foreign policy in the 
hope that aligning himself in this regard with liberal Presidents such as Wilson and Kennedy 
would encourage the support of contemporary liberals in Congress. However, what separated 
Reagan from Wilson was his belief that democracy in Nicaragua could be achieved through 
the use of the Contras as a military force, rather than Wilsonian diplomacy. A few weeks later 
at a press conference, Reagan was asked if the goal of US policy was to remove the 
Sandinistas from power. Reagan replied, “Well, remove in the sense of its present structure, 
in which it is a Communist totalitarian state, and it is not a government chosen by the people. 
So, you wonder sometimes about those who make such claims as to its legitimacy,” before 
adding “we have an obligation to be of help where we can to freedom fighters and lovers of 
freedom and democracy, from Afghanistan to Nicaragua and wherever there are people of 
that kind who are striving for that freedom.” Asked if this required the overthrow of the 
Sandinistas, Reagan responded “Not if the present government would turn around and say, all 
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right, if they'd say: ‘Uncle’.”107 The non-governmental organisation Human Rights Watch 
was quick to point out the hypocrisy of referring to the Contras as democratic freedom 
fighters when they were allegedly engaged in the “deliberate use of terror” 108 to achieve the 
overthrow of the Sandinistas. 
    With his post-election popularity and newly conceptualised Nicaraguan policy, Reagan 
began the arduous task of attempting to win over a majority in Congress to support him. His 
administration began by making Congress and the public targets of what has been described 
by the General Accounting Office as “prohibited, covert propaganda.”109 Between the end of 
February and the end of April the administration had produced over seventy publications and 
held conferences, briefings, and meetings with editorial boards in an attempt to shift attention 
away from the Contras democratic credentials by trying to paint Nicaragua, Cuba and the 
Soviet Union as the greatest threat to democracy in Central America.
110
 The president put 
himself at the forefront of this campaign and increased the level of anti-communist rhetoric 
directed at Congressmen who continued to oppose him on Nicaragua. Speaking to reporters 
on April 4, Reagan noted: 
 
“Democracy can succeed in Central America. But Congress must release the funds that 
can create incentives for dialogue and peace. If we provide too little help, our choice will 
be a Communist Central America with Communist subversion spreading southward and 
northward. We face the risk that a hundred million people, from Panama to our open 
southern border, could come under the control of pro-Soviet regimes and threaten the 
United States with violence, economic chaos, and a human tidal wave of refugees.”111     
     
Whilst attempting to scare the population, Reagan appeared to weaken his demands to the 
Congress. In the same speech, Reagan told Congress that if they released the $14 million 
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already appropriated then he would not use this money for military purposes but to provide 
humanitarian assistance to the Contras, who in return would call a cease-fire and enter 
negotiations with the Sandinistas. It is unlikely that this was a genuine attempt to limit the US 
to providing food and clothing to the Contras. Instead, safe in the knowledge that the Saudi 
Arabian government had been providing a million dollars a month for the past year, Reagan 
was probably attempting to move Congress in small steps towards greater support for the 
Contras. 
    The first round of Congressional votes on the issue ended in failure, with the House voting 
down the $14 million of humanitarian aid by 213-215. However, having moved from a 
complete funding cut off to only two votes away from $14 million in less than a year 
demonstrates the extent to which Reagan was beginning to win over more members of 
Congress with his red-baiting rhetoric and aggressive legislative strategy.  
    Reagan was given a helping hand by the actions of the Sandinistas. On April 23 they 
announced that their President, Daniel Ortega, had arranged to visit General Secretary 
Gorbachev in Moscow at the beginning of May. This announcement proved to be a disaster 
for both the Sandinistas and the liberal Democrats who had voted against Reagan’s 
humanitarian aid bill. Reagan was able to present this as clear evidence that the Sandinistas 
were intent on strengthening their ties with the Soviet Union. Senator Dodd claimed to be 
shocked “that some Democrats were surprised that Daniel Ortega went to Moscow. Where 
did my colleagues think he was going to go? Disney World?” 112  The actions of the 
Sandinistas allowed Reagan to impose a trade embargo on Nicaragua, allowing him to 
highlight the problems posed by communists in the region, and weakening the liberal 
Democrats still further. 
    As a result, the Democrats approached Reagan with a compromise. Representative 
McCurdy told the president that if he would commit to “political, not military solutions in 
Central America” and give his assurance that “we do not seek the military overthrow of the 
Sandinista government” then he would get the votes he needed.113 McCurdy put this in a 
letter to be sent to Congressmen and Reagan agreed to sign it. On June 12 the House 
approved $27 million humanitarian aid for the Contras by a vote of 248-184. As Kagan has 
argued, “Of the 73 Democrats who voted for the McCurdy amendment, no more than 25 were 
hardcore conservatives… they voted more out of anger and fear than out of conviction, anger 
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at Ortega and fear of the political consequences of voting against aid to the contras.”114 
Reagan had skilfully manipulated the political process and was finally beginning to push 
Congress closer to his desired goal of resuming the supply of US military aid to the Contras. 
 
7.4.1 1986 Military Aid 
 
    By early 1986 Reagan was once again prepared to approach Congress and request military 
aid. The decision was finalised at a January 10 meeting of the NSC.
115
 Several events had 
happened since the passing of the humanitarian bill in June that helped firm up Reagan’s 
position, including the discovery of Cuban soldiers in Nicaragua and the interception of 
Nicaraguan arms bound for Honduras.  On February 26 he requested $100 million dollars 
from Congress, 70% in the form of military aid.
116
 The president also requested the end of 
restrictions against the CIA and Department of Defence to allow them to operate the supply 
chain. Reagan made it clear to Congress that he fully intended to support the Contras in their 
armed struggle to overthrow the Sandinistas by stating, “you can’t fight attack helicopters 
piloted by Cubans with band-aids and mosquito nets.”117  
    However, it would be impossible for Reagan to get the bill passed without the support of 
moderate and conservative Democrats. In order to win these votes, the Reagan administration 
launched what Carothers has described as “the single largest congressional lobbying effort of 
the entire Reagan presidency.”118 The initial results were not promising, with Reagan losing a 
first vote on March 20 by 222 to 210. Reagan promised to “come back, again and again, until 
this battle is won.”119 
    The propaganda campaign continued unabated in the mass media. Full-page 
advertisements and open letters were taken out in newspapers claiming that if the Contras 
were defeated then the US would be swamped with “refugees, spies, criminals and 
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terrorists.”120 Such unsubstantiated vitriol drew criticism even from Republican supporters of 
Reagan’s Nicaragua policy. Senator David Durenberger stated that portraying “every senator 
and congressman who votes against lethal aid as a stooge of communism” was 
“outrageous.”121 However, this was a deliberate ploy by Reagan.  Raising the spectre of 
increased immigration from Central America would lead to increased fear among residents of 
southern states which in turn would lead to political difficulties for Democrats in these 
regions if they were accused of being soft on immigration. With the Congress so evenly split, 
Reagan was hoping this tactic would change the vote of enough southern moderate 
Democrats, and reinforce his traditional conservative base. 
    As with the humanitarian aid bill a year earlier, the Sandinistas contributed inadvertently to 
the Reagan legislative campaign. Only two days after Reagan’s defeat in the House, the 
Nicaraguans launched an attack on Contra camps in Honduras. Having just voted against 
sending military aid to the Contras, many Democrats were left publicly embarrassed by the 
Sandinistas’ incursion into a neighbouring country and were once again left with the 
awkward choice of having either to defend their position to conservatives in their districts or 
acknowledging that Reagan had been correct and they would now support him. 
    The combination of aggressive rhetoric, intense media campaigning and external events set 
the scene for a tense June vote on military aid. With only a twelve-vote deficit Reagan 
personally intervened in the process. Reagan asked his staff to identify potential swing voters 
and invite them for a meeting with the president in the Oval Office. Combining his own 
personal charm, his popularity with the electorate and the prestige of the office of the 
presidency, Reagan was able to convince several Congressmen to change their votes. Carroll 
Hubbard, one of two Kentucky Democrats who Reagan talked into voting in favour, has said: 
 
“It was a real thrill to meet with him… I was leaning toward changing my position prior 
to meeting with the President, but I must admit his taking about 15 minutes of his time… 
was persuasive upon me to help him out, to go along with him and trust his judgement… 
I’ve always liked and admired him. I’m a Democrat, he’s a Republican, but he’s also my 
president.”122 
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On June 25 the House voted 221-209 in favour of sending $100 million to the Contras, 75% 
military aid, whilst the CIA and Department of Defense were authorised to train and provide 
intelligence to the guerrillas. Reagan finally achieved the result he had wanted. The task had 
not been easy and had required over two years of intense legislative effort and public 
relations endeavours. Reagan had initiated the campaign and had refused to back down in the 
face of Congressional opposition. Representative Michael Barnes explains how influential 
Reagan was in the process: “The guys in the middle just got tired of being beaten up on both 
sides… they knew Reagan was going to come back and back and back on this. He was 
obsessed by it… He just wore everybody out.”123 The victory also stands as testament to the 
ability of a president, especially a popular president, to shape the direction of US foreign 
policy and influence Congress. As Cynthia Arnson has argued, “when a president as popular 
as Ronald Reagan made an issue his primary foreign policy goal, it was just a matter of time 
until he got what he wanted.”124 This demonstrates how important presidential perseverance 
can be in determining bureaucratic and legislative success. From the beginning Reagan had 
made the Contras the focal point of his Nicaragua policy. Congressional funding would be 
key to this policy’s success. Over the course of five years Reagan had been able to adapt his 
official public strategy towards Congress. He knew when to downplay military funding and 
emphasise humanitarian aid, or when to appeal directly to voters to increase their fears over 
the spread of communism in Central America. Even after setbacks when Congress voted 
against him he began again, asking for small amounts. The final goal was always military 
funding for the Contras, and in June 1986 Reagan achieved this. He was successful because, 
as stated above, he ‘wore everybody out.’ Moderate Republicans and liberal Democrats 
decided the time and effort it would take to fight Reagan would be better spent on other 
policies. They did not rank Nicaragua as high as Reagan and were not prepared to put the 
effort in to oppose his funding policy. This provides evidence to support the argument 
presented by this thesis that presidential agency is crucial to US foreign policy making. 
Unfortunately for Reagan, the consequences of his decision to search for alternative sources 
of funding meant this success would be short lived.   
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7.5 Reagan’s Management System: Collapse 
 
    If Reagan is to be credited with a central role in successfully acquiring military aid from 
Congress, he must also be credited for his part played in the nadir of his presidency and the 
events that eventually put an end to any future attempts to fund the Contras. The Iran-Contra 
scandal was a hugely complex affair which involved both US policy in the Middle East and 
Central America. As a result, it would go far beyond the scope of this chapter to attempt to 
recount it in any great detail. Instead, several examples will be drawn from this incident to 
highlight the extent to which Reagan was responsible for the overall framing of the policy, if 
not the final and illegal decision that brought an end to his Nicaragua policy. 
 
7.5.1 Iran-Contra and the end of Nicaraguan policy 
 
    In brief, the Iran-Contra scandal developed from Reagan’s desire to secure alternate 
sources of funding for the Contras. As discussed previously, in 1984 he authorised his 
National Security Adviser, Robert McFarlane, to begin looking for possible donor countries, 
which eventually led to the involvement of the Saudi Arabian government. The operation was 
carried out by a restricted number of NSC officials, including McFarlane, Oliver North and 
Constantine Menges, who extended their role from merely sourcing funds to becoming 
actively engaged in running the supply operation in Nicaragua.
125
 North and Menges were the 
point men for the operation on the ground, regularly meeting with Contra leaders.
126
 At the 
same time, Reagan and his administration were involved with ongoing negotiations to 
attempt to free American hostages who had been captured in Lebanon. A complex plan was 
devised amongst a restricted number of NSC staff and Reagan to sell weapons to Iran, who in 
return, it was hoped, would use their political leverage with the hostage takers in Lebanon to 
gain the release of the American hostages.
127
 Finally, and most controversially of all, 
McFarlane’s successor as National Security Adviser, John Poindexter, authorised Oliver 
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North’s plan to transfer excess funds from the sale of missiles to Iran to the Contras in 
Nicaragua. The operation was exposed in November 1986 when a plane carrying CIA 
operatives crashed in Nicaragua and the Lebanese magazine Ash-Shiraa reported the sale of 
missiles to Iran. The scandal resulted in a Congressional investigation, an independent 
counsel report, and criminal proceedings against several members of the NSC staff. 
    What is important for this analysis, however, is to locate the role of President Reagan. It 
was clear to his staff, the Congress and the public that he deemed the situation in Nicaragua 
to be of utmost importance to US national security. He had also explicitly stated time and 
again that any US policy in this region must be centred on supporting the Contras militarily in 
order for them to put pressure on the Sandinistas, either to force them to the negotiating table 
or to overthrow them. Once the Boland amendment was passed he had given clear 
instructions to his NSC staff to keep the Contras supplied. This set in motion the chain of 
events detailed in the previous paragraph. Therefore it is clear to see that Reagan was very 
much the chief instigator of the policy to search for outside funds. What is more, it was 
Reagan who decided to give this task to the NSC staff and restrict access to information 
relating to the project even from some of his closest advisers, including the Secretaries of 
Defence and State. Thus his administration was divided and he was happy to delegate control 
of the policy to the selected members of his NSC staff. In this instance, delegation proved to 
be his Achilles heel. As Draper has argued, “The president’s notorious lack of interest in 
details gave them [the NSC staff] something in the nature of a blank cheque, once they had 
obtained his general agreement to a course of action.”128 To make matters worse, there is 
general agreement amongst Reagan’s staff that once he authorised the Contra funding 
operation, he stepped back and rarely followed up the progress of his staff. North and Menges 
were operating safe in the knowledge that they had presidential authority to carry out their 
tasks. Poindexter took the decision to transfer the funds to the Contras, and deliberately did 
not tell the president in order to provide him with plausible deniability should the operation 
be uncovered.  
    By delegating this authority to Poindexter, Reagan seriously undermined the foreign policy 
making process of his administration. He had been elected on the promise to implement a 
cabinet form of government and to put an end to the bureaucratic conflicts between the NSA 
and the Secretary of State. By 1986 Reagan had cut Shultz out of important elements of both 
his Central American and Middle Eastern policies, centralised foreign policy making in the 
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White House, and pushed his NSAs into operational roles. However, in doing so, Reagan 
placed Poindexter in a position that he was not qualified for. Instead of helping coordinate 
presidential foreign policy by presenting Reagan with unbiased policy options from the 
relevant Departments and agencies, Poindexter decided on his own not to tell the president 
about the possibility of transferring arms from Iran to the Contras, and instead authorised the 
transfer, believing that this was what the president would have wanted. One cannot blame 
Reagan for Poindexter taking this decision, but as president and fully aware that both the Iran 
missiles sale and Contra funding hunt were under way he should have been asking Poindexter 
for regular and detailed updates, especially as he was unable to discuss the matter with 
Shultz. Therefore, the decision to transfer the funds was an indirect consequence of the policy 
and the process Reagan had initiated. 
    The decision to conduct the operation through the NSC staff was not just about restricting 
access within the administration, it was a deliberate strategy by Reagan to bypass the 
Congressional oversight committees. As discussed earlier, during his first term Reagan had 
been scrutinised by the congressional oversight committees after he authorised the original 
covert interventions in late 1981. However, by giving the operation to the NSC staff, this cut 
out Congress as only the CIA were required to brief the intelligence committees once a covert 
finding had been signed by the President. As Judge Walsh noted in his report following the 
completion of his independent counsel investigation, Reagan and his selected members of the 
NSC staff “came to accept… the mistaken view that Congress couldn’t be trusted 
and…[policy] was better left to a small inside group not elected by the people… a scheme 
that reflected a total distrust in some constitutional values.” 129 Draper is even more scathing 
in his analysis: 
 
“The combination of compartmentation, deniability, and secrecy made it possible for a 
few of the self-elect to become, as Secretary Weinberger put it, ‘people with their own 
agenda.’ This phrase starkly expresses what was most significant about the Iran-contra 
affairs – the takeover of governmental policies by a few strategically placed insiders 
infatuated with their own sense of superiority and incorruptibility.”130 
     
Reagan had not only allowed this to happen, but had played a central role. He wanted to fund 
the Contras and he was prepared to do this with or without the authorisation of Congress. In 
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his diary he had written “I was tired of foreign policy by a committee of 535”,131 a clear 
reference to his desire to pursue foreign policy without the continued interference of 
Congress. Poindexter even went so far to testify before the congressional committee 
investigating the Iran-Contra affair that Reagan was “ready to confront the Congress on the 
constitutional question of who controls foreign policy.” 132  However, the committee 
concluded that the Iran-Contra affair was characterised by “secrecy, deception, and disdain 
for the law.”133 
    Reagan’s defence was that he “was not fully informed.”134 However, this is a rather weak 
defence as it is clear that the only aspect of the policy he had not been informed about was 
the diversion of funds. He had ordered the search for external funds, he knew about the Saudi 
money, he knew about the sale of weapons to Iran and he knew about North and Menges 
running the supply operations with the Contras. He had also involved himself directly at 
crucial junctions, for example when he telephoned the president of Honduras and asked him 
not to shut down the Contra bases in his country.
135
 Whether Reagan broke the law is not 
important for the current analysis, what has been demonstrated is that Reagan was very much 
a central force in the making of the Iran-Contra policy. Reagan was not a puppet at the hands 
of competing groups of advisers. He knew what his goals were and he acted accordingly to 
achieve them. Unfortunately, his weaknesses were an over reliance on the delegation of 
authority to the wrong people and a complete inability to follow up on their endeavours. It 
was this combination of involvement at the planning stage and absence at the implementation 
that eventually brought an end to any hope Reagan had of engineering a Contra victory in 
Nicaragua. For his remaining two years in office he was unable to convince Congress to 
release any more funds to the Contras and he left office in 1989 with the Sandinistas still in 
power.  
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7.6 Conclusion 
 
    In the previous chapter it was argued that Reagan’s worldview contributed to the 
formulation of the policy of rollback. This is the goal that motivated Reagan and provides us 
with the overriding framework that has allowed us to analyse and explain his role in the 
formulation of policy in Nicaragua. When the Sandinistas came to power and began initiating 
their left wing reforms, forging ties with Cuba and the Soviet Union, and exporting arms to 
help support other rebel movements in Central America, it would have been difficult for an 
ideologue like Reagan to view this as anything other than a direct security threat and 
ideological challenge to the United States. The fact this was happening in Central America, 
so close to the United States and in the middle of what Reagan viewed as the US’s traditional 
sphere of influence only helped intensify the feeling of threat felt by Reagan. It was almost 
inevitable therefore that the US under Reagan would rank Nicaragua as one of the highest 
foreign policy issues requiring attention.  The evidence presented in this chapter supports the 
argument that Reagan’s worldview was crucial to the decision to rank Nicaragua as a major 
security threat and played a key role in the framing of Nicaragua as a Soviet controlled proxy. 
    The shape the US response eventually took was obviously a combination of several factors, 
both domestic and international. First of all there were important systemic restrictions facing 
Reagan. He viewed Nicaragua as a proxy of Cuba and the Soviet Union. Any hostile action 
taken by the US against Nicaragua could quickly escalate if the Soviet Union decided to 
respond. Thus Reagan was limited by his desire not to provoke a wider war with the Soviet 
Union. Second, there were domestic restrictions placed on Reagan by the American public. 
The legacy of Vietnam was still felt strongly and it would be impossible for Reagan to 
involve the US in any military conflict that did not have clear national security implications. 
Although Reagan felt that Nicaragua posed a serious threat to US security, for the duration of 
his presidency a majority of the US public disagreed with him. This was reflected in 
continued opposition to his Nicaragua policies from a significant proportion of Congress. 
    However, even with these restrictions, it is necessary to acknowledge the role played by 
Reagan in determining the direction of US policy in Nicaragua. He could not engage the US 
military in an overt intervention, but as president he could authorise the CIA, along with 
traditional military support, to engage in covert operations to help support the Contra rebel 
groups who were engaged in an armed rebellion against the Sandinista government. It is also 
clear that Reagan was the driving force behind the policy of refusing to negotiate with the 
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Sandinistas without the support of the Contras. With Reagan as president it was clear to all 
observers that supporting the Contras remained the focal point of his Nicaragua policy. 
Reagan believed that it would be impossible to achieve reform in Nicaragua without the 
threat posed by the Contras. Without the Contras, Reagan argued that the Sandinistas would 
only engage in diplomacy to buy time to strengthen their hold over Nicaragua. It is clear to 
see, therefore, that Reagan set the agenda of foreign policy during his administration. He 
chose the outcome he desired and set in motion the policy that he believed would help him 
achieve this goal. 
    The impact Reagan had on US foreign policy can also be seen from his relationship with 
his foreign policy executive. Reagan tried to surround himself with ideological cohorts, but 
on an issue as controversial as Nicaragua it was not surprising that divisions would open up 
between those who agreed with Reagan’s hardline approach and those who favoured more 
moderate tactics. Complicating this division was the fact that most of the hardliners were to 
be found in the White House and NSC, whereas the moderates were mostly drawn from the 
State Department.  To smooth over these differences and bring focus to US foreign policy 
would require extensive presidential involvement to help iron out these bureaucratic conflicts. 
Unfortunately this did not happen under Reagan. Time and again throughout this chapter it 
was demonstrated that Reagan not only failed to resolve these structural issues, he also 
contributed to them by cutting out various members of his staff from policy discussions. 
Shultz was absent from the decision to launch Big Pine and most of his foreign policy team 
was not told of Reagan’s decision to search for alternate sources of funding for the Contras. 
The Iran-Contra scandal demonstrates the complexity of US foreign policy making and the 
myriad of actors and forces at play, but it also allows us to draw conclusions about the impact 
the president has. Time and again those involved in the scandal explained they acted in 
accordance with what they thought Reagan wanted. His desire to support the Contras was so 
clear that Poindexter, North, Menges et al did not think they had to run every detail past 
Reagan because it was obvious he wanted the Contras to remain the focal point of Nicaragua 
policy. The fact that Reagan was happy to delegate such authority, and did not intervene to 
review the policy or demand regular updates only demonstrates the extent to which a 
president, by his absence, leaves a power vacuum in the foreign policy bureaucracy. In the 
case of Nicaragua this vacuum was quickly filled by the NSC staff. Therefore, we can draw 
the conclusion that Iran-Contra was a direct, though unintended, consequence of Reagan’s 
policy choice and hands off management style. 
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    The case study of Reagan and Nicaragua also sheds light on the relationship between the 
president and Congress. As discussed in chapter three, the Founding Fathers designed the 
constitution to force the branches of government to share power so that each branch would 
act as a check on the other. In some respects, Reagan’s Nicaragua policy demonstrates the 
extent to which this is true. Reagan was never able to convince a majority in Congress to 
consistently support him on the issue of aid to the Contras. There was a constant seesaw back 
and forth between votes in favour of Reagan’s policy and votes against. At one point 
Congress was able to place restrictions on Reagan, even going so far as to cut off all aid to 
the Contras as a result of the second Boland Amendment. However, in spite of this 
opposition, Reagan was still able to conduct foreign policy in Nicaragua, was able to send US 
forces to intervene covertly, was able to secure outside funding for the Contras in direct 
opposition to the Congressional ban, and was finally able to secure a vote in favour of 
military aid to the Contras after a monumental legislative effort that Reagan was at the 
forefront of. It is interesting to think how successful Reagan might have eventually been in 
the last two years of his presidency if Iran-Contra had not happened, or had at least not broke 
in the media.  
    Reagan’s Nicaragua policy directly challenges the post-Vietnam and Watergate era 
argument that the “imperial” presidency had been replaced by a resurgent Congress, let alone 
an “imperilled” presidency.136 It suggests that Congress struggles to be anything more than a 
reactive branch in foreign policy. In the time it takes for the Congress to secure a majority in 
opposition to a president’s policy, the executive may have already set in motion a policy that 
will be impossible to retract at short notice. When faced with a president as popular as 
Reagan, Congress finds itself in an even weaker position, with members of Congress 
reluctant to challenge the president less they face accusations of being weak on national 
security. That is not to say that Congress has no power at all. A significant congressional 
majority opposed to the president’s policy can make life very difficult for the Chief 
Executive. However, Congress lacks the unity and decisiveness of the presidency, so it is 
often slow to react. This is precisely the advantage that Reagan used to assert presidential 
dominance in foreign affairs. However, with Iran-Contra he went too far, and suffered the 
consequences. 
    In conclusion, Reagan offers a valuable insight into presidential agency in US foreign 
policy making. Individual presidents may be restricted by international and domestic 
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constraints, but within these boundaries it is clearly possible for a president to place a 
significant personal stamp on the conduct of US foreign policy. In the case of Nicaragua, the 
most important decisions: to intervene or not, to intervene covertly or overtly, to fund the 
Contras, to pursue alternate sources of funding, all of these decisions were made by Reagan 
and it is possible to imagine how a different policy would have emerged if another president 
had been elected. 
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Chapter Eight: Comparison of Truman and Reagan 
  
8.1 Introduction  
 
    This chapter will conduct a comparison of the foreign policies of presidents Truman and 
Reagan in order to establish the impact the president has on the formulation of US foreign 
policy. The chapter will proceed in three sections looking at the sources and constraints of 
presidential autonomy. The first section begins with the external environment each president 
confronts in the shape of the international system. This section will argue that the president’s 
worldview is crucial in determining the general orientation of US foreign policy during each 
administration.  The second section focuses on the internal sources and constraints of the 
executive bureaucracy. Unsurprisingly, as Chief Executive, the president has greater control 
over events within this environment. However, more room for presidential manoeuvre results 
in opportunities for both success and failure. This section will argue that the management 
style adopted by the president becomes an important factor in all aspects of foreign policy, 
including decision-making and implementation. The third and final section places the 
president within the context of the US system of separated powers. It will look at how the 
constitutional settlement, which forces the president and Congress to share foreign policy 
power, creates a system of formal constraints that each president must contend with. The 
argument presented here is that how the president works with Congress is central to the 
success of their foreign policy. Throughout the chapter it will be noted that each of these 
sources and constraints do not exist in isolation. It will be shown how the relationship 
between all three, and the president’s awareness of and ability to work within this context, 
determines the extent to which a president is able to maintain presidential autonomy and 
control over the direction of US foreign policy. The chapter will argue that the constraints 
facing the president are not fixed. They change as a result of both exogenous factors beyond 
the president’s control (the foreign policies of foreign states and elections to congress, for 
example) and directly as a result of presidential actions, such as choice of management style 
and decision-making. This three stage comparative analysis will demonstrate the importance 
of developing a multilevel framework in order to locate the role of presidential agency in US 
foreign policy and explain US Cold War policy during the Truman and Reagan 
administrations. 
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8.2 External Sources and Constraints: the International System  
 
    The international system provides the external constraints each president must face in the 
formulation of foreign policy. These constraints, for the most part, take the shape of other 
states and their foreign policies. The nature of the system forms the heart of most structural 
IR theoretical explanations of foreign policy choices and outcomes.  The key terms of the 
discipline are familiar: great powers, balance of power, security, national interests, intentions 
and uncertainty.
1
 Each president must contend with an international system that is beyond 
their direct control. When trying to make foreign policy a president must ask how their 
actions will be interpreted in the governments of foreign states, how are these states likely to 
respond and what form will their foreign policy take? Just as US foreign policy is the result 
of a multitude of complex inputs, so too are the foreign policies of other states.  The 
uncertainty and potential reprisals from powerful states present serious constraints for the US 
president. 
 
8.2.1 Truman Example 
 
    The international system confronting Truman was new, bringing forth greater uncertainty 
and increased tension. At the end of the Second World War the US found itself standing on 
the world stage as a true great power for the first time in its history. Their war time ally, the 
Soviet Union, was victorious on the Eastern Front, although suffering massive casualties and 
structural damage in the process.  The traditional great powers of Western Europe had been 
ravaged by war and would not retain their status as great powers. The international system 
was now bipolar, dominated by the US and Soviet Union. 
    Although initially hopeful that the war time alliance would continue, over the course of the 
first few years in office Truman bore witness to the breakdown of this relationship and the 
development of the geopolitical rivalry that became known as the Cold War.
2
 The main 
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external constraint facing     Truman, therefore, was the existence of the Soviet Union.  It 
stood as the US’s main geopolitical rival militarily, economically, politically and 
ideologically.  US foreign policy would have little direct influence in Eastern Europe where 
the Red Army had thousands of troops stationed and Truman had little desire to engage 
militarily with the Soviet Union. The Truman administration was also fearful of the spread of 
communism into other countries, either by direct Soviet intervention, domestic communist 
uprisings, or, worst of all, winning elections.
3
 
    In this context the Soviet Union was a constraint that could not be overcome in any literal 
sense, certainly not in the foreseeable future for Truman and his advisers. The USSR was not 
going anywhere. Early Cold War US foreign policy would have to be formulated within these 
constraints, with Truman and his staff engaged in constant appraisal of what could and could 
not be done. This was demonstrated in chapters four and five where document after document 
highlighted the extent to which policymakers were trying to evaluate  how the Soviet Union 
would react, not just in Korea but fearful of reprisals in Berlin and throughout Europe.  The 
minutes of these meetings present the image of a president dealing with a constant sense of 
uncertainty and fear in trying to formulate foreign policy in the shadow of the Soviet Union.
4
 
    However, Truman was not paralysed by this fear and uncertainly. Instead, Truman decided 
to get the United States into the Cold War. Having weighed up the strategic and ideological 
concerns of what he viewed as attempted Soviet incursion into to the Mediterranean, Western 
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Europe and Asia, Truman gave aid to Greece and Turkey, enunciated the Truman Doctrine, 
supported the Marshall Plan, oversaw the development of collective security arrangements, 
went to war in Korea to defend these, and overhauled the internal policymaking apparatus 
with the National Security Act of 1947. This was the birth of containment. The very name 
demonstrates the extent to which Truman viewed his policies as purely reactive in the face of 
Soviet hostility. 
 
8.2.2 Reagan Example 
 
    President Reagan faced a similar international system. The Cold War continued, with few 
expecting it to end soon. The Soviet Union remained the other great power in the bipolar 
system of the 1980s and thus exerted the largest external constraint on the foreign policy 
options of Reagan. In the two decades since Truman had left office the Cold War had cooled 
down in some respects whilst heating up in others. After twenty five years the fear and 
uncertainty of the early post war years had subsided. There was little chance of the Soviet 
Union taking over the world, if they even ever had the desire to, and the Cold War had 
become a routine. However, due to developments in nuclear weapons and their delivery 
systems, both the USA and the Soviet Union now had the capability to destroy each other and 
the rest of the world.  Mutually assured destruction placed an additional constraint on US 
foreign policy.  
    Reagan’s view of the Soviet Union was underpinned by strong ideological convictions. 
The Soviet Union was a communist state and communists could not be trusted.
5
 For Reagan, 
the US was a shining beacon of freedom and democracy. As the leader of the free world he 
rejected the idea of containment. Such a policy granted legitimacy to the Soviet Union when 
it was Reagan’s goal to leave communism, and by default the Soviet Union, on the ‘ash heap 
of history.’6 Reagan required a reorientation of US foreign policy. He wanted to banish what 
he believed was the defeatist legacy of the Carter administration. If America was in decline 
then it was not terminal. To restore the US to her former glory Reagan ordered a defence 
build-up, adopted a more overly aggressive rhetorical tone and diplomatic approach to the 
Soviet Union, and developed a policy of rollback which he hoped would chip away at the 
outer limits of the ‘evil empire.’ This deliberate strategy of Reagan pushed the constraints of 
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the international system to the very limit and increased tensions between the two states to 
their highest since the Cuban Missile Crisis.
7
 
 
8.2.3 Comparison 
 
    In terms of a direct comparison of the external constraints Truman and Reagan faced there 
are important differences and similarities. Both presidents were confronted with a bipolar 
international system.  Whereas Truman faced a new and developing system with all the 
uncertainties this brought, Reagan operated within a more stable environment which in theory 
could have reduced tensions.  However, although Truman confronted the new realities of 
nuclear warfare, and remains the only US president to have used atomic bombs, Reagan had 
to contend with the Soviet Union’s second strike capability and the reality of mutually 
assured destruction. Although there were differences in the severity of potential retaliation, 
for both Truman and Reagan the Soviet Union served as the largest external constraint on 
their foreign policy choices. This is interesting in terms of IR theory because in purely 
structural terms, each president faced the same system. The US made up one half of the 
bipolar system, with the Soviet Union taking its place as the opposing pole. Adopting a 
purely structural approach would therefore explain very little in terms of developments 
between the two states. Neorealists would be restricted to focusing on changes in the balance 
of power and identifying examples of buck passing or bandwagoning. These approaches 
would be unable to explain the development of containment or rollback, let alone their 
application in Korea and Nicaragua, two developing countries which should have been of 
little interest to the great powers of the US and Soviet Union. Therefore, only by developing a 
multi-level framework which incorporates the role of agency can we explain these events.   
    Truman initially believed he could maintain good relations with the Soviet Union. He 
wanted to avoid further conflict after the devastation wrought by the Second World War. He 
had no love for dictatorships but he thought it would be possible for the US and Soviet Union 
to reach a diplomatic compromise which would satisfy both their interests. Truman’s main 
concern was to maintain peace and, based on the lessons he had drawn from his study of 
history and the origins of war, he was prepared to work with the Soviet Union to achieve this. 
However, over time, Truman interpreted Soviet actions in Europe and Asia as hostile to the 
United States and began to perceive them as a threat. By 1950 Truman had not only 
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developed the policy of containment but was prepared to militarise it by entering the Korean 
War. In this sense Truman was a reactive president. He changed his view of the Soviet Union 
as a result of his interpretation of their actions and this proved crucial for the development of 
containment. 
    Reagan was not so open minded upon entering office. He held strong negative views not 
only of dictatorships, but specifically communism and the state structure which had 
developed in the Soviet Union. Reagan was an ideologue in the sense he believed in the 
superiority of liberal democracy, capitalism and the United States. The foreign policy of the 
Soviet Union posed the greatest risk to these and so it was his duty as president to stop them. 
This is not to say Reagan was a warmonger. He held a genuine desire to abolish nuclear 
weapons. But if he was to negotiate with the Soviet Union at any point then this could only 
be done from a position of strength.
8
 Reagan was therefore more purposeful than Truman in 
initially shaping his foreign policy towards the Soviet Union. Reagan believed he had the 
solution: increased military strength, diplomatic confrontation and challenging the premises 
of containment with the development of rollback. The defence build up, hostile rhetoric of his 
first term and the development of policy in Nicaragua highlight the importance of Reagan’s 
worldview. 
 
8.2.4 What this Tells us about Presidential Autonomy 
 
    The above analysis demonstrates there is a complex relationship at work between the 
external sources and constraints of US foreign policy, and the extent to which the president of 
the United States is able to operate as an autonomous actor within these constraints. In the 
cases of Truman and Reagan the existence of the Soviet Union posed the greatest constraint 
on their foreign policy choices. Neither president was able to ‘overcome’ this constraint in 
the sense of ‘defeating’ the Soviet Union, or looking beyond it.  However, what can be shown 
is the important role of the president’s worldview in orienting the general foreign policy 
strategy of the United States. Truman’s reactive worldview contributed to the development of 
containment whereas Reagan’s purposeful worldview was the basis for reheating the Cold 
War and initiating the rollback policy. From within these broad parameters specific policies 
can be developed, as demonstrated by Truman sending aid to Greece and Turkey, and Reagan 
sending aid to the Contras. Thus, although the president is not ‘overcoming’ the constraints of 
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the international system, he can orientate US foreign policy in the direction behind which he 
will try to build domestic  political support. This is important for IR theory because it shows 
that structure and agency are not separate and both are required to fully explain international 
relations. Events at the system level are perceived by individual decision-makers and it is 
through their worldview that these events are given meaning. Is the event important? Does it 
pose a threat? Does it require a response? What form will the response take? The answers to 
these questions will depend on how the individual processes the information they receive. 
Reagan interpreted the actions of the Sandinistas as a threat to US national security. Liberal 
Democrats in Congress did not. Differences in worldview, and how this influences 
perceptions of the system, matter. 
    The challenge each president faces is to try and line up enough of the pieces within the 
fragmented system of US politics, specifically the executive bureaucracies responsible for 
designing and implementing these foreign policies, and the Congress who are responsible for 
funding, legislation and representing the views of US society. It is these challenges this 
chapter must now address. 
 
8.3 Internal Sources and Constraints: the Executive Bureaucracy  
 
    The constitution designates the president as chief executive of the US government and 
grants him formal power over the bureaucracy. In theory, each member of the executive 
bureaucracy is under the command of the president. He is their senior manager. In an ideal 
world, the president would issue orders and the bureaucracy would obey. However, as the 
previous chapters have demonstrated, this is not the case. The bureaucracy is a complex web 
of powerful individuals and institutions, each with their own interests, who often compete 
with each other and the president for influence. This poses problems for the president as the 
bureaucrats may see him as a rival, disagree with his polices, or even try to work against him. 
This produces another potential constraint for presidential action. How the president works 
with the executive bureaucracy is crucial in determining the degree of presidential autonomy 
he is able to maintain and determines how successful he will be in formulating foreign policy. 
    This section will focus on the management systems deployed by both presidents in their 
attempt to bring order to the bureaucracy. It focuses on the role of the president in bringing 
bureaucratic consensus to the executive and the extent to which this acts as a constraint on the 
president. How a president deals with divisions within his administration, both institutional 
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and ideological is crucial. The key argument presented in this section is the degree to which 
the decisions made by the president influence the level of bureaucratic constraint he faces.  
 
8.3.1 Truman Example 
 
    Management style is an attempt by the president to bring order to the chaos of the 
bureaucracy, to try and impose his will, and achieve the policy outcomes he desires.  For 
Truman, this meant overhauling the competitive system of management employed by his 
predecessor, Franklin Roosevelt. The style of management developed by Roosevelt was 
freewheeling and ad-hoc.  Tasks were given to different advisors at different times. These 
tasks were often split between advisors with the president neglecting to tell his staff that other 
members of the team were performing the same duty. This was a deliberate ploy by 
Roosevelt. Once each advisor became aware they were competing with each other, they 
would have to bring their disputes to the president for resolution. In the process of doing so, 
Roosevelt believed he would have access to more information, would be able to keep tighter 
control of his bureaucrats and thus increase his presidential autonomy.
9
  
    Truman disagreed with Roosevelt, viewing the competitive system as an unnecessary 
constraint on the flow of information and impeding effective decision-making.  Drawing on 
his experience from the army and Senate he instituted a formal management system. Truman 
established clear lines of authority and jurisdiction, granting cabinet heads responsibility for 
specific policy areas and worked to build close relationships with these top level advisors. In 
the area of foreign policy this was supplemented with institutional reorganisation brought 
about by the National Security Act of 1947 and the creation of the National Security Council. 
Regularity was enforced with weekly meetings between the president and his Secretaries of 
State and Defence, weekly meetings of the cabinet and, from 1950, weekly meetings of the 
NSC. Truman placed his faith in the formalist system, the loyalty of his advisors, and stuck 
rigidly to this.
 10
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    In the early years of the Truman Administration there was tension between two groups in 
the foreign policy bureaucracy: those who viewed the Soviet Union in realist terms as a 
traditional great power who could be treated like any other, and those who believed the 
Soviet Union was a revolutionary state who wanted to overthrow the capitalist world order 
and replace it with worldwide communism. Initially, President Truman found it difficult to 
subscribe wholly to either camp and tried to find the middle ground between the two. The 
combination of bureaucratic incoherence, magnified by the president’s own indecision, 
placed restrictions on Truman’s ability to produce a coherent strategy for dealing with the 
Soviet Union during the first two years of his administration. He despised authoritarianism, 
but he hoped the US could work with the Soviet Union to avoid another war. However, 
Truman began to read Soviet actions in Iran, Berlin and Eastern Europe as hostile and over 
the course of his first term developed the Cold War mindset. With Truman subscribing to the 
view of the Soviet Union as a revolutionary state the influence of the realists was diminished. 
There did not seem to be a deliberate attempt by Truman to limit the influence of the realists, 
for example, he was not actively removing them from office. However, he did not actively 
seek their input. The victory of the Cold Warriors allowed Truman to not only develop the 
policy of containment, but to militarise it in the second term.  This demonstrates the impact 
presidential worldview can have on brining coherence to the foreign policy bureaucracy. It 
does not guarantee good decision-making, as shall be discussed below, but it does help 
remove bureaucratic restraints and increase a president’s scope for action. 
    The effect of the one group beginning to dominate as the president’s worldview solidified 
towards the Cold War mindset helped overcome bureaucratic constraints as it brought a level 
of agreement amongst his top level advisers, which was strengthened by Truman’s formal 
system. Thus it was easier for Truman to achieve bureaucratic consensus within his foreign 
policy team, allowing him increased influence in the policy making process. This can be seen 
in the decision to send aid to Greece and the development of the Truman Doctrine. When 
news of British withdrawal from Greece was received by the US, Truman was able to mould 
bureaucratic consent behind the assessment that the Soviet Union would try and dominate the 
Mediterranean unless the US intervened to stop them.
11
 Truman was then able to present a 
united front to Congress in support of his plan for foreign aid. This is most notable in the 
presentations made by Truman, Marshall and Acheson during their meeting with 
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Congressional leaders in the run up to the Truman Doctrine speech and the congressional 
vote on aid to Greece.
12
 By presenting a united front Truman was able to convince Senator 
Vandenberg of the seriousness of the Soviet threat and enlist his support in securing the 
necessary votes for the aid bill to pass in Congress. 
    However, bureaucratic consensus does not always help a president. Indeed, as chapter five 
demonstrates, excessive bureaucratic consensus can produce negative results. In the case of 
Korea, the ideological conformity which had developed during the first five years of the 
Truman administration proved a limitation on the president’s decision-making. The 
combination of an external crisis and intra-group solidarity, the result of ideological 
conformity and intra-group loyalty, placed unintended restrictions on Truman’s management 
system in the shape of groupthink. The major weakness which developed was a reliance on 
too few advisors, all of whom shared similar Cold War mindsets, which resulted in the 
suppression of dissenting views and intelligence warnings of Chinese intervention. As a 
result, President Truman made the decision not only to authorise US troops to cross the 38
th
 
parallel, but to allow them to push ever closer to the Chinese border, leading to the Chinese 
intervention of November 1950 and the years of stalemate which followed. In this example, 
Truman’s management style and the ideological conformity within his administration created 
the necessary conditions for groupthink which placed unnoticed and unintentional constraints 
on his decision-making.
13
 
 
8.3.2 Reagan Example 
 
    A recurring theme of US foreign policy is, upon arrival in the Oval Office, the new 
president is critical of the management system employed by his predecessor. This was no 
different with President Reagan in 1981. He had been a vocal detractor not only of President 
Carter’s policies, but of the bureaucratic processes involved in formulating them.  Carter had 
created an additional bureaucratic constraint for himself by failing to properly define the 
relationship between his Secretary of State, Cyrus Vance, and National Security Advisor, 
Zbigniew Brzezinski. Reagan claimed the Carter Administration was “unable to speak with 
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one voice in foreign policy” due to the bureaucratic chaos resulting from the Vance and 
Brezinski relationship.
14
 
    Reagan attempted to bring clarity to his foreign policy team by adopting a formalist 
management style, downgrading the role of the NSA and claiming to give his Secretary of 
State, Alexander Haig, pride of place in the foreign policy executive. However, this set-up 
was distorted by Reagan’s decision to run foreign policy through the NSC and set up the 
inter-agency process. This suggested the Secretary of State would not hold the same role in 
the Reagan administration as had been promised. There is no rule to say that the Secretary of 
State must be the leading figure in any president’s foreign policy team, nor are they required 
for effective policy making. The legacy of Kissinger’s years as NSA during the Nixon 
Administration offers evidence to support this.  Reagan’s inter-agency process may have 
functioned smoothly with a reduced role for the Secretary of State. The problem, however, 
was the conflicting messages Reagan was sending. The president was empowering Haig in 
public and in private meetings with his Secretary, but he was weakening him by developing 
the inter-agency foreign policy process. This did not create the clear lines of jurisdiction and 
hierarchy that are essential for the smooth operation of a formal management system. 
    This was compounded by Reagan’s reliance on the ‘troika’ of Chief of Staff James Baker, 
Deputy Chief-of-Staff Michael Deaver and White House Counsellor Edwin Meese. This 
overt politicisation of the foreign policy process became problematic on several fronts. This 
first was the extent to which the ‘palace guard’ controlled access to the president. Reagan’s 
first Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, complained that the White House staff limited his 
access to the president, to the extent he was only able to meet with Reagan once during the 
transition from election to inauguration, and continued to struggle with the troika throughout 
his year in office.
15
 The president has a limited amount of time in his daily schedule so they 
will not be able to meet with every member of staff who demands the Chief Executive’s 
attention. However, by limiting the access of the Secretary of State, the president sows the 
seeds for bureaucratic conflict which, if left unchecked, lessens their ability to control the 
executive and direct foreign policy. 
     Reagan also struggled to decide on what role he wanted his National Security Advisor to 
play in the inter-agency process.  Initially he downgraded the role of the NSA, expecting 
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them to act purely as a manager of the NSC and its staff, to help the president hear as many 
bureaucratic voices as possible, and not to engage in policy advocacy. Even though Reagan 
did not want the NSA to play a policy advocate role, the NSA still required bureaucratic 
muscle to carry out the day to day management tasks of the NSC. As discussed in chapters 
six and seven, this did not happen due to the excessive involvement of Reagan’s palace guard. 
His troika acted as a wall between the Oval Office and the president. In the case of the NSA, 
they did not initially have any direct access to the president. Richard Allen was forced to 
report to Reagan’s White House Councillor, Edwin Meese. Access was restricted and as a 
result the NSA could not do their job of making sure Reagan was briefed from all sides. 
Without the support of Reagan, Allen was in no position to exert any influence and was 
reduced to trying to “shove decision documents and position papers” down the “funnel-like 
management system that Meese had created to spare Reagan from decision-making.” 16 
Unable to work in this environment, Richard Allen quit in January 1982. 
    Over the course of his eight years in office Reagan was unable to establish clear lines of 
jurisdiction between his Secretaries of State and National Security Advisors. Upgrading the 
NSA and granting them direct access to the president in 1982 should have helped, but this 
was not the case.  Reagan never settled into a consistent relationship with any of his foreign 
policy team. He worked well with Allen’s replacement, William Clark, but sidelined him 
after the appointment of George Shultz as Secretary of State. This seemingly productive 
relationship was tarnished by the Iran-Contra scandal when Reagan cut Shultz out of the 
decision-making process and developed policy in secret with NSAs Robert McFarlane and 
John Poindexter. Reagan’s inability to involve himself in these bureaucratic battles, let alone 
resolve them in any meaningful manner, placed constraints on his ability to formulate foreign 
policy, as can be shown over the course of eight years in Nicaragua. 
    Reagan’s relationship with the bureaucracy was driven by ideology from the start. Reagan 
entered the White House with an ideological worldview of international politics. The Soviet 
Union was the greatest threat to the national security of the United States. As a communist 
state they were not to be trusted. Reagan viewed US-Soviet Union relations in simple terms. 
The United States was a liberal-democracy and a shining beacon of good in the world. The 
Soviet Union was evil and responsible for the Cold War. Having been elected on a promise to 
restore the United States to her former glory Reagan was determined to surround himself with 
advisors who shared similar views and supported his policy programme. Reagan created a 
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separate staff of over one hundred people whose job was to screen candidates for “philosophy 
as well as competency and integrity.”17 This was a deliberate attempt by Reagan to assert his 
control over the bureaucracy. By filling the top positions of the bureaucracy with as many 
conservative ideologues as he could Reagan hoped to reduce constraints and increase 
presidential autonomy in the policymaking process.  For most of the big policies of the first 
term, the military build up, defence budget increases and tax cuts, the ideological influence 
on the bureaucracies proved successful.  However, it was also a significant factor in the 
debacle in Nicaragua. 
    There was ideological agreement within the Reagan administration on foreign policy to the 
extent the Soviet Union was viewed as the primary rival and security threat to the United 
States. However, deep division existed over the severity of this threat and the policies 
required to meet the threat. Two rival camps were formed within Reagan’s foreign policy 
team. The first group became known as the hardliners. They believed the Soviet Union had 
exploited the era of detente in order to aggressively expand their influence in the developing 
world. As a result, they argued US foreign policy in the developing world, in the form of the 
Reagan Doctrine, must be targeted on direct intervention. Diplomacy was of little use and “a 
sell-out to communism.”18 The second group were known as the moderates. They argued that 
Reagan Doctrine intervention was only part of a broader strategy which needed to include 
diplomacy in the hope of settling regional conflicts peacefully. This was conceptualised in 
Secretary of State Shultz’s ‘dual-track strategy’. 19  These tensions came to a head over 
Nicaragua. They helped to reinforce the institutional division between the National Security 
Council staff and the State Department as the former was dominated by hardliners such as 
NSAs Richard Allen, William Clark, Robert McFarlane and John Poindexter, whereas the 
State Department was home to the majority of moderates such as Secretary of State Shultz 
and Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Thomas Enders. 
    Over the course of his eight years in office, Reagan struggled to smooth these divisions. 
On the topic of Nicaragua he positioned himself closer to the hardliners, as he shared their 
views on the nature and extent of the Soviet threat in Central America. However, he did not 
make this clear to his advisors and he did not work hard to resolve the tensions within his 
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administration and promote bureaucratic compromise. Instead, as the document analysis of 
the declassified NSC meetings in the previous chapter demonstrated, Reagan cut the 
moderates out of the decision-making process. When discussing third country funding for the 
Contras, Reagan did not tell the rest of his advisors that he had already authorised his 
MacFarlane and Poindexter to secure third country funding.
20
 By deliberately cutting out 
leading officials such as Secretary of State Shultz he limited the sources of information he 
was hearing, particularly those from the moderates who would have told him it was a bad 
idea. By setting in motion the events which would eventually lead to Iran-Contra Reagan 
significantly decreased both his presidential autonomy and destroyed his Nicaragua policy.  
 
8.3.3 Comparison 
 
    The important point to note is that not all foreign policy discussions involving the president 
will take place at fully attended regular meetings. The complexity and sheer amount of time 
required to address foreign policy issues renders this impractical. Therefore the fact Truman 
would hold regular private meetings with Acheson did not signal a break down in his 
management style in the same way Reagan’s did. Truman made it clear that all options and 
decisions would be made through the official channels, which by 1950 meant through the 
National Security Council.
21
 Anything decided outside of the NSC would be brought to the 
table to keep the relevant parties informed. This was a deliberate attempt by Truman to place 
limitations on his senior advisors and limit the possibility of end runs into the Oval Office. 
Truman did not want to make foreign policy on the fly and his formal management style was 
his attempt to bring the executive under his control. By granting specific jurisdictions to the 
senior members of his administration and allowing them to operate free from excessive 
interference Truman hoped this would generate the loyalty to his programme and increase 
effective policymaking. 
    This is not what happened with Reagan.  On the surface Reagan appeared to be running a 
formalist system, but rather than stamping out end runs as Truman had done, Reagan allowed 
them to take place within his executive. In large part this was the result of his inability to 
properly define the relationship between his National Security Advisors and Secretary of 
States, and by default the relationship between the Department of State and the National 
                                                          
20
 National Security Planning Group (1984) “Minutes of NSPG Meeting” June 25, in Nicaragua - The Making of 
U.S. Policy 1978-1990 document set, National Security Archive, document number NI02127 
21
 Truman, H.S. (1950) Letter from President Truman to Vice President Barkley “Operation of National Security 
Council”,  July 19, 1950, President’s Secretary’s Files, Folder 187, Harry S. Truman Presidential Library 
263 
 
 
 
Security Council. The lack of clear jurisdictions and defined roles generated deficiencies in 
policymaking from the earliest months of the administration. The most notable deficiency 
arose out of Nicaragua policymaking. Reagan was aware of the divisions between the 
moderates and hardliners as their views were aired at NSC and NSPG meetings.
22
  However, 
rather than trying to work out a compromise between the two factions, or making it clear he 
supported the hardliners, Reagan decided to work outside the established channels of his 
formal system to empower his NSA and the NSC staff to secretly develop the hardliners’ 
policy of using third country donors and private citizens to fund the Contras in Nicaragua. It 
is difficult to imagine Truman treating Acheson or Marshall in the same way Reagan treated 
Shultz.  
    Reagan was unable to stand back and address the deficiencies in the process. He went 
through six national security advisors in eight years.  There was constant tension between his 
NSA and Secretaries of State. There were ideological divisions within his administration. It 
would be beyond the power of even the greatest of bureaucratically minded presidents to 
solve all of these problems completely. However, Reagan never made a conscious effort to 
systematically address these issues. As was discussed in the previous chapter, when Shultz 
brought these questions to Reagan’s attention, the Secretary was fobbed off with little in the 
way of acknowledgement.
23
 These problems could never be resolved, or at least diminished, 
without a sustained level of presidential involvement. The individual players would not have 
the bureaucratic muscle required to make the necessary changes. Only the president could do 
this. By not addressing these issues, Reagan fundamentally weakened his executive and the 
efficacy of his policymaking process. The breakdown of his Nicaragua policy stands as the 
most relevant example of this. 
    It is interesting to note the role played by ideology in the Truman and Reagan 
administrations and the impact this had on presidential autonomy. Initially it seemed Reagan 
was able to use the appointment process to successfully fill his staff and bureaucracy with 
fellow ideologues.
24
 To an extent this was true, especially in relation to his first term foreign 
policy, which focused on increased defence spending and developing a tougher policy 
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towards the Soviet Union.  However, ideological divisions soon appeared over the extent of 
the Soviet threat and how the Reagan Doctrine should be applied. These ideological divisions 
were then reinforced by the institutional rivalries between the NSC staff and the State 
Department. These divisions hampered the formulation of Nicaragua policy and asked more 
of President Reagan as manager of the executive than he was able to deliver.  
    This contrasts with the Truman administration. During the first years of the Truman 
presidency US policymakers faced the challenges of the post war environment, the decline of 
the traditional European powers and the arrival of the US and Soviet Union as a world 
powers. As a result, there was no dominant ideology within the administration. Two 
competing schools of thought regarding the Soviet Union and the direction of US foreign 
policy emerged.
25
 The realists argued the Soviet Union were just like every other historic 
great power, concerned with maximizing their power, security and influence within the 
existing international system. They were concerned not with the internal workings of the 
Soviet state, but with their external behaviour. As a result, the Soviet Union could be treated 
just like any other great power and foreign policy could be directed along traditional 
diplomatic lines, with the possibility of cooperation remaining an option. The second group 
did not accept the view of the realists. They rejected the view of the Soviet Union as another 
great power looking to secure its position within the international system. Instead, the Soviet 
Union was a revolutionary state who wished to overthrow the capitalist world order and 
replace it with worldwide communism. In order to explain the Soviet Union’s foreign policy 
these analysts argued that US foreign policy must concern itself not just with calculations of 
power and interest, but must focus on ideology. A detailed understanding of the 
characteristics of the Soviet state was crucial to predict and counter Soviet foreign policy. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, Truman struggled initially to locate his own worldview 
within these two groups, but in light of what he viewed as Soviet aggression in Eastern 
Europe and Asia, he eventually moved closer to the ideologues and contributed to both the 
development of the Cold War mindset and the dominance of this group in the US foreign 
policy bureaucracy. 
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8.3.4 What this Tells us about Presidential Autonomy 
 
    The relationship between the president and the executive bureaucracy is crucial, and is 
based on more than the president commanding and those below him obeying. An important 
example of this is the Truman Doctrine speech discussed previously. It was shown how 
bureaucrats worked to shape the speech in line with Truman’s preferences. This demonstrates 
how presidents do not necessarily have to command their subordinates to achieve compliance. 
By making their preferences clear, and by establishing well organised bureaucratic channels 
and jurisdictions, sub-ordinates in the policy making process are able to pre-empt presidential 
instructions and begin shaping policy in the direction of pre-established presidential 
preference. This is one way the president can overcome bureaucratic constraints. However, 
this does not preclude bureaucrats from ignoring these presidential signals and working to 
their own personal or institutional agenda. It is important to note, though, this would be a 
deliberate act of policy sabotage by the individual or groups involved; it would not be the 
result of presidential action. 
    Highlighting the role of the president in the executive is also important. He is another 
player in the complex environment of the bureaucracy, but he is not an equal player. The 
president has the ability to lessen the constraints of the bureaucracy. In the examples 
discussed above, the importance of a president’s worldview and management style were 
demonstrated. These are tools the president can use to attempt to generate consensus on the 
direction US foreign policy should take, and to try and generate enough support amongst top 
level bureaucrats. To do this requires clear instructions from the president so that the 
executive are aware of his preferences and are able to shape policy along these lines. Again, 
this will not guarantee policy success, but it will help to lessen the internal constraints placed 
on the president by the bureaucracy. It is also important because it demonstrates the role the 
president as an individual plays in trying to maximise his autonomy in the decision-making 
process. The president has choices to make in terms of how they will manage their executive. 
These choices can play a significant role in decreasing or increasing the potential constraints 
placed on the president by the bureaucracy.  
    The president’s own choices play a large part in determining the constraints they face. 
Reagan demonstrates the extent to which a president’s inability to manage divisions within 
his administration can increase these constraints.. This is clear on two fronts. First there was 
the level of institutional division, most notably between the White House staff and the wider 
bureaucracy. In the case of foreign policy, this struggle usually takes place between the State 
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Department and the National Security Council staff. At the highest level of the administration, 
this takes the form of a bureaucratic rivalry between the Secretary of State and the National 
Security Advisor, the ranking officials within these institutions. The second divisions can be 
classified as ideological. This is the degree to which advisors within the administration 
disagree on matters of policy. If these policy disagreements coincide with institutional 
divisions the president faces an even larger constraint. From the Reagan example, it can be 
shown how central the president is in creating a productive working relationship between 
these institutions and individuals; particularly due to the fact Reagan was unable to do so. 
This demonstrates the extent to which the president has a role to play in determining the 
influence of bureaucratic constraints. By not being able to establish clear jurisdictions 
between these institutions, or improve the working relationship between the hardliners and 
moderates over Nicaragua policy, Reagan made life difficult for himself. He created 
avoidable constraints and as a result decreased his presidential autonomy in the policy 
making process. This can be contrasted with Truman’s success with the Truman Doctrine, 
where he was able to unify his bureaucracy and present a united front to Congress. 
    This is not to say that bureaucratic consensus is the answer to the president’s problems. It 
is not. From the previous chapters examples can be drawn to show when bureaucratic 
consensus proved beneficial to the president (Truman with Greece, Reagan with the arms 
build up), when bureaucratic conflict reduced presidential autonomy (Reagan and Nicaragua, 
specifically Iran-Contra)  and even when bureaucratic consensus brought problems for the 
president (Truman with Korea).  Therefore, the important conclusion to draw is the role of 
the president in being able to identify when bureaucratic consensus will help him achieve his 
goals and the necessity for this bureaucratic consensus to be constructed in the appropriate 
manner with either widely accepted compromises or publicly declared presidential 
instructions. This is especially true if the president is running a formal management system. 
End runs into the Oval Office and the president meeting with select officials behind the backs 
of other key advisors is likely to limit his presidential authority. The president also has to be 
aware of his information sources. If he is relying on too few advisors, or is hearing the same 
advice, it is his responsibility to ensure he hears other voices, and that his advisors know he is 
taking onboard new views. From the examples discussed throughout this thesis it is clear the 
president as an individual has an important role to play in reducing the constraints they face 
and maximising presidential autonomy. 
    These examples serve as evidence for the wider argument being made in this thesis. That is, 
the president, through their own choices, plays a crucial role in determining the extent of 
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bureaucratic constraints and opportunities they face. In doing so they are responsible for 
securing a degree of presidential autonomy. They cannot overcome all constraints, and cannot 
guarantee policy success, but they, as individuals, have the potential to make their 
relationship with the bureaucracy easier, if they know how to operate and adapt. 
 
8.4 Domestic Sources and Constraints: Congress  
 
    As discussed in chapter three, the constitution created a political system where power is 
separated and shared amongst the three branches of the federal government. In the area of 
foreign policy, this means that presidential foreign policy making is constrained by the 
constitutional powers of Congress. The president is Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, 
but Congress has the power to declare war. The president signs treaties, but they must be 
ratified by the Senate. As always, Congress is granted the power of the purse. This means that 
the president must achieve Congressional support in order to fund their foreign policies. Thus, 
how a president interacts with Congress is central to the success of any foreign policy. 
 
8.4.1 Truman Example 
 
    The idea is often presented that Congress was more accommodating in the early years of 
the Cold War.
26
 It can be shown that it was more nuanced than this, especially in Truman’s 
first term. As Richard Neustadt has argued, “This does not mean that when the Cold War did 
occur dissent from presidential actions and proposals in the foreign field was altogether 
superseded. Far from it. Congressional bi-partisanship in foreign policy for the most part 
extended only to Europe and Japan, not to the world at large, especially not to China.”27 
    There were several groups within Congress who tried to make life difficult for Truman in 
the area of foreign policy.  First and foremost were the isolationists. They rejected the need 
for increased US activism abroad and the resulting budget increases this would require.
28
 
Second were the ‘Asia first’ Republicans. This group wanted Truman to direct the 
containment policy towards Asia. This opposition magnified with the victory of Mao and the 
communists in 1949. These Republicans tried to blame Truman for the ‘loss’ of China and 
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criticised him for focusing too many resources on Western Europe at the expense of Asia.  It 
is difficult to establish if this was a genuine concern for US foreign policy in the Far East, or 
if it was political point scoring by Republicans in the hope of exploiting the Cold War to 
accuse Truman and the Democrats of being weak in the face of communist aggression. The 
furore surrounding Senator Joseph McCarthy and his ‘anti-American activities’ committee 
lends credence to this.
29
 
    How did Truman overcome this opposition? The events leading up to the Truman Doctrine 
played a crucial role. He did several things to increase his chances of Congressional success. 
First, he met with the ranking members of the Congressional foreign policy committees. In 
particular, his relationship with Senator Vandenberg was crucial. As discussed in the previous 
section, Truman was able to present a unified bureaucratic consensus to the Senator. The 
combination of Truman, Marshall and Acheson was successful in convincing Vandenberg of 
the seriousness of the Greek and Turkish situations.
30
 Vandenberg was then able to use his 
influence within the Congressional committee system to spread the president’s message and 
to prepare the relevant senior Congressmen for the forthcoming vote on aid to Greece.
31
   
    As demonstrated in the previous chapters, the Truman Doctrine speech played an 
important role in generating wider support and cementing the mindset amongst a majority of 
Congressmen. There was also helpful input from Vandenberg, demonstrating the extent to 
which members of Congress can improve the president’s position in the foreign policy 
process. Vandenberg explained to Truman, Acheson and Marshall that if the president was 
planning to address both houses of Congress and the wider US public, it would be necessary 
to use strong and clear language. By this, the Senator meant that framing the Greek and 
Turkish situation purely in dry terms of US geo-strategic interest in the Mediterranean would 
not be particularly useful. He had listened to Marshall make the case for US intervention in 
these terms and had not been convinced. It was only when Truman gave Acheson permission 
to speak and the then Assistant Secretary of State outlined the threat of communist expansion 
in a more passionate and emotive style, focusing on the threat to Western European 
democracy, that Vandenberg became convinced of the severity of the situation.  Congress and 
the American people would be more supportive if the Greece and Turkey were placed within 
a global context and discussed in terms of the threat posed to democracy. The simple 
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dichotomy of good versus evil would likely secure votes in Congress and bring the 
developing Cold War to the attention of a wider public.
 32
 
    As discussed in the previous chapter’s analysis of the development of the Truman Doctrine, 
Truman’s speech writers were already working on these ideas, in line with the president’s 
preferences. The confirmation from Vandenberg that this was the correct way to proceed 
strengthened Truman’s position. The combination of Truman’s speech and Vandenberg’s 
assistance led the House passing the bill 287-107 and the Senate voting in favour 67-23. 
Truman’s relationship with Congress was essential in passing the aid bill and laying the 
foundations for the development of the containment policy. 
 
8.4.2 Reagan Example 
 
    By the administration of Ronald Reagan, the relationship between the president and 
Congress in the area of foreign policy had developed. The Cold War had been ongoing for 
thirty years. Tensions between the US and the Soviet Union had not disappeared, but there 
was an air of normalcy about the structure of the international system. The course of the Cold 
War had had an impact on relations between the branches of the US government. By the 
1970s, scholars were discussing the rise of the ‘imperial presidency’ and the extent to which 
the executive had usurped foreign policy power at the expense of Congress.
33
 However, after 
the Vietnam War, Congress had reasserted itself, passing the War Powers Act of 1973 and 
tried to reign in what it saw as presidential excess in the area of discretionary and 
reprogrammed funding. The result was the administrations of Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter 
giving rise to debate as to whether the presidency was in fact ‘imperilled’ rather than imperial 
in its relationship with Congress.
34
 
    Thus, when Reagan entered office, he was met with several Congressional constraints in 
the area of foreign policy. The first related to the international system. After thirty years of 
Cold War relations between the Soviet Union and the US were still tense. However, the air of 
uncertainty that plagued the early years of the Cold War during the Truman administration 
had noticeably decreased. This had a marked effect on many Congressmen. Instead of 
preparing to acquiesce to presidential authority in the area of foreign policy, as had defined 
much of presidential-congressional relations until the early 70s, Congress was now prepared 
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to challenge the executive over control of US foreign policy. The most notable example of 
Congressional fight back was the passing of the War Powers Act of 1973. This was a 
deliberate attempt by Congress to rein in the power of the president in the area of national 
security policy and the use of US force abroad. The act stipulated that the president must 
notify congress within 48 hours of the deployment of troops to military action and must 
withdraw US forces within 90 days, unless congress authorises the use of force or declares 
war.
35
 This was the domestic political environment Reagan faced in trying to formulate 
foreign policy. 
    The context of foreign policy in Nicaragua highlighted these constraints, and also created 
additional ones. As the documentary record showed, Reagan and his advisors ranked 
Sandinista control of Nicaragua as a major security threat to the United States. They believed 
the Sandinistas were a front for further Soviet intervention in Central America. The fear was 
having established a foothold on the mainland, the Sandinistas, backed by Cuba and the 
Soviet Union, would try to seize power in the surrounding states, such as El Salvador.  
Reagan was not prepared to allow this to happen.
36
 Unfortunately for the president, 
Congressmen in both the House and the Senate did not agree on his assessment of the threat 
posed by the Sandinistas, or that they were the spearhead for a Soviet backed Cuban invasion 
of Central America. This was compounded by the divided government Reagan faced. The 
Democrats maintained control of the House for his eight years in office, Republicans held the 
Senate for his first six years. Reagan was therefore unable to command a consistent majority 
of voters in Congress to support his application of the Reagan Doctrine to Nicaragua. The 
combination of congressional resurgence in foreign policy, divided government, and 
perception of the threat posed by the Sandinistas and Soviet Union, placed limitations on the 
options available to Reagan. There would be no public and congressional support for the use 
of US military force in Nicaragua so Reagan had to find other options.  
    As always, it is important to note that these constraints are not fixed. External events can 
develop, the whole House and a third of the Senate are up for re-election every two years, and 
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Congressmen can change their vote. The president can have an important role to play in re-
shaping the constraints they face. 
    In the case of Reagan and Nicaragua, the fixed positions of the liberal Democrats who 
continually opposed Reagan, and the conservative Republicans who supported him, never 
constituted an outright majority in both branches of government over Reagan’s two terms in 
office. Thus, on the topic of Nicaragua, Reagan was presented with a selection of swing 
voters who would determine whether each successive request for funds for the Contras would 
be successful. The fact that Congress veered from the outright ban on Contra funding with the 
passing of the Boland amendments in 1984, to authorising $100 million of military aid in 
1986, demonstrates there was room for manoeuvre. It is therefore important to examine how 
these swing voters were influenced and to locate the role of President Reagan in loosening his 
congressional restraints between 1984 and 1986. Particularly important is how Reagan turned 
a 222 to 210 vote against Contra funding in March 1986 into a 221-209 vote in favour in June. 
    One of Reagan’s greatest strengths was his command of political rhetoric. In order to try 
and convince Congress, and the American people, of the need for Contra funding, the 
president initiated an intensive public relations campaign to demonstrate the severity of the 
threat posed by the Sandinistas.  Full page advertisements were taken out in newspapers 
claiming that if the Contras were defeated the US would be swamped with “refugees, spies, 
criminals and terrorists.”37 Reagan himself addressed reporters saying: 
 
 “If we provide too little help, our choice will be a Communist Central America with 
Communist subversion spreading southward and northward. We face the risk that a 
hundred million people, from Panama to our open southern border, could come under the 
control of pro-Soviet regimes and threaten the United States with violence, economic 
chaos, and a human tidal wave of refugees.”38 
 
This was a ploy by Reagan to increase the fear of immigration in the southern border states 
and to get the citizens of these states to place pressure on Democrat House members to vote 
in favour of Contra funding. 
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    Reagan also personally intervened in the process. He asked his staff to identify potential 
swing voters and invite them for a meeting in the White House. Using his personal charm, the 
Congressmen’s respect for the office of the presidency, and his popularity with the electorate, 
Reagan was able to convince several Congressmen to change their votes, including two 
Democrats from Kentucky.
39
 
    Finally, external events helped loosen Congressional restraint. In March, Sandinista 
government forces launched an attack on Contra bases in Honduras. Then, in April the 
Contras announced that their president, Daniel Ortega, would be visiting General Secretary 
Gorbachev of the Soviet Union in Moscow at the beginning of May.
40
 Reagan was able to 
exploit this by placing a trade embargo on Nicaragua. This further weakened southern liberal 
Democrats in an election year. On June 25 the House voted 221-209 in favour of sending 
$100 million to the Contras, 75% of which was military aid, and authorised the CIA and 
Department of Defence to train and provide intelligence to the Contras. 
    Representative Michael Barnes explains how influential Reagan was in the process: “The 
guys in the middle just got tired of being beaten up on both sides... they knew Reagan was 
going to come back and back and back on this. He was obsessed by it... He just wore 
everybody out.”41 As Cynthia Arnson has argued, “when a president as popular as Ronald 
Reagan made an issue his primary foreign policy goal, it was just a matter of time until he got 
what he wanted.”42 Two years of intense legislative effort and public relations endeavours 
had been rewarded. This demonstrates the ability of the president to influence Congress and 
shape the direction of US foreign policy. 
    Unfortunately for Reagan and his administration, a president’s actions can also increase the 
level of constraint presented by Congress. As discussed in the previous chapter, Reagan 
played a central role in the debacle of Nicaragua policy. In large part this was a result of his 
dealings with Congress, or more accurately, his attempts not to deal with them. Reagan was 
determined to first halt the spread of arms from Nicaragua to El Salvador and, preferably, 
remove the Sandinistas from power.
43
 However, there was no realistic chance of using US 
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troops to achieve this end. Another option was required. It was on this basis that Reagan 
authorised $20 million dollars to be sent to the Contras and, more controversially, the 
deployment of five hundred CIA operatives to interdict arms in November and December 
1981.
44
 This was the birth of covert US involvement in Nicaragua. 
    The Hughes-Ryan Act of 1974 required the president to present a finding to the 
intelligence committees in both houses of Congress if covert action was initiated by the CIA. 
The rules laid down in the act were a deliberate attempt by Congress to increase their 
oversight of US covert action. The law also required the head of the CIA to appear before the 
committees to answer any questions Congress may have about the nature and scope of the 
covert operations being undertaken by the US government.
45
 Thus, if covet actions were to 
form the centrepiece of US policy in Nicaragua, Congress, by law, was to be kept fully 
informed. 
    The vague language used in the still not fully declassified presidential findings (“support 
and conduct... paramilitary operations against...Nicaragua) combined with the evasiveness 
and incoherence of Director Casey’s briefings of the intelligence committees reflect the 
extent to which Reagan was prepared to limit Congressional knowledge of US covert actions 
in Nicaragua. Committee questions over several briefings around the topic of escalation, the 
exact role of the CIA, and whether the US was trying to overthrow the government of 
Nicaragua were not answered with any great detail. 
    The most notable incident where below standard presidential findings and executive 
briefings of the intelligence committees resulted in increased Congressional opposition to 
Reagan was the decision to allow the CIA to mine harbours in Nicaragua in 1984. The plan 
was formulated by a selection of hardliners in the NSC and was presented to Reagan outside 
of formal channels. When Reagan authorised the mission, he did so without asking for a 
formal review of the plan from his senior staff or the Joint Chiefs.
46
 This again demonstrates 
the weakness of Reagan’s management and decision-making style.  In terms of Congressional 
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relations the decision to mine the harbours was a disaster. The intelligence committees had 
not been briefed as required by law. When news broke of the operation in the US media, even 
the most supportive of Congressmen, Barry Goldwater, the Senate Intelligence Committee 
chairman turned against Reagan: 
“It gets down to one, little, simple phrase: I am pissed off!... The President has asked us 
to back his foreign policy. Bill, how can we back his foreign policy when we don’t know 
what the hell he is doing?... But mine the harbours of Nicaragua? This is an act violating 
international law. It is an act of war. For the life of me, I don’t see how we are going to 
explain it.”47 
 
The House and Senate were quick to follow this up and voted in May 1984 for a ban on all 
funds for use in military or covert activities against Nicaragua, the so called Boland 
Amendment. President Reagan and his attempt to keep Congress out of Nicaragua policy by 
failing to keep the intelligence committees informed of covert activities led directly to these 
increased Congressional restraints. 
    President Reagan’s attempts between 1984 and 1986 to get around these limitations also 
demonstrate how a president can increase the level of Congressional opposition further.  By 
authorising the search for third country and private donors, even though Congress had banned 
US funding of the Contras, Reagan initiated events which would culminate in the Iran-Contra 
scandal of 1986, resulting in congressional investigations, criminal proceedings and the end 
of Reagan’s policy in Nicaragua. This was a deliberate attempt by a president to bypass 
Congressional restrictions, but the result was increased Congressional opposition just at the 
time Reagan was beginning to make progress with votes in Congress on the subject of 
resuming legitimate funding of the Contras. 
 
8.4.3 Comparison 
 
    Comparing a single president’s relationship with Congress over their time in office is 
difficult. A two term president will face four different Congresses. The relationship will not 
be fixed and will vary across time and policies. This is clear from the Reagan example. 
Comparing two presidents’ relationships with Congress therefore offers additional challenges. 
    In the area of foreign policy it would be possible to draw a simple conclusion from the two 
case studies in this thesis: Truman had it easier than Reagan. Truman had the benefit of 
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Democrat control of both houses for six out of eight years. Reagan’s Republicans only had 
the Senate for six years and never the House. Truman faced the ‘acquiescent’ Congress of the 
first half of the Cold War, whereas Reagan dealt with post-Vietnam resurgence. However, on 
closer inspection, this conclusion and the premises upon which it is based can be challenged. 
In terms of simple divided government, Truman faced Republican control of the House and 
Senate between 1945 and 1947. The ‘Do Nothing Congress’, as Truman styled them, almost 
shut down his entire domestic legislative programme.
48
 In the field of foreign policy, Truman 
was faced with strong isolationist sentiment within the Republican Party. This was 
complemented by a majority of Republicans who accused Truman of ignoring East Asia, 
specifically China, in favour of Western Europe.  However, in face of this opposition, 
Truman managed to convince a Republican Congress to vote in favour of aid to Greece and 
Turkey. 
    The counter argument is Congress was merely responding to the threat posed by 
communism and thus the external environment was the driving force. However, this too can 
be challenged. From the analysis of primary documents in the Truman chapter, Senator 
Vandenberg made it clear to Truman it was not guaranteed the aid bill would pass. In fact it 
would require direct presidential involvement by way of a speech to a joint session of 
Congress. The speech would have to sell the aid programme to Congress and the American 
people on the wider ideals of upholding freedom and democracy in the face of authoritarian 
aggression. Truman’s relationship with Vandenberg was also crucial.49 Once the president 
was able to convince the Vandenberg of the necessity of aid to Greece, the Senator became 
an important Congressional ally in marshalling Republican votes.
50
 
 
8.4.4 What this Tells us about Presidential Autonomy 
 
    The wider point to be made is that external events are important in terms of providing a 
president with opportunities and constraints, but these do not determine relationships between 
the president and Congress. How the president makes use of these external events is 
important. Reagan was able to achieve Congressional success when he was able to portray 
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Ortega’s visit to Moscow and the Sandinista attack on Contra bases in Honduras as a threat to 
US national security. He framed these incidents as examples of the point he had been trying 
to make for the previous five years. Congress assented and voted to send aid to the Contras. 
    A president’s relationship with Congress is also crucial in determining the level of 
opposition they face. Truman was relatively open with Congress, even if he was guilty of 
over-selling the Soviet threat in Greece and Turkey. The result of this openness was less 
hostility than might have been expected from a Republican Congress. Reagan, however, was 
rather duplicitous in his dealings with Congress over Nicaragua. By not informing Congress 
of the decision to mine the harbours and search for third country and private donors, the 
president made a rod for his own back. The deliberate attempt to bypass Congress led to 
substantial opposition, first with the Boland Amendment and finally with the Iran-Contra 
hearings. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
 
    This chapter has analysed three of the major sources of US foreign policy, the international 
system, the executive bureaucracy and the Congress, and their relationship with the president. 
In particular, it has argued that the president has a crucial role to play in determining the 
extent to which these institutions act as constraints on his autonomy and ability to direct US 
foreign policy. It has shown how important the president’s worldview is in determining the 
overall direction of US foreign policy during their time in office. The reactive nature of 
Truman was crucial to the development of the policy of containment, whereas the ideological 
drive of Reagan orientated US foreign policy in a more aggressive manner towards the Soviet 
Union than had been experienced in the preceding decade.  
    The second argument presented was the role of the president’s management style in 
determining the level of control they were able to exert over the bureaucracy, and the impact 
this had on effective policy making. Examples were shown of both effective presidential 
management of the executive (the Truman Doctrine) and ineffective efforts (Reagan and Iran-
Contra, and Truman’s decision to cross the 38th parallel). 
     Finally, the chapter placed the presidency within the context of the system of separated 
powers constructed by the constitution. With foreign policy power shared between both 
branches, and Congress controlling US finances, the relationship a president develops with 
Congress becomes key in establishing a successful foreign policy. Truman was able to win 
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over a Republican House and Senate to send aid to Greece and Turkey, while Reagan 
provided examples of both managing to secure funds from Congress for the Contras, and a 
complete cut off of funds. The cyclical nature of the relationship between Reagan and 
Congress over eight years of Nicaragua policy demonstrates that the legislative constraints 
facing a president are not fixed, and that the president as an autonomous actor is a crucial 
variable in determining the success and failure of this relationship. 
    In terms of the wider conceptual issues raised by the thesis, this chapter has demonstrated 
the importance of developing a multilevel framework which incorporates both agency and 
structure. The three sections of this chapter, focusing on the president’s relationship with the 
international system, executive and Congress, have shown that a purely structural approach 
would be limited in its explanatory power. The international system does not exist separately 
from the states and individuals who populate it. Instead, events at the international level are 
going given meaning by the extent to which they are perceived by individuals. As discussed 
previously, different individuals possess different worldviews and, as a result, perceive events 
differently. What is more, international relations are grounded in human agency. Foreign 
policy can only be operationalised as a result of the decisions made by individuals. Therefore 
how and why these decisions are made become crucial to any understanding of international 
relations. In terms of US foreign policy, the relationship between the president, the executive 
and the congress remains central to our explanations. 
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Chapter Nine: Conclusion 
 
9.1 Introduction 
 
This thesis has analysed the role of presidential agency in US foreign policy. It conducted a 
case study comparison of the foreign policies of Harry Truman and Ronald Reagan, 
developing a multi-level analytical framework focusing on the president’s interaction with 
the international system, the executive and the Congress.  This final chapter will conclude the 
thesis by placing Truman and Reagan within the wider context of US foreign policy during 
the Cold War and assessing their legacies. It will then proceed with a final analysis of the 
wider conceptual issues raised by the study of presidential agency in US foreign policy. The 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the limitations of the present study and possibilities 
for future research. 
 
9.2 Truman: Wider Context and Legacy  
 
It is necessary to place the Truman within the wider context of US foreign policy during the 
Cold War. Truman played a central role in the formulation of containment, which would 
become the dominant principle of US foreign policy for the next thirty years. The legacy of 
Truman is therefore central to our understanding of both the development of the Cold War 
and the broader role of the presidency in US foreign policy. Put simply, it was Truman who 
got the US into the Cold War. Truman developed containment, its militarisation, its overt 
ideological element, the bipartisan consensus to support these, and the development of the 
institutional US foreign policy presidency on the back of the National Security Act of 1947. 
He laid the basis for what would become known as the Imperial Presidency. 
    However, this was not predestined. Truman had options. The response to the crises in 
Greece and Turkey was not inevitable. As discussed in chapter four, when the US received 
word of British intentions to leave Greece and Turkey, intense discussions took place within 
the executive over how the crisis should be interpreted in light of developments in the 
international system. Debate centred over Soviet intentions and the fear of communist 
expansion.  There were two groups working at the lower levels of the bureaucracy, the 
realists and the Cold Warriors, who offered differing conceptualisations of the Soviet threat 
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(the so called Yalta and Riga axioms).
1
 There were different strategic paths available to US 
foreign policy decision makers. They could refrain from intervention. They could make a one 
off contribution to the Greek and Turkish governments. Or, as eventually happened, they 
could frame their intervention in terms of a worldwide programme to assist ‘free peoples’ 
who were facing the threat of ‘subjugation by armed minorities or outside pressures.’2  This 
thesis argues the role of the president was central to this process. Truman had decisions to 
make. It was his choice that set the US on the path to containment. The point made in the 
previous case study analysis was that this demonstrates the role of the president’s worldview. 
Truman had begun to interpret Soviet actions in Eastern Europe and Iran as hostile to US 
interests. As a result, he began to favour the interpretation of the Cold Warriors, decreasing 
the bureaucratic influence of the realists in the State Department led by George Kennan. This 
was demonstrated in chapter four when Truman’s role in the drafting of the Truman Doctrine 
speech was analysed. However, there is also a wider point to be made about the existence of 
choice, the role of the president and the development of the Cold War. 
    The birth of the Truman Doctrine was not inevitable. Equally so, the militarisation of 
containment was the result of choice. As argued previously in chapters four and five, 
presidential worldview again played an important role in this process. The president chose to 
view the Soviet Union as a military threat, as did the advisors he surrounded himself with. 
The documentary record of the president’s meetings with these officials time and again 
illustrates the extent to which all foreign and security policies were discussed in light of the 
Soviet military threat.
3
 This worldview framed the development of US intervention in the 
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Korea. The deployment of US combat troops to Korea stands as one of the most important 
moments of US foreign policy during the Cold War. The case study in the previous chapter 
focused on the role of Truman’s worldview and management style in terms of their impact n 
framing Korea as a security concern, the decision to intervene and the decision to cross the 
38
th
 parallel. However, the case study of Korea also stands in a wider context. It signalled the 
militarisation of containment and the president’s rejection of Kennan’s non-military 
alternative. From 1950 onwards the Soviet Union would be perceived as a military threat and 
US foreign policy would be orientated accordingly with ever increasing defence spending, 
entering into collective security arrangements with ally states in various regions of strategic 
importance, long term international commitments founded upon US led multilateral 
institutions and the deployment of the US military across the globe, culminating in the 
Vietnam War in the mid 1960s.  
    Truman’s decision to enter the Korean War also had an important legacy for executive-
congressional relations in foreign policy during the Cold War. Truman did not ask Congress 
for a declaration of war. Instead, he argued it was essential for the US to intervene in Korea 
in order to defend the United Nations, and, as a result of inherent executive power, as 
president he had all the authority he needed to execute the UN resolutions authorising 
member states to use force to repel North Korea’s invasion. This claim to inherent executive 
war making power would form the basis of Johnson and Nixon’s justification for ever 
increasing US involvement in the Vietnam War and stands as one of Truman’s most enduring 
legacies.
4
 
    Finally, just as important as the material legacy of Truman’s militarisation of US foreign 
policy during the Cold War was his rhetorical justification for these policies and the Cold 
War ideological discourse he played a role in creating. As discussed previously, having 
decided to send aid to Greece and Turkey, Truman required Congress to authorise the 
funding of this programme. Agreeing with Senators Vandenberg and Clayton that he had to 
‘shock’ the US Congress and the US public in order to win their support, Truman delivered a 
speech before Congress that tried to do just that.
5
  The language used during the speech 
tapped into the defining characteristics of US political culture: freedom, liberty and 
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democracy. Truman emphasised the need for US leadership of the free world in the face of 
totalitarian aggression. This commitment to help ‘free peoples’ and  spread democracy 
became the ideological and rhetorical cornerstone which would reappear time and again in 
the public pronouncements of US foreign policy makers during the remainder of the Cold 
War and beyond.
 6
 Truman played a crucial role over the course of his administration in 
creating this image of the United States and how it viewed its role in the Cold War. 
 
9.3 Reagan: Wider Context and Legacy 
 
    Although the Cold War would enter its final stages during the Reagan Administration and 
end less than two years after he had left office, upon election in November 1980 it was not 
clear to any of the participants that international politics was about to undergo such a quick 
and radical change. As discussed in the Reagan case study, US foreign policy was firmly 
rooted within the existing Cold War structure upon Reagan’s inauguration. After thirty years 
of bipolarity, the international system was relatively stable and US-Soviet Union relations 
were for the most part predictable, although forever conducted with the threat of nuclear 
destruction. However, US foreign policy faced what many policymakers and commentators 
believed to be a series of problems.
7
 The US’s involvement, escalation and eventual retreat 
from the Vietnam War had produced a level of social and political opposition unseen before 
in the realm of US foreign policy.
8
 American citizens were no longer willing to acquiesce in 
the use of military force abroad as they had previously. US foreign policy was now conduced 
in the ‘post-Vietnam’ era, and this placed significant domestic restraints on US foreign policy 
makers.  As a result, political discourse was dominated by the idea of American decline and 
weakness. This was compounded by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the perception of 
an increasingly powerful and assertive Soviet Union. The foreign policy of Jimmy Carter 
struggled to counter these ideas, with its focus on multilateralism, human rights, and a 
seeming weakening of containment. 
    During his election campaign and upon his inauguration Reagan promised to change this.  
He believed in American exceptionalism and was determined to restore America to what he 
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believed was its former glory.  Reagan rejected what he saw as the liberal defeatism of the 
Carter years and wished to spearhead a conservative revolution in both domestic and foreign 
policy. Domestically, Reagan argued in favour of free enterprise, deregulation and tax cuts to 
stimulate the US economy and provide the material basis for a resurgent foreign policy. This 
foreign policy would be based on Reagan’s ideological worldview of international politics: 
the Soviet Union was the primary source of evil in the world and it was the responsibility of 
the US to defeat them. To do so, Reagan ordered an increase in defence spending and adopted 
a more overtly military posture. Equally important was the language used by Reagan to 
explain and justify these choices. The Soviet Union was the ‘Evil Empire’ who had  “openly 
and publicly declared that the only morality they recognise is what will further their cause, 
meaning they reserve unto themselves the right to commit any crime, to lie, to cheat, in order 
to attain that.”9 This was contrasted with his view of America: “as we renew ourselves here in 
our own land, we will be seen as having greater strength throughout the world. We will again 
be the exemplar of freedom and a beacon of hope for those who do not now have freedom.”10 
This dichotomy framed Reagan’s foreign policy at almost every level. Domestic renewal 
would lead to a more assertive foreign policy. Reagan issued a stark warning to “the enemies 
of freedom” that “peace is the highest aspiration of the American people. We will not 
negotiate for it, sacrifice for it; we will not surrender for it, now or ever.”11 To secure this 
peace, Reagan would “maintain sufficient strength to prevail if need be, knowing that if we 
do so we have the best chance of never having to use that strength.”12 This idea of negotiating 
from a position of strength remained central to Reagan, and formed the basis of his foreign 
policy strategy throughout his administration.
13
 
    Reagan also attempted to place his own stamp on the US’s strategy towards the Soviet 
Union and what he believed to be the worldwide threat of communism. As early as the 1960s 
Reagan had publicly stated his opposition to the policy of containment and argued in favour 
of a more aggressive alternative: “Containment won’t save freedom on the home front any 
more than it can stop Russian aggression on the world front…we must roll back the network 
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of encroaching control.”14 The idea of rollback became central to the doctrine which would 
eventually bear his name. The reality of international politics in the 1980s meant that no 
serious attempt could be made to rollback the Soviet Union or the Warsaw Pact in Eastern 
Europe. The threat of mutually assured destruction tempered this ambition. Understanding 
this structural constraint, Reagan turned his attention to what he saw as a major defeat for 
Carter’s foreign policy, the victory of ‘communist’ rebels in several developing world 
countries. He believed the Soviet Union had helped these groups attain power in order to 
spread communism throughout the developing world. It was in response to these events that 
Reagan planned to formulate a policy of rollback. He wanted to see these revolutions 
defeated and believed the US was in a position to help. As we saw in the Nicaragua case 
study, the specific policy developed was one that promised aid to anti-communist rebel forces 
who were trying to overthrow the newly installed communist governments. The success of 
the doctrine is still debated, but it stands as an example of Reagan’s attempt to reassert 
America’s power in the international system. 
    As Neustadt has argued, Reagan came to office with his purposes clear.
15
 Reagan’s team 
did the best they could to staff the executive with like minded individuals. This was a clear 
attempt to bring ideological coherence to the White House.  At the broad level it proved a 
success. Defence budgets were increased, America rearmed and the rhetoric directed towards 
the Soviet Union increased. However, as shown in chapter seven, it was not possible for 
Reagan to maintain complete ideological coherence. Differences occurred between the 
moderate and hard-line factions, who disagreed on the means to achieve the goal of rollback. 
Reagan was not able to manage effectively and Nicaragua stands as an example of this. 
    Reagan’s Nicaragua policy is also important because it demonstrates the existence of the 
‘imperial presidency’. Future presidents will not cite the events surrounding the Iran-Contra 
as a precedent for inherent executive power in US foreign policy. However, Reagan’s actions 
during the course of his administration serves as an example of what the president has the 
potential to do, even in the face of Congressional opposition. 
    Finally, the legacy of Reagan extends beyond the Cold War. The combination of Reagan’s 
increased defence spending and the collapse of the Soviet Union provided the material basis 
for the United States to establish itself as the hegemon of the 1990s and early 21
st
 Century.  
The idea of Reagan  ‘winning’ the Cold War has formed the basis for post 1991 US foreign 
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policy discourse and permeates current US foreign policy, most notably towards Russia.
16
 It 
is used as evidence to support ‘the end of history’ thesis and contributes to the American 
sense of identity as leader of the free world.  Furthermore the alleged victory of US ideals has 
formed the basis of official US government claims to the legitimacy of US hegemony since 
the end of the Cold War.
17
  These claims have of course been challenged from a variety of 
perspectives, most notably the attacks of 9/11. However, in terms of the remit of this thesis, 
this material and ideological legacy serves as an example of the influence of President 
Reagan. 
 
9.4 Conceptual Implications 
 
    How much is in the president’s control and how much is contingent on other actors? This 
question is perhaps misleading. There is very little the president can do entirely on his own. 
He relies on other actors at every stage of the process: advisers who bring him information 
and who he discusses policy options with; bureaucrats who offer solutions to implementing 
policy (and who actually implement policy); and Congress who authorise funding. These 
actors are all part of the process. The president needs to ‘line up’ enough of these actors on 
his side to ensure a policy is enacted. Whether that policy is ‘successful’ or not depends not 
only on the president’s personal skill, but on factors out with the president’s control, such as 
Congress and other states in the international system. 
    Another complication is how we determine ‘success’.  It is possible to conceive of and 
measure success in different ways. To look at one eight year Nicaragua policy in the case of 
Reagan and try to determine if it was a success or not is a challenge. Instead it is possible to 
look at certain parts and determine if there was a success or not. For example, one obvious 
success would be Reagan securing military funding for the Contras in 1985 and 1986. There 
was a constraint in the shape of Congressional opposition, he acted by spearheading an 
intense legislative campaign, and he was successful in winning the necessary votes. We can 
identify the role of the president in personally securing a selection of swing voters.  However, 
                                                          
16
 Goldgeiger, J. and McFaul, M. (2003) Power and Purpose: US Policy Towards Russia after the Cold War 
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution); Talbott, S. (2002) The Russia Hand (New York: Random House) 
17
 Clinton, W.J. (1992) ‘Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Democratic Convention in New 
York’, July 16, The Public Papers of the President, The American Presidency Project, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=25958, accessed 22/08/2013;  Clinton, W.J. (1995) ‘Address to the 
Nation on Implementation of the Peace Agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, The Public Papers of the President, 
The American Presidency Project, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=50808&st=&st1=, 
accessed 22/08/2013 
285 
 
 
 
during the same two year period and in relation to the same Nicaragua policy, the Iran-Contra 
scandal was set in motion by the same president. This decision ended up destroying Reagan’s 
Nicaragua policy in the last two years of his presidency. This is clearly a failure. Yet we have 
success and failure occurring at the same time on the same policy. Likewise there are 
examples of success and failure from Truman. Securing aid to Greece and Turkey from a 
Republican congress was a success. Intervening in Korea was a success until November 1950. 
The decision to cross the parallel could have been a success if Truman had limited his 
objective to defeating the North Korean army and not advancing too far north. However, 
Truman’s decision to approaching the Yalu River, which resulted in China’s intervention in 
the war, was clearly a failure.  
    The common thread running through the Truman and Reagan case studies is that both 
presidents had options. Truman did not have to send aid to Greece and Turkey, or frame his 
decision to do so in terms of a global struggle against totalitarianism. Nor did he have to 
frame Korea as a security threat and order US troops to cross the 38
th
 parallel. Reagan did not 
have to rank Nicaragua as a security threat, or arm the Contras. He did not have to empower 
the NSC in the face of Congressional opposition, or authorise the search for third country 
donors,  or cut Shultz out of the decision-making process. These were all choices made by the 
president.  
    The very fact that choice exists provides justification for adopting an approach which 
incorporates human agency.  To adopt a wholly structural approach runs the risk of arguing in 
favour of historical determinism, where choice does not exist and events are predetermined 
due to the overwhelming influence of social structures. Likewise, adopting a purely agency 
based approach may fail to take into account the fact that choice is not exercised within a 
vacuum. Therefore, this thesis has adopted a multi-level approach which argues agents and 
structures are mutually constitutive.  It contributes to the multi-level analysis literature by 
offering an agency based perspective of US foreign policy decision-making. The thesis is an 
attempt to bridge the gap between FPA and international relations.
18
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9.5 Limitations of Study and Future Research 
 
    The multi-level approach of FPA is data intensive. Therefore this thesis has only been able 
to compare a limited number of policies across two presidencies. Future research will be able 
to apply this framework across other policies during these administrations, as well as to the 
foreign policies of other presidents. In terms of methodology and the large amount of primary 
documents required to conduct this level of detailed analysis, this will probably be limited to 
presidencies from before Reagan as a result of the classification process placing  restrictions 
on the availability of high level US foreign policy documents. It may be possible to conduct a 
more basic analysis of the more recent presidents if the researcher has access to interview the 
highest ranking members of these administrations. However, It is unlikely that any researcher 
will have the level of access and security clearance required to conduct such a study of a 
contemporary president. 
    Conceptually, this thesis demonstrates that further research is needed into the relationship 
between presidential worldview and management style. It is possible to locate other aspects 
of US foreign policy that could provide empirical evidence for further analysis. Continuing 
with the Reagan administration, the Iran side of the Iran-Contra scandal would appear to 
provide ample opportunity to further analyse the extent to which Reagan was able to reshape 
his management structure in order try to secure the release of the Lebanon hostages, again 
cutting out senior members of his foreign policy team in order to pursue a goal he viewed as 
important.  Other examples could be the pursuit of SDI and Reagan’s attempts to shape 
foreign policy rhetoric, often conflicting with the senior members of his foreign policy and 
speechwriting teams.  Reagan’s foreign policy continues to be an important topic, with major 
works published recently by Lettow, Mann and Anderson and Anderson, but the focus 
remains heavily on Soviet policy.
19
 Little attention has been paid to Reagan’s Nicaragua 
policy over the past decade. This thesis has begun to fill this gap by laying the foundation for 
future research. As more documents are declassified over the coming years it is hoped that 
scholars will return to one of the most important and controversial foreign policies of the 
Reagan era. In doing so, the academic evaluation of Reagan will continue to progress. 
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    Finally, Foreign Policy Analysis continues to be dominated by US studies. The multi-level 
framework developed in this thesis could be applied to other states in order to analyse the role 
of individual chief executives, their worldview, their management style and how they operate 
within the multi-level framework of their specific domestic and international context. In the 
wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, demonstrated his belief in human agency and the potential for individual leaders to 
make a difference: “This is a moment to seize. The kaleidoscope has been shaken, the pieces 
are in flux, soon they will settle again. Before they do, let us reorder this world around us.”20 
One can hope the findings of this thesis will contribute to the conceptualisation of the role of 
agency in foreign policy and international relations, and that further studies will try to address 
the issues it has raised. 
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